

**Report of the Committee on
Premises Security**

Wayne D. Moore, *Chair*
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Raymond A. Grill, *Secretary*
The RJA Group, Inc., VA [SE]

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Chadwick Callaghan, Marriott International, DC [U]
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Louis Chavez, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., IL [RT]
Thomas L. Chronister, Oxnard Police Department, CA [E]
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 Rep. American Institute of Architects
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Michael D. DeVore, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., IL [U]
 Rep. NFPA Industrial Fire Protection Section
John C. Fannin, III, SafePlace Corporation, DE [SE]
 Rep. Delaware Security Alarm Task Force
Louis T. Fiore, L. T. Fiore, Inc., NJ [IM]
 Rep. Professional Alarm Services Organizations of North America
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Mark A. Visbal, Security Industry Association, VA [M]
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Alternates

Shane M. Clary, Bay Alarm Company, CA [IM]
 (Alt. to John M. Lombardi)
Kurt W. Collins, The RJA Group, Inc., IL [SE]
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Staff Liaison: **Richard P. Bielen**

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on the overall security program for the protection of premises, people, property, and information specific to a particular occupancy. The Committee shall have responsibility for the installation of premises security systems.

This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the front of this book.

The Committee on **Premises Security** is presenting two Reports for adoption, as follows:

Report I of this Report on Comments was prepared by the **Technical Committee on Premises Security**, and documents its action on the comments received on its Report on Proposals on NFPA 730, **Guide for Premises Security**, 2005 edition, as published in the Report on Proposals for the 2005 June Meeting.

NFPA 730 has been submitted to letter ballot of the **Technical Committee on Premises Security**, which consists of 26 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

Report II of this Report on Comments was prepared by the **Technical Committee on Premises Security**, and documents its action on the comments received on its Report on Proposals on NFPA 731, **Standard for the Installation of Electronic Premises Security Systems**, 2005 edition, as published in the Report on Proposals for the 2005 June Meeting.

NFPA 731 has been submitted to letter ballot of the **Technical Committee on Premises Security**, which consists of 26 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

730-1 Log #29 **Final Action: Reject**
(Entire Document)

SUBMITTER: Kathleen M. Woods, ASIS International
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-1

RECOMMENDATION: Delete Guide 730 in its entirety.

SUBSTANTIATION: ASIS International believes that the NFPA should abandon its project to create a Guide for Premises Security.

The NFPA has endeavored to create a guide that will address premises security for such entities as Educational Facilities, Healthcare Facilities, One and Two-Family Dwellings, Lodging Facilities, Apartment Buildings, Restaurants, Shopping Centers, Retail Establishments, Office Buildings, Industrial Facilities, Parking Facilities, and Special Events. The Guide as it presently exists in the 2005 June Association Technical Meeting Report on Proposals (pages 730-57 to 730-111) is a document that is too broad in its scope and purpose and treats the complex and multi-faceted topics associated with premises security in a one-dimensional, incomplete and unrefined fashion. As an example, it is a disservice to think that premises security in an institution as important as a Healthcare Facility can be adequately addressed in less than three full pages (Chapter 12, pp. 730-82 to 730-84).

Furthermore, the document does not even attempt to address items that it states should be addressed. As an example, one should look at Chapter 11, Educational Facilities. Section 11.4 states "A security program for a primary or secondary school should address the following security vulnerabilities; vandalism, theft and embezzlement, sexual predation, assault, weapons violations, and burglary." Section 11.4.1 seeks to fully address Vandalism, Section 11.4.2 seeks to fully address Theft and Embezzlement Prevention, and Section 11.4.3 seeks to fully address Burglary Prevention. There is no mention made of sexual predation, assault, or weapons violations, which NFPA states a security program for a primary or secondary school should address.

The document will reference something important and not even mention it in other areas. For example, in Chapter 9, Security Personnel, under Section 9.6, Security Personnel Selection, Guide 730 states that "...the person responsible for site security should give strong consideration to the following factors:

- (1) Federal, state, and local laws and regulations pertaining thereto
- (2) Knowledge of criminal activities and proper law enforcement response procedures
- (3) Judgment and emotional stability
- (4) Experience and demonstrated ability to retain composure under pressure
- (5) A personal history free of convictions for felonies or crimes involving dishonesty or moral turpitude."

There is no mention made of drug testing or screening. Yet, for Employment Practices under Educational Facilities, Healthcare Facilities, Lodging Facilities, etc., Guide 730 states "The following should be considered:

- (1) Background checks, including criminal records checks, employment history and references should be done on all individuals with access to critical assets.
- (2) When outside services, (contractors, vendors, or other personnel) are used, management should ask the vendors/contractors' management about their pre-employment screening and drug testing practices.
- (3) A drug testing program should be established."

One would be on solid ground to argue that the inclusion of drug screening and testing for the various facilities listed above without the inclusion of drug screening and testing under Security Personnel is an egregious oversight.

Furthermore, the NFPA process of acting on proposals is problematic and should be revisited. Under Restaurants, Section 16.4.1.1.5.1 states "Studies have shown that resistance to a robber's demands accounted for 82 percent of commercial robbery killings. Management should establish a policy of nonresistance and give it top priority in training program. Employees should be trained on what to do before, during, and after a robbery."

Under Retail Establishments, Section 18.4.2.5 states "Management should establish a policy of nonresistance and give it top priority in training program. Employees should be trained on what to do before, during, and after a robbery. Additional training should be provided on how to be an effective witness by observing details, events and descriptions.

ASIS commented that these two sections showed an inconsistency within the guide. If additional training on how to be an effective witness is important in retail establishments, is it not just as important in restaurants? Yet, because ASIS did not state that the two sections should be identical, NFPA rejected ASIS' comment with the Committee Statement "The submitter did not provide specific language to change the section. The submitter should provide specific wording and cite specific sections where this material should be changed and placed." While ASIS was not specific as to whether the additional training should be deleted from the Retail Establishment section or added to the Restaurant section, the Committee should have readily deduced that the sections were inconsistent. Guide 730 is not the work product of the people who submit the comments; it's the work product of NFPA. Therefore, NFPA should strive to understand all comments submitted and work toward quality and consistency within the document without having to be told by submitters how to do so.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: NFPA 730 was developed by the committee with input from the public in the form of proposals and now public comments.

Previous input from ASIS was that the document was too specific, now the comment is the document is too broad. The document is developed by a committee of people who are in the security and safety fields and is a product of the ANSI approved consensus process. The work product has been developed over the last four years with considerable input from the security and safety industry. The document is also a "living" document that can be changed as future proposals dictate.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Negative: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE:

CALLAGHAN: I agree with ASIS' comments that NFPA should not continue with the Premises Security Guide. ASIS is the appropriate organization to promulgate guidelines for the security profession.

730-2 Log #CC9 **Final Action: Accept**
(Chapter 2)

SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Premises Security

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Add all references from the body of the Guide to Chapter 2.

SUBSTANTIATION: This will conform to the Manual of Style.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: Since I do not agree with the overall concept of NFPA promulgating security guidelines, I abstain from voting on all comments except 730-1.

730-3 Log #39 **Final Action: Reject**
(2.3)

SUBMITTER: John C. Fannin, III, SafePlace Corporation

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: 2.3 Other Publications.

Illuminating Engineering Society of North America. Lighting Handbook - 8th Edition. New York, NY: IESNA, 1993 2000.

SUBSTANTIATION: Reference is not the same version as in the text of the Guide. See 6.4.1.5.2.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee used the 8th edition in the development of the Guide. The committee did not review the 9th edition for this edition. The committee will review the 9th edition for the next cycle. In addition, the Manual of Style does not allow the edition to be specified in the body of the document, only the reference section.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE:

GIGANDET: In developing codes, standards and guidelines, it is common practice to reference the latest publications, as such publications, by virtue of their authorship and the organizations that published them, suggest they represent the latest in good engineering practices.

To reference an older edition when a newer one exists is not considered good engineering practice, especially when you consider:

1. There are few NFPA 730 committee members in a position to dispute the technical and/or safety merits between the new and the older publication being referenced.

2. Most users of the referenced publication will utilize the latest publication because it represents good engineering practice to do so. Using an older publication without substantial reasoning is neither sound nor has merit.

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-4 Log #17 **Final Action: Accept**
(3.3.xx)

SUBMITTER: Michael D. DeVore, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company / Rep. Premises Security Technical committee and IFPS Sectio of NFPA

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-36

RECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows:

3.3.XX Unauthorized Person. A person who does not have permission to enter a protected premises or is not authorized to have access to specific confidential information.

SUBSTANTIATION: This is the language from proposal 730-36 where the committee accepted the revised definition of unauthorized person.

Subsequently the definition was deleted in the action on Proposal 730-105.

Unauthorized person is used in the document. The revision to the definition in Proposal 730-36 (Log #25) appears to meet the substantiation of the submitter in Proposal 730-105 (Log #204).

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: This is not new material as it was accepted but deleted in error by another proposal 730-105 (Log #204) during the ROP stage.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-5 Log #26 **Final Action: Accept in Principle**
(3.3.2)

SUBMITTER: Joseph Hetzel, Door & Access Systems Manufacturers Association

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-11

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

Controls may be electronic or physical and may vary depending on type of credential, authorization level, or time of day. Electronic controls ~~with~~ may use a reader to identify the credential. Physical control ~~can~~ may be a guard or a camera monitored by a guard.

SUBSTANTIATION: 1. Electronic controls should not be limited to using a “reader”.

2. Replacing “can” with “may” is editorial, to bring more clarity to the fact that physical control should not be limited to a guard or a camera monitored by a guard. Human physical control may not be a guard; it could be any human so designated either inside or outside of the protected area.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

See Committee Action on 730-53 (Log #10).

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on 730-53 (Log #10).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-6 Log #11 **Final Action: Accept**
(3.3.7)

SUBMITTER: Michael D. DeVore, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company / Rep. Premises Security Technical committee and IFPS Sectio of NFPA

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-36

RECOMMENDATION: Delete 3.3.7 and its subsections 3.3.7.1, 3.3.7.2, and 3.3.7.3

SUBSTANTIATION: The definitions for initial briefing, refresher briefing, and termination briefing were deleted by committee action in proposal 730-36 but left in the draft text. The three terms are not used in the document.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: This should be deleted in the draft of NFPA 730.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-7 Log #CC1 **Final Action: Accept**
(3.3.9, 3.3.53.1)

SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Premises Security

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Delete 3.3.9, 3.3.53.1 and 3.3.53.5 and renumber 3.3.53 accordingly.

SUBSTANTIATION: These terms are not used in the document.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-8 Log #12 **Final Action: Accept**
(3.3.14)

SUBMITTER: Michael D. DeVore, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company / Rep. Premises Security Technical committee and IFPS Section of NFPA

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-36

RECOMMENDATION: Delete 3.3.14.

SUBSTANTIATION: The definition for custodian was deleted by committee action in Proposal 730-36 but left in the draft text. The term “custodian” is not used in the document.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Delete in the draft.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-9 Log #13 **Final Action: Accept**
(3.3.29)

SUBMITTER: Michael D. DeVore, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company / Rep. Premises Security Technical committee and IFPS Sectio of NFPA

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-36

RECOMMENDATION: Delete 3.3.29

SUBSTANTIATION: The definition for industrial security was deleted by committee action in Proposal 730-36 but left in the draft text. The term “industrial security” is not used in the document in this context.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Delete in the draft.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-10 Log #14 **Final Action: Accept**
(3.3.30.2)

SUBMITTER: Michael D. DeVore, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company / Rep. Premises Security Technical committee and IFPS Sectio of NFPA

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-36

RECOMMENDATION: Delete 3.3.30.2.

SUBSTANTIATION: The definition for sensitive compartmented information was deleted by committee action in Proposal 730-36 but left in the draft text. The term “sensitive compartmented information” is not used in the document.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Delete in draft.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-11 Log #15 **Final Action: Accept**
(3.3.43)

SUBMITTER: Michael D. DeVore, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company / Rep. Premises Security Technical committee and IFPS Sectio of NFPA

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-28

RECOMMENDATION: Delete 3.3.43.

SUBSTANTIATION: The term proximity alarm system was deleted in proposal 730-28, but still appears in the draft. “Proximity alarm system” is not used in the document and should not appear in the definitions.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Delete in draft.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-12 Log #16 **Final Action: Accept**
(3.3.49)

SUBMITTER: Michael D. DeVore, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company / Rep. Premises Security Technical committee and IFPS Sectio of NFPA

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-36

RECOMMENDATION: Delete 3.3.49.

SUBSTANTIATION: The term sensitive compartmented information facility was deleted in proposal 730-28, but still appears in the draft. “Sensitive

compartmented information facility” is not used in the document and should not appear in the definitions.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Delete in draft.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-13 Log #19 **Final Action: Reject**
(3.3.53.6 Proprietary Alarm System)

SUBMITTER: Mary Read, Johnson Controls, Inc.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows:

3.3.53.6 Proprietary Alarm System. An alarm system in which alarm signals are monitored by receiving equipment located at the protected property by personnel responsible to the owner of the protected property.

SUBSTANTIATION: Section 3.3.53.1 mentions a proprietary alarm system but does not define what it is. The new text is meant to provide a meaning to the term. This newly defined term will also be added to subsequent sections.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on 730-7 (Log #CC1).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-14 Log #30 **Final Action: Accept in Principle**
(5.1.1)

SUBMITTER: Bill H. Strother, Weingarten Realty Management Co. / Rep. Intl. Council of Shopping Centers

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 721-15

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

Security planning usually begins with a Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA), which is a systematic and methodical process for the following: (1) Examining ways an adversary might exploit an organization’s security vulnerabilities that can result in an undesired outcome. (2) Developing countermeasures to address adversarial events.

SUBSTANTIATION: While a formalized security vulnerability assessment may be appropriate for certain properties, it may not be necessary for others. Every mall, shopping center, neighborhood center and open-air center is unique, and the amount of security planning needed for a particular property varies depending on several factors, including, but not limited to, its location (e.g., rural, suburban, urban), use, status (e.g., high-profile, low-profile), physical characteristics, level of crime on the property and in the surrounding community, and the level of local law enforcement.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

Revise text to read:

Security planning should begin with a Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA), which is a systematic and methodical process for the following: (1) Examining ways an adversary might exploit an organization’s security vulnerabilities that can result in an undesired outcome. (2) Developing countermeasures to address adversarial events.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on 730-21 (Log #32).

The term “Usually” as defined by the American Heritage Dictionary means 1. Commonly encountered, experienced, or observed, 2. Regularly or customarily used, 3. In conformity with regular practice or procedure.

“Should” is defined by Chapter 3 of NFPA 730 and the Regulations Governing Committee Projects found in the NFPA Directory as: Indicates a recommendation or that which is advised but not required.

The committee believes the use of the word “Should” provides the user with more options.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-15 Log #CC2 **Final Action: Accept**
(6.4.6.2)

SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Premises Security

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: In 6.4.6.2, delete “9th Ed.” from the section.

SUBSTANTIATION: The MOS does not allow the edition to be published in the body of the guide.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-16 Log #40 **Final Action: Accept in Principle**
(6.5.2.1.1)

SUBMITTER: John C. Fannin, III, SafePlace Corporation

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: 6.5.2.1.1 Information on recommended lighting levels for outdoor protective lighting is also provided in the IESNA Lighting Handbook, 9th Ed., published by the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA).

Renumber balance of section.

SUBSTANTIATION: Addition of this text correlates with 6.4.1.5.2.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

Delete the words “9th Edition”.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The MOS does not allow the edition to be published in the body.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-17 Log #27 **Final Action: Accept**
(6.8.2)

SUBMITTER: Bob Eugene, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

6.8.2 Bullet-Resisting Glazing Materials. The Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (UL) Standard ANSI /UL 752 +1995, *Standard for Bullet-Resisting Equipment*, provides testing criteria for glazing materials used to form bullet-resisting barriers designed to protect against robbery or holdup. The Standard also includes testing criteria for the devices and fixtures used in bullet-resisting enclosures. The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard ASTM F 1233-95, *Standard Test Method for Security Glazing Materials and Systems*, provides test criteria to evaluate the level of resistance of security glazing materials and systems to forced entry due to ballistic impact.

Add to 2.3.x

UL Publications. Underwriters Laboratories Inc., 333 Pfingsten Road, Northbrook, IL 60062-2096.

UL 752 Standard for Bullet-Resisting Equipment, 2000

SUBSTANTIATION: “ANSI” is deleted. Although currently under review through the ANSI process, the referenced standard is not yet ANSI approved. The current edition being reviewed for ANSI approval is dated “2000” with some revisions to the document also being reviewed.

NFPA Manual of Style Section 2.3 requires that referenced standards include their date of publication in Chapter 2, and that all other references shall be permitted to only reference the title or document number, not the year of publication.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-18 Log #28 **Final Action: Accept in Principle**
(7.2)

SUBMITTER: Bob Eugene, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-139

RECOMMENDATION: Revise Committee Action as follows:

7.2 Locking Hardware *.

Locks are the most widely employed security devices. They are found on anything to which access must be controlled, such as vehicles, storage containers, doors, gates, and windows. The security of any property or facility relies heavily upon locking devices. Locks are designed to provide various levels of deterrence or delay entry, and are an integral part of an overall security system. An assessment of all hardware, including door frames and jamba, should be included in any physical security survey. Locking devices vary greatly in appearance as well as function and application. Egress and Fire Resistance provisions relating to Doors and Hardware in NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm Code, and NFPA 80, Fire Doors and Windows, should be maintained. Individual products should be certified listed to the standards in 7.2.1 through 7.2.7 as applicable.

7.2.1 * ANSI/BHMA A 156 Series performance standards which include

security tests and are shown in the applicable sections. ~~Individual products should be listed to Underwriters Laboratories also provides listings-~~

~~7.2.2 UL 1034 for Burglary Resistant Electronic Locking Mechanisms to UL1034,~~

~~7.2.3 UL 437 for Key Locks to UL 437 ,~~

~~7.2.4 UL 768 for Combination Locks to UL 768 ,~~

~~7.2.5 UL 294 for Access Control System Units to UL 294, and~~

~~7.2.6 UL 2058 for High Security Electronics Locks to UL 2058 , and~~

~~7.2.7 UL 305 for Controlled Exit Panic Devices, as applicable.~~

A.7.2 Locks are the most widely employed security devices. They are found on anything to which access must be controlled, such as vehicles, storage containers, doors, gates, and windows. The security of any property or facility relies heavily upon locking devices.

An assessment of all hardware, including door frames and jambs, should be included in any physical security survey. Locking devices vary greatly in appearance as well as function and application.

A.7.2.1 ANSI/BHMA A156 performance standards include security tests and are shown in the applicable sections.

Also add UL Standards to 2.3.x as follows:

UL Publications. Underwriters Laboratories Inc., 333 Pfingsten Road, Northbrook, IL 60062-2096.

UL 294 Standard for Access Control System Units, 1999, Revised 2004

UL 305 Standard for Panic Hardware, 1997, Revised 2004

UL 437 Standard for Key Locks, 2000, Revised 2004

UL 768 Standard for Combination Locks, 1999

UL 1034 Standard for Burglary-Resistant Electric Locking Mechanisms, 2000 Revised 2004

UL Subject 2058, High Security Electronic Locks

SUBSTANTIATION: This section was re-formatted. Explanatory material was moved to the Annex A. The ANSI/BHMA performance standards were editorially revised to include the "A" in the A156 series. Additionally, the referenced standards were revised to be enumerated in a column for easier reading.

The draft publication failed to include the UL standards that were enumerated in the body of the proposed guideline. The specific UL publications referenced in 7.2 have been identified for inclusion in Section 2.3.x. Any other UL standards referenced in the provisions of this guideline should also be included editorially. These would include:

UL 608 Standard for Burglary Resistant Vault doors and Modular Panels, 1999, Revised 2001

UL 681 Standard for Installation and Classification of Burglar and Holdup Alarm Systems, 1999, Revised 2001

UL 687 Standard for Burglary-Resistant Safes, 2000

UL 752 Standard for Bullet-Resisting Equipment, 2000

ANSI/UL 972 Standard for Burglary Resisting Glazing Material, 2002

ANSI/UL 3044 Standard for Surveillance Closed Circuit Television Equipment, 1994, Revised 1998

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

In the proposed 7.2.1 delete the word "which" and in proposed 7.2.2 delete the words "to UL 1034". The remainder of the comment stands.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The changes were editorial in nature and the committee agrees with the substantiation.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-19 Log #20 **Final Action: Accept**
(7.2.16, 18.4.6.3.2.2, 20.4.2.1)

SUBMITTER: Mary Read, Johnson Controls, Inc.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: In each section/paragraph mentioned above, the word "can not" is used and it should be "cannot".

SUBSTANTIATION: Grammar.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-20 Log #31 **Final Action: Accept in Principle**
(10.1)

SUBMITTER: Bill H. Strother, Weingarten Realty Management Co. / Rep. Intl. Council of Shopping Centers

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-174

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

An effective asset protection program usually includes the development and implementation of a security plan ~~which should be documented~~ and the

cooperation and support of top management. This facility security plan should address the protection of all of an organization's defined critical assets which can include people, property, information and products.

SUBSTANTIATION: While a formalized security plan may be appropriate for certain properties, it may not be necessary for others. Every mall, shopping center, neighborhood center and open-air center is unique, and the amount of security planning needed for a particular property varies depending on several factors, including, but not limited to, its location (e.g., rural, suburban, urban), use, status (e.g., high-profile, low-profile), physical characteristics, level of crime on the property and in the surrounding community, and the level of local law enforcement.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

Revise text to read:

An effective asset protection program should include the development and implementation of a security plan which should be documented and the cooperation and support of top management. This facility security plan should address the protection of all of an organization's defined critical assets which can include people, property, information and products.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Although we agree with the submitters request a security plan may not always be developed but if one is, it should be in a written form.

See Committee Action on 730-21 (Log #32).

The term "Usually" as defined by the American Heritage Dictionary means 1. Commonly encountered, experienced, or observed, 2. Regularly or customarily used, 3. In conformity with regular practice or procedure.

"Should" is defined by Chapter 3 of NFPA 730 and the Regulations

Governing Committee Projects found in the NFPA Directory as: Indicates a recommendation or that which is advised but not required.

The committee believes the use of the word "Should" provides the user with more options.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-21 Log #32 **Final Action: Accept in Principle**
(10.2.1)

SUBMITTER: Bill H. Strother, Weingarten Realty Management Co. / Rep. Intl. Council of Shopping Centers

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-175

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

Security planning usually begins with a Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA). See Chapter 5 for detailed information regarding the development and implementation of a facility specific Security Vulnerability Assessment.

SUBSTANTIATION: While a formalized security vulnerability assessment may be appropriate for certain properties, it may not be necessary for others. Every mall, shopping center, neighborhood center and open-air center is unique, and the amount of security planning needed for a particular property varies depending on several factors, including, but not limited to, its location (e.g., rural, suburban, urban), use, status (e.g., high-profile, low-profile), physical characteristics, level of crime on the property and in the surrounding community, and the level of local law enforcement.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

Revise text to read:

Security planning should begin s with a Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA). See Chapter 5 for detailed information regarding the development and implementation of a facility specific Security Vulnerability Assessment.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The use of the word "should" endorses the process and recommends its use.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-22 Log #21 **Final Action: Reject**
(11.4.3.3)

SUBMITTER: Mary Read, Johnson Controls, Inc.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

An intrusion detection system also can deter a burglar. A certificated central station alarm system that sends a silent signal to a monitoring station, which dispatches guards on receipt of the signal or a proprietary alarm system that receives an alarm signal and dispatches a guard, is are preferred. (The remaining text is unchanged)

SUBSTANTIATION: Section 11.4.3.3 does not account for the situation where a education facility has their own proprietary alarm system and guards on the premises. Also, the word "certificated" was added to be consistent with the other similar sections 16.4.2.3.3.2 and 18.4.3.3.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on 730-23 (Log #CC3) and 730-30 (Log #4).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-23 Log #CC3 **Final Action: Accept**
(11.4.3.3)

SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Premises Security
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

An intrusion detection system also can deter a burglar. An ~~central station~~ alarm system that sends a ~~silent~~ signal to a monitoring station, which dispatches guards on receipt of the signal, is preferred. (The remaining text is unchanged)

SUBSTANTIATION: The paragraph was reworded to be more general.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-24 Log #CC7 **Final Action: Accept**
(11.17, 14.4.9, 15.4, 16.5, 17.3, 18.4.1.1, 19.4.9, 21.5, 22.5)

SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Premises Security
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-183A

RECOMMENDATION: Move the first three sentences of each section to the appropriate annex and modify the fourth sentence to read as follows:

“Employers can ensure a high level of integrity in the workforce by considering the following practices.” The balance of each section remains unchanged.

11.17* Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized. Employers can reduce their threat exposure while creating an environment of honesty, ensuring ensure a high level of integrity in the workforce. The following should be considered: by considering the following practices:”

(1) Background checks, including criminal records checks, employment history and references should be done on all individuals with access to critical assets, (see Chapter 10 - Security Planning).

(2) When outside services, (contractors, vendors or other personnel) are used, management should ask the vendors / contractors’ management about their preemployment screening and drug testing practices.

(3) A drug testing program should be established.

A11.7 Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized.

14.4.9* Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many hotel employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), including guests and guest rooms, the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized. Employers can reduce their threat exposure while creating an environment of honesty, ensuring ensure a high level of integrity in the workforce. The following should be considered: by considering the following practices:”

(1) Background checks, including criminal records checks, employment history and references should be done on all individuals with access to critical assets, guests or guest rooms. (See Chapter 10 - Security Planning).

(2) When outside services, (contractors, vendors or other personnel) are used, management should ask the vendors / contractors’ management about their preemployment screening and drug testing practices.

(3) A drug testing program should be established.

A14.4.9 Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many hotel employees have access to critical assets

(people, property and information), including guests and guest rooms, the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized.

15.4* Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized. Employers can reduce their threat exposure while creating an environment of honesty, ensuring ensure a high level of integrity in the workforce. The following should be considered: by considering the following practices:”

(1) Background checks, including criminal records checks, employment history and references should be done on all individuals with access to critical assets, (see Chapter 10 - Security Planning).

(2) When outside services, (contractors, vendors or other personnel) are used, management should ask the vendors/ contractors’ management about their preemployment screening and drug testing practices.

(3) A drug testing program should be established.

A.15.4 Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized.

16.5* Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized. Employers can reduce their threat exposure while creating an environment of honesty, ensuring ensure a high level of integrity in the workforce. The following should be considered: by considering the following practices:”

(1) Background checks, including criminal records checks, employment history and references should be done on all individuals with access to critical assets, (see Chapter 10 - Security Planning).

(2) When outside services, (contractors, vendors or other personnel) are used, management should ask the vendors / contractors’ management about their preemployment screening and drug testing practices.

(3) A drug testing program should be established.

A.16.5 Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized.

17.13* Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized. Employers can reduce their threat exposure while creating an environment of honesty, ensuring ensure a high level of integrity in the workforce. The following should be considered: by considering the following practices:”

(1) Background checks, including criminal records checks, employment history and references should be done on all individuals with access to critical assets, (see Chapter 10 - Security Planning).

(2) When outside services, (contractors, vendors or other personnel) are used, management should ask the vendors / contractors’ management about their preemployment screening and drug testing practices.

(3) A drug testing program should be established.

A.17.13 Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized.

18.4.1.1* Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized. Employers can reduce their threat exposure while creating an environment of honesty, ensuring ensure a high level of integrity in the workforce. The following should be considered: by considering the following practices:”

(1) Background checks, including criminal records checks, employment history and references should be done on all individuals with access to critical assets, (see Chapter 10 - Security Planning).

(2) When outside services, (contractors, vendors or other personnel) are used, management should ask the vendors / contractors' management about their preemployment screening and drug testing practices.

(3) A drug testing program should be established.

A.18.4.1.1 Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized.

19.4.9* Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized. Employers can reduce their threat exposure while creating an environment of honesty, ensuring ensure a high level of integrity in the workforce. The following should be considered: by considering the following practices:"

(1) Background checks, including criminal records checks, employment history and references should be done on all individuals with access to critical assets, (see Chapter 10 - Security Planning).

(2) When outside services, (contractors, vendors or other personnel) are used, management should ask the vendors / contractors' management about their preemployment screening and drug testing practices.

(3) A drug testing program should be established.

A.19.4.9 Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized.

20.5* Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized. Employers can reduce their threat exposure while creating an environment of honesty, ensuring ensure a high level of integrity in the workforce. The following should be considered: by considering the following practices:"

(1) Background checks, including criminal records checks, employment history and references should be done on all individuals with access to critical assets, (see Chapter 10 - Security Planning).

(2) When outside services, (contractors, vendors or other personnel) are used, management should ask the vendors / contractors' management about their preemployment screening and drug testing practices.

(3) A drug testing program should be established.

A.20.5 Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized.

21.5* Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized. Employers can reduce their threat exposure while creating an environment of honesty, ensuring ensure a high level of integrity in the workforce. The following should be considered: by considering the following practices:"

(1) Background checks, including criminal records checks, employment history and references should be done on all individuals with access to critical assets, (see Chapter 10 - Security Planning).

(2) When outside services, (contractors, vendors or other personnel) are used, management should ask the vendors / contractors' management about their preemployment screening and drug testing practices.

(3) A drug testing program should be established.

A.21.5 Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets

(people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized.

22.5* Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized. Employers can reduce their threat exposure while creating an environment of honesty, ensuring ensure a high level of integrity in the workforce. The following should be considered: by considering the following practices:"

(1) Background checks, including criminal records checks, employment history and references should be done on all individuals with access to critical assets, (see Chapter 10 - Security Planning).

(2) When outside services, (contractors, vendors or other personnel) are used, management should ask the vendors / contractors' management about their preemployment screening and drug testing practices.

(3) A drug testing program should be established.

A.22.5 Employment Practices. The increase in the number of lawsuits based on the tort of negligent hiring has resulted in employers being under a greater responsibility to use due care in selecting employees. At the same time, federal and state laws impose restrictions on employers that are intended to protect the privacy of applicants. Since many employees have access to critical assets (people, property and information), the need for preemployment screening cannot be overemphasized.

SUBSTANTIATION: This change was made to correlate with the change in 730-25 (Log #25).

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on 730-25 (Log #25) regarding 12.4.3.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE

DEVORE: Editorial. Content was shown moved to Annex A, but not shown deleted from the body. The remaining body text was not shown changed as outlined in the comment.

730-25 Log #25

Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part

(Chapter 12)

SUBMITTER: Joshua Elvove, VA Rocky Mt. Network

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: 1. Revised chapter title to: "Health Care Facilities and Ambulatory Health Care Occupancies".

2. Revise 12.1 so it copies the official NFPA 101 definitions for "Health Care Occupancies" and "Ambulatory Health Care Occupancies" respectively.

Note: as an alternative to 1 and 2 above, leave the Chapter name as is, but revise 12.1 to reflect the official NFPA 99 definition (3.3.69) definition for "Health Care Facilities."

3. Relocate all anecdotal language from the guide into the appendix as follows:

- a. all of 12.3.1 through 12.3.3
- b. the second sentence in 12.4.2
- c. the first four sentences of 12.4.3
- d. all of 12.4.4.1
- e. the third sentence of 12.4.4.2
- f. the first sentence of 12.4.4.2.1(A)
- g. all of 12.4.4.2.1(B)
- h. the first two sentences of 12.4.4.2.1(C)
- i. the first sentence of 12.4.4.2.2(C)
- j. the last sentence of 12.4.4.2.3(C)
- k. the second sentence of 12.4.4.2.4(A)
- l. the first sentence of 12.4.4.2.4(B)
- m. all of 12.4.4.2.4(C)
- n. the second sentence of 12.4.4.2.5(A)
- o. the first sentence of 12.4.4.2.6(C)

4. Revise 12.4 as follows: "The elements...for a health care institution facility should include ..."

5. Revise 12.4(3) as follows: Pre-Employment Screening Employee Practices

6. Revise 12.4.1 as follows: " Some Methods of obtaining this involvement should include..."

7. Revise 12.4.2 as follows: Employee training is should be a critical..."

8. Revise the first two sentences of 12.4.2(B) as follows: "Supervisors and managers are should be responsible..."

9. Revise the last sentence of 12.4.3 as follows: "The following employment practices should be considered."

10. Revise the second sentence of 12.4.4.1 as follows: "Other hospitals have resorted to arming security guards, hiring police officers, or..."

11. Revise the second sentence of 12.4.4.2 as follows: "The recommendations given below are should be considered general guidelines..."

12. Revise the second sentence of 12.4.4.2(A) as follows: "Adequate fencing...including parking lots with should discourage... and will likely should deter..."

13. Revise 12.4.4.2.2 as follows: "Protection for parking facilities should include s measures..."

14. Revise the second sentence of 12.4.4.2.2(A) as follows: "the preferred... access to the facility is should be to have one..."

15. Revise the second sentence of 12.4.4.2.2(B) as follows: "Sturdy screening...from floor to ceiling is preferred to should be installed in lieu of solid walls..."

16. Revise 12.4.4.2.3 as follows: "Building access control measures should include those..."

17. Revise the last sentence of 12.4.4.2.4(E) as follows: "Parents ~~also need to~~ should be..."

18. Revise 12.4.4.2.5(B) as follows: "Signs stating...video surveillance should be installed to serve as..."

19. Revise 12.4.4.2.5(F) as follows: "Duress alarms should be installed... triage stations, ~~and~~ reception and reception areas and any other location where a risk assessment determines this need."

20. Revise the second sentence of 12.4.4.2.8(C) as follows: "Patrols of the perimeter and interior areas of the facility should..."

21. Revise 12.4.4.2.6(D) as follows: "If weapons...special training is should be required..."

SUBSTANTIATION: 1 & 2: To ensure the consistent use of NFPA definitions and terminology.

3: There is a lot of anecdotal information that serves no purpose but to inform the reader on a variety of subject matter. This information should be included in the Annex.

4: Use consistent defined terminology (i.e., health care facility) in lieu of introducing a new term that is not defined (e.g., "health care institution").

4, 6-8, 11-18, 21: Specific guidelines should be written using "should" or "should be" instead of using "is," "are," "will likely" or "need to".

5 & 9: The title listed in 12.4(3) ("Pre-employment screening") doesn't match with the title of 12.4.3 ("Employment Practices"); the latter title appears to be more appropriate. (Also see 730-183b (Log #CP22)).

9 & 20: If part of the existing text is to be moved into the Annex per #3 above, then part of that text needs to be restated in order to make the subject matter clearer to the reader.

10: Some health care facilities, such as the VA, have hired their own police officers; therefore, this should be included.

19: JCAHO requires facilities to conduct risk assessments to determine their risks and associated actions. The additional text allows facilities to add (or subtract) areas where duress alarms are installed based upon such an assessment (e.g., outpatient mental health clinic, social worker's office, etc.)

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part

1 & 2. Reject part 1 and 2 and revise the definition of Health Care Facilities by using the definition from NFPA 99 to read as follows: Buildings or portions of buildings in which medical, dental, psychiatric, nursing, obstetrical, or surgical care are provided [NFPA 99, 3.3.69]

3. Add to the end of 12.3 "In performing a SVA the factors listed in the appendix should be considered."

Add an asterisk to 12.3 and accept the recommendation part 3. a, b.

c. In 12.4.3 move the first three sentences to the annex, add an asterisk to 12.4.3, and modify the fourth sentence to read as follows: "Employers can ensure a high level of integrity in the workforce by considering the following practices:"

d. Add an asterisk at 12.4.4 and move 12.4.4.1 to A.12.4.4 using the text of 12.4.4.1.

e. Globally change "health care institution" and "hospitals" to "health care facility" in the entire guide. Delete the second and third sentence of 12.4.4.2.

f. Delete the first sentence of 12.4.4.2.1(A). Add an asterisk to 12.4.4.2.1 and change the first sentence to read as follows: "Protection for exterior areas includes measures described below and in the annex."

g. The first, second and fourth sentence should be moved to the annex.

h. Accept the recommendations in this part, h.

i. Delete the first sentence of 12.4.4.2.2(c) and delete "8th Ed." Change "in compliance with requirements" to "as recommended".

j. Delete "be funneled to the reception area and" from 12.4.4.2.3(C) and delete the last sentence completely. Add a new sentence as follows: "Facilities should consider the use of visitor logs or badges."

k. Add an asterisk to 12.4.4.2.4 and change the sentence to read "Interior areas should be protected by measures described below and in the annex." Move the second and third sentence in 12.4.4.2.4(A) to the annex .

l. Delete the first sentence in 12.4.4.2.4(B) and start the second sentence with "In emergency rooms,..."

m. Delete the first sentence of 12.4.4.2.4(C). Second sentence to remain in body.

n. Delete the second sentence in 12.4.4.2.5(A). Correct sentence to read "...of the premises..."

o. Change the first sentence of 12.4.4.2.6(C) to read as follows: "If provided,

patrols of the ...".

4. Accept this change.

5. Revise 12.4(3) to read "Employment practices?"

6. Accept this change.

7. Accept this change.

8. Accept this change.

9. Reject this change. See change above in part 3.c above.

10. Add to A.12.4.4 Other health care facilities have resorted to arming security guards, hiring police officers. or..."

11. Reject this change. See action on part 3.e above.

12. Accept this change.

13. Accept this change.

14. Accept the change but add the following to the end of 12.4.4.2.2(A) "... entry and exit for vehicle parking."

15. Reject this change.

16. Accept this change.

17. Accept this change but it was move to the annex A.12.4.4.2.4.

18. Accept this change. Change the introductory sentence to 12.4.4.2.5 to read "Security equipment include those described below."

19. Revise 12.4.4.2.5(F) as follows: "Duress alarm devices should be installed at strategic locations as needed. Such locations may include emergency rooms, triage stations, reception, registration and other areas."

20. Reject this action. See action on part 3.o.

21. Accept this change. Add an asterisk to 12.4.4.2.6(D) and annex material to read as follows: "At the time this guide was drafted, the majority of the states require training for all security personnel who carry weapons."

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee has attempted to incorporate the submitters comments and have made additional changes for clarification.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-26 Log #1

Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part

(12.4.4.2.1(A))

SUBMITTER: Susan B. McLaughlin, SBM Consulting, Ltd.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

12.4.4.2.1 Exterior Areas.

(A) Fencing is one of the most effective means of establishing security. Adequate fencing around the entire perimeter of the facility, where practical, including parking lots, with may discourage some unauthorized access to the facility and will likely may deter the opportunistic criminal.

SUBSTANTIATION: While a fence will establish a security perimeter, and may be effective for small and urban facilities, it would be very impractical to entirely fence those hospitals with multiple buildings and large campuses. To maintain access for the communities served, these organizations typically have many entrances to the campus which would remain open, allowing in anyone who was determined to enter the campus. The concept of risk assessment on the part of the hospital is the critical factor in determining the need for fencing. It is overly optimistic to suggest that a fence will discourage unauthorized access and will likely deter opportunistic criminals. (Consider the legal ramifications of this statement to hospitals.) At best, this may be the outcome.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part

Revise 12.4.4.2.1 to read as follows:

"When used, fencing the entire perimeter, including parking lots may discourage unauthorized access to the facility and may deter the opportunistic criminal."

Also see Committee Action on 730-25 (Log #25) part 3.f, which deleted the first sentence.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Committee changed the wording to clarify the intent of the submitters comment. The first sentence was deleted in a previous comment 730-25 (Log#25).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-27 Log #2

Final Action: Accept

(12.4.4.2.2(A))

SUBMITTER: Susan B. McLaughlin, SBM Consulting, Ltd.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

12.4.4.2.2 Parking Facilities.

(A) Entrances and exits to the parking facility should be as few in number as practicable ~~and attended at all times~~ . The preferred method of controlling access to the facility is to have one means of entry and exit for vehicles; the volume of traffic at the facility, however, can require more than one entry and exit.

SUBSTANTIATION: The suggestion that a hospital should post staff members at all entrances to parking facilities does not take into consideration the current financial status of the health care industry. In an era when hospital staffing is declining to reduce costs, this is highly impractical and a poor use of hospital funding.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Also see change on 730-25 (Log #25).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-28 Log #41
(12.4.4.2.2(C))

Final Action: Reject

SUBMITTER: John C. Fannin, III, SafePlace Corporation

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: 12.4.4.2.2 Parking Facilities.

(C) In many electronic premises security lawsuits against healthcare facilities, inadequate lighting in parking facilities has been one of the factors in the finding of negligence. Illumination levels for parking facilities should be in compliance with requirements in the IES Lighting Handbook, 8th ed. **SUBSTANTIATION:** Correlates with other sections of the Guide. See 6.4.1.5.2.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: MOS does not allow the reference to an edition in the body of the standard. Also see 730-25 (Log #25).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-29 Log #3
(12.4.4.2.3(A))

Final Action: Accept in Principle

SUBMITTER: Susan B. McLaughlin, SBM Consulting, Ltd.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

12.4.4.2.3 Building Access Control.

(A) Accessible points of entry into buildings should be limited at all times after normal visiting hours, and at that time, all accessible entry points should be attended by a receptionist or security guard at a reception area.

SUBSTANTIATION: It is appropriate to limit hospital access after normal visiting hours, but very inappropriate and impractical for many hospitals to do so at all times. Many hospitals have a policy of being open to the community they serve, and therefore want to provide many entrances convenient to parking facilities and outpatient facilities. The concept of risk assessment on the part of the hospital is the critical factor in determining open and controlled points of access. The suggestion that a hospital should post staff members at all entry points does not take into consideration the current financial status of the health care industry. In an era when hospital staffing is declining to reduce costs, this is highly impractical and a poor use of hospital funding.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

Revise text to read as follows:

12.4.4.2.3 (A) Consideration should be given to establishing a program to control access by personnel, vendors and visitors.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee agrees with the submitter and has developed language to allow facilities to tailor the system to meet their needs.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-30 Log #4
(12.4.4.2.3(B))

Final Action: Accept in Principle

SUBMITTER: Susan B. McLaughlin, SBM Consulting, Ltd.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

12.4.4.2.3 Building Access Control.

(B) Identification cards should be issued to all employees, physicians, volunteers, students, and contract staff, according to the hospital's risk assessment process. The cards should have, as a minimum, a photograph of the bearer, at least the bearer's first name, and the bearer's position title, the bearer's signature, and the signature of the individual authorized to issue the card. Employees should be required to display their identification cards at all times.

SUBSTANTIATION: The hospital identification badge serves many purposes, including identification that an appropriate staff member is caring for a patient or is in a particular area of the facility. These issues are not unique to employees alone, and at the discretion of the hospital should include others as appropriate. Signatures may provide an additional level of security, but are not necessary to the primary function of the badge. The position title is essential to the identification function, and the bearer's name serves as one means of introduction. Many hospitals or hospital departments choose to include the first name only for the security of the staff member, and that aspect would be violated by including a signature.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

Revise text to read as follows:

12.4.4.2.3(B) Consideration should be given to issuing identification cards and a system to control their use.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee agrees with the submitter and has developed language to allow facilities to tailor the system to meet their needs.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-31 Log #5
(12.4.4.2.3(D))

Final Action: Accept in Principle

SUBMITTER: Susan B. McLaughlin, SBM Consulting, Ltd.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Delete the following text:

12.4.4.2.3 Building Access Control.

~~(D) A policy should be established regarding the communication of patient information, especially for patients who have been the victims of domestic violence or gang violence and can still be under threat of such violence.~~

SUBSTANTIATION: Such a policy has been established by the federal government. It is called the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

Revise 12.4.4.2.3(D) to read as follows:

"A policy should be established regarding the protection of patient information as required by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee agrees with the substantiation of the submitter and has revised text to include the information.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-32 Log #22
(12.4.4.2.5)

Final Action: Accept in Principle

SUBMITTER: Mary Read, Johnson Controls, Inc.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

(C) Recording equipment should be installed in a secure and protected part of the premises of the premises and should be monitored by trained security personnel.

SUBSTANTIATION: Typographical error.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

Revise text to read as follows:

(C) Recording equipment should be installed in a secure and protected part of the premises of the premises and should be monitored by trained security personnel under the control of authorized personnel.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee agrees with the submitter and has clarified any misinterpretation of the term "monitored by trained security personnel."

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-33 Log #7
(12.4.4.2.5(A))

Final Action: Accept in Part

SUBMITTER: Susan B. McLaughlin, SBM Consulting, Ltd.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

12.4.4.2.5 Security Equipment.

(A) A closed circuit television (video surveillance) system, if used, should

cover all entrances, exits, entrance ramps, elevators, stairwells, walkways and parking areas as appropriate per the organization's risk assessment. Lighting levels can may have to be increased for proper operation of the video surveillance system. Signs stating that the area is under video surveillance may serve as a deterrence to crime.

SUBSTANTIATION: A hospital may choose to selectively employ closed circuit television, and it is inappropriate to indicate that all of the areas listed in this paragraph must be monitored if any of them are. The concept of risk assessment on the part of the hospital is the critical factor in determining the placement of the cameras. Furthermore, this puts an undue financial burden on the hospital, both for camera equipment, and potentially for monitoring. It is unrealistic to make the statement that this signage will deter crime, although it may.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Part

Revise text to read as follows:

12.4.4.2.5 Security Equipment.

(A) A video surveillance system, if used, should cover all entrances, exits, entrance ramps, elevators, stairwells, walkways and parking areas as appropriate per the organization's risk assessment.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The second sentence was not accepted and was deleted in 730-25 (Log #25), part 3n. The third sentence was modified in 730-25 (Log #25), part 18.

The committee agrees with the submitter that video surveillance may be applied selectively.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-34 Log #6 **Final Action: Accept in Principle**
(12.4.4.2.5(B))

SUBMITTER: Susan B. McLaughlin, SBM Consulting, Ltd.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

12.4.4.2.3 Building Access Control.

(C) If a visitor badge is required by the hospital, visitors should be funneled to the reception area and not be able to access patient areas without passing the reception area. All visitors should be required to identify the person they are visiting, and to wear and easily identifiable visitor's badge.

SUBSTANTIATION: For some hospitals, a visitor badge is appropriate at all times, primarily due to the location of the facility or the patients served. For others it is inappropriate and impossible to enforce because they have a policy of being open to the community they serve, and therefore want to provide many entrances convenient to parking facilities and outpatient facilities.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

See Committee Action on 730-25 (Log #25), part 3, j.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on 730-25 (Log #25), part 3, j.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-35 Log #8 **Final Action: Accept in Principle**
(12.4.4.2.5(B))

SUBMITTER: Susan B. McLaughlin, SBM Consulting, Ltd.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

12.4.4.2.5 Security Equipment.

(B) The video surveillance system should monitor all street level doors and elevator banks, including freight elevators, as appropriate per the organization's risk assessment.

SUBSTANTIATION: A hospital may choose to selectively employ closed circuit television, and it is inappropriate to indicate that all of the areas listed in this paragraph must be monitored if any of them are. The concept of risk assessment on the part of the hospital is the critical factor in determining the placement of the cameras. Furthermore, this puts an undue financial burden on the hospital, both for camera equipment, and potentially for monitoring.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

Delete the last sentence of 12.4.4.2.5(A).

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The referenced section was incorrect. The last sentence was deleted because it duplicates the first sentence of 12.4.4.2.5(A).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-36 Log #9 **Final Action: Reject**
(12.4.4.2.5(F))

SUBMITTER: Susan B. McLaughlin, SBM Consulting, Ltd.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

12.4.4.2.5 Security Equipment.

(F) All security systems should be tested and maintained as deemed appropriate by the hospital's risk assessment process under contract.

SUBSTANTIATION: It is important to test and maintain all security systems, but NFPA should not prescribe the means to do so. This maintenance might also be effectively managed by hospital staff through a risk assessment process.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Incorrect statement has been addressed. See the draft of NFPA 730, section 12.4.4.2.5(G). The committee does not agree that the risk assessment should dictate when the system should be maintained.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-37 Log #CC6 **Final Action: Accept**
(13.4.4(1) & (2))

SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Premises Security

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-215

RECOMMENDATION: Delete 13.4.4(1).

Reword 13.4.4(2) as follows: "Install an intrusion detection system that provides perimeter protection and interior motion detection in selected areas and signals an alarm locally or to a monitoring station. Local ordinances may require a permit."

SUBSTANTIATION: The change was to eliminate the incidents of false alarms.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-38 Log #42 **Final Action: Reject**
(14.4.6.1)

SUBMITTER: John C. Fannin, III, SafePlace Corporation

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: 14.4.6 Common Interior Areas. Guest rooms and guest room corridors are not considered open to the general public and, management should consider evicting persons from these areas who are not guests or invitees of guests. The normal laws of trespass apply to these areas and local laws should be consulted. The following should be considered:

(1) Corridors, stairwells and elevators should be illuminated in accordance with IESNA Lighting Handbook 9th Edition.

SUBSTANTIATION: To correlate with the version referenced in the balance of the Guide. See 6.4.1.5.2.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The MOS does not allow the reference to use the edition in the body of the document.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-39 Log #33 **Final Action: Reject**
(16.3)

SUBMITTER: Bill H. Strother, Weingarten Realty Management Co. / Rep.

Intl. Council of Shopping Centers

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-233

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

A security plan, as described in Chapter 10, should usually be developed. A security vulnerability assessment, as detailed in Chapter 5, should usually be conducted.

SUBSTANTIATION: While a formalized security plan and a formalized security vulnerability assessment may be appropriate for certain properties, it may not be necessary for others. Every mall, shopping center, neighborhood center and open-air center is unique, and the amount of security planning needed for a particular property varies depending on several factors, including, but not limited to, its location (e.g., rural, suburban, urban), use, status (e.g.,

high-profile, low-profile), physical characteristics, level of crime on the property and in the surrounding community, and the level of local law enforcement.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The present wording provides more flexibility. Qualifying the term restricts the options available to the user.

Also see 730-14 (Log #30) and 730-20 (Log #31).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-40 Log #43 **Final Action: Accept in Principle**
(16.4.1.1.2.1)

SUBMITTER: John C. Fannin, III, SafePlace Corporation

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: 16.4.1.1.2.1 The interior and front and rear entrances of the premises should be well lit. Adequate outside lighting of the parking area and approaches during nighttime hours of operation enhances employee and customer protection. The IES Lighting Handbook, 9th Edition, published by the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America, provides information on lighting levels for specific areas and locations.

SUBSTANTIATION: To correlate with the version referenced in the balance of the Guide. See 6.4.1.5.2.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

Revise the first sentence to read as follows: "The entrances and the interior of the premises should be illuminated."

Change "IES" to "IESNA" and delete "9th Ed."

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The change in the first sentence was to clarify the recommendation.

This corrected an incorrect reference and its edition is not allowed by the MOS in the body of the document. See Committee Action on 730-16 (Log #40).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-41 Log #23 **Final Action: Reject**
(16.4.2.3.3.2)

SUBMITTER: Mary Read, Johnson Controls, Inc.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

An intrusion detection system also can deter a burglar. A certificated central station alarm system that sends a silent signal to a monitoring station, which dispatches guards on receipt of the signal or a proprietary alarm system that receives an alarm signal and dispatches a guard, is are preferred. (The remaining text is unchanged)

SUBSTANTIATION: Section 16.4.2.3.3.2 does not account for the situation where a restaurant facility has their own proprietary alarm system and guards on the premises.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on 730-29 (Log #3) and 730-30 (Log #4).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-42 Log #CC4 **Final Action: Accept**
(16.4.2.3.3.2)

SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Premises Security

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-292B

RECOMMENDATION: Change the second sentence to read: "An alarm system that sends a signal to a monitoring..." The remainder stays unchanged.

SUBSTANTIATION: The paragraph was reworded to be more general.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-43 Log #34 **Final Action: Reject**
(17.3.1)

SUBMITTER: Bill H. Strother, Weingarten Realty Management Co. / Rep. Intl. Council of Shopping Centers

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-117A

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

A security plan, as described in Chapter 10, should usually be developed. A security vulnerability assessment, as detailed in Chapter 5, should usually be conducted.

SUBSTANTIATION: While a formalized security plan and a formalized security vulnerability assessment may be appropriate for certain properties, it may not be necessary for others. Every mall, shopping center, neighborhood center and open-air center is unique, and the amount of security planning needed for a particular property varies depending on several factors, including, but not limited to, its location (e.g., rural, suburban, urban), use, status (e.g., high-profile, low-profile), physical characteristics, level of crime on the property and in the surrounding community, and the level of local law enforcement.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The present wording provides more flexibility. Qualifying the term restricts the options available to the user.

Also see 730-14 (Log #30) and 730-20 (Log #31).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-44 Log #44 **Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part**
(17.9)

SUBMITTER: John C. Fannin, III, SafePlace Corporation

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: 17.9 Lighting. Lighting is basic to any security program. Local ordinances and building codes can mandate minimum lighting requirements. The Lighting Handbook, 9th Edition, published by the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America, provides information on lighting levels for specific areas and locations.

SUBSTANTIATION: To correlate with the version referenced in the balance of the Guide. See 16.4.1.1.2.1 & 18.4.2.2.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part

Delete the word "minimum".

Delete "9th Edition" from the proposed text.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Minimum was deleted to correlate with other chapters.

The MOS does not allow the edition of the document to be specified in the body.

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-45 Log #35 **Final Action: Reject**
(18.3)

SUBMITTER: Bill H. Strother, Weingarten Realty Management Co. / Rep. Intl. Council of Shopping Centers

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 730-239

RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

A security plan, as described in Chapter 10, should usually be developed. A security vulnerability assessment, as detailed in Chapter 5, should usually be conducted.

SUBSTANTIATION: While a formalized security plan and a formalized security vulnerability assessment may be appropriate for certain properties, it may not be necessary for others. Every mall, shopping center, neighborhood center and open-air center is unique, and the amount of security planning needed for a particular property varies depending on several factors, including, but not limited to, its location (e.g., rural, suburban, urban), use, status (e.g., high-profile, low-profile), physical characteristics, level of crime on the property and in the surrounding community, and the level of local law enforcement.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The present wording provides more flexibility. Qualifying the term restricts the options available to the user.

Also see 730-14 (Log #30) and 730-20 (Log #31).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26**BALLOT RESULTS:** Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1**BALLOT NOT RETURNED:** 2 HARRIS, VISBAL**EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:**

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-46 Log #45

Final Action: Reject

(18.4.2.2)

SUBMITTER: John C. Fannin, III, SafePlace Corporation**COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO:** 730-2**RECOMMENDATION:** 18.4.2.2 Access Control.

(A) The interior and front and rear entrances of the premises should be well-lit. Adequate outside lighting of the parking area and approaches during nighttime hours of operation enhances employee and customer protection. The Lighting Handbook, 9th Edition, published by the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA), provides information on lighting levels for specific areas and locations.

SUBSTANTIATION: To correlate with the version referenced in the balance of the Guide. See 16.4.1.1.2.1 & 18.4.2.2.**COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:** Reject**COMMITTEE STATEMENT:** The MOS does not allow the edition to be specified in the body.**NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26****BALLOT RESULTS:** Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1**BALLOT NOT RETURNED:** 2 HARRIS, VISBAL**EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:**

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-47 Log #24

Final Action: Reject

(18.4.3.3)

SUBMITTER: Mary Read, Johnson Controls, Inc.**COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO:** 730-2**RECOMMENDATION:** Revise text to read as follows:

(B) An intrusion detection system also can deter a burglar. A certificated central station alarm system that sends a silent signal to a monitoring station, which dispatches guards on receipt of the signal or a proprietary alarm system that receives an alarm signal and dispatches a guard, is are preferred. (The remaining text is unchanged)

SUBSTANTIATION: Section 18.4.3.3 does not account for the situation where a retail establishment has their own proprietary alarm system and guards on the premises.**COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:** Reject**COMMITTEE STATEMENT:** See Committee Action on 730- 23 (Log #CC3).**NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26****BALLOT RESULTS:** Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1**BALLOT NOT RETURNED:** 2 HARRIS, VISBAL**EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:**

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-48 Log #18

Final Action: Accept

(19.4.2.10)

SUBMITTER: Michael D. DeVore, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company / Rep. Premises Security Technical committee and IFPS Sectio of NFPA**COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO:** 730-257**RECOMMENDATION:** Revise text as follows:

19.4.2.10 If an intrusion detection system is provided, it should be monitored by a monitoring central station alarm company. ~~Alternatively, a proprietary system with on-premises monitoring can be provided.~~

SUBSTANTIATION: The committee reason for rejecting Proposal 730-257 was that supervising station is not used in the document. Changing the word supervising to monitoring station introduces the defined term and completes the thought trying to be expressed in 19.4.2.10.**COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:** Accept**NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26****BALLOT RESULTS:** Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1**BALLOT NOT RETURNED:** 2 HARRIS, VISBAL**EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:**

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-49 Log #46

Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part

(19.4.5.4 & 19.4.6.3)

SUBMITTER: John C. Fannin, III, SafePlace Corporation**COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO:** 730-2**RECOMMENDATION:** 19.4.5.4 Lighting should be provided to illuminate

building entrances, pedestrian walkways and vehicular entrances. The IES Lighting Handbook, 9th Edition, published by IESNA should be consulted for recommended minimum illumination levels for these areas. The lighting system should be inspected regularly with inoperative fixtures repaired or replaced. 19.4.6.3 Stairwells and elevators should be provided with illumination in accordance with the Lighting Handbook, 9th Edition, published by IESNA Lighting Handbook.

SUBSTANTIATION: To correlate with the version referenced in the balance of the Guide. See 6.4.1.5.2.**COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:** Accept in Principle in Part

19.4.5.4 Lighting should be provided to illuminate building entrances, pedestrian walkways and vehicular entrances. The IES Lighting Handbook, 9th Edition, published by Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA) should be consulted for recommended minimum illumination levels for these areas. The lighting system should be inspected regularly with inoperative fixtures repaired or replaced.

19.4.6.3 Stairwells and elevators should be provided with illumination in accordance with the Lighting Handbook, 9th Edition, published by Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA) Lighting Handbook.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The MOS does not allow the edition to be specified in the body. The name of the organization was corrected.**NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26****BALLOT RESULTS:** Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1**BALLOT NOT RETURNED:** 2 HARRIS, VISBAL**EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:**

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-50 Log #47

Final Action: Accept in Part

(20.4.1)

SUBMITTER: John C. Fannin, III, SafePlace Corporation**COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO:** 730-2

RECOMMENDATION: 20.4.1 Intrusion Prevention. Most facilities have some measures that are intended to prevent intruders from entering the grounds or buildings. These measures can include fences, walls, locked doors, or alarm systems. The location of the facilities, whether urban or suburban, and the types of structures will determine how much and what type of protection a facility needs. In addition to basic measures, some facilities also provide physical protection of site utilities at the fence perimeter. Security lighting (good lighting around buildings, storage tanks, and storage areas) can also make it very difficult for someone to enter the facility undetected. The Lighting Handbook, 9th Edition, published by the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA), provides information on lighting levels for specific areas and locations.

SUBSTANTIATION: To correlate with the version referenced in the balance of the Guide. See 16.4.1.1.2.1 & 18.4.2.2.**COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:** Accept in Part

Delete "9th Edition".

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The MOS does not allow the edition to be specified in the body.**NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26****BALLOT RESULTS:** Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1**BALLOT NOT RETURNED:** 2 HARRIS, VISBAL**EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:**

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-51 Log #36

Final Action: Reject

(21.3.1)

SUBMITTER: Bill H. Strother, Weingarten Realty Management Co. / Rep. Intl. Council of Shopping Centers**COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO:** 730-287**RECOMMENDATION:** Revise text to read:

A security plan, as described in Chapter 10, should usually be developed. A security vulnerability assessment, as detailed in Chapter 5, should usually be conducted.

SUBSTANTIATION: While a formalized security plan and a formalized security vulnerability assessment may be appropriate for certain properties, it may not be necessary for others. Every mall, shopping center, neighborhood center and open-air center is unique, and the amount of security planning needed for a particular property varies depending on several factors, including, but not limited to, its location (e.g., rural, suburban, urban), use, status (e.g., high-profile, low-profile), physical characteristics, level of crime on the property and in the surrounding community, and the level of local law enforcement.**COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:** Reject**COMMITTEE STATEMENT:** The present wording provides more flexibility. Qualifying the term restricts the options available to the user.

Also see 730-14 (Log #30) and 730-20 (Log #31).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26**BALLOT RESULTS:** Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL**EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:**

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-52 Log #37 **Final Action: Reject**
(22.2)**SUBMITTER:** Bill H. Strother, Weingarten Realty Management Co. / Rep. Intl. Council of Shopping Centers**COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO:** 730-291**RECOMMENDATION:** Revise text to read:

A security plan, as described in Chapter 10, should usually be developed. A security vulnerability assessment, as detailed in Chapter 5, should usually be conducted.

SUBSTANTIATION: While a formalized security plan and a formalized security vulnerability assessment may be appropriate for certain properties, it may not be necessary for others. Every mall, shopping center, neighborhood center and open-air center is unique, and the amount of security planning needed for a particular property varies depending on several factors, including, but not limited to, its location (e.g., rural, suburban, urban), use, status (e.g., high-profile, low-profile), physical characteristics, level of crime on the property and in the surrounding community, and the level of local law enforcement.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject**COMMITTEE STATEMENT:** The present wording provides more flexibility. Qualifying the term restricts the options available to the user.

Also see 730-14 (Log #30) and 730-20 (Log #31).

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26**BALLOT RESULTS:** Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1**BALLOT NOT RETURNED:** 2 HARRIS, VISBAL**EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:**

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-53 Log #10 **Final Action: Accept**
(A.3.3.1)**SUBMITTER:** Michael D. DeVore, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company / Rep. Premises Security Technical committee and IFPS Sectio of NFPA**COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO:** 730-11**RECOMMENDATION:** Revise text as follows:

A.3.3.1 Access Control. ~~Examples of Access control portals are doors, gates, and turnstiles, and so forth. Controls may can be operational, technical, or physical or a combination thereof and can electronic or physical and may vary depending on type of credential, authorization level, day, or time of day. Electronic controls will use a reader to identify the credential. Physical control can be a guard or a camera monitored by a guard. Examples of portals are (doors, gates, or turnstiles, etc.)~~

SUBSTANTIATION: Revise annex material to match the revisions made in NFPA 731.**COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:** Accept**NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:** 26**BALLOT RESULTS:** Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1**BALLOT NOT RETURNED:** 2 HARRIS, VISBAL**EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:**

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-54 Log #CC5 **Final Action: Accept**
(B.18.4.3.3)**SUBMITTER:** Technical Committee on Premises Security**RECOMMENDATION:** Change the second sentence to read: "An alarm system that sends a signal to a monitoring..." The remainder stays unchanged.**SUBSTANTIATION:** The paragraph was reworded to be more general.**COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:** Accept**NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:** 26**BALLOT RESULTS:** Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1**BALLOT NOT RETURNED:** 2 HARRIS, VISBAL**EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:**

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-55 Log #CC8 **Final Action: Accept**
(Annex C)**SUBMITTER:** Technical Committee on Premises Security**COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO:** 730-292B**RECOMMENDATION:** Add references to Annex C as follows:

FEMA 426, 355 and E155 on Antiterrorism and Building Security Requirements (Need titles).

GSA Building Security Guidelines (Need titles).

DoD Unified Facility Criteria for Security Code/Standards (Title).

FM 3-19-30 U.S. Army Field Manual for Physical Security, issue number 1-2001.

SUBSTANTIATION: These references were added to provide the user with useful information and references.**COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:** Accept**NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:** 26**BALLOT RESULTS:** Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1**BALLOT NOT RETURNED:** 2 HARRIS, VISBAL**EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:**

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.

730-56 Log #48 **Final Action: Accept**
(C.1.2)**SUBMITTER:** John C. Fannin, III, SafePlace Corporation**COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO:** 730-2**RECOMMENDATION:** C.1.2 Other Publications.

Guide for Security Lighting for People, Property, and Public Spaces, IESNA G-1-03. Illuminating Engineering Society of North America, New York, NY, 2003.

Annex C Informational ReferencesC.1 Referenced Publications.C.1.1 NFPA Publications.C.1.2 Other Publications.Academic Institution Accreditation Requirements. Wilmington, DE:SafePlace Corporation, 2003.America's Crime Fears Threaten Retail Sales for 1995. Boston, MA:America's Research Group, 1995.Are You Ready. Washington, DC: U.S. Fire Administration, FederalEmergency Management Agency, 2003.Bates, Norman. Checklist for Security Assessments - Hotels and Motels.Sudbury, MA: Liability Consultants Inc., 1993.Berlonghi, Alexander, E. Special Event Security Management, LossPrevention, and Emergency Services. Mansfield, OH: Bookmasters, Inc., 1996.Chemical Accident Prevention: Site Security. Washington, D.C.: ChemicalEmergency Preparedness and Prevention Office, Office of Solid Waste andEmergency Management, United States Environmental Protection Agency,2000.Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990. U.S. Public Law 101-542, Title II, Nov. 1990: 104 (2384-2387).Fannin, John C. "A Discussion of Modern Security", Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Risk and Insurance Management Society, Chicago, IL (April 2003).Fourth Annual Survey of Restaurant and Fast Food Employees. Minneapolis,MN: National Computer Systems, 1999General Security Risk Assessment Guidelines. Alexandria, VA: AmericanSociety for Industrial Security International, 2003.Guidelines for the Safety and Security of Health Care and CommunityService Workers. San Francisco, CA: California State Department of IndustrialRelations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, 1993.Guidelines for Workplace Violence Prevention Programs for Health CareWorkers in Institutional and Community Settings. Washington, DC: Departmentof Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 1993.Higher Education Amendments of 1998 Act. U.S. Public Law 105-244, Oct.1998: 104 (2384-2387).Lodging Facility Accreditation Requirements. Wilmington, DE: SafePlaceCorporation, 2003.Meadows, Robert J. "The Likelihood of Liability." Security Management,35.7, pgs. 60-66, (1991). Alexandria, VA: American Society for IndustrialSecurity International.Niemann, Larry. "Are You Armed Against High Dollar Judgments in SecurityCases?" Austin, TX: Texas Apartment Association, National Institute of Justice,1988.Niemann, Larry. Rape Protection for Onsite Apartment Personnel. Austin,TX: Texas Apartment Association, 1988.Operation Liberty Shield. Washington, DC: Department of HomelandSecurity, 2003.Part IV - Security and Protective Lighting. Protection of Assets Manual.Santa Monica, CA: The Merritt Company, 1997, p.19.59-19.73b.Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report tothe United States Congress. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice,Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Maryland,1997.Preventing Homicide in the Workplace. Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofHealth and Human Services, National Institute for Occupational Safety andHealth, 1993.SafePlace Security Vulnerability Assessment Workbook. Wilmington, DE:SafePlace Corporation, 2003.Safety Bulletin: Terrorist Threat Condition Level Change. Wilmington, DE:SafePlace Corporation, 2003.Safety Bulletin: The Security Vulnerability Assessment. Wilmington, DE:SafePlace Corporation, 2003.

Security and Loss Prevention for the Hotel and Motel. New York, NY: American Hotel and Motel Association, 1985.

Security Principles 101: Physical & Administrative Protective Elements. Wilmington, DE: SafePlace Corporation Risk Management Consultants, Inc., 2002

Security Vulnerability Assessment: A Guide to Security Countermeasure Development. Wilmington, DE: SafePlace Corporation, 2003.

Sherwood, Charles W. "Security Management for a Major Event." Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation Law Enforcement Bulletin, August 1998.

Site Security Survey Record. Wilmington, DE: SafePlace Corporation, 2003.

Special Report: Are Malls Safe?, Security Law Newsletter 14.4, pgs. 37-39. (1994). Crime Control Research Corp.

Student Assistance General Provisions: Final Rule. (64FR210), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, Nov. 1, 1999 (59060-59073).

The Expanding Role of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in Premises Liability. NIJ Research in Brief. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1996.

Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, 2003.

C.2 Informational References.

C.3 References for Extracts.

SUBSTANTIATION: This document is an important and timely reference on security lighting subject matter. It compliments the reference in 2.3 to the IESNA Lighting Handbook.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 HARRIS, VISBAL

EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

CALLAGHAN: See my Explanation of Abstention on Comment: 730-2.