All non-NFPA photographs have been removed from this document.
RESCUE OPERATIONS REPORT
Oklahoma City, OK

April 19, 1995

Prepared by
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A bomb exploded outside of the Alfred P. Murrah federal office building on Wednesday, April 19, 1995 at 9:02 am in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The explosion was caused by a bomb in a 24 foot rental truck which was parked in the street on the north side of the building. The entire north face of the nine story building and approximately one third of the floors of the building was totally destroyed by the force of the explosion.

A number of federal agencies were located in the building. These included the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Secret Service, the Housing and Urban Development, Social Security Administration, the Small Business Administration, the Marine Corps, United States Customs, the Veteran’s Administration, the General Services Administration and the US Army. A daycare facility was located on the second floor of the facility.

The bombing resulted in 169 fatalities and 475 injuries.

A massive response of public safety agencies, health care providers and the general public occurred immediately following the explosion. The first arriving fire department personnel were faced with an overwhelming rescue operation. Buildings were damaged over a 48 square block area, and a large number of vehicles were on fire. Major structural damage occurred in not only the federal building but in a 26 story, 400 unit apartment building, a three story city office building and a two story building across the street in which there was a restaurant in the basement.

The closest fire units to the incident were located at Oklahoma City Fire Department Station 1, which is approximately 5 blocks from the Murrah Building. This station housed four units, and all responded within seconds of the explosion. In addition, there was a chief’s meeting in progress at this station, and they also responded immediately. As these units approached the scene, they began encountering debris in the road several blocks away from the explosion. Firefighters had to start walking in front of the apparatus to move the debris out of the roadway. In addition, they began to encounter injured people walking away from the blast. A number of the units immediately began treating victims, and quickly realized that there were going to be a large number of injuries. Two triage locations were immediately established, and the victims were sent to these locations to be triaged, treated and transported.

Oklahoma City Fire Department members, law enforcement and civilians immediately entered the collapsed structure and began to remove victims from the building. Human chains were formed, and as victims were located and uncovered, they were passed out of the building and into the street.

All of these operations were delayed by the discovery of what was thought to be a secondary explosive device at approximately 10:30 am. All rescue workers were removed from the building until the device could be safely secured. It turned out
not to be another explosive, and personnel were allowed to return to the building and resume rescue operations.

Within the first hours of the incident, rescuers removed a number of victims from the partially collapsed structure. Within the first four hours of the incident a large number of fire fighters from departments around Oklahoma City responded spontaneously to this disaster to help with the rescue operations. By the end of the incident, 43 fire departments provided assistance, along with a large number of law enforcement agencies.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) immediately deployed an Incident Support Team (IST) on Wednesday, April 19th, to assist the Oklahoma City Fire Department. An IST is comprised of personnel trained and experienced in helping to manage technical rescue operations at incidents involving structural collapse. IST personnel were on the scene Wednesday evening and began assisting OCFD in preparing for the arrival of the FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Task Forces.

Initially, two USAR Task Forces were activated and deployed to the incident, one from Sacramento, California and one from Phoenix, Arizona. An advance overhead team from the Phoenix Fire Department departed for Oklahoma City via commercial airline. Within a very short period of time, four additional Task Forces were activated from New York City; Montgomery County, Maryland; Virginia Beach, Virginia; and Los Angeles County, California. By the conclusion of operations on Friday, May 5, a total of ten USAR Task Forces had been involved in rescue operations.
The first USAR task force to arrive in Oklahoma City was the Phoenix Task Force, AZ-TF1, on Wednesday evening. They began to work in the structure at 2:00 AM, Thursday, searching for any survivors. They were soon joined very shortly by the Sacramento Task Force. Over the following 24 hours, the additional Task Forces from New York City; Montgomery County, Virginia Beach, and Los Angeles County, arrived and were placed into operation.

An Incident Command System structure was used in order to manage the incoming resources to this incident, and all of the operations conducted were under the command of the Oklahoma City Fire Department. Briefings involving all of the various components of the rescue operation were conducted twice a day at shift change (0700 and 1900 hours). Strategies for the rescue operations were decided and each operational period’s objectives were outlined in an Incident Action Plan that was printed and distributed at each briefing for all of the personnel involved.

A forward command post was established in a one story garage immediately adjacent to the incident. OCFD established its Rescue operations in this area, and the Incident Support Team was co-located with them. Equipment was immediately brought in to support this operation and included power, telephones, copiers, tables, chairs, etc. A room was set aside for briefing and strategy sessions, and wall maps were set up showing the extent of the damage as mapped by the structural engineers on the scene.

A Type I overhead team from the National Interagency Coordination Center in Boise, Idaho was requested by OCFD to assist in managing the incident and was deployed. The US Forest Service has a number of teams identified around the country that are available for immediate response to provide incident management assistance during multi-agency operations. Typically, these teams are used for large scale wildfire operations, and this was a unique application of this resource which worked extremely well. A multi-agency coordination center was established in the convention center in Oklahoma City where representatives from a number of agencies were brought together under the OCFD Incident Commander to coordinate the activities involved in the rescue and investigation activities.

The response of the community to this disaster was overwhelming. The Southwestern Bell corporate headquarters was quickly taken over as an operating center for the incident. The various agencies involved in the incident established their command posts in the parking lot and telephone lines that normally serviced the building were disconnected and rerouted into these command posts. The first floor was turned into a field kitchen where rescuers were fed. The third and fourth floors were used as dormitories for Task Force personnel from Sacramento and Phoenix. Offices were quickly refurbished with cots and sleeping bags.

Another parking garage several blocks away from the Murrah building was commandeered as a base of operations for the equipment caches for the Oklahoma City Fire Department and for the Phoenix and Sacramento Task Forces.
The Myriad Convention Center was used to accommodate the other Task Forces which were deployed. The Oklahoma Restaurant Association (ORA) was just starting its conference when the incident occurred and they quickly established a food operation in the convention center to feed all of the rescue personnel 24 hours a day. ORA has estimated that over nine days 100,000 meals were served.

On the scene, volunteer support was everywhere. People were moving throughout the site with wheelbarrows filled with ice and drinks. A national pizza chain was cooking pizzas on site and served 9,000 pizzas on the first day, alone. The Post Office, which was located across the street from the Murrah Building, was turned into a supply room with everything from bandannas to rain suits. An additional supply operation was established at the convention center where all of the donated material was handled. People were donating clothing, food, equipment and supplies in record numbers to support the rescue operations. If a request for some specialized service was made, such as veterinarians for the search dogs, the response was immediate and overwhelming.

The local cellular telephone companies quickly set up operations. Cellular telephones were provided to emergency personnel and all the airtime was donated by the companies. Three additional portable cells were set up around the scene to handle the additional traffic. One of the cellular vendors handed out 1,056 cellular phones, and their preliminary estimate is that they had $1,000,000 of airtime usage per day—at no charge to the rescuers.

Other support was provided by companies such as UPS, which set up shop in the convention center and shipped all packages for free. Volunteer massage therapists and podiatrists provided free services to the rescue personnel. Daily church services were held in the convention center.

The rescue operations were extremely challenging. The typical scenario that the Task Forces had trained for was structural collapse caused by an earthquake. When a building collapses in an earthquake, there are generally large pieces of the structure remaining that create void spaces in which live victims can be found. When the bomb exploded outside of the Murrah Building, the structure was essentially pulverized, which made it very difficult to shore up and stabilize the building.

A structural engineer from California with extensive experience in structural collapse was brought in by the IST to coordinate and support the engineering components of the Task Forces. Working with the engineers from the Task Forces who had already been on the scene, he quickly identified the weak points in the structure that needed to be shored. Extensive shoring was fabricated on site and installed by a contractor. Columns which normally extended only 13 feet before being supported laterally by a floor now extended 39 feet unbraced and were in immediate danger of buckling. Upper floors had pancaked into the first floor and had to be shored up in order to allow rescuers to move forward.
The debris removal was a tedious and laborious job. In order to avoid injuring any trapped victims, it was done by hand. Personnel from OCFD, volunteers from area fire departments, and Task Force personnel worked laboriously to remove the debris and then extricate the victims. All of the debris that was removed was taken by truck to a site where it was sifted by law enforcement personnel for evidence.

In order to avoid overworking crews, two 12 hour operational periods were established for each day. After the first five days, additional USAR Task Forces were phased in to relieve the initial Task Forces. These Task Forces came from Washington State; Menlo Park, California; Metro Dade, Florida; Fairfax County, Virginia.

Since it was a crime scene, and to secure the safety of the personnel on the scene, a perimeter was established around the area and staffed with law enforcement personnel. The FBI began badging people with photo ID’s almost immediately to control access into the scene.

This incident was of such complexity that the final outcome in terms of successful rescues could easily have been much lower. However, with the integration of all of the agencies involved and the overwhelming community support, the operation was concluded in as safe a manner as possible and as effectively as possible. The lessons that can be learned from the Oklahoma City Bombing will be widespread and will serve everyone involved in the protection of people from tragedies such as this.
Introduction

When a bomb exploded outside of the Murrah Building on Wednesday, April 19, 1995, a nation was shocked by the images that were being shown across the country. When the magnitude of the event was fully realized, the decision was made to deploy a team of personnel from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) to document this tragic event. The team was enroute to Oklahoma City within hours. For the next thirteen days, a team made up of Chief Fire Investigator Ed Comeau and Senior Fire Service Specialists Jon Jones and Stephen Foley logged over 400 staff hours observing the rescue operations, interviewing rescue workers and command officers and laying the groundwork for the development of the Oklahoma City Document Management Team.

During this period of time, the NFPA team was provided with unrestricted access to all phases of the rescue operations on a daily basis in order to record the activities of all of the rescue workers. NFPA participated in the briefings held twice a day by Rescue Command and was also briefed on a daily basis by senior command personnel. Due to NFPA’s involvement in the Urban Search and Rescue program, we were able to gather a great deal of information from daily contact with the eleven US&R Task Forces that ultimately were deployed. NFPA was provided with copies of all of the documentation generated by the Incident Support Team to assist in the recreation of this incident.

In addition to these activities, it was quickly realized that it was important to capture the memories of the incident from the first arriving responders. A team of interviewers comprised of NFPA, Oklahoma City Fire Department and National Fire Academy personnel was put together in order to meet with all of the first due crews and capture their thoughts. Twenty seven crews were interviewed, as well as 27 command officers. All of these interviews were transcribed and reviewed by the NFPA to form the basis of portions of this report.

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Acknowledgment

NFPA appreciates the assistance provided in documenting this incident, both during the seventeen days of the rescue and recovery operations and in the months afterwards by Chief Gary Marrs of the Oklahoma City Fire Department, the members of the Oklahoma City Fire Department and all of the other rescue personnel
involved. We would also like to thank Deputy Chief Mark Ghilanducci of the California Office of Emergency Services and the Incident Support Team members for providing us with access to the site, records and personnel. We also appreciate the time that many members of the US&R Task Forces took to talk with us and allowing us to accompany them during the rescue operations.

The NFPA would especially like to acknowledge the tremendous contribution that all members of the Oklahoma City Documentation Management Team and Oklahoma State University made towards the development of this preliminary report. Without their outstanding assistance and support, it would not have been possible.

The Building
At the time of the bombing, the Murrah Building was occupied by a number of federal agencies, including the following:

- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
- Drug Enforcement Agency
- U.S. Secret Service
- Department of Housing and Urban Development
- U.S. Customs; the General Services Administration
- Social Security Administration
- General Accounting Office
- U.S. Army and Marine recruiting centers
- Defense Audit Agency
- Department of Health and Human Services
- Small Business Administration
The IST personnel worked closely with the Oklahoma City Fire Department command officers throughout the incident.

The Murrah Building as seen from the northwest prior to the incident. The first two floors are inset, which resulted in exposing four of the columns to the direct affects of the blast. In addition, the north face is composed entirely of glass, which was completely sheared off by the force of the explosion.

- Federal Highway Administration
- Department of Agriculture
- Veterans Administration
- U.S. Department of Labor.

The building also housed a federal credit union and the America’s Kids Daycare center.

The building, a nine-story, reinforced concrete structure, was completed in 1977. Each floor was 13 ft high and measured approximately 220 by 75 ft. The floor slabs were of reinforced concrete that was 6 inches thick and they spanned 20 ft from east to west and 35 ft from north to south. Each floor was supported by concrete beams which measured 48 in by 20 in. Underneath the structure was a four level parking garage. There were two independent stairwells on the south side of the building, as well as an elevator core.

The building was constructed on two levels, which led to some confusion among emergency responders as to whether it had a basement. On the south side, which was at the front of the building on 4th Street, access was on the second floor. The street level on the north side, or back, of the building was on the first floor. This side of the building was constructed of plate glass, while the east and west walls were constructed of granite panels.
There was a discontinuity in the building design that was a significant factor in the collapse mechanism. On the north side of the building, the first and second floors were inset 10 ft from the sidewalk, creating an overhang. This design exposed four of the columns directly to outside of the building. In addition, there were only 4 columns on the north side of the building at the first and second floors. At the third floor level, a reinforced concrete transfer beam, measuring 36 in by 60 in, transferred the load from the floors above to the columns on the first and second floors.

**Structural Damage and Mitigation Efforts**

The truck that is believed to have contained the explosives was parked approximately 10 ft from the north side of the building in between column lines 20 and 22. Approximately 4,500 pounds of explosives were estimated to be contained within the vehicle when it exploded. (see diagram A)

The blast destroyed three of the four exposed two-story columns on the first and second floors on the north side of the building. The column that remained was shored quickly with two vertical pipe shores on each side of it by one of the contractors who had responded to the incident. In the time it took to cut the pipe after the column was measured, the building settled 1/4 inch, and the shoring had to be hammered into place.

The force of the explosion severely damaged a number of the interior columns as well. Since the floor slabs north of the middle columns were destroyed, these columns lost much of their lateral support. Columns F22 and F20, which normal-
The explosion ignited cars in a parking lot across the street and damaged a number of buildings in the area.

ly extended only 13 ft before being laterally supported by the floor slabs and beams, now spanned three floors, or 39 ft, without much lateral support.

This type of damage occurred in the day care center, which became a major focus of the rescue operations. Before crews could start entering this area, which was bounded by columns F18, F22, E18, and E22 and became known as the “the pit,” the columns had to be secured. A great deal of effort went into providing lateral shoring for these columns. Forty-foot sections of pipe, which weighed 800 pounds, had to be carried in manually, welded together, and then anchored against the columns with a combination of anchors and cabling. Several times during the subsequent days, anchors were pulled out when the shoring was struck by sliding debris or when a slab was removed, and they had to be resecured.

All nine floors of the reinforced concrete floor slabs on the northern side of the building had been destroyed to some degree by the explosion and were now in the debris pile at street level. A large “bite” had been taken out of the building between column lines 22 and 26 for the full north-south width of the building.

However, large pieces of the floor slabs were still hanging from the building by reinforcing bars. These slabs presented significant hanging hazards throughout the operation, and a major part of the daily work was to remove them so that rescue operations could be conducted underneath them. A team of structural specialists surveyed these slabs from a man bucket suspended by a crane, and then they developed a plan for removing them. For each operational period, a team of US&R personnel also was assigned to what was called “overhead hazard mitigation” duty.

One of these pieces, a 35,000 pound piece of the roof that was nicknamed the “slab from hell” or the “mother slab,” was being held in place at the top of column E24
by two reinforcing rods which were each 1 inch in diameter. During rescue operations, it was decided to remove the slab by cutting the rebar. After one of the bars was cut, however, the slab shifted significantly, and the operation was suspended, leaving the slab hanging from a single 1 inch rebar. The rescuers decided to attempt shattering the slab with small explosives, and a demolition contractor was brought in to provide input. He felt that placing the explosives properly would take more than 24 hours, and, instead recommended finding some other method. Finally, it was decided to use cables to secure the slab to what remained of the building. Even so, the slab presented such a significant hazard that no rescue or recovery operations were ever conducted directly beneath it.

On the south side of the structure at the plaza level, the granite panels over the entry way to the building had been damaged severely and were in danger of falling. Securing these panels became a priority early in the rescue, because this entry was a primary means of getting into the building. Boldt Construction installed cabling around these panels, holding them in place.
All nine floors on the east end of the structure were composed of granite panels without windows. A number of these panels were destroyed in the blast, and the remainder were attached poorly. This entire wall lost much of its support, because it was no longer attached to the building in a number of areas, and there was a great deal of concern regarding its stability, especially during periods of high wind. At one point, rescuers discussed removing the panels to reduce the amount of surface area against which the wind could push. However, this task was not done because it was felt that it would that the risk was not worth the danger of attempting to remove the panels. Throughout the incident, this portion of the building (as well as others) was monitored continuously with surveying theodolites. The maximum amount of movement detected was only 1/2 inch.

David Hammond, the lead Structural Specialist for this incident, reported that other columns were also damaged significantly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Column G12</td>
<td>Cracked at the 3rd floor. Supporting eight levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columns F20 and F22</td>
<td>Supporting seven levels. Levels 2 and 3 had been removed by the blast. These columns were lacking lateral support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column F16 and F18</td>
<td>Inadequate connection to the second floor beams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building’s East Wall</td>
<td>Since the blast had removed the south face of the building and much of the lateral floor support towards the east, this part of the building was lacking stability and was susceptible to movement caused by wind forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The floors inside the building were shored up to safeguard the rescuers and their operations. So much vertical wooden shoring was installed to support the existing floor slab on the first floor that the area, which became known as “the forest,” soon became impassable.

Throughout the 17-day period, the building was monitored for movement in a variety of ways. Surveying theodolites deployed throughout the site were aimed at fixed points on the building. If the structure moved significantly, an emergency evacuation was called until the hazard was secured. This situation happened several times, especially during high winds, which caused the building and debris to shift. In addition, “smart levels” were placed on several columns and checked regularly to determine whether there had been any movement.

The stairwells located on the south side of the structure survived the blast intact, which was critical since they provided a means of egress from the damaged building. Several of the stairwells’ doors had been damaged, but the stair shafts themselves were unharmed.

The south side of the building was faced with 3/4 inch glass, which was pulled into the building by the negative phase of the explosion. As a result, large pieces of broken glass were strewn about the interior of the building.
Since the loading dock on the west end of the building was not damaged significantly, it was used throughout the incident to house the US&R Incident Support Team and the Oklahoma City Fire Departments Operations Section.

Response—Day 1

Public Safety Agencies

Day 1: Wednesday, April 19, 1995

At the time of the bombing, the Oklahoma City Fire Department’s Red Shift was on duty, and members of Station 1, located five blocks from the Murrah Building, were preparing to leave for a training exercise that had been scheduled for 9:00 a.m. Their route would have taken them directly past the Murrah Building, but they had been delayed when one of the fire fighters received a telephone call.

Station 1 is a multicompany station housing Engines 1 and 51, Truck 1, and Squad 1, all of which immediately headed towards the explosion, as did a number of other companies throughout the city. Each unit took a different route to avoid converging on the scene from one direction.

Rescue 1 and Engine 51

Members of Rescue 1, which went east on 6th Street to Harvey, began to see a large number of injured people walking towards them the closer they got to the scene. The crew directed the victims to a makeshift triage point at the intersection of 6th Street and Harvey while they continued toward the area of the explosion.

When they arrived at the corner of 5th and Harvey, the crew split up. Two members helped rescue a victim from the Athenia Building, a two-story brick structure housing a restaurant located directly across the street from the Murrah Building. They used hand tools to remove the debris, then packaged the victim on a backboard and moved him to a nearby EMSA unit.

The two other members of Rescue 1 went to the Water Resources Building northwest of the Murrah Building. The interior of this structure had been damaged heavily, and furniture and bookcases had been overturned throughout.

On the third floor, the two Rescue 1 fire fighters and members of Engine 51 rescued a seriously injured man by placing him in a chair and carrying him down the stairs.

Engine 51 also had responded from Station 1, and they headed south on Harvey to a position across from the Journal Record Building. En route, they had stopped to check on the occupants of a damaged building on 7th Street, but their injuries were minor so Engine 51 continued its response to the Water Resources Building.
For the most part, the Athenia Building was completely collapsed with three floors of debris having fallen into the basement.

Emergency shoring was placed in the building so that rescuers could enter and search for victims.
Upon arrival, many of the cars in the parking lot to the north, across the street from the Murrah Building were on fire.

Once Engine 51's crew finished helping Rescue 1 with the injured man at the Water Resources Building, it entered the north side of the Murrah Building and began helping other fire personnel and civilians perform rescue operations in the area in which the daycare center was located—the area that ultimately became known as the “Pit,” because it began to resemble a pit as debris was removed. Crew members located victims in the debris by listening for their moans and calls for help.

As soon as the victims were extricated, they were handed off to nonfire rescuers, who had formed a human chain to pass the injured out of the building to the street for treatment.

The Rescue 1 crew remained at the Water Resources Building, where it joined the crew of Truck 1 in removing another victim, again in a chair, down the fire escape on the north side of the building.

After they turned the victim over to EMSA crews, the two crew members from Rescue 1 moved to the Athenia Building, which had partially collapsed. They looked through portions of the first and second floors, though they were hampered by significant structural damage.

At the same time, a member of the Murrah Building’s engineering staff gave a set of building plans to the operator of Truck 1, who gave them to a fire fighter to take to the incident command post at the next intersection.

**Truck 1**

Originally, Truck 1 had been ordered to ladder the Water Resources Building, in whose windows a number of people could be seen. The driver had tried to raise the
ladder while the officer and a crew member entered the building, but the tight quarters in which they were working kept him from doing so.

Truck 1 had responded from Station 1 east on 5th Street. As it approached the Regency Towers, which was west of the Murrah Building, fire fighters began to notice debris in the road, which the officer of the truck removed. They also began encountering waves of injured people, whom they directed toward two meter maids standing at the corner of 5th and Hudson. The officer picked the two meter maids because they were an easily recognized "landmark." An off-duty fire fighter was given the truck’s medical jump kit and told to start providing care at that location.

After the two fire fighters from Truck 1 helped the crew of Rescue 1 remove the injured man from the Water Resources Building, they were joined by the rest of Truck 1’s crew, which was assigned to the officer of Engine 1. Together, the two crews rescued a woman they found trapped under furniture and debris on the second floor, taking her out of the building by the north stairs. They then returned to the building to continue search operations.

**Engine 1**

Engine 1 originally had responded to the Murrah Building, going directly east on 5th Street. As it approached the Regency Towers, the officer, thinking it might be a hazardous materials incident, ordered the driver to stage the apparatus facing west in the event that they had to evacuate the area.

While walking towards the Murrah Building, they found an injured child in a car, and a crew member was left to take care of him. They also noticed a large piece of metal lying in front of a heavily damaged car, which turned out to be the rear axle of the vehicle that had held the bomb. Continuing east, they encountered 40 to 70 victims, whom they directed to the triage collection point that had been established at the intersection of 5th and Hudson streets.

As the crew of Engine 1 approached the Murrah Building, they were ordered to attack the car fires in the lot to the north of the building. They hand-laid a supply line from Engine 1 to the hydrant at 5th and Harvey, and then they advanced an attack line. Soon, however, they were ordered to begin search and rescue operations in the Water Resources Building. At the same time, Oklahoma City Fire Chief Gary Marrs ordered Engine 6 to attack the car fires from the east.

**Hazmat 5 and Engine 5**

Hazmat 5 responded to the bombing by traveling up Broadway to 5th Street, driving around a large metal object in the road that turned out to be the front axle of the bomb truck. When the crew arrived at the scene, several members of the hazmat unit, with the help of the Engine 5 crew, began providing first aid and triaging victims at the YMCA. Engine 5 had responded from quarters without waiting for the dispatch, as did most of the units.
The rest of the Hazmat 5 crew went to the basement of the Murrah Building, which was filling with water from broken water pipes, and they discovered live electrical wires hanging everywhere. Crew members had removed one victim from the basement when a police officer holding an infant stopped the fire officer and a firefighter. The two men took the baby to an EMSA unit on Robinson, just south of the building, and they re-entered the basement where they determined that the power and the water had been secured. They continued to the south side of the building where they helped extricate two more occupants from a collapsed area just inside the structure. The victims were placed on backboards and moved out of the building by a human chain.

**Truck 5**

Truck 5 responded south on Robinson Street along with Engine 5 and stopped at 6th and Robinson. On the way, they also encountered injured people, but the injuries were minor so Truck 5 continued toward the explosion site. When it arrived, its crew was ordered to help with the rescue operations in the basement of the Murrah Building where conditions were deteriorating. As crew members reached the building, however, they were told to begin treating a number of victims who had been removed from the building.

The crew also was ordered to move its truck to the building so that its ground ladders and generator could be used. When the officer returned to the unit, however, he found it was blocked by several emergency units that couldn’t be moved. He finally positioned the truck at the northeast corner of the building within 20 feet to 30 feet of the bomb crater. The ladder was raised, and three victims were rescued immediately from the sixth floor of the building.
Squad 18

Squad 18 originally was dispatched to Station 1 for staging, but it was quickly diverted to the incident command post at 6th and Hudson to help at the triage area on the southwest corner of the Murrah Building. When the crew arrived, however, it found that there was more than enough help at that area. It was sent to the third floor of the building, where crew members helped the crew of Truck 8 extricate a woman trapped in the debris on the north side of the building.

Engine and Brush Pumper 4

Engine 4 was on the air when the bombing occurred, and dispatched itself to the scene while Brush Pumper 4 responded from Station 5. They both backed into 5th Street from Broadway, parked east of the YMCA near Hazmat 5, and headed to the first floor of the Murrah Building.

On the way, two crew members stopped to care for a critically injured woman who had been removed from the basement. After listening to the radio traffic, which reported that victims were being trapped by the rising water, they decided to enter the first floor from the east side.

They discovered that water from broken sprinkler and domestic water lines was, indeed, rising on the first floor. In addition, natural gas was leaking from broken mains, live electrical wires were dangling, and heavy debris was strewn throughout the area.

The fire fighters quickly located a trapped woman, whom they brought to an area in which the other two crew members were working. The four crew members then
re-entered the basement, finding another woman trapped under debris at her desk. They extricated her, and then removed her from the building using a tabletop as a backboard.

By this time, additional EMS personnel had arrived, and the entire crew re-entered the building. They found another woman lying under debris on the southeast side of the first floor. A large amount of debris had begun falling, and the crew was concerned for its safety as well as for hers. One crew member lifted the woman onto his shoulders, and they began to search for a way out of the area. When they found a ground ladder in a foyer on the south side of the building, the crew climbed down it into the play area and left the building.

Once they had taken care of the injured woman, the crew again entered the building through the main entrance and began helping to remove debris from the second floor. They were assisted by fire fighters from Truck 7, who had been told to position their rig on the northwest side of the Murrah Building. After removing debris from the street, the fire fighters staged the truck and used its platform to reach the third floor, where they began search and rescue operations. When they found no one on the third, fourth, or fifth floors, they went down to help with rescue operations on the second floor.

While the two crews worked on the second floor, four members of Engine and Brush Pumper 4 went to the north side of the building, where they got a 39-foot ground ladder from Truck 5. They tried to raise the ladder to some victims trapped on the upper floors, but they were unable to reach them. Eventually, the victims were rescued over Truck 5’s aerial, which was on the north side of the building.

**Squad 21**

Squad 21 also dispatched itself to the bombing site after crew members heard the explosion and saw reports on television. They staged their apparatus in front of the Regency Towers and entered the Murrah Building from the northwest side. One crew member remained outside the building with medical equipment to coordinate the treatment of any victims the crew managed to remove.

Once inside, squad members helped a group of civilians remove one victim from the building, and then they re-entered the structure and moved east through the debris. They believed that they were in the first-floor basement of the building, and they had a hard time making their way through the debris and the severe structural damage. Nonetheless, they managed to locate a woman trapped by office equipment and a slab of concrete. The crew extricated her, and got her packaged for removal by a group of sheriff’s officers and security guards.

Next, Squad 21 helped personnel from Station 5 dig a woman out of a pile of debris above them. With members of the crew from Station 5 working above and those from Squad 21 working below, they managed to free the woman and package her on a backboard. Engine 10, which had been on an EMS call at the time of the bomb-
ing, also helped the crew of Squad 21 extricate several victims from the northwest corner of the building.

**Truck 6 and Engine 31**

Truck 6 performed a primary search of the Journal Record Building and then went across the street to search another building in which there was a serious gas leak. Engine 7 also was directed to search the Journal Record Building for victims after it initially had been dispatched to Station 1 where staging was established. They had received reports of someone trapped on an upper floor, but they were unable to locate anyone.

When members of Truck 6’s crew finished their search, they were sent to the south side of the Murrah Building to help with the search and rescue operations in that area. The crew entered the building near the freight elevator and looked for victims for approximately 45 minutes. They found a number of bodies and at least one survivor, all of whom they dug out by hand.

Also searching the Murrah Building was Engine 31, which had been dispatched by Fire Alarm at 9:30 a.m. and assigned to support operations on the first floor. Crew members entered the area using the stairway on the east side of the building and helped other units with search and rescue operations from approximately 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.

**Command Officer Response**

The shift’s command officers were also at Station 1 when the explosion occurred, conducting a meeting. As soon as the bomb went off, they all ran outside to see what had happened. When they saw the large cloud of smoke and debris hovering over downtown, they immediately headed for their cars or climbed on apparatus without waiting for the dispatch.

Chief Jim Conner was one of the first command officers from Station 1 on the scene. When he arrived, he was told to take command of Harvey Division, which was working on the north side of the Murrah Building (street names were used to name the various divisions initially). Major Cornelius Young, who was acting district commander for District 1 in which the explosion occurred, was appointed Command.

One of Conner’s first concerns was gaining control of the car fires in the parking lot to the north of the Murrah Building; he was worried that the flames would spread to the Journal Record Building to the north and the Athenia Building to the west. He ordered Engine 1 to do a reverse lay from a hydrant and begin attacking the fires while Engine 6 hit them from the east.

After ordering Truck 1 to rescue victims from the Water Resources Building, Conner requested more aerial apparatus. Next, he told the crew of Truck 8 to back its apparatus into the Murrah Building and extend the ladder to the third floor, where rescuers had found four people in critical condition. The crew of Truck 8 went up
the ladder with a stokes and brought one of the ambulatory victims, a male, down the ladder. In all, four victims were brought out of the building over the ladder.

Conner also ordered Truck 7 to use its platform to check the structural stability of the building. Due to the volume of radio traffic, he had to give most of his orders face to face.

Conner had all the units back up to the building for two reasons. First, he wanted them to take full advantage of their apparatus and maximize the reach of the ladders and platforms. Second, he wanted them to be able to leave as quickly as possible in the event of an emergency evacuation. Some of the drivers were hesitant to do so because of all the debris which could have cut the tires on the apparatus, but Conner told them they could fix the flats later.

Chief Robert McMahon also responded to the scene. The initial report he received had stated that there was a fire and that people had been injured. He asked dispatch several times to provide him with a list of the units responding to the scene, but he couldn’t get one.

McMahon, who assumed command of the incident from Major Young, began setting up his command functions and assigned officers to Safety, Planning, Logistics, and Emergency Medical Services. McMahon assigned Young to operations, Chief Gary Davis to EMS, Major Rick Henson to Planning, and Captain Jim Scalf to Logistics. He advised Planning to find a place to begin staging Logistics.

At the time, McMahon and Young were operating out of their cars, almost in front of the Oklahoma Water Resources Building.
McMahon assumed that all of his first alarm companies were committed, though he didn’t know specifically what they were doing. No Level 1 staging had been established, and no companies were waiting for assignment (Level 1 staging is the “forward” staging area located in the immediate vicinity of the incident). A third and fourth alarm had been requested before he arrived on the scene, and soon afterward, Chief Gary Marrs requested a general alarm that would call in all on duty units and the off-duty shift.

Chief John Moad reported directly to the command post, where the incident commander ordered him to help Major Young in Operations. Noticing that the MDT, which is the on-board computer on all of the fire apparatus, wasn’t listing the responding units, he tried to call dispatch on a cellular phone. When he found that the phone lines were jammed, he raised dispatch on Channel 2 and got a list of the responding companies, which he gave to the chief’s driver, who began listing out the companies for Young.

At about 9:15 a.m., Moad and Young moved to 604’s car (604 is one of the on-duty responders), because Moad was more familiar with it, and it had a prototype board that listed all the units in town. The car became the location for the Operations Division.

Moad helped coordinate the assignment of units and basically served as a Deputy Operations Chief while Young dealt directly with the divisions to determine their needs. Initially, units were assigned to a single resource function until the different divisions could be established.

**The First Evacuation**

At 10:30, a second explosive device was reportedly discovered, and the Murrah Building was evacuated. This evacuation gave the fire department the opportunity to relocate the incident command post to the parking lot of the Southwestern Bell building at 6th Street and Harvey. As units were pulled back, Chief McMahon evaluated his resources and developed a strategy for the ongoing operation.

All of the companies were told to report to staging at 10th and Harvey, which had been chosen as the command post’s new site, and to stand by for further orders. This evacuation was an extremely difficult and emotional experience for the crews working in the building. A number of them were in the process of extricating conscious victims, and they had to leave them in place. For example, members of Squad 18 and Truck 8 had been trying to lift large pieces of debris from a woman’s legs with a hydraulic spread for approximately 30 minutes when the evacuation order was given. Fortunately, they managed to free her and carry her from the building. The crew of Squad 21, which was working with crews from Stations 5, 8, and 10 on a long-term extrication when the order was given, wasn’t so lucky. Crew members were reluctant to leave their victim, whom they hadn’t yet managed to free, and had to be ordered out of the building.
The task of organizing the new command post fell to Chief Jackie Edmonson, who responded to 10th and Harvey, where he commandeered several police officers and fire fighters to help him.

While personnel who were ordered to the intersection with their apparatus for staging began to arrive, Edmonson placed the mutual aid fire fighters on the northwest corner, police on the southeast corner, media on the southwest corner, and civilians on the northeast corner. When the fire apparatus began to arrive, he had them stage on the east side of the street, which was north of the intersection by a large church.

As this set up was happening, the decision was made to set the command post up at 8th and Harvey instead of 10th and Harvey, which worked out well because the staging was now located away from the command post. So many units, apparatus, and people had begun reporting to 10th and Harvey that it would have been difficult to set up the command post there.

Heavy equipment began to stage at 10th and Harvey, as did the utility companies, Oklahoma Gas & Electric, Oklahoma Natural Gas, the water departments, street maintenance personnel, and others, including the cranes that began to show up at the site. As this part of the staging began to grow, it was moved down 10th Street towards Hudson.

When it was again deemed safe to re-enter the Murrah Building, different companies and mutual aid personnel were rotated into the scene to continue the search and rescue operations. About 25 people from OCFD were grouped into teams according to specialty, including trench rescue, rope rescue, and search and rescue.

One of these teams was sent to the roof of the Murrah Building up Truck 7's ladder and worked its way down, removing glass and other hanging material that was a hazard. Another team entered the north side of the building and began search and rescue operations on the second floor. Canine teams also went to work in the area, detecting and identifying the location of the dead. The bodies were put into body bags and taken to the medical examiner on the north side of the building after another report of a second explosive device occurred at 1:30 p.m.

After the first report of another explosive device at 10:30 a.m., Engine 5 was assigned to work in the Pit and on the second floor in the western portion of the building. Truck 5, which was ordered to ladder the northeast corner of the building, searched the areas that were accessible and helped the FBI with crime scene photography. The crew left the area when the second bomb scare occurred, returning when the “all clear” was sounded. Engine 5 and Truck 5 both returned to the station at 8:00 p.m.

Truck 7, Engine 8, and Truck 8 were all assigned to the same team and again positioned their apparatus at the northwest corner of the Murrah Building. The team was instructed to continue surveying the building for structural integrity and to transport crews to the upper floors of the building in the bucket. As operations contin-
ued, team members were also told to secure the building and ask all nonfire department personnel to get out. The team found 30 people digging in the debris on the second floor and instructed them to leave, then asked for fire department personnel to replace them.

Truck 7 continued assisting in search and rescue operations and moving crews to upper floors until the second bomb scare at 1:30 p.m. Crew members checked several of the floors on which they had dropped off crews and then moved their truck to the Regency Towers. Following the second “all clear”, Truck 7 returned to the Murrah Building and continued operations as before. The crew worked until 4:00 p.m., when it was relieved.

The crew of Station 15 was assigned to complete a secondary search of the fifth floor of the Murrah Building, and they went up in Truck 7’s bucket. Crew members continued their search until the second emergency evacuation, after which they were told to search the building at 519 Harvey Street. This evacuation took about ten minutes. Next they worked with companies from Station 17 to search the Regency Towers. They found no victims during their 90-minute operation.

During the first bomb scare at 10:30 a.m., Engine 31 evacuated to 5th Street, near the Regency Towers where it was staged for about 45 minutes before it was cleared to return to the Murrah Building’s basement to continue operations. The crew also helped other units with search and rescue operations and reported finding three or four people alive—and many dead—during the operation. At approximately 5:00 p.m., Engine 31 was relieved.

The crew of Truck 31 staged its apparatus at 5th and Robinson, and crew members carried equipment to the Murrah Building where they provided lights on the east side of the basement. The crew then went back to the truck, which a law enforcement officer told them to move. They relocated to 4th and Harvey on the west wing of the Murrah Building’s courtyard and brought their equipment to the south entrance of the building where they encountered a crew trying to remove a victim through a skylight. When this effort proved unsuccessful, the crew of Truck 31 carried the injured woman to the east entrance of the basement and took her up the stairs.

As this rescue was being completed, the second evacuation was ordered, and the crew staged at the Regency Tower. When Truck 31 returned to the Murrah Building, the crew reported to the main floor at the south entrance. One of the rescuers already on site asked for a hydraulic tool and cutters, and the officer from Truck 31 went into the hole with the equipment while the rest of the crew stayed outside. He used the tool to disentangle a female victim whose leg was being prepared for amputation and stayed to help with this rescue for the rest of the afternoon.

While the lieutenant was working in the basement, the rest of his crew heard someone calling for help nearby. The chief overseeing the operation in that area cleared them to search for this victim, whom they located in a cave-like opening in the de-
bris toward the center of the building. It took six fire fighters and two nurses about 30 minutes to reach the woman and secure her to a spine board. They passed her through the debris to a place where personnel could treat her bleeding before they removed her from the building.

Truck 31’s crew continued to search in the general area of the skylight until their lieutenant rejoined them. They were sent to the garage at 4th and Harvey for rehab at 5:00 p.m.

**Command Officers Actions After the First Evacuation**

All the command officers reported to the command post when the first emergency evacuation was sounded at 10:30 a.m. They formulated a plan for gaining control of the incident. Chief Conner was assigned to return to the scene to assume command of the building and to coordinate activities. With Chief Vernon, Conner established himself as rescue command, and the two set up a plan to route all personnel through the command post so as to establish a personnel accountability system.

This system was managed by Chief Moad, who assigned an officer to stage the incoming personnel and form them into teams of 12 members. Each team was put under the command of an officer and assigned a radio. Their identification was taken for accountability purposes, and they were briefed and moved to the scene.

On the north side of the building, Major Taylor tried to coordinate and control the activities of the rescue personnel and volunteers. This task was extremely difficult due to the sheer number of rescuers and to the fact that there were so many points of entry into the building from that side.
At 1:00 p.m., Chief Mike Webb met with the command officers at the site and gave them specific assignments to be implemented at 3:00 p.m. which would strengthen the command and control of the incident. Chief Pennington was assigned to assume Logistics, and Chief Edmonson was sent to Rescue Command to relieve Chief Conner.

Along with Chief Tabor, Chief Edmonson devised a method of identifying the layout of the building. To avoid confusion, they decided to refer to the exterior of the building as Sectors 1, 2, 3, and 4 and to the interior floors as Divisions 1, 2, 3, and so on.

Chief Bunch, who coordinated with the law enforcement agencies, also sought to reduce the confusion at the site by putting the U.S. Marshal's Service in charge of scene security and control. Since so many different law enforcement personnel were on the scene, no one agency had been initially placed in charge of scene perimeter control.

When another explosive device was reportedly found in the building at 1:30 p.m., Chief Conner was with an Oklahoma Highway Patrol bomb technician, who told him that they should evacuate the building again so that they could address the problem. The device was removed in the sheriff's bomb trailer and exploded in a remote location.

Following this second evacuation, Chief Moad and Major Taylor started working on the south side of the building with several police officers to gain control of the scene and shut down access to the building.

When Chief Edmonson relieved Chief Conner at 3:00 p.m., Conner gave him a status report. Some truck companies were operating in the building as were the specialty teams under Chief Shannon. A number of dog teams, mostly from law enforcement agencies, were also working the scene. In addition, Conner identified the adjacent buildings in which primary searches had been done.

Shortly afterward, the U.S. Marshals began to implement perimeter control and clear out people who were not involved directly in the rescue operation. In terms of resources, Edmonson felt that there were already enough personnel at the scene.

By then, Division Chief Shannon, who was in charge of rescue operations, was reporting to Edmonson, who was Rescue Command. Edmonson was working directly with Chief Shannon’s assistant, Major Craig Rokie, to get a feel for the interior operations. Shannon reported that all of the floors had been searched and that the walking wounded were out of the building.

Initially, Edmonson used an inspector's van as a command post. When he found that it didn’t work well, he set up his operations in the loading dock on the west end of the Murrah Building. He chose the loading dock because it was close to the operation, and the building’s architect, whom he’d met on the scene earlier in the day,
had told him it was stable. Edmonson had the debris cleared and then ordered tables and chairs for the rescuers and for the command post. Since he already was located on the south side of the building, Edmonson did not establish a Division 1.

Also reporting to Edmonson was an officer on the south side of the Murrah Building whose specific orders were to allow no one in or out of the building unless they had been assigned. When the officer began to ask Edmonson whether certain companies were supposed to be in the building, the chief realized that people were freelancing, or operating without specific direction from Command. Essentially, anyone who showed up in bunker gear and identified themselves as an Oklahoma City fire fighter was allowed inside. According to the U.S. Marshal’s Service they had been instructed by Command to allow anyone with bunker gear into the site.

**EMS Operations**

While the fire department responded to the bombing site to search the rubble for victims, EMSA responded to begin caring for them. EMSA provides Oklahoma City and other municipalities in the area with ambulance service. Despite the fact that the explosion knocked the primary and backup telephone lines into EMSA’s dispatch out of service, seven of the ambulances and two of the supervisor units responded as soon as the explosion occurred. EMSA also lost cellular service, so only 911 was available for communication.

When it finally became clear what had happened, all of EMSA’s units switched over to the emergency operations center frequency for disaster communications. EMSA’s dispatch center tried to contact the various area hospitals using the Hospital Emergency Alert Radio (HEAR) frequency, which is used primarily by hospitals and ambulance services during disaster operations to coordinate activities. However, a number of the hospitals were not monitoring this channel, and police officers had to be dispatched to tell them to tune into it.

The initial plan was to station one EMSA supervisor at the incident command post and another at triage and treatment, because each supervisor’s vehicle is equipped to operate as a miniature command post. EMSA Medical Command was located at 6th and Robinson, along with triage and treatment, and staging was located at 10th and Robinson. A secondary triage area was established at the northwest corner of the Murrah Building at 5th and Harvey; three ambulances were staged at this location.

By 9:17 a.m., EMSA had begun to recall all its off-duty personnel to work, and at 9:25 a.m., EMSA command requested mutual aid ambulances for staging. At 9:40 a.m., Dr. Peter Maningas, medical director for EMSA and the Oklahoma City Fire Department, asked that the disaster medical assistance team (DMAT), which operates out of Tulsa, be activated.

By 9:27 a.m., EMSA began transporting patients, including at least seven from the east side of the Murrah Building, from the scene to area hospitals. Since the EMSA
communications center was unable to contact the hospitals directly to determine how many beds they had available, police officers were sent to get this information and relay it to Medical Command.

By 9:51 a.m., EMSA knew that Saint Anthony’s Hospital had unlimited beds, Presbyterian had 50 critical and noncritical beds, Norman Memorial had three critical beds, Baptist Medical Center had 20 patient beds, Deaconess Hospital had eight patient beds, Bethany had an unlimited number of “walking wounded” beds, and Mercy and Edmond had an unlimited number of beds.

EMSA also had set up a morgue on the south side of the plaza to hold the bodies of victims until the Medical Examiner’s office could establish a more permanent site.

At 10:05 a.m., the last patient was transported from the treatment and triage areas, and the primary triage and treatment area was moved from 6th and Robinson to 5th and Robinson Streets 16 minutes later. According to the estimates given at the time, 139 victims had been taken from 6th and Robinson, 99 victims by ambulance and 40 victims by other means; ten victims had been taken from 5th and Harvey, all by ambulance; and 61 victims had been transported from 4th and Harvey, 29 of them by ambulance and 32 people by other means. EMSA estimated that 800 to 1,000 people were evaluated at the various triage and treatment areas, but only one in five had to be transported immediately.

When the first bomb threat occurred at 10:30 a.m., the last patient in triage had been sent to a hospital so only the medical staff had to evacuate. Staging was moved to 10th and Robinson, while Medical Command moved to 7th and Robinson. Treatment and triage moved to NE 5th Street and the railroad tracks, while Staging 2 was established at NW I and Harvey. Staging 2 was moved back four blocks.

Volunteer rescuers and medical personnel had established an unauthorized treatment area at NW 5th and Broadway, but no patients were there when an EMSA unit checked it, so the medical personnel at that location were moved to the treatment and triage area at NE 5 Street and the railroad tracks. Several of these unauthorized or “rogue” treatment areas had been set up spontaneously by well-meaning civilians and medical personnel. However, Medical Command was unaware of their existence, and they had no direct communication with either Medical Command or the incident command post. As a result, they had no readily available means of transportation and were unable to provide Medical Command with accurate information about the number of injured people.

At one point, Medical Command was again relocated, to NW 8th and Robinson, and then again to NE 5th and Harrison. At 10:50 a.m., treatment and triage relocated to NE 5th and Oklahoma/Harrison, where a field hospital was set up. Staging 3 was set up at NE 5th and Harrison.

When a resource check was done at 10:54, Staging 1 was at NW 10th and Robinson with 15 units, eight of which were EMSA and seven units were mutual aid. Stag-
ing 2 was at Park; Staging 3 was at NE 5th and Harrison; and Medical Command was at NE 5th and Harrison. Triage and treatment was still at NE 5th and Harrison.

At this time, it was decided that two ambulances with paramedics aboard would stage at the northeast corner of the Murrah Building and shuttle victims to the field hospital at NE 5th and Oklahoma/Harrison Streets, where they were to be triaged and then moved to the appropriate hospital for definitive care. Arriving medical personnel were assigned to the field hospital until it eventually was staffed by about ten emergency room physicians and 20 emergency room or ICU nurses. Ten paramedics were assigned to provide support. By the time the hospital finally was established, however, all of the surface rescues had been completed, and rescue crews were working on the more seriously trapped victims, who had to be extricated more slowly.

At 11:27 a.m., another bomb threat was reported to EMSA in the Old Federal Building to the south of the Murrah Building. Staging 2 was evacuated, and the personnel and units at this location were moved into Staging 1 at NW 10th and Robinson.

By 11:50 a.m., 31 ambulances were on site, as were four buses and eight aid, or wheelchair, cars. The aid cars were used to transport those with minor injuries and were equipped to handle basic life support patients.

The plaza on the south side of the Murrah Building was designated as a triage and treatment area in anticipation of removing a large number of victims from the building. Two additional units were staged at the building, bringing the total to four.

Because the extrication of the trapped victims proved to be so slow, most of the EMSA units were relieved after 1:00 p.m. Only a core group was kept on site. At 1:44 p.m., the field hospital was broken down, and non-EMSA personnel were released from duty.

Another bomb threat occurred at approximately 1:30 p.m., leading to the evacuation of the triage area on the south plaza. It was moved back to NE 5th and Harrison until 2:04 p.m. when it was re-established.

At 2:21 p.m., a woman whose leg had to be amputated to free her from the debris was taken from the Murrah Building and routed to Saint Anthony’s Hospital.

St. Anthony’s Hospital

One of the closest major medical facilities to the incident was St. Anthony’s Hospital, which was approximately ten blocks away. The hospital became aware of the incident in the same way that many people in the downtown area did—they felt the shock wave. They did not know exactly what had happened, but they assumed that they would be getting a large number of patients.
St. Anthony's disaster plan calls for the emergency room (ER) staff to serve as the initial triage point and determine the type of treatment that patients need as they arrive. The first patient was brought in by a police officer in a patrol car at 9:08 a.m. and then others started arriving by private vehicles. By 9:18 a.m. the first ambulances started to arrive with injured victims.

Initially, the patients were being treated in the emergency room itself. However, the first wave of victims that were brought in were not seriously injured, and they wanted to save the emergency room for the more serious cases. An adjacent, outpatient area was set up as a treatment area for these patients.

At 9:30 a.m., the physician in charge of the operation, Dr. Thomas Coniglione, established a triage and collection point in the hospital’s driveway to avoid congestion in either the emergency room or the outpatient treatment area. Three triage teams evaluated the patients as they arrived and determined what treatment they should receive. The serious patients were sent to the emergency room and the superficial injuries went to the outpatient area. When the emergency room began to overflow, patients were sent to the intensive care area, which was located above the emergency room. The overflow area was established by a nurse on her own initiative once she recognized the problem. Dr. Coniglione said that this decision making was indicative of how once people recognized a problem, they worked quickly to resolve it immediately.

Personnel from the hospital and off-duty staff immediately responded to assist, so there was never any concern about staffing. While triaging victims, Dr. Coniglione would look up and pick someone out of the crowd who had the necessary skills to start treatment. If he didn’t see anyone immediately, he’d call out a specialty, and someone—often two or three people—would respond.

According to Coniglione, when a patient was evaluated, medical personnel were assigned to the patient. As opposed to normal operations at a hospital, the physicians assigned to a patient stayed with that person throughout their course of treatment, instead of transferring them to other departments such as X-Ray, for example. No one was wanting for treatment.

As it turned out, the most prevalent type of injury they encountered were eye injuries. There were not enough ophthalmologists to treat everyone individually, so people with these injuries were gathered together in one area.

By 9:45 a.m., three patients were being operated on, and at the peak there were five simultaneous procedures being carried out. It was estimated that there were 35 surgeons working simultaneously on patients.

One of the problems that occurred early was with communications. When the hospital attempted to contact EMSA on their normal channels, they were unable to raised them. What St. Anthony’s did not realize is that EMSA had switched over to their disaster frequency to coordinate their own activities. This situation was quickly rec-
tified, however, because EMSA’s headquarters was right across the street from the hospital and personnel were able to walk over and coordinate activities.

On the other hand, internal communications within the hospital were overloaded quickly. The telephone system was overwhelmed so portable radios which were provided by security and runners were used to pass messages throughout the hospital.

Supplies were readily available and distributed throughout the various treatment areas of the hospital to support the operations. At one point they were running low on supplies, such as gauze and suture material, but a medical wholesaler was contacted and these supplies were delivered immediately.

When rescue personnel finally removed the last survivor from the Murrah Building at 10:40 p.m., the transition to a long-term, labor-intensive rescue/recovery operation began. EMS requirements were scaled down.

A survey of the area hospitals indicates that they treated more than 390 victims, many of whom had arrived in private vehicles. In addition, a number of victims were transported by Oklahoma City Police personnel, and reports indicate that a municipal bus also was used.

Hospital records reveal that the vast majority of these people were treated for lacerations and other basic wounds. The type and volume of injuries were similar to those expected after a tornado or to those reported in other terrorist blasts.

In regards to some of the “lessons learned,” Dr. Coniglione stated that they were prepared for the worst, and when the first patients began to arrive, they were moved to the outpatient treatment area in anticipation of more injured casualties arriving. What they did not realize was that these patients were the most badly injured patients. This misunderstanding was caused by a lack of information from the scene regarding the extent of people injured and the types of injuries. However, due to the speed with which people were rescued and transported, relaying this type of information to the hospital in a timely manner would have been extremely difficult.

Staffing was never a problem. Off duty personnel responded on their own volition. Everyone “pitched in” and did whatever had to be done, regardless of the task. Dr. Coniglione said that he realized this when he saw a physician pick up a broom and begin sweeping glass off of the floor.

Many volunteers reported to the hospital to assist—more than St. Anthony’s could accommodate. The media had made a request for blood donors and mistakenly told them to report to the hospital. However, donations were accepted only at a local blood bank, not at the hospital. This mistake created some frustration among the volunteers because they desperately wanted to help. Hundreds of calls from across the country came and offered assistance of all types, from specialists to supplies. Coniglione said that when he finally was able to return to his office, the door jamb
literally was papered with notes and messages taken by his secretary during the disaster.

Coniglione felt that his hospital, as did the others, responded to this incident well. While they always train for disaster, this incident certainly tested the limits of the training, people, and equipment. The key to the success, he felt, was flexibility and the ability to respond to a changing situation.

**The Federal Response**

FEMA developed the USAR program following Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, when the need for a cadre of trained rescuers that could be mobilized quickly to respond to such disasters became apparent. The program currently consists of 26 task forces located throughout the country, each composed of 61 members that are drawn from a variety of disciplines and divided into four major branches: Search, Rescue, Medical, and Technical. Each multidisciplinary task force is self-sufficient and can be en route to a disaster with a full complement of personnel and equipment within six hours of notification.

The search component of each task force is responsible for locating trapped victims, using a combination of technical search equipment, such as cameras and listening devices, and canine search teams. The rescue component, which is responsible for rescuing the victims the search teams locate, consists of personnel who are trained in skills such as shoring, rope rescue, and confined space operations. The medical component, composed of paramedics and physicians, is responsible primarily for supporting task force members rather than victims. One of the most diverse teams, the technical component, is made up of specialists in the areas of documentation, structural engineering, hazardous materials, logistics, and communications.

Each task force brings with it a standard cache of equipment that provides the task force with everything it needs to operate at a disaster scene for up to 72 hours. This cache includes such items as generators, concrete cutting saws, hydraulic lifting equipment, ropes, a wide variety of hand tools, wheel barrows, lighting, communication equipment, and so on. Task forces also come prepared to house and feed themselves for up to 72 hours so that they won’t strain the local resources, which already are pushed to the limit by the disaster. The cache also includes tents, food, water, and sleeping bags.

FEMA activated the USAR task forces from Phoenix and Sacramento within two hours of the bombing, and the two groups began gathering resources and personnel for deployment.

Phoenix sent Assistant Chief Compton, Assistant Chief Storment, Deputy Chief Barger, and Captain Gallagher to Oklahoma City by commercial airline to help integrate the task forces into OCFD operations. The advance team arrived at 6:30 p.m. on the day of the bombing and met with the incident commander to begin laying the groundwork for the arrival of the federal response.
The Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) advance team from Phoenix arrived during OKC Chief Edmonson’s shift and reported that the bulk of the USAR resources would be in at about midnight.

FEMA also deployed an Incident Support Team (IST) to work with OCFD Operations. An IST is composed of personnel from around the country who specialize in USAR operations and can provide overhead support to the local authorities. These specialists, who are members of fire departments, state agencies, and other organizations, also can ascertain what federal resources can be brought to bear on an incident. The IST, which is modeled on the highly successful U.S. Forest Service overhead teams, is set up according to standard incident command system format with a team leader supported by four branches—Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance.

Once a full IST deployment was on site in Oklahoma City, a 12-hour operational period was established. Deputy Chief Mark Ghilarducci of the California Office of Emergency Services was the IST leader. He arrived at the site Thursday at 1:00 a.m., just about the time Chief Ron Moss relieved Chief Edmonson. Battalion Chief Mike Tamillow of Fairfax County Fire and Rescue was the assistant IST leader for nighttime operations. Battalion Chief Ray Downey of the New York City Fire Department took care of exterior operations, while Division Chief Jim Hone of the Santa Monica Fire Department took care of interior operations. Lieutenant Tom Carr of Montgomery County Fire and Rescue was the logistics chief, and Assistant Chief Kim Zagaris of the California Office of Emergency Services was the planning chief. Other IST personnel on site included Assistant Chief Jim Strickland of Fairfax County Fire and Rescue. David Hammond, a structural engineer from California, was brought in to coordinate the Structural Specialist component of the operation.
When the IST team arrived, Ghilarducci and the other members watched OCFD conduct the rescue operation. After observing for about 45 minutes, they met with Chief Moss to discuss strategy options. Based on this meeting, a series of changes was implemented within an hour. These changes included setting up a hard perimeter using fencing, stopping the use of heavy equipment on the debris pile, relocating the rehabilitation (or “rehab”) area to a more remote location, establishing a work area for the IST in the loading dock, and establishing staging areas.

The IST determined that the operation would be long and intensive and would require a great many USAR resources. A team of OCFD command officers and IST personnel then conducted a full size-up of the structure to determine the extent of the damage.

It was decided that several USAR task forces would be needed to operate at this incident. In addition to Phoenix and Sacramento, which already were activated and arriving on site, other task forces were activated for deployment. At one point, six task forces were working 12-hour shifts on the site removing debris, shoring the building, and extricating victims. The task forces originally were configured such that half of the task force would work 12 hours and then be relieved by the other half. However, due to the tremendous amount of resources that this incident would require, it was decided the entire task forces would work a full 12-hour shift and then be relieved by another task force. This “blitz” attack strategy worked very well and was adopted throughout the entire 17 days of the incident.

While establishing the infrastructure to support the management of the USAR operation, the IST was working around the clock. Within the first 36 hours, most people only had four hours of sleep, if even that much. People were working on coor-
Oordinating the activation, arrival, and deployment of task forces on the site, the establishment of a full IST operation, and regular, ongoing coordination of activities with the Oklahoma City Fire Department.

There was no doubt at any time that this operation was headed by the Oklahoma City Fire Department. Briefings were held twice a day at the change of shift (7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m.) with the OCFD command staff, IST command staff, task force leaders, and representatives from the various law enforcement agencies involved in the operation.

An important tool that was used in keeping everyone well informed of the events that had transpired during the previous 12 hours and the plan for the next 12 hours was an Incident Action Plan. This document was prepared twice a day by the IST and included strategy and tactics plans for the upcoming shift, information such as weather, progress reports, engineering status updates, and other important information.

Later in the incident, a number of other experts were brought in to support the operation or relieve others. They included Chief Mike McGroarty of the La Habra Fire Department, Captain Mike Parrish of Riverside County, and Chief John Huff of the Lincoln Nebraska Fire Department. After a number of days, John Osteraas relieved David Hammond as the lead structures specialist.

One of the reasons that the IST and USAR operation were a success, according to Chief Ghilarducci, was that most of the people involved knew each other from having worked together over the years. Even though this event was the first time that so many task forces from across the country had come together, the command officers and task force leaders had opportunities to meet and work together while developing the USAR program. Due to these personal relationships, it was possible for the task forces to start working right away in an efficient manner.

During his shift, Chief Edmonson mentioned that he also had to work with FBI agents, who kept him apprised of the areas in which they were collecting evidence and who did not impede the rescue operations, and with the military. The military, which responded early in the incident with a large amount of personnel and resources, was not as organized as Edmonson would have liked, so he told an officer that he needed to assign someone to coordinate military resources. As a result, the military immediately set up an operation on the northwest corner of 5th and Harvey with a broken chair and a broken table and began coordinating its resources. This organizational structure became more structured over time, and throughout the incident, the military played an important role in providing personnel, equipment, and transportation.

Tinker Air Force Base sent a number of fire fighters and equipment early in the incident. Initially, Tinker raised its level of security until intelligence personnel determined that no hostile action would be directed towards the base. Once they determined that there was no direct threat to the base, resources were deployed to the
downtown area, and they were used for the duration. Tinker was also where the task forces arrived and departed from throughout the incident.

The U.S. Air Force transported all of the USAR task force personnel and their caches of equipment to Oklahoma City from previously identified points of departure throughout the country. The military transport system already had some experience in this area, having mobilized for earthquakes in California, but it had never been asked to move so many civilians on such short notice. A specialist, Rick Heltin, was brought in to coordinate all of the military airlift operations.

FEMA provided overhead support for the assistance. The director of FEMA, James Lee Witt and other staff personnel from Washington and other locations throughout the country were on the scene to assist in the operation. A Mobile Emergency Response Unit (MERS) from Denton, Texas was dispatched to Oklahoma City. MERS units are designed to provide significant telecommunication support on the scene of an incident. They also have emergency purchasing authority, which was extremely helpful in acquiring specialized equipment for the task forces as well as items such as clothing, bedding, and other support material.

It was decided to establish a unified command post for all of the agencies involved in the incident. The U.S. Forest Service was asked to deploy an overhead team to set up a Multiple Agency Command Center (MACC) for this incident. The Forest Service has extensive experience in using the Incident Command System (ICS) on large scale wildland incidents and were well equipped to establish a similar operation in Oklahoma City. While it was certainly a different application for them (an urban collapse problem vs. a wildland fire), the same type of skills and resources were needed. Pat O’Bannon, a Fire Management Officer from the Savannah River
Forest Station was placed in charge of establishing the MACC operation. A team of Forest Service personnel from across the country were brought together, and by Sunday, April 22, the MACC was up and running in the Myriad Convention Center. The MERS unit installed a complete communications system as well as providing equipment such as fax machines and copiers.

All of the agencies involved in the rescue and law enforcement aspects of the incident were brought together to coordinate the activities at the site. Briefings were held twice a day and a video link with FEMA headquarters in Washington was established.

Ultimately, as the incident was scaling down, the MAC function was downsized and relocated to the city’s emergency operations bunker some distance from the site.

Construction Overview

A large number of companies and people from the construction trades took part in the successful 17-day rescue and recovery operation after the Oklahoma City Bombing. The operation’s success can be attributed to the caliber and dedication of the people involved.

Identifying every individual or company that participated in the operation would be difficult. However, NFPA and the Oklahoma City Documentation Management Team interviewed a number of those who did participate to learn what roles they played and to reconstruct the event from their perspective. Two of the companies from whom people were interviewed were Boldt Construction and Allied Steel.

Boldt Construction, a national company based in Appleton, Wisconsin, manages a number of construction projects in Oklahoma City. Allied Steel has been in business in Oklahoma City since 1939 and primarily does crane rental, specialty rigging, and equipment setting.

At the time of the explosion, a number of Boldt Construction’s managers were at their headquarters, about seven miles from the scene. When the explosion shook the building, they turned on the television and immediately saw what had happened. Jerry Ennis, vice president for Boldt Construction of Oklahoma, realized that construction equipment would be needed on the scene, and he and his managers began trying to contact the proper emergency services personnel. When they eventually reached the Oklahoma County Sheriff’s office and offered their services, they were told to report to the area.

While trying to contact the Sheriff’s Office, Boldt management had begun sizing up the equipment that was available and would be needed on the scene. When they realized that a 50-ton hydraulic crane was being used on a job in Edmond, they ordered it shipped downtown. Within minutes, the crews in Edmond began knocking down the crane, which was escorted to Oklahoma City by Edmond Police. They also began bringing in Boldt crews from other construction sites around the area.
As this was happening, Boldt managers Lex Payne and Don King went to the disaster site, where they reported to the Incident Command Post and offered their services. Within minutes, one of the chiefs asked them to coordinate the arrival and deployment of construction equipment and contractors.

At the time of the explosion, Randy Sudik, president of Allied Steel, was finishing a meeting at his office. He and his construction manager went outside, saw the cloud of smoke and dust, and immediately started heading in that direction in their trucks. As they got close, they began to encounter injured people and stopped to help treat them.

Sudik’s first thought was that it had been a natural gas explosion or that an aircraft had crashed downtown. As he approached the scene, however, he realized that the damage had probably been caused by an explosion, although he had no idea that it had been a bomb.

He contacted Allied Steel’s dispatcher on the radio to begin routing equipment to the scene. According to the dispatcher, they had already received two calls, one from the Oklahoma City Fire Department and another from the police department, asking what equipment they had available to help out at the scene.

One of the first pieces of equipment that Allied deployed was a 50-ton hydraulic crane used on a job downtown, which had just been completed that morning. It was routed to fire headquarters where it was staged along with other equipment. At the peak of the incident, there were five Allied cranes at the site: a 70-ton hydraulic crane, two 50-ton hydraulic cranes, a 100-ton Latis truck crane, and a 185-ton Latis truck crane, the largest truck crane in the state of Oklahoma. Three additional cranes were staged at fire headquarters, but they were not used during the rescue and recovery operation.

Once they arrived at the scene, Boldt managers Payne and King began scouting locations from where they could coordinate all of the construction activity. They decided that a parking lot at 5th Street and Shartell, about four blocks from the Murrah Building, would serve their purposes. This parking lot, which was paved and fenced in, became the fabrication yard as well as the staging area for all of the construction activity over the next 17 days.

Construction personnel had serious concerns about the building’s structural integrity, and once they had a chance to size up the building, they realized that they had to address certain areas immediately. One of these areas was on the south side of the building over the main entrance where the explosion had dislodged several precast concrete panels. The panels were hanging precariously over the route a number of the rescue workers were using. Securing them became as soon as possible became a priority.

Their second priority was to shore up the northwest corner of the building where the explosion had destroyed three out of four of the exposed columns and serious-
The Pit was ultimately shored with a network of pipe shoring that had to be installed by hand. Ly damaged the one that remained. Construction personnel fabricated shoring out of Schedule 40 pipe 12 inches in diameter, with plates 1 inch thick on the top and bottom. In the time it took them to measure the column and fabricate the shoring, the building settled 1/4 of an inch, and the shoring had to be hammered in place. The building was settling very rapidly.

Their third area of concern was what eventually became known as “the pit” in the middle of the building. The floor slabs in this area had been blown away from the columns, dumping rubble three or four floors high into the hole, and the columns, which normally extended only 13 feet before being laterally supported by the floors, now extended 39 feet without any lateral support. Everyone was concerned that these columns might buckle under the load of the building and the debris on the floors above.

The Allied cranes were used to remove debris, and a number of these removals were very challenging. According to Allied’s Sudik, “It was the most delicate game of pickup sticks that you can imagine.” Part of the problem was that no one was sure what was going to happen once the crews placed cables on slings on the debris and began lifting it out, because so many of the large pieces of debris were interconnected. After the incident, Allied threw away all of the rigging it had used because of the unusual stresses that had been placed upon it.

Cranes were used to carry people up into the building. Because the north side of the Murrah Building was so badly damaged, getting into certain areas without being lifted into them by a man basket suspended from a crane was difficult. Law enforcement teams also used a crane to inspect adjacent buildings and to gather evidence from them.
Cranes were used extensively throughout the operation to remove debris and raise workers up to the building.

Construction crews found installing horizontal shoring in the pit difficult because they had to shore from the top down as they removed the rubble. As the debris pile was lowered over the course of the operation, 17-foot lengths of pipe weighing more than 1,000 pounds were brought in to support the columns horizontally. Crews could not place heavy cranes on the plaza next to this area because it would not support the weight of the equipment. Workers had to carry many of the pipe shores into the pit on their shoulders and install them by hand.

In developing strategies for shoring the building, Boldt and the other contractors worked closely with the engineers from the task forces and with David Hammond, the lead engineer for the rescue operation. According to the contractors, it normally takes some time to get an answer from an engineer on a construction site, but this was not the case during the rescue operation. Everyone worked together to identify problems and determine solutions very quickly. The contractors provided input by telling the engineers what types of material might be readily available. For example, one of the original plans called for shoring made of 6-inch-square tubing, while round pipe shoring could be obtained more easily and quickly. Also, the contractors were able to let the engineers know what kind of equipment was available and where it could be used. For example, the building’s garage was located under the plaza on the south side, so weight limitations meant that the only type of equipment that could be used in that area was a bobcat.

For the first two days, managing the construction crews and coordinating the activity of all of the contractors was a bit difficult, given the confused situation. By the third day, however, everyone began to realize that they’d be working at the scene for quite a while and that it would be necessary to bring in additional help and schedule workers to avoid burning them out. The trades people and managers began work-
ing 12-hour shifts, and Boldt brought in managers from other offices across the country to help support the operation.

Among the contractors' activities during the operation was installing a cover on the crater made by the bomb. The bomb technicians wanted to recover evidence from the crater immediately, but this would have interfered with the rescue operations on the north side of the building. To keep the crater free from debris until evidence recovery could begin, crews laid a tarp over it; after a few days, the tarp was replaced by a wooden cover. This cover protected the site and allowed workers greater access to that portion of the building.

The Oklahoma City Bombing marked the first time many of these contractors had worked with the fire department on an emergency, and they were all impressed by the amount of latitude that the fire department gave them to do their jobs. As a result, the private and public sector agencies quickly grew to trust one another and respect each others' abilities. Typical of this trust is an incident Ray Ennis of Boldt recounts. When a Boldt construction manager began telling a command officer how his crew was going to have to place a crane into the building to move some debris, the command officer simply said, "Why are you telling me this? Just do it."

Working around such heavy equipment was also a first for many of the rescuers. As Ennis notes, the number of cranes and other pieces of heavy equipment and their proximity to one another made this construction scene anything but a normal one. In fact, one of the rescue teams, hesitant to move across a particular portion of the scene because of all of the working equipment, asked that operations be suspended for a moment to allow everyone to cross safely. That impressed Ennis, mak-
ing him realize that a scene he took for granted could intimidate someone unfamiliar with it. It also made him realize how much emphasis the rescuers placed on the safety of their own people.

Safety was a major concern throughout the incident, and the private contractors' track record mirrored that of the public safety agencies. There were no major injuries to any of the contractors during the incident.

A number of companies donated equipment, material, and people to the rescue effort, and coordinating all of the contractors on the scene was a large undertaking—one that worked out very well. It was extremely unusual to have so many large pieces of heavy equipment, particularly the cranes from Allied Steel, operating so closely together, but many of the operators had known each other for years and were familiar with the way that they all worked. This helped them coordinate debris removal and keep the operations moving safely.

The rescue and recovery operation in Oklahoma City was a unique project for Boldt Construction, Allied Steel, and all the other construction contractors that participated; it was probably the first time they had ever been involved in such a situation. Based on what he saw in Oklahoma City, however, Boldt's Jerry Ennis predicts that the public and private sectors will have further opportunities to work together and work together well. Admittedly, the circumstances surrounding this operation were unusual, but eventually, says Ennis, the job became very much like any other construction project—"a bizarre construction project, but it was a construction project, and that's how we handled it."

**Cellular Service**

There were two major cellular providers in Oklahoma City—Cellular One and Southwestern Bell. Both responded immediately to the disaster and provided support to the incident.

**Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems**

Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems (SWBMS) had three cell sites providing service to the downtown area at the time of the bombing. None of them were damaged by the blast, but within a short time all of the cells had traffic running five to six times above the normal load. Rescue operations personnel and the media were placing a heavy load on the existing 37 channels, and it was decided to add additional channel capacity. In addition, SWBMS's Dallas office offered their Cell On Wheels (COW), a portable cellular system that could add additional capacity to the system. Plans were made for transporting and locating the COW at the edge of the disaster site.

Additional channels were added to one of the cell sites on the east side, as well as one on the west side, so that a total of 49 channels were now available. A site was
located for the COW at NW 7th and Harvey, and arrangements were made for the equipment that would be needed to get the COW in service.

At 9:30 p.m. the COW arrived. A 40 foot high antenna was erected, and work began on connecting the COW into the local cellular system. By 5:00 am on April 20, it was operational, and the channel capacity was increased to 65 channels in the downtown area. By Thursday afternoon, 50 percent of the traffic load was being handled by the COW and the west site. On Friday, April 22, an additional 10 channels were added to the COW, bringing the total capacity to 75.

In addition to the work done on the cellular system, SWBMS also provided 500 telephones free of charge to city, state, and federal agencies. Company personnel set up charging stations and made hourly deliveries of fresh batteries to two dozen sites in and around the disaster. Calls being made on SWBMS telephones were free of charge for the duration of the disaster.

**Cellular One**

Cellular One also did not have any damage to its facilities. Once they ensured that their equipment was intact, they began focusing their efforts on ensuring that there was sufficient channel capacity. There were four Cellular One sites serving the downtown area, and they began balancing the traffic load between the cell sites.

An additional step that was taken was to assign priority service. A number of channels were set aside for use by personnel using phones that had priority service programmed into them. This was accomplished within 90 minutes of the explosion and helped to ensure that personnel directly associated with the rescue operations could access a channel.

Shortly after the bombing, Cellular One began distributing cell phones to rescue workers and law enforcement personnel. A distribution site was set up and by 4:00 p.m. phones were being distributed. By the end of the disaster, it is estimated that Cellular One provided 1,052 telephones. All of the telephones provided had unrestricted service, and the user could call anywhere, worldwide, toll free.

Initially, there was such a variety of cellular telephone models being used, that it was difficult to ensure that there were adequate supplies of charged batteries available. However, they eventually standardized on one model, which helped significantly. Cellular One personnel worked around the clock providing fresh batteries, not only at their distribution site, but throughout the disaster area.

Cellular One also brought in a COW to provide additional channel capacity in the downtown area. By 6:00 pm on April 19, the COW was operational at Main and Walker Streets and an additional 30 channels were provided in the downtown area. This was still not enough capacity, however, and it was decided to add a sixth cellular site at NW 9th and Robinson. This COW site was operational by 6:00 pm on April 20th, and added another 38 channels.
There was still some congestion occurring at the point where the cellular system linked into the landline system. An additional 48 trunk lines were requested from Southwestern Bell, and this helped to relieve much of the congestion that was being experienced.

The decision had been made by the Oklahoma City Fire Department to establish a Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) at the Myriad Convention Center. The MACC was to be staffed by representatives from a number of different agencies involved in all aspects of the incident, and telecommunications requirements would be significant. A Microcell was installed within the Myriad Convention Center itself, which would provide additional capacity for just that immediate area without taxing the rest of the system. AT&T took a system that was in the process of being manufactured for another customer off the manufacturing line, rushed it through testing, and delivered it to Cellular One. It was operational by 4:00 pm on April 22.

Between the previously existing four cell sites, the three COWs and the Microcell, an additional 300 channels were added to the system.

An additional service that Cellular One had to provide was cellular service for the Fairgrounds. President Clinton was arriving for a ceremony to be held at the Fairgrounds, and Cellular One temporarily installed a COW on April 22 for one day to handle the needs of the President and the Secret Service.

Cellular telephones were a key component of this incident. The rescue services used them extensively throughout the duration of the rescue and recovery operation. The media relied on them heavily to communicate with their personnel. Security and law enforcement personnel coordinated their operations via cellular telephones. There were a host of other agencies and personnel that relied on the cellular system to support their communications needs. This incident demonstrated how the cellular system has become a critical part of managing a disaster scene.

**Southwestern Bell**

Southwestern Bell provided landline telephone service to Oklahoma City and had a number of its facilities located in the downtown area. Following the blast, Southwestern Bell provided supported the operation by not only supplying emergency telephone service, but by donating the use of their facilities.

One of Southwestern Bell’s buildings, One Bell Central, which served as a headquarters and administrative building was turned over to the city for their use immediately following the blast. The parking lot outside of this building evolved into a command village where rescue and law enforcement agencies located their command vehicles. This was a very advantageous location for the command village and served the needs of the various agencies well throughout the incident. In addition, underneath the covered parking area a food distribution site was established for rescue workers and law enforcement personnel.
The Sacramento and Phoenix task forces were housed within the building. Offices were turned into dormitories, and the regular occupants of the offices would stop by, not to do any work, but to check on the welfare of the task force members that occupied them and see if there was anything they needed.

Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) areas were set aside on the first floor, as was a cellular telephone distribution center.

One of the priorities for Southwestern Bell was to provide telephone service to all of the agencies operating at the incident. Landlines were run to the all of the command vehicles that were located in the parking lot outside of the building. This was done by simply finding a telephone in a worker's office in the building and extending the line out of the building to the location desired. Since these lines ran through corridors to the outside of the building, they had to be checked and maintained frequently due to the damage that they endured.

Another area that was critical and required telephone service quickly was the Incident Support Team (IST), which was going to be located in the Murrah Building west loading dock. In order to provide for this service, a 100 pair cable was extended via an underground tunnel from the Federal Courthouse to the Murrah Building. This provided service for the telephones, modems, and fax machines that were required to support IST operations.

Other areas where emergency telephone service was provided included the MACC center at the Myriad, the Medallion Hotel for GSA staff, the U.S. Marshall's command center and other agencies. All told, there were roughly 1,500 phone lines installed at the site within the first week. Since these lines were temporary, they were subject to damage from vehicular and foot traffic and had to be repaired often.

In addition to direct support of the telecommunications needs, Southwestern Bell provided another rather unique form of assistance. Several of their computer aided drafting (CAD) technicians assisted in mapping the building and identifying the locations of the victims. Interviews were conducted with survivors who would identify the locations of missing people just before the blast. These locations were drawn onto a three dimensional rendering of the building by Southwestern Bell CAD technicians, and the drawings were used by the task force engineers and rescue crews in developing search and rescue strategies. Frequently, the victims would be found in the debris pile directly below where they had been shown on the drawing. Throughout the incident, and in the months following, the drawings that Southwestern Bell had developed were the most comprehensive and accurate ones of the building.

Oklahoma Restaurant Association

At the time of the bombing, the Oklahoma Restaurant Association (ORA) was holding its annual conference and trade show at the Myriad Convention Center. The conference, which had started on Tuesday, the day before the bombing, attracted more than 12,000 professional restaurant operators and vendors while the trade show attracted more than 430 exhibitors.
Within hours of the bombing, ORA decided to cancel the conference and establish a feeding operation. Vendors displaying products such as commercial ovens, stoves, and refrigerators immediately put their equipment into operation, and the food that originally was going to be used to feed the conference attendees was diverted to the rescue workers. An ORA management team immediately began contacting local suppliers and vendors, and tractor trailers of food and supplies were soon being dropped off at the Myriad to be stored in refrigerated trailers that were placed outside the building, plugged into the convention center, and left running on site throughout the entire incident. Volunteers workers established a full kitchen and food line, and within the first 48 hours, they prepared more than 25,000 meals.

Not only was this operation feeding the rescuers at the Myriad, but ORA also was supplying food for some of the satellite operations around the disaster site with the help of United Parcel Service (UPS), which provided trucks and drivers to move the food quickly. The UPS trucks and personnel were easy to identify, which allowed them to move more quickly through security perimeters.

ORA continued to provide support for the feeding operation for about ten days until the American Red Cross took over the preparation and distribution of food to the rescue workers. Over this period, between 3,200 to 4,000 meals were prepared for each eight-hour shift, 24 hours a day, for a total of approximately 100,000 meals. Each day, more than 200 workers were needed to fill all the shifts.

**Charitable Organizations**

There were a number of charitable organizations involved in various aspects of the incident. Their operations ranged from providing direct support, such as food and clothing, to counseling and support to the families of the victims.

The American Red Cross dispatched personnel to the scene immediately following the bombing. The Disaster Action Team responded and provided first aid on the scene. According to one account, approximately 25 members of the Disaster Action Team went into the building and helped extricate victims. Personnel in the Emergency Response Vehicle served cold drinks and snacks to the rescue workers.

In addition to the support on the scene, arrangements were made at the Red Cross Chapter headquarters to manage the people volunteering to assist. On the first day alone, 2,200 people registered.

People were also dropping off donations to assist in the operations. The media was broadcasting requests for donations that were, at times, erroneous, according to the Red Cross. The response to these requests would be immediate and overwhelming. Even though the materials would ultimately be used, there was some difficulty in managing the influx of material.

By Saturday, April 22, Red Cross operations were moved to a vacant building on Sheridan Avenue, near the Murrah Building. The Red Cross maintained this office there until June 21, 1995.
Volunteers worked around the clock feeding the rescue workers.

After approximately 10 days, the food operation that was being run by the Oklahoma Restaurant Association was turned over to the Red Cross. They continued to provide meals at the Myriad for the task forces housed there, as well as throughout the site.

The Red Cross estimates that more than 20,000 people received crisis counseling from 1,088 Red Cross workers. More than 9,500 volunteers and staff assisted during the rescue and recovery operation and in the aftermath.

**Feed The Children**

Another organization, Feed The Children (FTC), provided assistance at the scene. FTC is based in Oklahoma City, and was formed in 1982 in response to famines in Africa. They maintain an 18,000 square foot warehouse in Oklahoma City that is stocked with drinking water, food, tools, and other equipment.

FTC established a distribution site about one block north of the bombing site. They helped to provide food and equipment for the operation using the equipment that they had stockpiled.

There were a multitude of other organizations that provided significant and ongoing support throughout the operation. The Salvation Army had a number of food sites set up and were involved in distributing equipment and material. Organizations such as the American Heart Association, the American Lung Association, the
Areawide Aging Agency, Associated Catholic Charities, Boy Scouts of America, Camp Fire Boys and Girls, Girl Scouts, Goodwill Agencies, among others, all assisted victims of the bombing and the rescue operation.

**Media**

In an effort to find out what the media thought about the way this incident was handled in regards to media operations, NFPA investigators met with media representatives from several local television stations, a national news organization, and several newspapers. Although those interviewed did not represent all the media that responded to the incident, their comments helped shed some light on the needs of the media during a major incident and on the role that the media can play.

The local television stations found out about the incident in the same way many people did: They felt the blast. Several crews were already downtown, covering other stories, when the explosion occurred. One reporter had just left police headquarters and immediately headed toward the blast area, providing a report on her cellular telephone while en route. A television crew returning to the station from the scene of a stabbing turned around, and the cameraman began filming through the windshield as they drove to the scene. One television station had a camera mounted on its antenna to provide shots of the area weather. The station immediately trained the camera on the downtown area and saw the cloud of smoke coming from the blast. In the initial stages of the incident, all of the footage shown was from the local affiliates. Very quickly, however, the national networks dispatched their own news crews to cover what was rapidly evolving into a major story.

In fact, the influx of media, both local and national, was immediate and almost overwhelming. Many news organizations feel it is important to have their own people on the scene, providing the information to their own communities, even though they may be thousands of miles away from the scene, and satellite technology makes it easy for television stations to have a local presence at a major news story. Reporters were arriving from around the world to report on this incident.

To accommodate all these people and their equipment, an area in was established in a parking lot several blocks from the scene. All media representatives were asked to report to this area where they were then allowed to set up their satellite trucks.

Meals were not only provided at the Myriad, but throughout the site.
At one point, there were 48 satellite trucks in the lot.

Providing a location for satellite news vehicles that is close enough to the scene to give news crews access, yet out of the way of the rescue operations is something local officials should be prepared to do at any major incident.

Oklahoma officials found that one key factor to working effectively with the media was to have a single spokesperson who was regularly available. Fortunately, the Oklahoma City Fire and Police Departments had cultivated relationships with the local media and a number of reporters and public information officers were familiar with each other because they had worked together on previous incidents.

After the bombing, the Oklahoma City Fire Department became the primary media contact, with the department's public information officer, Chief John Hanson, providing regular updates. All the reporters and media representatives we talked to felt that Hanson did a good job of being available and providing information in a timely manner. One reason for his success, according to one reporter, was his ability to “talk in sound bites,” which is very important to television. Another factor was the availability of Hanson or another department representative. Due to the nature of the incident, stations could never predict when they might be going live, and it was very valuable having someone available on short notice as an official spokesperson.

While the Oklahoma City Fire Department provided regular updates, these updates often did not coincide with live television updates from the scene. It would have been helpful to have a central location where the media could gather the latest information just before going live. One media outlet suggested that a central media command post be established where reporters could go for this data.
Oklahoma television stations were covering the incident live, 24 hours a day, for a number of days. This placed great demands on the news organizations in terms of resources and personnel. Just as with the rescue crews, the news crews were putting in very long hours under extremely stressful conditions.

The Oklahoma City bombing was a difficult incident to cover for many reasons. Early on, for example, the overwhelming demands put on the cellular telephone system made it difficult for studios to communicate with their news crews. As one producer put it, they were “communicating with the news crews by ESP.” Reporters would suddenly just “pop up” with a live report from the scene.

Television crews found it hard to get new footage because they were restricted from the scene and there was so little visual access to the site. The media representatives interviewed said that they understood the reasons for these restrictions, but they did cause the incident to get stale in terms of visual impact. Because television crews could not regularly get “fresh” footage for their newscasts, they began to resort to such measures as putting cameras with long lenses on elevated platforms several blocks away. Eventually, FEMA began to provide some video footage shot by the Phoenix US&R task force during the rescue and recovery operations.

Since the media had little visual activity to cover at the scene itself, they would sometimes turn their focus on the rescue workers and others involved in the incident, lining up along the fence between the Incident Command Post and the area where workers walked back and forth. At times, it was like running a gauntlet, with reporters yelling questions and asking workers for interviews. Reporters also interviewed the victim’s families, although several reporters said that if a family member told them they did not want to talk, they honored their wishes. Frequently, however, according to various media personnel, they found that the victims’ relatives did want to be interviewed and that they found the interviews to be a calming, relieving experience.

Television stations dedicated tremendous resources to covering this incident, some going so far as to press sales people into service in the news rooms. One station even hired 25 freelancers to cover the incident, a relatively unusual practice.

Another local television outlet took the rather unusual step of setting up one of its smaller studios as an editing studio where news crews from around the world could edit their tapes and pull in footage from a common “feedbox.” The move was so successful that the station eventually had to move into a larger studio, where they established 25 editing stations. By the middle of the day following the bombing, an estimated 300 people were using the studio. One station employee remarked that he had no idea where some of the languages he heard even came from.

Although the written press does not always have as urgent a need to respond in a timely manner as television does, the New York Times had been working on a mobilization plan for just such an incident when the Oklahoma bombing occurred, and the paper wound up flying a number of reporters to the scene on the corporate jet to establish a mini-bureau in Oklahoma City.
In several instances, the media and those managing the scene worked together for their mutual benefit. At one point, for example, the fire department needed a live aerial shot of the incident and asked a media helicopter to go up for them and get it. Since the airspace over the incident had been restricted 10 minutes after the explosion, the media jumped at the chance. A command officer went along to gain an aerial perspective on the incident.

In another instance, the police public information officer (PIO) asked a reporter at one of the local television stations to tell the populace where the triage points were located and what was going on.

During the incident, NFPA investigators also conducted numerous interviews with the US&R task forces, asking them, among other things, how they worked with the media and how they handled media requests. One task force from Phoenix brought its own PIO, Battalion Chief Phil Yeager, when it was deployed. Although this position was not part of the task force's standard personnel list, the task force leader determined that it would be important to have someone covering the event. Yeager became responsible for coordinating with the media—one less detail the task force leader had to contend with.

Yeager was able to update the Phoenix media outlets on the scene and provide them with the "local flavor" they were looking for. He also scheduled interviews with rescue workers when possible to give the media a different perspective on the incident. And when something happened that affected the task force, Yeager made sure that the information given to the media was accurate; this helped quell unfounded rumors. At one point, a task force member sustained a back injury. Yeager immediately contacted one of the Phoenix television stations to give them the
facts of the incident, thereby calming the fears of the fire fighter’s family and co-workers. Yeager also provided the Phoenix fire department with regular updates from the incident, which they relayed to the families and co-workers of the rescuers.

Phoenix also added a videographer to its task force whose sole responsibility was to document the actions of the task force on video. His footage provided a valuable record of the early stages of the incident and was distributed to the media by FEMA.

This incident was as emotionally demanding on the reporters and other media people as it was on everyone else at the site. Several reporters would just not quit, and one producer said that he had to drive down to the scene from the studio and force his reporters and camera crews to leave the scene to get some rest. Several stations brought in counselors to talk not only to the people working at the scene, but to those in the stations, too. One man said that he had seen a lot of damage and human suffering in his newsroom career, but it had always been in some remote location seen on a television monitor. This time, the things he was seeing were taking place just a few miles away in his hometown.

Emergency responders often do not perceive the media as a key component of the incident management. However, the bombing in Oklahoma City showed that actively working with the media can be extremely beneficial in meeting the needs of the public and the media while still providing emergency services where needed.

Response-Day 2 through Day 17

Day 2
Thursday, April 20, 1995

By Day 2, a number of different resources had started to flow into the site, and fire departments responded from all over the country to assist. OCFD formed work groups of OCFD and mutual aid fire fighters under OCFD direction to help remove debris. In fact, so many people responded that the system quickly became difficult to manage. Both on- and off-duty OCFD personnel were also rotated through the scene.

Federal resources—specifically, the US&R task forces—also started to arrive. The standard operating procedure for task force operations is to make a “blitz” attack for the first 24 hours following an incident. After that, half of the task force is relieved for rest while the other half continues working. They then move into two 12-hour shifts with each half relieving the other. Very early in this incident, however, it was decided that an entire task force would operate for 12 hours before it was relieved by another task force. Twenty-five such operational periods passed before the incident ended 17 days later.
Since this incident was so large, IST asked FEMA to deploy four task forces from New York (NY), Virginia Beach (VA), Los Angeles County (CA), and Montgomery County (MD), in addition to the two from Phoenix (AZ) and Sacramento (CA). By the end of the incident, 11 task forces would be used.

The Phoenix US&R Task Force left Luke Air Force Base in Arizona and arrived at the site of the bombing at 1:00 a.m. on Thursday. They immediately were assigned to search operations on the second floor and ordered to install shoring in the basement. As their equipment was off-loaded from Air Force trucks, it was set up in a garage several blocks from the bombing site where a full logistics support operation was established.

The Sacramento Task Force arrived from Travis Air Force Base at 6:00 a.m. and was assigned to search and rescue operations in the southwest basement underneath the America’s Kids Daycare Center.

Most of the Phoenix Task Force was relieved at 8:00 a.m. for rest and rehab, and task force members went directly to the headquarters of Southwestern Bell, which had given the city the use of its building at 8th and Harvey Streets. The building’s offices were quickly transformed into dormitories for both the Phoenix and Sacramento Task Forces to use when off duty.

By this time, resources from the Oklahoma City area also were being mobilized. The support provided by the community was divided into two areas: direct support of the rescue operations on the scene such as supplying cranes, generators, and the like, and support of the rescue effort—supplying food, housing, and so on.

Cranes were brought in and personnel from Boldt Construction of Oklahoma City were on site to provide technical assistance. Boldt also coordinated a number of the other construction companies operating on the site.

As for supporting the rescue effort, citizens donated time, money, services, and materials. At the time of the bombing, the Oklahoma Restaurant Association (ORA) was having its annual convention at the Myriad Convention Center, five blocks from the Murrah Building. Within hours, it established a feeding operation on the main floor of the convention center using the equipment and supplies it had brought for the convention. ORA immediately made arrangements with local suppliers to bring food to the convention center, and several suppliers dropped refrigerated trucks at the Myriad to store it in.

Also at the Myriad was an area set aside for donated goods and clothing. A mini “drug store” was set up in one corner, with toiletries and over-the-counter medicines. Masseuses were available daily. An optometrist shop was set up to repair eyeglasses. People brought in their “therapy dogs” for rescuer workers to pet so that they would feel better.
On the site, volunteers pushed wheelbarrows full of ice, drinks, and food for the workers. A local Little Caesar's pizzeria set up a field kitchen and proceeded to cook pizzas nonstop for about 13 days. In addition, Feed the Children set up a distribution center in a parking lot.

Personnel from the National Fire Protection Association were on site by 8:30 a.m., Thursday morning, working with the ATF and the Oklahoma City Fire Department to help document the incident for a number of the agencies involved. Ed Comeau, Chief Fire Investigator; Jon Jones, Senior Fire Service Specialist; and Stephen Foley, Senior Fire Service Specialist, were on scene for the next 13 days.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers sent two of its US&R STOLS (Systems to Locate Survivors) teams and two structural engineers to the scene. STOLS teams are equipped with listening devices that are designed to identify victims trapped in piles of rubble. The structural engineers are part of a cadre of engineers that are highly trained in structural collapse operations.

At 2:30 p.m., the Virginia Beach Task Force arrived at the Murrah Building where it was assigned to search and rescue operations. It was sent with the OCFD to the basement near the daycare center at 9:30 p.m., because it was thought that 21 children's bodies might still be buried there. However, all 19 had been removed from that area by this time.

An hour and a half later, the New York Task Force had arrived at the Murrah Building.
As time passed, the disaster site became more organized. Task force engineers and personnel from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began mapping the building and identifying the columns to provide landmarks for the rescue operations. The front debris pile was split into three distinct areas—east, central, and west—and portions of the building were called by distinctive names. For example, the area under the daycare center became known as "the Pit." The large pieces of concrete hanging by reinforcing rods on the upper floors were called "widow makers" or "wind chimes." A 35,000-pound piece of concrete hanging from the eighth and ninth floors was called both the "Mother Slab" or the "Slab from Hell."

The Slab from Hell was, in fact, compromising rescue operations beneath it and had to be either stabilized or removed. It was feared that since it was only being held in place by some reinforcing rods, it could fall at any time. On Sunday, a team inspected the slab to determine a course of action. Due to its location and the floor damage around it, safely cutting the slab free would have been extremely difficult. Another option was to use explosives to either "shred" the slab or sever the rebar and allow it to fall, but a demolition contractor estimated that it would take approximately 30 hours to place the charges. Eventually, the team decided to secure the slab in place with cables. The following day, it was secured by crews working from cranes, and smaller pieces surrounding the Mother Slab were cut away.30)

This incident was one of the first in which structures specialists from both the US&R task forces and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers were widely used. Initially, the task force engineers were the only ones operating on the scene. However, it quickly became apparent that engineering resources had to be coordinated at the IST level so David Hammond was brought in to serve as the lead structures specialist during the day. Tom Niedernhofer of the Corps of Engineers covered the night shift. The Corps of Engineers also brought in engineers to augment the task force operations.

**Day 3**

**Friday, April 21, 1995**

The process of removing debris from the building was very labor-intensive. Much of the work had to be done by hand, and debris had to be removed from some areas in wheelbarrows or 10-gallon buckets. In other areas, human chains were formed to pass the debris out. As more and more of the rubble was removed, small Bobcats were brought in to help.

All of the debris removed from the building was sifted twice by law enforcement personnel, first on the site and then at an impound yard, to which it was trucked. The object of this process was to identify potential evidence and to recover personal belongings.

At 7:00 a.m. on Day 3, the Los Angeles County Task Force was placed into service on the scene. Until they were relieved at 7:00 p.m., they conducted search opera-
tions on all floors of the Murrah Building and in the Journal Record Building to the north. Several members of the task force also helped the FBI Evidence Recovery Team to dismantle vehicles for evidence.

At 1:00 p.m., the Phoenix Task Force returned to the scene and was divided into two teams. One team continued the search and rescue operations on the second floor of the Murrah Building while the other removed debris and conducted search and rescue operations on the north debris pile.

That afternoon, the Oklahoma City Fire Department held a strategy meeting with FEMA, NFPA, and several other organizations to discuss resource management. It was apparent that the incident was going to be a long one, so the OCFD decided to ask the National Interagency Coordination Center in Boise, Idaho, for a Type I (short) overhead team to help manage the resources and document the incident as it progressed.

During the day, four more bodies were found, this time in the restaurant in the Athena Building to the north of the Murrah Building.

When the Virginia Beach Task Force came back on duty at 7:00 p.m., more than 62 people were still thought to be missing. The task force was sent to work in the Pit, and Bobcats were brought in through the garage to help remove debris.

That evening, wind, rain, and hail began to fall on the site. The storm intensified throughout the night, causing work stoppages in the early hours of Saturday morning as winds gusted up to 35 miles per hour. The wind was causing debris to be-
Rescue teams performed the laborious task of removing debris, hand over hand from the debris pile.

come loosened on the building, endangering the rescuers operating below. In addition, the east wall of the building had lost much of its lateral support, and it would move when strong wind gusts hit it.

Day 4
Saturday, April 22, 1995

By Day 4, the operations were becoming routine for all the agencies involved. Briefings, which were held at 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. every day, involved all the key players in the rescue operation as well as law enforcement representatives.

In addition, the planning branch of the IST prepared incident action plans (IAP's) twice a day and distributed them to command personnel involved in the operation. These plans, which included situation reports, objectives for the upcoming operational period, safety hazards, weather forecasts, building diagrams, and other pertinent data, were instrumental in disseminating information uniformly among the different agencies and groups involved.

In response to concerns about the quality of the food, the incident management team also decided that all food would be prepared by the Oklahoma Restaurant Association at the Myriad where most task force personnel and their equipment were being housed. The Association would also deliver the food to the various feeding sites. This would cut down on the number of people who became ill after eating food that had been left out too long and would alleviate the problem with trash, which had begun to accumulate throughout the site. UPS trucks and drivers were drafted to deliver the food since they were readily identifiable, which helped them get through security.
Again, severe weather began to affect the rescue operations. The high was only 48°F, or 17°F below normal, and a severe thunderstorm hit at 4:30 in the morning, interrupting rescue operations.

During the storm the teams working in the first floor of the Murrah Building noticed that a support beam had shifted about 6 inches. They quickly installed additional shoring to prevent it from dropping any further, then double-checked their evacuation routes to ensure that they were clear of debris and easy to find in the event of an emergency evacuation.

The personnel assigned to the Type I Team from National Interagency Coordination Center had begun to arrive on site and set up the multi-agency coordination center (MACC) in a large room at the Myriad Convention Center. Representatives from each of the agencies involved in the operation participated in the MACC, which included a centralized media contact, Logistics, Planning, Operations, etc. FEMA installed hardwired telephones for the various areas of the MACC, and a video hookup with Washington was installed to allow MACC personnel to video conference with FEMA agency representatives twice a day. By 4:30 p.m. on Sunday, the MACC was up and running.

Day 5
Sunday, April 23, 1995

Rescue operations had to be halted again at 2:00 a.m. on Day 5 when cracking and movement were detected on the second floor, and the area had to be reshored. When operations resumed, the second floor was stabilized.
Rescue operations were conducted around the clock.

Later that morning, rescuers met to discuss the large pieces of concrete hanging by rebar on the upper floors. They felt that the concrete was endangering the rescue operations below and decided to remove it.

At 1:00 p.m., the Sacramento Task Force completed its last shift and prepared to demobilize. Three and a half hours later, the Fairfax County Task Force, which had been deployed at 5:30 a.m., arrived in Oklahoma City.

During the evening shift, the Chief of the Oklahoma City Fire Department met with IST and OCFD personnel, who were concerned that no plan was being followed from shift to shift. As a result of this meeting, several procedures were implemented to ensure the continuity of operations from one shift to another and to allow the incident commander to be able to plan better. In addition, six more IST personnel from around the country were activated to support rescue operations.

At one point during the search operations, a task force encountered a suspicious-looking briefcase. FBI explosives personnel x-rayed it and determined that it was not another bomb.

**Day 6**
**Monday, April 24, 1995**

On Day 6, Chief Mike McGroarty of the La Habra, California, Fire Department was assigned to IST front operations, and the task forces were put on 12-hour shifts to create a more uniform work schedule. They now worked from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. and from 8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. The Los Angeles County Task Force was moved to the 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. shift, and the Puget Sound Task Force was deployed at 8:00 a.m.
One of the rescuers' tasks throughout the operation had been to remove debris hanging from the edges of the overhead floors regularly, often by cutting it away and taking it out with a crane. Early Monday morning, a crane operator tried to remove a beam from the Pit, but it was so heavy that the first attempt failed. The beam had to be re-rigged before it could finally be removed.

Construction crews began installing additional pipe shoring on the third level, a process that was expected to take up to ten hours. When the bomb went off, most of the support for the columns that held the Murrah Building up was destroyed. To ensure that the rescuers were safe from collapse, a significant amount of shoring was installed.

Initially, this shoring consisted of wood 4 x 4's. In fact, one area of the first floor eventually became known as "the forest" because of the massive amount of wood shoring holding it up.

A pipe shoring system was later installed in the Pit. This system, which was fabricated on site of 40-foot lengths of 6-inch pipe weighing 800 pounds, was designed by David Hammond and Boldt Construction. It worked by bracing the columns against the remaining stable portions of the structure.

At 1:00 p.m., the Fairfax County Task Force began operations on the site, though it was forced to suspend operations later that afternoon when winds gusted up to 50 miles per hour.

At 10:30 p.m., the Phoenix Task Force was relieved after its last shift. Oklahoma Governor Keating thanked them, personally, for their efforts.

Day 7
Tuesday, April 25, 1995

On Day 7, the New York and Virginia Beach Task Forces finished their last shifts at 1:00 in the morning and were demobilized. That afternoon, they were taken to the Cowboy Hall of Fame where they received a proclamation for their efforts.

At 1:00 p.m., the Menlo Park Task Force began operations at the Murrah Building. An hour later, the Puget Sound Task Force, which had set up its base of operations at the Myriad at 9:30 the night before, began its first shift at the bomb site.

Day 8
Wednesday, April 26, 1995

At 9:02 a.m. on Day 8, a week after the bombing, a moment of silence was observed throughout the city in memory of those who had died in the explosion. As a sign of support, people also drove with their headlights on, wore blue ribbons in memory of the victims, and set up memorials around the perimeter of the site. School children sent hundred of cards to the rescuers, which were left on the tables where they ate.
Earlier that morning, workers had made an opening into the Pit from the first floor, which allowed the Bobcats to remove debris from the area much more rapidly. Access to the Pit was again improved later that afternoon by knocking a hole in a wall, which created two routes along which the Bobcats could remove debris.

Because the debris had actually provided lateral support to the vertical columns damaged in the blast, its removal made the Pit more and more unstable. As the columns lost support, they became much more likely to buckle.

Rescue personnel also began removing the debris hanging by rebar from the upper floors. Personnel assigned to this task first had to rig all the floors with safety lines and equipment transfer and retrieval lines. They then core-drilled all the concrete slabs that were to be removed and fit them with cabling so the rebar could be cut and the cranes could lift them away from the building.

That afternoon, high winds again forced rescuers to suspend work for about two hours. No longer supported by the floor slabs, the east- and west-end walls of the structure had become very unstable, and workers felt that they might be toppled by a particularly strong gust. The east wall was especially vulnerable. The weather was also a factor that evening, when the wind chill factor dropped to the mid 20’s.

Fears of collapse continued into the evening when an emergency evacuation was ordered after a structural engineer monitoring the building saw a large, unstable, concrete panel shift.
Day 9
Thursday, April 27, 1995

By Day 9, the Pit had been cleared down to the floor level. An estimated 100 people were still missing, and most of them were expected to be found near the ground floor between Columns 16 and 22.

When the debris around Column 22 was finally removed, workers noted some damage that had to be repaired before operations could continue. Now that the contractors had access to all four sides of the column, they could install sleeves that were two feet long at the third-floor joints of both this column and Column F22. A quick-setting grout was injected into the sleeves to further strengthen them, and additional pipe bracing was installed to provide more lateral support.

At 8:00 p.m., the L.A. County Task Force completed its last shift.

Day 10
Friday, April 28, 1995

On Day 10, the Puget Sound Task Force was assigned to the 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. shift. By this time, rescue operations had become very organized and somewhat familiar. The situations rescue personnel faced were anything but routine, but the way they dealt with them and the organizational structure both had fallen into place.
Day 11
Saturday, April 29, 1995

On Day 11, the weather was very much in the favor of the rescuers, with an average temperature of 64°F, and workers began to make more extensive use of heavy equipment, such as cranes, trucks, and Bobcats. This allowed them to remove much more debris from the site.

Day 12
Sunday, April 30, 1995

On Day 12, the Fairfax County and Metro Dade Task Forces completed their final work period and began to demobilize, while the Orange County Task Force reported for its first shift at 8:00 p.m.

The operation officially shifted from a rescue operation to a recovery operation, meaning that work had to be done more deliberately and more cautiously. The building had become extremely hazardous due to the extensive debris removal that had been done. Heavier equipment could now be used in the debris pile because there was no longer much hope of finding any survivors who might be injured by it.

The bomb crater was filled with soil to allow the cranes to move in closer for further heavy lifting. One of the dump trucks that was dropping a load of sand overturned into one of the cranes, missing the crane operator by a few feet. He was shaken, but unhurt.

At the request of OCFD, Ed Comeau and Jon Jones of NFPA and Hugh Wood of the National Fire Academy began interviewing the first-due crews and command officers to capture their thoughts and impressions, as well as the actions they took in the first 12 hours of the incident.

During the evening shift, an approaching storm front forced workers from the job several times, and the building and the IST were evacuated. Several of the granite panels on the east wall of the third or fourth floor were dislodged, probably by the wind, and landed on the roof of the one-story structure next to the Murrah Building. The structures specialists inspected the panels and had several of them removed and others braced. Two fire fighters assigned to the eighth and ninth floors of the Murrah Building to monitor the Slab from Hell were rotated hourly to ensure that they were alert.
The ends of the pipe shoring system in the "Pit" were secured to columns by anchors and quick-setting grout.

Day 13
Monday, May 1, 1995

The Puget Sound and Menlo Park Task Forces completed their last shifts on Day 13. Before they left, some of the members visited various schools in the area and relatives of the victims at the request of the governor of Oklahoma.

Task force operations were scaled down as more mechanical equipment was used.

Day 14
Tuesday, May 2, 1995

At 6:00 p.m. on Day 14, IST operations were suspended and a Technical Advisory Team was established.

Day 15
Wednesday, May 3, 1995

On Day 15, a technical advisory team (TAT) was formed to assist OCFD. It was composed of Kim Zagaris; Mike McGroarty, the TAT leader; Don Shawver of Operations; Bob Lee and Steve Shomber of Rescue; Mike Doyle of Safety; Bruce Bailey of Logistics; Rudy Alfaro of heavy equipment; Dr. Ben Schifrin, the TAT medical representative; and John Osteraa, a structural engineer.

Operations were suspended for the day at 6:00 p.m.
Day 16
Thursday, May 4, 1995

The objective during Day 16 was to account for, and remove, all of the bodies by 6:00 p.m. When this task wasn’t completed by the deadline, the workers elected to keep going until the operation was officially terminated by Chief Marrs at 11:52 p.m. At this time, all but three victims had been removed, and Chief Marrs considered the operation too hazardous to continue.

When the recovery operation ended, workers began to prepare the building for demolition. The remaining three victims would be removed after it was imploded. To help identify the area in which they were located, workers spray-painted the debris orange so they would know when they reached the level at which the original debris had been located.

Day 17
Friday, May 5, 1995

Chaplain Wilson of OCFD conducted a small memorial service that was attended by the remaining rescuers on the site at 1:00 a.m. At 2:00 p.m. that afternoon, another memorial service was held on site for the rescue personnel and their families, as well as the families of the victims. Following this service, all TAT personnel were released for demobilization.

The Murrah Building was imploded at 7:01 a.m. on May 23, 1995, by Controlled Demolitions of Maryland. It took 150 pounds of explosives in the building to bring it down.

Explosion Characteristics

The bomb, which is believed to have been made of approximately 4,800 pounds of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil, was hidden in a rental truck parked at the curb near the building’s north entrance. When it exploded, the resulting pressure wave moved outward, “lifting” the building up and causing a number of its columns, beams, floor slabs, and connections to either weaken or fail. When the pressure wave passed, gravity took over, causing a catastrophic failure. In addition, the force of the explosion shattered three of the four exposed columns on the first and second floors and sheared off the building’s glass facade, bringing down approximately half of each floor. The resulting “pancake” collapse trapped the building’s occupants in the debris and severely damaged several other buildings in the vicinity.

It was estimated that the initial blast produced a shock wave of approximately 5,000 psi. According to the United States Geological Survey, the force of the explosion would have been equivalent to a Richter Magnitude 4 earthquake if all the energy had been directed into the ground. Since much of the energy was radiated upward and outward, however, the resulting shock wave was a Magnitude 1.1
The shock wave from an explosion moves outward from the point where the initial explosion occurred (the epicenter) in a spherical direction until it encounters barriers such as walls, ceilings, floors, etc. When it encounters such barriers, the force of the wave front is deflected, similar to ripples in water. The force of the pressure dissipates as a function of the cube root of the distance (a location twice the distance from the blast than another will feel only one-eighth the pressure). Based on the damage seen, this explosion would be categorized as “high order damage,” as described in NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations.²

An engineer from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers experienced in evaluating the effects of explosions on structures, stated that even though the direct pressure could have been in the vicinity of 4,000 psi to 5,000 psi, you can get what is called “reflective pressures” in certain portions of the building. This would occur in the areas where the shock wave is moving at supersonic speeds of over 1,100 feet per second, and it would be possible to see reflective pressures of 10,000 psi or 12,000 psi. These pressures would shatter or pulverize the concrete completely, which was evidenced by some of the damage that was observed in the Murrah Building. According to NFPA 921, it is possible for the initial shock wave to be amplified as much as eight times.³

Above the third or fourth floor, the pressure wave from the explosion probably was not moving at supersonic speeds. The damage that would be seen above these levels would be caused by the direct impact of the shock wave upon the building members.

Only one of the four exposed columns on the north side, Column G12, survived the blast. It continued to support eight levels, although it was cracked at the third floor. The second and third floors were blown away at Columns F20 and F22, which meant that they no longer had any lateral support at these levels. Instead of extending 13 feet before they were supported, they now extended 39 feet without support and were likely to buckle under the vertical load imposed upon them. Columns F16 and F18 had weak connections to their second-floor beams, which reduced their lateral support. And the east end of the building lost many of its lateral connections.

In addition, parts of the building were hanging by rebar, creating numerous overhead hazards. The contents of the building were also hanging precariously from the edge of each exposed floor slab.

The shock wave also entered the building through the north facade, which had been shattered by the force of the explosion. As it did so, it moved furniture and other furnishings, and created shrapnel and flying debris. Glass, measuring 3/4 inches thick on the opposite side of the building, was blown into the building. This was probably caused as the shock wave “wrapped” around the building and pressurized the exterior side of the opposite face of the building.

The bomb crater was covered with a tarp in order to protect any remaining evidence. According to the United States Geological Survey, the force of the explosion, if it had been directed completely downward into the ground, would have been equivalent to a Richter Magnitude 4 earthquake.

The debris pile resulting from this damage was very compact, with few void spaces. In essence, the explosion "shredded" the building, producing very small pieces of debris, rather than the larger chunks one would expect from a catastrophe such as an earthquake. Debris piles composed of large chunks of debris create large, survivable void spaces. The affect of the explosion on the building and the resultant damage made for very challenging, and dangerous, working conditions for the rescue workers.

**USAR**

The Oklahoma City Bombing was the first incidence of the widespread use of the USAR task forces in rescue operations. Prior to this incident, California had used its task forces extensively within the state for its own disasters, and selected task forces from throughout the country had been activated for certain natural disasters. However, this incident marked the first time that task forces from across the country had been brought together and operate closely on a single operation.

This incident was somewhat unique in terms of the preparation and training that the task forces had received over the years. The worst calamity the task forces had trained for was a major earthquake with a significant number of people trapped and extensive amount of buildings damaged. However, the situation that faced them in Oklahoma City was such that there was only one major building damaged, and all of the injuries and trapped victims were contained primarily within that one building. Geographically, this incident was very focused.
The skills that the task forces were equipped with, however, were such that they were able to apply them to this incident. Lifting and moving large pieces of debris, breaching through reinforced concrete, shoring a collapsed structure— all of these skills were part of the task forces’ original training for earthquake disasters and were very applicable to the situation that they were faced with in Oklahoma City.

What made this incident so significantly different was the emotional impact and visibility of the incident. Every action that was taken by every rescue agency involved in the incident was broadcast around the world. Added to that was the emotional impact—a terrorist bombing, in the heartland of the United States that not only killed 150 adults, but 19 children. Without a doubt, the children’s deaths carried a heavy toll on everyone involved.

**Task Force Evolution**

The US&R program evolved out of two disasters that occurred in 1989. The Loma Prieta earthquake struck California, causing significant damage in the San Francisco area, while Hurricane Hugo blasted the southeastern United States coast. In the aftermath of both of these incidents, the federal government realized that it did not have the ability to respond quickly with the kind of rescue resources needed in an urban environment. FEMA was tasked with developing such an ability.

A committee of recognized experts from across the country was brought together to create such a program. Recognizing that this was a “first of its kind” type of approach, a broad spectrum of skills and disciplines were brought together. People from fire departments and other rescue organizations, the private sector, and the military brought their expertise to bear on designing what ultimately became known as the Urban Search and Rescue program.

The concept was that there would be a series of teams across the country that would be available for rapid deployment. Each team would be equipped with a standard cache of equipment, weighing over 50,000 pounds, that would be packaged, or able to be packaged, within six hours.

In addition to the equipment, each team would have a standardized roster of people with very specific skills. Specific skill requirements were identified for each role that would need to be filled.

The objective was to form an effective partnership between FEMA and existing organizations, such as fire departments, that could fill the personnel requirements of these teams. However, funding was not available to fully outfit the teams, and it was decided that efforts would be made to recruit teams that could provide partial funding to assist. A request for applications from interested organizations was made. Very detailed applications that requested information regarding the sponsoring or-
ganizations existing resources and personnel and their specific needs to meet the minimum equipment and personnel requirements were filled out and submitted to an evaluation committee. Out of this application process evolved the first 25 task forces.

Selection of the task forces was based on several criteria. One key factor was the present technical ability of its personnel. Agencies with an established, recognized program such as technical rescue, were likely candidates since their personnel would already have the requisite skills that would be needed in a disaster situation. Another important criteria was geographic location. It was necessary to select teams that were in high risk areas, such as California (which wound up with eight of the first 25 task forces), but to also identify teams in low risk areas that would not be immediately impacted by a disaster. Teams such as Phoenix and Nebraska were selected because they were located in locations that were relatively stable (from a disaster standpoint) and would be able to deploy relatively quickly to effected parts of the country.

Since there was not adequate funding to support all of the task forces, other potential sources were identified that the task forces could draw on. One of the key sources was surplused military equipment. Surplus equipment depots were identified across the country and FEMA made arrangements for task force logisticians to draw on the equipment at no charge. While the equipment by no means fulfilled all of the needs, and was always used or worn, it certainly provided at least a start to filling out the cache. The logisticians became very adept at identifying potential equipment sources and “scrounging” from some very creative places.

The plan was that when a task force was activated they would then be able to draw on federal disaster relief funding to fill out their cache. When the Northridge earthquake occurred, one task force that was activated was provided with authorization to purchase whatever equipment was needed. The task force had made prior arrangements with a number of vendors in their immediate area, and they immediately sent trucks and personnel to start picking up items such as 60 sleeping bags and sleeping pads from a camping store, hand tools and generators from a hardware supplier, communications equipment, etc. Not all of the equipment could be obtained before they deployed, but they were outfitted with sufficient equipment to “get the job done.” Other sources, such as law enforcement seizures, provided more tools, cellular telephones, radios, etc.

Under the guidelines developed by FEMA, the task force could continue to purchase equipment for up to three days following the activation. Staff remaining behind continued to feverishly place orders for equipment to the tune of approximately a half a million dollars to effectively outfit the task force with their full complement of equipment.

Since this deployment, FEMA modified its guidelines and provided more direction on how the purchases could be made.
Task Force Composition—Personnel

The original task forces were comprised of 56 members. The plan was that each task force would have half of its members work for a 12 hour shift and then be relieved by the other half. For this reason, every position on the task force was duplicated.

The personnel for most of the task forces were drawn from the fire and rescue services since they had most of the previous experience in this area. Some positions, however, required specialists to be drawn from the private sector, such as engineers and physicians, because these were rare skills to find within a fire department.

Task Force Composition—Equipment

The equipment cache that was identified by the steering committee was extensive. It was recognized that rescue operations following a major urban disaster would be complex and require very unique resources. In addition, each task force was expected to be fully self-sufficient in order to not be a burden to the local resources, which would already be stretched by the disaster. Therefore, in addition to the rescue tools and equipment, they would also have to be outfitted with tents, sleeping bags, food, MREs, water, portable chemical toilets, etc.

The various disciplines involved in the search and rescue operations all had very unique equipment requirements. For example, the rescue component would need an extensive supply of ropes, pulleys, carabiners, harnesses, and webbing. The search component would need highly specialized equipment, such as acoustic listening devices that could locate victims trapped under tons of debris and cameras on telescoping that could peer into cracks and crevices. The medical component would require an extensive supply of drugs and medications. This need created a problem in terms of inventory, since a number of the items were controlled drugs, and also a logistical problem of keeping them cool and ensuring that they did not go out of date.

The technical component of the task force had some of the most varied equipment needs. The hazardous materials specialists required meters and other monitoring equipment to enable them to detect hazardous conditions, as well as specialized personnel protective equipment such as suits, gloves, and breathing apparatus. The Documentation Specialist would need a full cache of video equipment, still photography equipment, film, and computers to document the activities of the task force. The Communications Specialist was responsible for ensuring that every member of the task force had a working portable radio, and that there was a base station established. The base station was to be powered by either a generator, municipal power, or with solar power cells, if necessary. In addition, cellular telephones were a part of the cache as well as more esoteric communications capabilities such as satellite telephones.
FEMA US&R TASK FORCE
56 CIVILIAN/4 DoD POSITIONS
24-HOUR OPERATION

FIGURE 1
Task Force Composition—Tools

The skills required to effect the rescues in this incident were very similar to those used in the rescue of victims trapped in earthquakes. The victims were trapped within tons of reinforced concrete that either had to be removed, breached, or shored.

Each Task Force is equipped with a versatile “tool box” upon which they can draw to perform such rescues. The skills and tools used in the USAR environment are not always commonly used by rescuers. A wide assortment of tools that are used within construction, however, lend themselves to USAR rescue operations.

For example, a hydraulic concrete cutting saw is one of the valuable tools. This tool, designed for use in construction, cuts through 11 inches of reinforced concrete, and is one of the few tools available that is able to accomplish this in the rescue environment.

Some tools, however, were designed specifically for rescue operations. One such valuable piece of equipment is a telescoping search camera that allows the rescue teams to search areas that are not accessible for personnel. By creating a small hole, or using the existing voids, it is possible to use the 9-foot telescoping pole to place a camera lens within a small area and search it for trapped victims. The searcher, wearing a monitor on his chest, is able to manipulate the articulating head of the pole that contains the camera lens and look for potential survivors. In addition, the head also contains a small light, microphone, and speaker, which allows the rescuer to communicate with trapped victims.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers developed a device called the System to Locate Survivors (STOL). These units are very sensitive acoustical listening devices that are placed around a collapsed structure. By listening for sounds of trapped victims, these devices are able to triangulate on the location and provide rescue teams with possible areas in which to concentrate their search.

Conducting search and rescue operations is hard, arduous work that requires a large cache of ordinary tools such as hammers, saws, wheelbarrows, lights, shovels, and other pieces of equipment used to move debris. The equipment list that each task force has is a long, extensive, and well thought out list that attempts to anticipate the needs of the task forces working in these situations.

Task Force Composition—Skills

When designing the personnel roster for a task force, the original committee was faced with a challenging problem—how to ensure that all of the necessary skills are provided, but limit the number of personnel to a manageable amount that could be mobilized and transported quickly. Four basic areas were identified: search, rescue, medical, and technical. In order to meet the goals of providing a functional,
self-sufficient task force on the scene of a disaster these skill would need to be brought together.

The search component utilizes two types of search methods-canine and technical. The canine search teams are made up of several handlers and dogs, selected and trained to work in the urban collapse environment. Dogs that are effective in wild-land searches are not always as capable in a collapsed building, so it was necessary to develop new selection criteria and training programs for the handlers and their dogs. In addition, the hazards that the dogs would face in collapsed buildings would be those that were not seen before by other canine search teams, i.e., large piles of debris over which they must climb and burrow, often out of the site of their handler; sharp objects which can cut their paws easily; dust which, when inhaled, can make them ill; dark, confined spaces for which they must be prepared to enter and search.

The technical search component uses the equipment mentioned earlier such as telescoping cameras and acoustical listening devices. This was another discipline that evolved out of the USAR program.

The rescue component draws upon a number of existing disciplines and pulls them together into one functional group. Rescue skills such as confined space, rope, trench, and structural collapse are all brought to bear by the rescue teams as they make entry into collapsed buildings. The personnel working on the rescue teams must be competent in all of these skills as well as able to improvise “on the fly” based on what they may encounter.

The medical component was not established to provide what is termed “mass casualty care.” These needs could be better addressed by either the existing medical infrastructure in the disaster area or by established disaster response units such as the federal government’s Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs). Recognizing the extremely hazardous environment in which the task force would be operating, the medical component was designed to provide medical care to the task force personnel. Since it would be difficult to obtain medical supplies in a disaster area, a large cache of supplies including bandaging material, IV solutions, and drugs, was established. A secondary objective of the medical component was to be able to provide initial treatment for any victims that were located.

A combination of paramedics and physicians are brought together to form the medical component. Since paramedics are often trained to work under arduous conditions, they were well prepared for rescue operations. However, there are not as many physicians trained to function in these conditions. A training program was developed by FEMA to prepare physicians for the situations they would encounter.

The final component of the task force, Technical, brings together a wide diversity of skills. Included on this team are the following disciplines: structural engineering; hazardous materials; heavy rigging and equipment; technical information; communications; and logistics.
One of the valuable positions on the task force is that of the Structural Specialist. This is a structural engineer that had undergone a rigorous training program from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that trains them and prepares them for working in this environment. In addition to the education they have received as structural engineers, they have received training in areas such as structural triage, failure mechanisms, and emergency field shoring. Their role is to advise the Task Force Leader of the potential structural hazards, how the search and rescue teams can safely enter a collapsed structure, and where and how to shore up a damaged building.

The Hazardous Materials Specialists use the training they have received to identify and recognize hazardous situations such as contaminated atmospheres or toxic spills or runoff that may endanger rescuers. Since controlling hazardous materials releases is a very complex and equipment-intensive operation, it was determined that this would best be left to the local emergency services.

The Heavy Equipment and Rigging Specialist serves as a liaison between the task force and local resources such as crane operators. Disasters bring together groups, such as construction workers and rescue workers, that normally do not work together and don’t always understand the needs or concerns of each other. This specialist communicates between the two disciplines and allows for the best utilization of the available resources.

The Technical Information Specialist is responsible for documenting the incident. This person uses a variety of techniques to accomplish this, including video and photography. While it often does not seem important during the disaster, such records are found to be invaluable in the aftermath when attempting to recreate what had transpired.

The Communications Specialist is responsible for maintaining all of the communications capability of the task force. Each task force member is supplied with a portable radio, and the task force establishes on-site base stations. In addition, equipment such as cellular telephones and satellite phones are used extensively. Maintaining this delicate equipment under these conditions requires extensive knowledge and ability. A training program geared specifically for this specialist was established by FEMA to assist in the rapid setup of a communications infrastructure.

The final position is that of Logistics Specialist. This is the person that is responsible for obtaining, maintaining, and distributing all of the equipment that a task force requires. It is, by far, one of the most critical positions on the task force. Following the Oklahoma City bombing, it was apparent that this critical function was understaffed and that additional personnel were needed in order to ensure that this key component was kept fully functional at all times.

**Command Structures**

The Incident Management System is used exclusively in managing the Task Force operations. There are four components to each Task Force, each of which is managed by a Unit Leader who reports directly to the Task Force Leader.
The job of the task force is to provide support to the local incident commander. The agency in charge of the incident stays in charge—the task force is not there to replace them or take over the incident. The Task Force Leader reports to the incident commander and provides him or her with guidance on the resources available and how they can possibly be used.

Realizing that a number of agencies will not be familiar with the task forces and the potential resources they can provide, standardized “briefing papers” have been developed that can be provided to the authority having jurisdiction.

**Procedures, Policies, Paperwork**

Organizing such a program as the US&R program is a daunting task. Personnel at FEMA were assigned to this job, and a contract was awarded to a private sector agency. In order to ensure that all of the task force operations were standardized, manuals were developed for guidance. These manuals included:

- USAR Task Force Description Manual
- Operations System Description Manual
- USAR Field Operations Guide
- Task Force Readiness Guide
- Incident Support Team Operations Manual
- USAR Task Force Training Manual

In addition, specialized training programs for the Logistics, Structures Specialists, Canine Search, Communications, and Medical personnel were developed and delivered to the task forces.

Recognizing that the need to deploy a task force would probably arise infrequently, a means for the members to rapidly get up to speed on tasks for operations was needed. A Field Operations Guide (FOG) was developed that provided an abbreviated, yet comprehensive, overview in a booklet that could fit into a pocket. This is a concept that has been in existence for a number of years in the forest service and was adapted for use in the US&R program.

The growth of the US&R task forces over the years has been significant. Since their inception, they have continued to demonstrate the value of having a cadre of well trained and equipped personnel available for rapid response to a disaster. While the Oklahoma City bombing incident was the most extensive use of these teams, their value has been demonstrated time and time again in disasters such as Hurricanes Andrew (1992), Emily (1993), Fran (1996), Typhoon Brian (1992), the Northridge Earthquake (1994), the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia, and the explosion and collapse in San Juan, Puerto Rico (1996). The lessons learned from each of these disasters are invaluable in preparing the task forces for the future.
Structural Specialists

Each US&R task force has two structural specialists whose role is to advise the task force leader of the extent of structural damage and of shoring methods. Before this incident, the structural specialists' training had focused on earthquake-related damage, because this was considered the "worst case" scenario. Their training program, which was designed by David Hammond under contract with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Earthquake Preparedness Center of Expertise (EQPCE). Hammond, has trained a number of engineers.

At this incident, each task force brought its complement of structural specialists, and the Corps of Engineers provided 13 engineers to support the operation. This brought the number of engineers working at the site to 37.

Originally, the structures specialists were planning on supporting their own individual task forces. Early in the incident, however, it became obvious that this plan would not work. Some of the engineers had different views, and the engineering plan changed with each change of shift, based on the different engineers' opinions. David Hammond was brought in as lead engineer to help coordinate the engineering component, allowing it to "speak with one voice" during the rest of the operation. Working under Hammond during the day was Tom Niedernhofer; during the night shift, Tim Willard took over. Both Niedernhofer and Willard, structural engineers from the Corps of Engineers with extensive disaster response experience, had both worked with Hammond as instructors at the Corps Structural Collapse School. John Osteraa later joined the incident to provide assistance and relief for Hammond.

Role of the Structural Specialist

The task force Structural Specialist fills a very unique role. The person in that position is responsible for providing the task force leader (TFL) with information relating to the structural damage in several areas:

- **Structural triage.** A system has been developed by Hammond that the structural specialists can use in assessing the damage over a large area and "scoring" the buildings based on the damage and potential for trapped victims. This system allows the structural specialists to rapidly size up a disaster area and provide this information to the task force leader (TFL), allowing the TFL to allocate his or her resources as effectively as possible.

- **Hazard Mitigation/Access.** If a decision is made to rescue victims from a specific building, there are three strategies that can be used with collapsed buildings or parts of the building: avoid the hazard, remove the hazard, or shore it. The structural specialist is trained to provide guidance and specific recommendations to the rescue crews on the best potential strategy and on the type of shoring that could
TASK FORCE LEADER'S MISSION ASSIGNMENT CHECKLIST

[ ] ASSIGNED LOCALITY/JURISDICTION: ________________________________

[ ] TYPE OF ICS STRUCTURE IN PLACE: ______________________________

[ ] TFL's IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR (title/name): _______________________

[ ] ICP OR SUPERVISOR'S LOCATION: _________________________________

[ ] PLNNG/BRFING MEETINGS SCHEDULE/LOCATION: ___________________

[ ] CURRENT SITUATION: ___________________________________________

SEARCH & RESCUE ISSUES:

[ ] TYPE OF AREA INVOLVED: ________________________________

[ ] PRIORITY BLDGs. (schools/hospitals/etc.): _______________________

[ ] NUMBER/LOCATION OF KNOWN VICTIMS: _______________________

LOCAL MEDICAL SYSTEM:

[ ] FUNCTIONING EMS/HOSPITALS?: _______________________________

[ ] MILITARY/DMAT TEAMS?: ________________________________

[ ] VICTIM HAND-OFF PROCEDURES: ______________________________

[ ] MEDEVAC OF INJURED TF MEMBER?: ___________________________

[ ] VETERINARY RESOURCES?: ____________________________________

COMMUNICATIONS PLAN:

[ ] FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT: ________________________________

[ ] REPORTING TYPE/SCHEDULE: ________________________________

[ ] LOCAL JURISDICTION's RADIO ASSIGNED TO TF?: _______________

TRANSPORTATION:

[ ] TRUCKS/BUSES: _____________________________________________

[ ] AIRCRAFT/HELICOPTERS: ___________________________________

[ ] REQUESTING PROCEDURES: ________________________________

TF SUPPORT:

[ ] BASE OF OPS LOCATION?: ________________________________

[ ] SUPPLY AVAILABILITY (food/water/equip.): ______________________

[ ] HEAVY EQUIPMENT/CRANES: ________________________________

[ ] LOCAL/MILITARY SECURITY SUPPORT: _________________________

[ ] REQUEST PROCEDURES: ___________________________________

MEDIA ISSUES:

[ ] LOCAL JURISDICTION PIO (title/name): _________________________

[ ] PROCEDURES (info release/interviews/etc.) ______________________
TASK FORCE NAME: ____________________________

COMPOSITION

• 56-person tactical unit for search and rescue operations.
• Multi-disciplinary organization:
  * search element
  * rescue element
  * medical element
  * technical support element
• Totally self-sufficient for the first 72 hours of operation.
• Full equipment cache to support the task force’s operations.
• Assisting DoD Liaison Team assigned to the task force
  (2 officers/2 radio operators).

CAPABILITIES/LIMITATIONS

• Capable of round-the-clock search and rescue operations (two 12-hour shifts).
• Search operations:
  * physical
  * canine
  * electronic
• Rescue operations in various types of structures:
  * wood frame
  * steel frame
  * unreinforced masonry
  * reinforced concrete
• Sophisticated medical treatment capabilities limited to:
  * injured task force members
  * entrapped victims
• Technical support capabilities for task force operations:
  * structural integrity assessments
  * hazardous materials assessments
  * liaison with heavy equipment/crane operators
• The task force has radio equipment for their own internal communications needs.

TASK FORCE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

• Transportation
  * vehicles/aircraft needed for the movement of the task force and cache.
  * medical transport required for extricated victims.
  * evacuation required for any injured task force member.
• Communications
  * the task force’s radios are set to frequency ________
  * it would be advantageous to provide the task force with a radio from the host jurisdiction
  * reporting requirements to the incident Command Post need to be identified (how/when)
  * secure communications with the medical transport and TF member evacuation systems
• Initial strategic/tactical briefing
  * if available, copies of past/current/future incident Action Plans should be provided
  * strategic/tactical assignment clearly identified for the task force
• Media considerations
  * the local jurisdiction’s Public Information Officer (PIO) should be identified
  * the local jurisdiction’s media procedures (info release, interviews, etc.) should be identified
• Appropriate area maps, building plans or other information should be provided

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best be installed. If it is necessary to either remove a hazard or to breach through a floor or wall, the structural specialist also can guide them on the best methods to use and the dangers that may be involved.

**Structural Specialist Training**

The training that prepares structural specialists for this unique task has evolved over the past few years into a comprehensive program. It started in 1991, when the Corps of Engineers was asked to prepare 200 engineers nationwide to respond on very short notice to a major disaster.

The Earthquake Preparedness Center of Center (EQPCE), headed by Terry Mendoza, was chosen to develop the program with the help of a curriculum advisory group composed of Corps personnel, private sector engineers, and public sector emergency responders. The group, which provided a broad-based view from a number of different perspectives, helped develop the curriculum and the training program. Rick Young, and later Kelley Aasen, were instrumental in preparing and running each course. David Hammond was recruited because of his extensive work in the area of disaster response and of his personal involvement in several earthquakes.

The California Office of Emergency Services (OES), under Deputy Chief Mark Ghilarducci, was brought in as a partner. California already had a well-established program for US&R first responders called Rescue Systems I, a 40-hour course that provided students with basic techniques such as rope rescue, lifting and moving heavy objects, incident command, and so on—all of the skills aimed at rescuing victims from structural collapses. Since the structural specialists participating in this program would have little or no experience working in a rescue environment, this course would not only provide them with a basic set of skills but would also serve to acclimate them to the environment in which they would have to work. Chief Mike McGroarty of the La Habra Fire Department was the course’s primary instructor.

Rescue Systems I served as the first week of the program. The second week of the course was devoted to providing the engineers with knowledge and skills directly related to their area of expertise-structural collapse. This five-day program trained the engineers in areas such as structural triage, building collapse patterns, and shoring and breaching techniques, which are all subjects designed to build on the participants’ basic knowledge.
The triage module was unique in that the engineers were asked to size up a building or a number of buildings and tell the incident commander where survivors were most likely to be found. This ability is critical in search and rescue operations because incident commanders often have to decide how best to devote limited resources to searching extensive areas as effectively as possible.

The engineers were given a form to use to “score” buildings in order to arrive at a numerical rating that they could used to the “rank” buildings. This scoring system is based on such factors as the time of day the incident occurred (an office building is more likely to be occupied during the day than late at night), the type of structure (wood-frame structures generally are more resistant to earthquakes), the survivability of a structure (reinforced concrete buildings generally have void spaces in which victims may be trapped, yet survive), and the resources required to effect a rescue (large, precast buildings require a lot of people and specialized equipment).

Initially, many engineers were uncomfortable with this role and with the responsibility because they were not used to having their information acted upon so quickly and decisively. However, the engineers were told that they were not making the life or death decisions about where to begin rescues. Rather, they were giving the incident commander input that would allow him or her to make those decisions.

While the primary mission of the Corps of Engineers was to train its cadre of engineers, it was quickly recognized that this training would be of immeasurable help to the Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces. As a result, the class was offered to FEMA, which agreed to fund engineers from the Task Forces on a rotating basis. These engineers would attend the second week of the program.

Since half of the engineers attending the second week would not have had the chance to go through Rescue Systems I, a field exercise was added to the second week to
Teams of engineers from both the Task Forces and the Army Corps of Engineers worked around the clock to develop strategies for the rescue workers.

reinforce the lessons they learned in the classroom and to expose them to some "real world" situations.

A two-story, wood-frame building at the camp served as the site for this training. A maze in the building that simulated six collapsed floors, none higher than two feet, was constructed. Through this maze went teams of engineers, installing shoring as they went. This exercise forced them to work as a team and to communicate what shoring was needed. It also taught them to appreciate the conditions that rescuers face.

To provide the instructors for the second week, the Corps gathered a group of experienced engineers and fire service personnel, including Tom Niedernhofer and Tim Willard, both professional engineers with the Corps, who were students in the very first class. Both have grown into key instructors, and both were key people at the Oklahoma City incident. Battalion Chief Chuck Nicola, Chief Fire Investigator Ed Comeau (originally with the Phoenix Fire Department and now with NFPA) were also instructors in the program.

Graduates of this course have been used at a number of incidents, including the collapse of the Sampoong Department Store in Korea and the Northridge Earthquake in California, among others. The engineers' skills and their ability to coordinate at the Oklahoma City bombing were direct results of the exceptional training they received from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Analysis

This incident provided a large number of “lessons learned” that can be passed onto the public safety organizations and others that could potentially be involved in disaster response.

Incident Command

The use of the incident command system (ICS) was critical to the success of this operation. During the first 6 hours, the OCFD made a concerted effort to impose a structured management scheme, even though the magnitude of the incident, the number of rescuers—both official and volunteer—and the number of different agencies involved made it extremely difficult to gain full control of the scene in the initial stages.

Certain aspects of this incident complicated ICS implementation. For example, almost all the chiefs on duty that day arrived on the scene simultaneously, as did a large number of companies. This brought a lot of resources to help with the problem quickly, but the sheer volume made it difficult for the incident commander to size up the situation and begin building his command structure incrementally, as he would have normally, by assigning companies as they responded or arrived.

Command officers and companies made strategic and tactical decisions on the scene independently due to the overwhelming nature of the incident and the difficulty with radio communications. These decisions, which were based on experience, were almost universally correct and were instrumental in saving lives—which reflects well on the level of training and preparedness of the companies and command officers. However, the incident commander didn’t necessarily know what individual companies were doing. He assumed that his full first-alarm assignment was committed—which it was—but he had no idea what they were doing.

Nor was the incident commander always aware of decisions made or actions taken by those at a higher level, as he was not always given the information disclosed at various briefings.

Most of the command officers immediately slipped into command roles and began trying to establish a structured management system. They deliberately avoided becoming personally involved in rescue operations, a difficult yet critical decision that was instrumental in helping the incident commander develop the ICS structure. In addition, most of the task force leaders and the people staffing the IST had worked together over the years in putting together the US&R program, and this familiarity was immensely helpful in getting everyone right to work.

Unfortunately, unified command with other agencies was not established at the incident commander level, and liaisons with other agencies were not established in the fire department command post. The agencies involved in this incident were not
accustomed to working in such an environment, and, even after the MACC center was established on Day 5, they continued to operate as they had over the previous days. The MACC should have served as the focal point for coordinating all interagency command and control decisions, but apparently these decisions were not made or relayed to other agencies through this mechanism.

Among the issues these agencies had to resolve was a conflict between the philosophies of rescue and criminal investigation. The rescue workers needed to move debris rapidly, while the law enforcement personnel wanted to preserve evidence for the investigation. Fortunately, this conflict was resolved to mutual satisfaction within the first few days of the incident.

This entire situation was further complicated by the inevitable difficulties in communication, as the radio channels quickly became overloaded. Many orders on the scene had to be given face to face, and the incident commander received few progress reports.

Communication also proved difficult for the structural engineers on the scene, who found it hard to coordinate and speak with one voice. An engineer on one shift would clear an area as being structurally sound, while an engineer on the next shift would require additional shoring or stop operations. This frustrated the rescuers, because it meant that the plan kept changing. At one point, Chief Marrs intervened and told the engineers that they needed a consistent plan of operations. After this, they began to hold regular briefings among themselves to pass information from one shift to the next.

In addition to the multitude of professional rescuers on the scene, the area was overrun with people, including public safety personnel and civilians, who wanted to help. And none of them, except the fire department personnel, had ever operated in a structured ICS environment. These people had uncontrolled access to the scene early in the incident because there was little perimeter control. And once law enforcement officers did establish perimeter control, it was not a “hard” perimeter. Anyone who looked official was allowed through, which meant that personnel could freelance, or operate outside of the control of the Incident Command System in the building.

Preliminary analysis of the EMS response to this incident has also identified several issues that should be addressed by agencies faced with similar situations. First, area hospitals sent large quantities of medical supplies to the scene during the incident, the type and quantity of which were not coordinated with EMSA Medical Command. Because much of the material wasn’t needed at the site, logistics problems developed.

In addition, large numbers of medical personnel responded to media requests for assistance at the scene. In many cases, these individuals freelanced without being part of the command system, making it difficult for EMSA and other medical responders to operate. Several reports describe the establishment of unauthorized treat-
ment areas, operated in a very dangerous environment by personnel who were not trained in field operations and wore no protective equipment. One volunteer rescuer was killed when she was struck by debris.

Coordination between area hospitals and public safety/EMS command at the scene was lacking. Emergency departments were mobilized and staffed, but they were not advised of the conditions at the site. This resulted in patients with potentially serious injuries being triaged to “minimal” care areas, while the “immediate” care areas waited for a wave of seriously injured patients that never came. In addition, there was a breakdown in communications due to the fact that EMSA changed over to its disaster frequency, yet the hospitals were not aware of this change. Also, the hospitals were not monitoring the common disaster frequency and police officers had to be dispatched to the hospitals to gather information regarding their capacity to handle patients.

Despite all the problems, this operation, which would have overwhelmed any fire department, was a success in many ways. First and foremost, fire department personnel rescued all those still alive in the building within the first 13 hours of the incident—in fact, most of the rescues were accomplished within the first hour and a half.

And of the hundreds of rescuers working at the scene, only one—a civilian with no protective gear, operating outside of the fire department ICS system—was killed. The fact that only one rescuer was killed during the entire operation and none sustained a major injury, despite the extremely dangerous conditions under which they were operating, is a credit to the emphasis placed on rescuer safety throughout the operation. From the beginning, all personnel were briefed on the situation, told to operate as a team, and asked to maintain a high level of safety awareness.

Perhaps the most important lesson this operation has to offer is that unified command is critical at incidents involving a number of different agencies. Liaisons from all of the agencies should be assigned to the command post, and all agencies that may have to work together should be trained in a common ICS system so that they can rapidly integrate their operations.

The value of having an established “chain of command” was also recognized by non-emergency responders. One of the lessons learned, identified by a construction contractor that responded, was the importance, within his own organization, of having pre-established roles of responsibilities and functions for his personnel.

**Accountability**

In the initial stages of the incident there was little personnel accountability being used. The immediate focus of the operation was on rescuing visible survivors and extricating trapped people. A large number of rescuers were working, and this included not only fire department personnel, but law enforcement and civilians who spontaneously entered the collapsed building and began helping others.
This was identified as a problem immediately by several fire service command officers, but they were unable to gain control due to the sheer number of rescuers that responded and due to the building layout, which had many points of entry. Following the first bomb scare, when everyone pulled back, they were able to start implementing some accountability systems and controlling access.

Personnel accountability systems were used throughout the latter parts of the incident to ensure that everyone working at the scene had a specific assignment in order to reduce freelancing. The primary emphasis of this accountability system, however, was for security purposes. One of the objectives of personnel accountability-identifying trapped personnel if a collapse should occur, for example, could not have been met due to the multiple points of entry into the building. Also, since there were literally hundreds of people moving through the checkpoints, it was not possible to effectively "check out" someone who had passed through the point earlier.

Some task forces implemented their own personnel accountability systems based on those which they used in their own jurisdictions. These systems, however, were not coordinated with the overall personnel accountability system.

Personnel accountability is vital, not only to ensure that an incident commander can account for all of his or her personnel, but also in order to control the flow of people and units in an orderly manner.

Rehab

It is also important to ensure that people get sufficient rest. Everyone involved in this incident, especially within the first 48 hours, was working long shifts without sufficient rest. Members of the IST, for example, went for 36 hours before stopping to sleep. It is vital to establish work/rest periods and to enforce them. It is also important to establish the rest areas away from the rescue scene. In the initial stages of the incident, the rehab area for the rescuers was located in the Murrah Building garage. Workers resting in this area were not sufficiently removed from the incident to allow them to rest. Rehab areas were later established at various locations, such as the Southwestern Bell building.

It is also necessary to recognize that workers who are not usually associated with a disaster, such as construction personnel, media, and support personnel, are going to be working long, hard hours too. It is important for other organizations to identify the need for rehab for these people and be prepared to support it.

Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD)

Along with the need for rehab is the need for what is termed Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD). This was identified very early in the incident as a need, and a number of organizations started providing it to rescue workers. However, this was not a coordinated effort, and there was insufficient monitoring of the quality of the CISD being provided. A policy was established that fire department personnel,
when leaving at the end of their shift, had to be “signed out” by CISD personnel. What this was ultimately turning into, according to a number of people, was a case of taking a slip of paper into the CISD location, having it signed by a worker, and then leaving without being evaluated or having any counseling done.

The fire department had a strong CISD program in place prior to this incident, but it was not equipped to handle something of this magnitude. Having working relationships with other CISD programs or personnel who could help to apply service on a greater scale would be extremely beneficial.

It is also important to ensure that efforts are made to identify all potential CISD candidates. There were several groups within the fire department that were impacted by the incident, yet did not receive any CISD counseling until well into the incident.

Communications

Communications was a problem from the very beginning in this incident, again due to the magnitude of the response. Radio channels were immediately overwhelmed, and much of the communications had to take place “face to face.” Units were working independently without specific direction but, due to their training, were operating as needed. The disaster response radio network for the hospitals was not effective because a number of them were not monitoring it and could not be reached.

The cellular companies provided an invaluable service at this incident by establishing a large network to support the operations and by also providing a large quantity of cell phones. In addition, the telephones that they provided were programmed with a priority signal that would enable them to gain access to a cell channel over conventional cellular customers.

Much of the success in regards to the interaction with the cellular companies could be attributed to preplanning. There was a working group involving a number of the public safety agencies and the cellular providers that had been meeting prior to this incident and developing disaster response plans. The value of such efforts were demonstrated at this incident.

Infection Control

The problem of infection control, biohazards and worker’s exposures was one which was addressed in this incident. Normal infection control procedures (gloves, splash suits, goggles, etc.) were used as much as possible. Inhalation hazards were addressed through the use of respirators for the workers.

The possible transmission of contamination by food became a concern. There were a number of people and organizations independently providing food to the rescue workers and to the site. There was concern over food not being kept hot and then being eaten, open food containers and trash buildup. It was decided that a single
vendor would supply all of the food. This resulted in a more consistent quality of food being provided on the site. In addition, trash dumpsters were set up throughout the site. It was fortunate that ORA was prepared to provide large scale feeding operations on such short notice. Developing a working relationship with such organizations within the community can be extremely beneficial.

Personal hygiene was a concern, also. Portable toilet facilities were established on the site. However, there were inadequate facilities for workers to wash up after working, and it was common to see workers leave the building, stop to eat, and then re-enter the building to go back to work.

A decontamination facility was set up. This facility, however, was for gross decontamination of the workers. In addition, it was initially staffed by personnel who were not adequately trained, and they used cleaning solutions on some workers at full strength rather than diluting it. It is important to not only establish such decontamination facilities, but to ensure that they are properly staffed.

The Center for Disease Control (CDC) was on scene during the incident and evaluated the efforts being made at infection control. They felt that the measures being implemented were effective at addressing the hazards being faced by the rescuers. However, it was several days before a number of these procedures had been set in place.

**Federal Response**

The federal government has developed a Federal Response Plan that has a number of wide ranging functions within it for disaster response. It would be valuable to understand the federal resources that are available and how to request them within this plan.

When federal resources are deployed to an incident, it is important that everyone understand their function and their role within the Incident Management System. This was not established clearly at this incident and resulted in some confusion as to which agency or position was responsible for carrying out certain tasks. Prior to an incident, agencies should develop an organizational plan and communicate it to everyone involved in the management of the incident and follow this plan.

The fact that Oklahoma City management personnel had a prior working relationship with some of the local federal personnel was key to the integration of federal operations into this incident. Working relationships should be established with the agencies in your jurisdiction prior to an incident.

**Federal Reimbursement**

If federal funds are going to be made available for reimbursing agencies and companies involved in an operation, it is important to understand how the federal re-
imbursement system works. Key administrative personnel from the city had attended a federal training program within the previous year which addressed disaster response and preparedness. However, they told NFPA investigators that there was inadequate information given to them on what would be required after the disaster to ensure that proper documentation was recorded during of the incident. Specific types of documentation will be necessary to apply for reimbursement, and it is best to begin gathering this documentation during the incident. Personnel should be specifically assigned to this task as soon as possible.

The organization’s financial personnel should begin working with federal financial personnel as soon as possible to identify the guidelines under which reimbursement will be provided. There was confusion during the incident and in the months following regarding what was perceived to be a reimbursable expense at the time of the disaster versus what was approved afterwards. Identifying the ground rules early in the incident will help to avoid some of this misunderstanding.

**Logistics**

A number of independent logistics operations were established to support the various organizations that responded. This resulted in duplicate orders, orders being canceled, mis-deliveries, equipment being diverted, and other problems. Centralizing the logistics operations, or at least coordinating them, would help to ensure that many of these problems could be avoided. This would also help with documenting the purchases for federal reimbursement.

**Volunteers**

Pre-identify an organization responsible for registering and managing volunteers. Provide those that wish to volunteer with a central place to report.

**Donations**

An overwhelming amount of material was donated to this incident. Pre-identify an organization that will be responsible for managing donated materials, including receiving the material, warehousing it and distributing it.

A number of different organizations at this incident were providing services and donating materials. It may be necessary to assign one agency or organization to coordinate all of these operations in order to minimize duplicated efforts and to most effectively utilize the donated materials. It may also be necessary to establish systems for handling financial donations as well as material donations.

Once the incident is complete, there may be unused donated material remaining. A plan for the distribution of this material should be established.
Information/Intelligence

Due to the complexity of this incident, it was necessary to gather a great deal of information about the building’s construction and the potential location of any trapped victims. From the very beginning, rescue personnel worked with the building’s engineers and architect in developing intelligence about the design of the building. This operation, which evolved over the course of the incident into a sophisticated system, was instrumental in ensuring that rescue operations were conducted as safely as possible. Computer Aided Drafting (CAD) was used to develop drawings which were updated frequently with information on the building and the location of victims.

Survivors of the bombing were interviewed immediately in order to develop a list of those who might still be trapped within the building. As this list was developed, it was relayed to the rescue personnel. These survivors were also queried on the exact location of the missing people immediately before the explosion. This information was invaluable in identifying the potential location of victims within the debris pile. At times, the location of the victims in the debris pile was directly below where they were last reported to have been seen. Personnel should be assigned to developing this intelligence as soon as possible following a disaster.

Daily Incident Action Plans (IAP) were developed by the IST and distributed every twelve hours. These plans were extremely important in ensuring that everyone involved with the operations was advised regarding operations during the previous 12 hours, the plan for the next 12 hours, and other relevant information such as weather. Briefings were held twice a day to review the IAP and identify any potential problems that may arise. The IAP’s and the briefings were invaluable in transmitting information about the operation to everyone involved.

Implementing such intelligence-gathering operations and developing an infrastructure to support the processing and dissemination of the information can be key to a successful and effective outcome. Resources such as CAD, structural engineers and architects, and facility engineers should be identified as quickly as possible. A system should be developed for gathering this information and ensuring that it is provided to the appropriate personnel to assist in the operation.

Resources

A number of non traditional resources were used in managing this operation. An inventory of such resources within the community should be conducted prior to an incident, and relationships with the companies that can provide these resources should be established. This was a key factor, for example, in integrating the cellular telephone operations into the incident due to prior planning.

Immediately following the incident, a construction contractor was identified as the coordinator of all of the construction activity that would be associated with this incident (cranes, shoring, debris removal, etc.) This worked out extremely well and
allowed those with the appropriate knowledge and experience to most effectively coordinate the massive response of construction equipment and personnel.

Following this incident, several private sector contractors indicated that it would be extremely helpful to have training in the Incident Management System in order to apply it within their own organizations and to understand how the overall rescue and recovery operation is conducted. Agencies familiar with IMS should provide training to such organizations in the basics of the Incident Management System so that they can apply it within their own organizations and also understand how they integrate into the overall incident.

**Transportation**

It was necessary to move large amounts of equipment from a variety of locations to and from the site. Commercial contractors (such as UPS was used at this incident) should be utilized to transport food and supplies throughout a disaster site. Using a company with uniformed personnel and easily identifiable vehicles made access control easier.

Sufficient transportation should be available for personnel and equipment. Initially, rescue crews were walking from the convention center to the site to begin work, and back again after their shift. This resulted in some lost time that could have been used more effectively on the scene. In addition, they had to carry their personal equipment while walking this distance, at times in rain and other adverse weather.

**Administrative Services**

While the number of emergency responses within Oklahoma City dropped significantly during the rescue and recovery operation, agencies should plan on maintaining all other services (emergency and non-emergency). It may be necessary to bring in additional personnel to fill in for those working at the disaster. Also be prepared to bring in additional support staff to provide logistical support to the operation, answer telephones, take messages, etc.

**Documentation**

A small, multi-organizational documentation team was established the day following the incident. This team grew during the incident and in the months following to a large, multi-agency team that compiled a great deal of information on the events that occurred. Documenting the incident will be critical in the aftermath when it will be necessary to re-construct what transpired, so establish a documentation operation as quickly as possible to begin recording information. This information can be critical when applying for reimbursement for expenses incurred during the operation.
One of the comments that was repeated by people who had worked at this incident was that they had no time to write down what was being done. It was strongly recommended by these people that personnel involved in managing such an incident use small personal tape recorders or Dictaphones to capture thoughts and comments.

**Facilities**

Efforts should be made to pre identify locations that can serve as unified command posts. These locations should have features such as adequate size, communications capabilities, power, rest rooms, and conference rooms. The sites selected should allow pagers and telephones to operate within them. In this incident, the MACC was relocated to an underground bunker where cellular telephones and pagers would not operate.

As soon as the need is identified for using construction equipment at an incident, locations for staging this equipment should be identified. Large areas will be needed for not only the equipment but also for stockpiling supplies and material and for fabricating operations. If possible, select a location that is outside of the security perimeter. This will avoid the need to coordinate the entry of workers and supplies with the secure area.

**Housing and Feeding**

Large numbers of rescuers required housing and feeding. While the task forces are set up to handle their own needs, they are relatively spartan. Having housing locations that are warm and dry is a better option than tents. Emergency service organizations should identify sites that are capable of housing and feeding large numbers of rescue workers and make arrangements with the operators of these sites before a disaster strikes. When making these arrangements, the operators should be advised that they may have to relocate their operations when taking over such facilities. At the bombing, the convention center that was used for housing and feeding the task forces had to cancel some programs since there was no longer space available.

Identify non-traditional organizations and companies within the community that are capable of providing large scale feeding operations for extended periods of time, such as professional restaurant or hospitality organizations. These organizations may have the ability to tap into wholesale distributors and mobilize large numbers of professionals to staff such an operation. It was very fortuitous that ORA was holding a conference at the time, which greatly facilitated establishing a feeding operation.

It is important to coordinate these operations with organizations such as the American Red Cross which traditionally have responsibility for mass feeding operations. Have plans in place for feeding operations which span many weeks or months for large numbers of people.
Security

Security was a major concern because this was a crime scene and a criminal investigation was being conducted. It is important to establish as quickly as possible which agency will be responsible for coordinating security. One of the resource items to identify when planning for large scale incidents is portable fencing for establishing a perimeter.

Recommendations include developing plans for access control to the site. The FBI established a point where personnel were badged before entering the site which centralized access control. However, due to the volume of personnel requiring badging, this procedure was often backed up. Another recommendation is to ensure that this operation is adequately staffed and equipped to handle large numbers of people in order to avoid it becoming a bottleneck.

To control the number of authorized people entering a site, efforts should be made to minimize the number of entry points into the site in order to manage the personnel accountability system and to facilitate security control.

There were a number of private sector companies and government offices that were within the isolated area that could not gain access to their buildings. In addition, there were a large number of private vehicles that the owners could not immediately retrieve. A lesson learned was that the agencies involved need to be prepared to facilitate allowing companies to either re-establish their operations or gain access to their buildings on a limited basis. Also be prepared to allow people to recover their vehicles from within the secured area.

Criminal Investigation

Since this was a crime scene, there are specific functions that law enforcement carry out. At times these may be contrary to the normal operations conducted by rescue personnel. For example, it is necessary for rescue personnel to remove debris to gain access to trapped victims, but this material may be evidence which law enforcement personnel would wish to leave undisturbed. Develop a plan for coordinating the evidence recovery operation with law enforcement personnel. By assigning law enforcement personnel to work with the rescue teams it is possible to identify evidence as it is encountered by the teams and document its location.

All of the debris that was removed from the scene was analyzed for evidence. Several debris-sifting operations were established. It is necessary to have large, secured areas for these operations and for evidence storage. Also, a number of trucks and trash dumpsters were required to support these operations.

Media

This was an extremely high profile media event. Identify a primary point of contact within your organization for media contacts in order to provide a regular flow of accurate information. Be prepared to clarify any mis-information which the
### U.S.&R. STRUCTURE/HAZARDS EVALUATION

Where required, circle all the information items that apply. **Note:** Aftershocks may cause additional damage than noted.

#### STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION

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**STRICTURE TRIAGE • DATE/TIME**

1. **ZERO VICTIMS PROBABLE, WRITE ZERO, GOTO NEXT BLDG**
2. **POTENTIAL NO. OF TRAPPED ÷ 5 (MIN=1 MAX=50)**
3. **CONDITION OF VOIDS**
   - **3.VERY SEPARATE PART** COMPACT LAYERS COLLAPSE
4. **TIME GET TO VICTIM**
   - **1 ONE DAY 2 HRS**
5. **CHANCE OF COLLAPSE**
   - **1 LOW CHANCE HI CHANCE**
6. **SPECIAL INFO: SCHOOL / HOSPITAL = +25**
   - **KNOWN LIVE VICTIM = +5 EA**

**NO GO (CIRCLE, WRITE NO-GO & WHEN/IF TO REVISIT)**

**FIRE HM**

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**BLDG TOTAL**

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© NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION • OKLAHOMA, RESCUE OPERATIONS REPORT
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<td>1. ZERO VICTIMS PROBABLE, WRITE ZERO, GOTO NEXT BLDG</td>
<td>2. POTENTIAL NO. OF TRAPPED ÷ 5 (MIN=1 MAX=50)</td>
<td>3. CONDITION OF VOIDS 1 VERY SEPARATE PART COMPACT LAYERS COLLAPSE</td>
<td>4. TIME GET TO VICTIM 1 ONE DAY 2 HRS</td>
<td>5. CHANCE OF COLLAPSE -1 LOW CHANCE HI CHANCE</td>
<td>6. SPECIAL INFO: SCHOOL / HOSPITAL = +25 KNOWN LIVE VICTIM* = +5 EA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO GO (CIRCLE, WRITE NO-GO &amp; WHEN/IF TO REVISIT)</td>
<td>FIRE HM</td>
<td>BLDG TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
media may give out. At one point a request for medical volunteers was made by the 
media which resulted in a large number of medical staff people walking down to 
the site. No official request had been made and there was no plan for handling this 
influx of people, which placed an additional burden on the incident commander.

**Medical**

Not all of the medical operations were coordinated through the incident command 
system during the initial parts of the operation. It is important that this be done in 
order to ensure that triage, treatment, and transportation resources are used as ef-
fectively as possible.

The Incident Management System should also be utilized within the hospital struc-
ture to facilitate treatment of victims. Communications, both within the hospital 
and to external operations, are critical, and efforts should be made to identify al-
ternative communications systems and to ensure that existing disaster communi-
cations systems are operational. During this incident, the existing disaster radio fre-
quency system did not work because the hospitals did not routinely monitor it and 
because a number of them either had their receivers turned down or off. It was 
necessary to dispatch police officers to the hospitals to determine how many pa-
tients the hospitals could handle.

At one point, large amounts of medical supplies were shipped to the scene by a 
hospital that felt they would be needed but that were not requested by the incident 
commander. Also, medical personnel were deployed to the scene although they 
were not requested either. In order to utilize these people and this equipment, a 
makeup emergency room was set up on the site, but it was never utilized.

Efforts should be made to avoid placing additional burdens on the incident com-
mander to manage resources which aren't needed at the scene and may be more 
appropriately used elsewhere.

**NFPA Documents**

NFPA has a number of documents that can provide guidance to departments and 
agencies in developing procedures for responding to incidents similar to the Okla-
homa City Bombing. There are two NFPA documents that relate to incident man-
ageent that could be referenced in developing specific procedures. The first is 
NFPA 1561, *Standard on Fire Department Incident Management System*. The sec-
ond is NFPA 1600, *Recommended Practice for Disaster Management*. 
Other documents which could provide assistance include:
NFPA 471, Responding to Hazardous materials Incidents
NFPA 1470, Standard on Search and Rescue Training for Structural Collapse Incidents
NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program
NFPA 1521, Standard for Fire Department Safety Officer
NFPA 1581, Standard on Fire Department Infection Control Program
NFPA 1983, Standard on Fire Service Life Safety Rope and System Components

Conclusion

The Oklahoma City Bombing was an unprecedented tragedy in the history of the United States. Never has a homicide resulted in such a tragic loss within our country.

What occurred cannot be changed. The loss of life and the injuries that resulted cannot be lessened. However, we can learn from this tragedy, and use the lessons learned to help reduce the impact of future senseless acts of violence. Unfortunately, we are seeing more of these incidents occur. The Olympic bombing in 1996 which killed two civilians in Atlanta, and the abortion clinic bombing, also in Atlanta, in 1997 which injured several law enforcement members are testimony to the dangers faced by responders. The abortion bombing used two bombs, one of which was detonated while law enforcement personnel were conducting their investigations. Such tactics, which are commonly used in other parts of the world, are ones which responders in the United States will have to consider when developing strategies for dealing with these acts of violence.

The heroic feats that were performed by the rescuers, the outpouring of compassion and support from across the country, and the response from public safety agencies from around the world provided an opportunity to see all that is good in people. As said by one of the physicians interviewed in the preparation of this report, the people of Oklahoma City, and all of those who helped, have redefined the meaning of the word “hero” in every sense.
Appendix

Building Floor Plans

Timeline

IAP
Appendix

Timeline

4/19/95 to 5/23/95
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:02:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Officers calling in a blast in downtown OKC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:02:13</td>
<td>OGS</td>
<td>Oklahoma Geological Survey Station at Norman, OK experienced a Large Surface Wave. (The first)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:02:23</td>
<td>OGS</td>
<td>Oklahoma Geological Survey station in Norman, OK recorded a Large Surface Wave (the 2nd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:02:56</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>&quot;CP&quot; Heard at Dispatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:03:28</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>&quot;Loud Boom and CP&quot; at Dispatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:04:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Officer reports that the blast was at the federal building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:04:28</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Federal Building was identified as target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:04:56</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>&quot;Cp Heard&quot; at Dispatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:05:23</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E51 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:05:24</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>C1 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:05:24</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E1 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:05:24</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E4 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:05:24</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E6 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:05:24</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>S1 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:05:24</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>T1 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:05:24</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>T6 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:05:45</td>
<td>EMSA</td>
<td>&quot;As many EMSA units possible&quot; requested by OCPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:05:45</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Several Jury members in Court House reported as injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:06:54</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Police PIO advised of the incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:07:24</td>
<td>EMSA</td>
<td>6-7 People Down @ 100 NW 6th. EMSA advised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:07:33</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>J53 at 6th &amp; Hudson for traffic control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:07:47</td>
<td>EMSA</td>
<td>EMSA at 5th &amp; Hudson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:07:49</td>
<td>EMSA</td>
<td>C52 (OCPD) requesting all available EMSA units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:08:01</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>C3 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:08:07</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>HM5 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:08:25</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>DEPCH (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:08:27</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>2 people reported under the rubble at the East side of the Federal Building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:08:57</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E5 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:08:57</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>T5 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:10:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bill Justice, NREMT-P/FF, established South Triage sector at NW 4th St. between Robinson and Harvey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:11:25</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>2 subjects not moving at 100 Block of NW 6th (CR Anthony Building).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:12:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>O2 advises that there are people trapped on the 6th floor of the Federal Building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:12:30</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>Fire Dept. First Aid Station &quot;5th BDY FORWALKING WOUNDED&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:15:00</td>
<td>MEDIA</td>
<td>Local news and radio broadcasts requested assistance from anyone with emergency medical or disaster response capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:15:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Military participation in relief efforts began at this Time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:15:32</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E10 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:15:32</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E7 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:15:32</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E8 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:15:32</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>HT24 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:15:32</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>S17 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:15:32</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>S18 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:15:32</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>T7 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:15:32</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>T8 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:15:33</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>S21 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:15:33</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>S34 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:17:00</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>Fire Chief is 97 at 5th &amp; Broadway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:17:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>C118 is on the East side, 3rd Floor of Federal Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:17:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Water is rising in building and PD can't get people out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:19:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Command Post &amp; ERT activated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:20:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Initial life saving response forces were dispatched from Tinker AFB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:20:29</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>S12 advised to stage CP and ERT at 8th and Walker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:20:53</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>Fire Dept. staging at NW 6ht &amp; Harvey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:22:47</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Bomb Squad to Robert S. Kerr and Robinson for a suspicious briefcase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:25:24</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>C16 requests 2 ladder trucks on East side of Federal Building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:26:10</td>
<td>EMSA</td>
<td>Emsa advised all available units en route. Mercy EMS and Tulsa have been notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:27:26</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>J57 has traffic stopped at 10th and Hudson.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:28:28</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>All EMSA and Fire units requested to 4th and Harvey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:29:11</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>X50 DV and EMSA attempting to evacuate 4th and Harvey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:29:41</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>5th and Harvey, in alley, gas blowing everywhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:29:51</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>No answer by fire on direct line from police to fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:30:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Tinker AFB Building 591 received bomb threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:31:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Police Command established at 6th &amp; Harvey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:33:15</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>A46 at Bank of Oklahoma, reference: briefcase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:33:33</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>&quot;Chief wants Air 1 to top of Bld, there are people trapped&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:33:36</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>A24 advises 2 bomb techs en route to Bank of Oklahoma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:37:12</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Officer Down at 5th and Harvey. Was in the Building. L2145 advises officer at NW corner of Building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:37:49</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>EMT97 at 5th and Harvey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:38:00</td>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>DPS CP arrived.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:39:17</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>L214 advised ambulance is 97 at 5th &amp; Harvey (Officer Down)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:41:57</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>X50 requests &quot;all people&quot; to assist evacuation on South side of Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:43:45</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Subject showed officers where briefcase was at Bank of Oklahoma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:44:09</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>X50 advises no release of info related to daycare center to go to the triage area at 4th and Harvey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:45:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>First ERT contingency arrives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:46:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>X50 requests 3 units on S. side staircase to assist in clearing building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:46:50</td>
<td>SAH</td>
<td>Saint Anthony's requesting NW 13th and Dewey be closed.(repeated at 9:46:54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:46:56</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Digging for survivors from basement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:47:07</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>P819 en route to assist X50 on South side of Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:48:03</td>
<td>MEO</td>
<td>Morgue established at SE corner of Federal Building childrens playground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:50:18</td>
<td>MAFD</td>
<td>Capt. Rob Branson, Shawnee Fire Dept, Going to scene to assist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:50:56</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>J19 En route to OMH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>09:51:12</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>J9 en route to 4th &amp; Harvey with Lab Van.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:02:29</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>J17 standing by at OMH for crowd control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:09:10</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>X50 advised that &quot;they&quot; are through sweeping the building. Requests 3 man teams report to S side of building for final sweep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:10:50</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>K2 requests Tinker AFB Bomb dog to report 5th and Robinson to join OK County Bomb Squad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:11:12</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>9th floor checked and cleared. &quot;The best they can do without dogs&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:15:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Blood drive began at Tinker AFB jointly by Base Hospital and Oklahoma Blood Institute, over 100 units of blood collected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Fire Protection Association Fire Investigations Team Page 3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:16:09</td>
<td>STLC</td>
<td>Saint Luke's advises they have room if necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:16:58</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Floors 4-8 secured. &quot;The best they can do without dogs.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:20:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>507th airfueling wing put on &quot;crewrest&quot; and aircraft on alert for med-vac purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:25:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Tinker AFB implemented Threatcon Bravo and 100% check at base entry points.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:27:00</td>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>FEMA Region 6 offering assistance with Search and Rescue if needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:28:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Possible second device found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:30:00</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>Incident Declared a General Alarm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:30:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Remainder of ERT arrived.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:32:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>6 bodies moved from playground to Methodist Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:33:37</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Another device found on side of Federal Building. All officers evacuate area. CP moved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:34:54</td>
<td>EMSA</td>
<td>Triage moved to NW 3 &amp; Harvey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:35:00</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>1 SPS Bomb Dog Team on-scene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Fort Sill Dog Teams on-scene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Vance AFB on-scene/ dogs standing by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Shepherd AFB Bomb Dog on-scene</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Surgeons from Med Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radios and Communications Gear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3CCG provided vehicles, personnel, and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Sill providing body bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TAFB FD Liaison deployed downtown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>507th aircraft and crews placed on alert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>932nd Scott AFB aircraft and crews put on alert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Randolph AFB provided 3 medivac aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:40:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>OCPDCP ordered evacuation of all personnel and moved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:40:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Area around Murrah Building &quot;controlled&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>10:40:00</td>
<td>USPHS</td>
<td>Office of Emergency Preparedness was notified of the incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>11:00:00</td>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Centr was activated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>11:00:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Tinker AFB Building 591 Bomb threat terminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>11:00:00</td>
<td>USPHS</td>
<td>&quot;Oklahoma EMS&quot; requested deployment of the Tulsa Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>11:10:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>OCPDCP at 8th &amp; Harvey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>11:16:24</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>F.D. ordered barricades moved to NW 3 &amp; NW 12 / Dewey to Santa Fe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>11:19:30</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>C44 sent to Presbyterian with hurt ankle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>11:20:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Outer perimeter &quot;controlled&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>11:22:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>OCPDCP advises no secondary devices found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>11:23:00</td>
<td>MACC</td>
<td>Agency Department Heads meet at CP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>11:30:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Tinker AFB received off-base bomb threat specifically targeting TAFB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>11:44:00</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>CP advised that rescue operations had resumed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>11:50:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Shawnee Hospital sending 5 doctors with police escort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:00:00</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>Traffic perimeter controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:00:00</td>
<td>USPHS</td>
<td>DMAT Mobilization approved by Dr. Boufford, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:09:59</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>CU4 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:09:59</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E11 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:09:59</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E15 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:09:59</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E19 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:09:59</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E21 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:09:59</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E22 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:09:59</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>T15 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:09:59</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>T19 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:09:59</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>T22 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:10:00</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E30 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:10:00</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>T30 (OCFD) Dispatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:12:11</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E9 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:12:11</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>T9 (OCFD) Dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:14:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Tinker AFB implemented Threatcon Charlie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:14:28</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E25 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:15:15</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Suspect Vehicle: Late Model Chevy Full Size Pick-Up, Brown with tinted windows, smoked colored bug deflector. Suspect 1: Mid-Eastern Male, 25-28 YOA, 6ft. tall, athletic build, Dark hair &amp; beard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:16:18</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E24 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:16:56</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>E17 (OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:22:15</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>OG&amp;E responded to the S. side of the building with water pumps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:47:00</td>
<td>MAFD</td>
<td>Shawnee FD offering Ropes, Lights, and 6 generators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>12:48:00</td>
<td>MAFD</td>
<td>Edmond Civil Defense Standing By. Radio operators and all resources available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>13:14:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>PD advises FD of a vehicle at 6th and Hudson leaking fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>13:18:00</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Red Cross requesting that no more casualties be sent to them at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>13:29:00</td>
<td>MAFD</td>
<td>City of ADA is standing by.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>13:30:00</td>
<td>USPHS</td>
<td>DMAT arrived on-scene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>13:31:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Division 1 needs Bomb Squad Rep to his Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>13:36:00</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>R &amp; R established at NE corner of 6th &amp; Harvey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>13:39:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>State EOC can provide the following resources:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Generators-from 15kw to 2000kw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transformers, Cable Distribution Systems, Switch Gear, Aux. Fuel Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Temporary Morgue Cooling- Industrial Air Conditioning, Ducts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Available 24 hours a day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>13:41:00</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>R&amp;R needs Porta-Potties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>13:41:00</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>Safety Officer advises he has been cleared to remove bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>13:48:00</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>Federal Building evacuated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>13:51:24</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>Another device located at the NW corner of the building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>13:52:03</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>C2(OCFD) dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>13:57:00</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>1 Crew left in the Federal Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>14:00:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Tinker AFB Fire Dept. received request for all cots, blankets, sleeping bags, tents and associated materials to support long term search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>14:02:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>PD gave all clear to enter building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>14:04:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oklahoma State Trucker's Association standing by with volunteered equipment and operators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>14:21:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>New Base established at 316 NW 6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>14:30:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>OCPDCP moved to 1 Bell Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>14:34:00</td>
<td>MAFD</td>
<td>Tulsa FD Heavy Rescue Unit Available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>15:12:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dolese has Generators, Loaders, Backhoes available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>15:16:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Swift Transportation offering Drivers and Semi-Trailers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>15:21:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>New Suspect Vehicle: Blue, small to medium size, GM product, possibly chevrolet cavalier or blazer. Vehicle may be a rental car from National Car Rental Systems in DFW, Texas. Possible tag of PTF54F. Suspects: Occupied by Middle Eastern male/males.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>15:25:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>T-43 aircraft expected to arrive at TAFB form Randolph AFB with Medical Teams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>15:30:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>T43 aircraft expected at Tinker AFB from Randolph AFB with Medical Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>16:00:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>First major shipment of response support assets sent to scene by Tinker AFB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>16:30:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>T1 aircraft expected at Tinker AFB form Randolph AFB with a medical crew.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>16:50:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>CA TF2 equipment palletizing and loading completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>17:00:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>High Angle Rescue Team with all equipment available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>18:00:00</td>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>FEMA requested a Medical Technical Assistance Team and a Mortuary Assessment Team be deployed to OKC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>18:00:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>USAF personnel on-scene: 56 Fire Fighters, 20 Civ. Engineering, 80 Security Police (1 dog team on scene, all other dog teams involved in security of TAFB), 50 Combat Communications, 20 Transportation, 50 Base Volunteers, 50 Disaster Response Force/Base Agency Command and Control, 326 Total TAFB personnel on-scene (not including 1 TAFB Public Affairs Team).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>18:00:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>TAFB equipment on-scene: Excavation Equipment 1.5 ton truck 1 bobcat excavator 1.5 ton dump truck 1 6 passenger truck 1 air compressor and jackhammer 1 K12 industrial saw assorted hand tools and support equipment assorted wet weather gear 365 cots 16 GP tents 2 Ambulances with full life support equipment 22 security vehicles 1 10K forklift 5 29pax buses 1 pickup truck 3 tractor trailers 4 fire vehicles 50 personnel heaters 200 cots 21 prime moving vehicles 28 generators 4 water buffalos 17 GP tents 110 Light kits 1 Giant Voice System 254 blankets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>18:05:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>OK State Sheriff's Assoc. offering 125 officers, 34 cars, 1 rescue unit, 1 ambulance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>18:52:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deanna Johnson, Minneapolis, Minnesota, offering 2 Search and Rescue Dogs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>19:15:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>C141 aircraft from Luke AFB expected to arrive at Tinker AFB with a FEMA Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>19:42:00</td>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Chief Griffith, OCPD ordered all officers to report all out-of-state vehicles to the Mobile Command Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>19:50:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Electrical maintenance and truck offered by Bob Keumey, owner of Electric Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>20:00:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Col. Bornhoft coordinating all DoD participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>20:33:17</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>Engine &amp; Squad ordered to the SE corner of the building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>20:40:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>C5 aircraft from Andrews AFB expected to arrive at Tinker AFB with FBI Team and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>20:45:00</td>
<td>NWS</td>
<td>Local severe weather warning issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>21:32:00</td>
<td>NWS</td>
<td>Weather Warning cancelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>22:35:00</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>FBI mission arrived on scene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/95</td>
<td>22:35:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>FEMA personnel from Travis and Luke on-scene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>00:09:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>C5 from Andrews AFB expected at Tinker AFB with FBI Team and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>00:12:17</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>603 terminating command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>00:35:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel on-scene rotated out with fresh personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>00:55:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thermo-Camera on-scene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>00:55:00</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>603 sends Chris Jackson to act as PIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>02:10:03</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>MCGRAW REPORTS THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO GET 60 RESPIRATORS FROM TINKER AFB FOR USE AT THE SCENE TO HELP THE WORKERS BREATHE IN THE DUSTY AIR ENVIRONMENT. THEY ARE ALSO GOING TO ASK FOR 3 DOZEN TRENCHING TOOLS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>04:04:43</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Information received from ARC shelter at St. Lukes Church in OKC 100 registered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>04:12:00</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Request for food stuffs: Water, Gatorade, Fruit Juice, Coffee, Hot chocolate for Canteen 2 - Salvation Army 7th and Harvey ASAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Request relayed to ARC Mass care at 04:00 and being filled immediately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>05:00:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>California Task Force 2 activated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>05:00:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>New York Task Force 1 Medical Component activated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>05:25:42</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>For info re: Victims - Call ARC @ 232-7121 or go to First Christian Church at 36th &amp; Walker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSBI &amp; ARC Report 170 Unaccounted for, 575 - 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>06:20:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>CA TF2 Medical Team activated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>06:45:48</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Joe McGraw called to provide additional phone numbers to reach the command posts as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OCFD (627-0908) Cellular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>06:59:03</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Southwester Bell Telco has installed a mobile cellular site near the disaster area for better coverage. Since the incident began, S.W. Bell has provide 150 free cellular phones and free air time to the response force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>07:00:00</td>
<td>NWS</td>
<td>Weather Report: Low of 30 degrees Farenheit, High of 70, winds Low, 20% chance of showers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>07:00:00</td>
<td>OCFD</td>
<td>Incident Objectives:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Provide for safety of personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Thorough search of Basement, 1st floor, 2nd floor, &amp; 3rd floor</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Identify # of missing personnel by agency &amp; location</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Continued rescue of victims and removal of deceased</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>5. Complete base of Ops for Phoenix and Sacramento USAR Teams</td>
</tr>
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<td>6. Complete Base of Ops for IST</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7. Continue to support OCFD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>07:00:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>USAR Teams on scene:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arizona Task Force 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>California Task Force 1 or 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>07:30:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>CA TF2 Medical Team Begins health screening of Task Force members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>07:57:27</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Steve Bennett 728-4291 State Farm Claims Req Poc for Coord to begin claims ADJ in downtown area where bus acts and vehicles are located. Alternite POC John Steel 752-6601. LL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>INS Dept Janet McDaniels will Handle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attempt to recontact SFARM Met W/NEG Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>08:08:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Air Liquide, OKC offering Oxygen &amp; Nitrogen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>08:08:28</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Message Left at ODCEM: &quot;Karisi, an ambassador, knows what happened and who is responsible. 011-4124245895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>08:17:00</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Available:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Helicopters (each lifts 5 tons), Kamalua, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cellular Phones, Priority Programed</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Search &amp; Rescue Dogs, W. Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Communication Equipment, Stillwater, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>08:17:51</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Emergency Provision: These Things were Volunteered:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. 2 Helicopters can lift 5 tons from Russia, Kamalua call Nananetta May at 818-340-5530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Mike Butchko, cell phones for use, Priority cell Phones; call 703-684-6446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Search and rescue dog team from W. Virginia. Call Nancy Skinner at 304-485-8444 or 304-422-0090 (FAX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Gene Frickey, stillwater, has communication equipment at 405-377-6521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. A man called and left this message: Karisi, an Ambassador, knows what happened and who is responsible. 011-4124245895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This FAX was sent over from the Gov. Office by Jason Nelson. cjd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>08:20:00</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Attended FBI briefing. No change in injuries / deaths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>08:30:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tulsa DMAT Released from duty in OKC and returned to Tulsa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>08:46:40</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Met Director; briefed him on FBI Info. McGraw has been directed to return to state EOC W/Info at 8:15 hrs. Director told Ashwood &amp; Liebe to return to command Post He will go to Civic Center and contact FEMA Liaison. Il</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>08:50:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Clerical assistance offered by Lawton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>08:50:07</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Ron Hil, Connie Dill or Anyone at the State Office. If you need any type administrative support or clerical support from Lawton or need me to come to the State EOC to provide relief for other clerical or administrative support personnel, I would be happy to provide that assistance on the weekends and week days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>08:57:07</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Holly Kelly Lawton/Comanche County EOC 8:50 am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Oklahoma County's Mobile EOC is located on NW 6th between Walker and Dewey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Hard Line Phone 232-1701, Cellular 831-6333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don Lynch has just arrived.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EIS Data number (At this time) is 826-2795.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pleas call (or EIS/TCOMM) If you receive this, I had a lot of difficulty with this yesterday.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>09:00:51</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Gayland Kitch, Moore EM for Oklahoma Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fred Liebe, Albert Ashwood, and I attended the 7:30 FBI Briefing. This briefing will take place at 7:30 and 19:30 daily. Weldon Kennedy, SAC/FBI, has been designated as the on-scene commander. Personnel count is as follows: FBI-140, ATF-100 by close of bus, US Marshall-45, FEMA-?, OHP-50, Military Guard-92 MPs. Dave Williams is in charge of the FBI. Evidence OCFD reported 36 fatalities (by Chief Gary Mars). Two significant ground rules were established 1) no free lance investigation work will be accomplished 2) No individual interviews will be conducted by investigators. The incident building has been throughly fenced off w/limited access available at 5th and robinson and 5th and harvey to authorized search &amp; rescue ADN investigation personnel only. The perimeter will be reduced significantly today. jm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>09:29:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bull Dozer, Front End Loader, and Volunteers available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>09:29:40</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Dean Adkins, W/former speaker Nancy Johnson's Office has bull dozer front end loader and volunteers. Il</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>09:30:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>CA TF2 Medical screenings completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>09:30:31</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>EQ present being utilized on backhoe in correct for pickup of any debris from large to one small baseball size items. They need a claim shell attachment to backhoe. Obtain from Kirby Smith 495-7820 will req special opr and he is licensed to OPR contact Cynthia Smith. II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Passed to Liebe at 9:40 hrs. 1015 hrs from Liebe, Coord W/OKC FD &amp; Kirby Smith. EQ DEL approx 0300. Clam shell not available in OK and not req at present time. Butch beck PVT party soliciting Bus W/Kirby SMith. Kirby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>09:30:48</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Unknown ARC rep went to OKC FD requesting volunteers - req David Hackett (ARC) for follow-up action on who, where, ETC. II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>David Hackett Notified to contact Fred Liebe @ 640-3848 0945 Hrs. ARC OPS CTR Informed about situation and following up. John Chartier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>09:37:53</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Request search for entries pertaining to body bags ASAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>09:40:23</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>No Recorded messages/entries on EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>09:50:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>Dr. Ward from OSDA called: OHP on scene are advising possible raw sewage. DEQ has been notified. OSDH concern is the need of tentnus and possible GAMA Coulbin. GAMA Coulbin is in short supply-advised of a Stockpile in Atlanta C.D.C. E Manley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>09:58:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>CA TF2 received briefing. Medical Section provided Safety briefing. Memphis-Shelby county, Metro Nashville, Tennessee Association of Rescue Squads available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>09:58:59</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>The following have committed immediate resources at your request: Memphis - Shelby County, Metro Nashville, and Tennessee Association of rescue Squads. The Tennessee Assoc of rescue squads is comprised of over 100 rescue Squads who area involved in specialized teams (I.E. K-9, Heavy Rescue, ETC) LL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>10:19:57</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>FEMA MERS has been established at the following: Logisitcs trailer w/satelite telephone - FBI CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>MRV - At evidence collection warehouse 101 NW 4th Between Classen and Western on NW 4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At 8:10 FT Sill's Logistics Mobility Center Arrived at The FBI CP. jim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>10:30:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>CA-TF2 en-route to March AFB for transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>10:30:08</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>I.D. Badges incorrect need a change: Allan Clark Temp. Morgue, 833-8013 pager 556-7027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Liebe confirmed at 1054 hrs medical Officer who coordinated w/OKC PD...Only OKC PD badges will be recognized. At 10:55 hrs Loomis passed info above to Clark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>10:35:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-800-HELP-NOW number set up for financial contributions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>10:55:21</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Available equipment and manpower list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Posted on Resource sheet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>10:55:28</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>OKC FD Command Post # 291-1109 close hold - internal use only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>10:57:49</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Received call from Jon Overmyer, Reg 6. He has been appointed as public Assistance Officer for the Presidential Emergency Declaration. He will arrive tomorrow April 21. As of now, categories A and B (EMG, Work and Debris removal) is eligible for reimbursement for state/local efforts. He will have more info upon arrival. Requests we make initial contact w/OKC and OK County responders on required records. L Culp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Larry Culp will handle request. cjd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:05:00</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>ARC is relaying a request from the family assistance ctr informed military @ 1st Christian Church, 36th &amp; Walker. 15 members of Dept. National Guard need to be relieved at center. Contact completed: LTC DS 520-3004 or 520-3031. John Chartier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:05:00</td>
<td>USARMY</td>
<td>Fort Sill Logistics Mobility Van On-Scene with the following equipment: 1 UHF 450-470 4 UHF 140-170 1 FM 20-60 2 Cellular Phones 1 30KW Generator 1 5KW Generator 1 Refrigerator-small 1 Heater/air 6 work stations 1 PA System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:05:35</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>250 Body Bags being flown from Memphis, TN to OKC by TENN ANG. 300 body bags being FED EX from Dallas to OKC. ETA from Memphis, TN to OKC 1245. ETA from Dallas, TX to OKC ? today. Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:07:39</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>FAX number for ODCEM Command Post is 291-1075.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:07:57</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Received Memo from DOL; Subj; Asbestos</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Logged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:08:12</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Ron Phillips has equip service available  call 405-342-1228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:12:23</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Charles Anders w/rural Econ Dev, Federal Agency at 742-1016, or Susan Estes; has volunteers for food handling, has additional volunteers ID specific to FEMA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Loomis passed info to ARC and FEMA. Contacted Red Cross Staffing - relayed names &amp; contact number of 50 volunteers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:20:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>NY Port Authority offering a structural Engineer, Operations Recovery specialist, and trauma assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>POCs: GEO. Marliin, EXE DIR  Kathleen Donovan, Chair Woman</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Logged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:25:34</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Requested we contact a Dr. Robert Frank in New Orleans (Heart Spec) and inform him we do not need his assistance at this time. (504) 393-1817 or (504) 349-4901. Christine Jolly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Message delivered to 1st phone number at 1135 by Christine Jolly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:25:44</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Dr. Ward of OSDH advises that exposure to raw sewage @ the sight will be &quot;A possible exposure for very Few.&quot; Advises no need for concern on tetus and/or Gamma Goublin @ this time. He will check names: Scott Lillybridge &amp; Dr. Hogan since neither of us know them. Eddie Manley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:30:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>Cellular Phones for CA-TF2 Comm. received from Los Angeles &quot;CC&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:40:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Argus Hamilton offering to do shows or organize comedian fund raising effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:45:43</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>ARC Damage assessment: NW 9th St. - Single family houses @ 811, 816, 424; NW 7th ST - Single Family Houses @ 501, 503 and apartment @ 509, 6 Units; NW 6th St - Single Family Houses @ 604, 605, 613, 622, 623 and apartment @ 714, 8 units; Walker ST - Single Family House @ 809; NW 8th St. - Apartment @ 516, 8 Units; NW 5th St. - Apartment @ 333, 280 Units; Note: All of above have sustained minor to major damage. John Chartier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>11:47:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Available: Shepherd Mall- Old Dillard's Store Area  Young Generator- Quiet Running Generators 1st Christian Church- Free Counseling Volker Stieber- Heart Beat listening Tool OK Farmer's Union- 2 Furnished Buildings in OKC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 04/20/95 | 11:47:30 | ODCEM  | 1) Shepherd Mall - POC is ED DUCLOS. Will donate the old Dillard's section of the Mall (947-9977).  
2) Young Generators - POC is Melanie. Have Generators that run very quietly (800)821-5095 or (805)473-7400.  
3) Free Counseling - POC is Carol Albano. Home Based or Group counseling 36th & Walker @ 1st Christian Church. Group sessions are held @ 12 noon @ 4400 N. Lincoln. 425-0301 or 425-0308 - Red Rock mental.  
4) Mr. Volker Stieber from California & of German Descent. Technology to hear heart beat as small as a mouse's (510)944-9309. Point of contact - Melissa Tease SW medical 636-7342.  
5) Phillip Klutts - OK Farmers Union - Have 2 Bldgs available in OKC w/furniture. Point of contact - Brenda Free 491-1590.  
6) Kathy Markley or Neal Gunn - Ticket Maste (214)750-7400. Willing to come in & set up Special #s for Donations etc. Barbara Taylor. |
| 04/20/95 | 11:50:17 | ODCEM  | Contact by FEMA REP - Question from state of Arkansas Neutral ID Team. Heard rumor that we needed ID teams - ques posed to Military Examiner's Office - Answer is No. Info passed back. Eddie Manley.  

Info given back to State of Arkansas per Manley |
| 04/20/95 | 12:00:00 | USAF   | Tinker AFB Resources on scene:  
14 Fire  
6 Civil Engineering  
80 Security Police  
1 Dog Team (all other dog teams involved in TAFB security)  
15 Combat Communications  
16 Transportation  
35 38th Engineering Installation Wing  
55 Base Volunteer Pool  
50 Disaster Response Force/Base Agency Command and Control  
271 Total TAFB Personnel |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>12:00:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>TAFB Equipment on scene: excavation equipment 1 1.5 ton truck 1 bobcat excavator 1 5ton dump truck 1 6 passenger Truck 1 aircompressor with jackhammer 1 K12 industrial saw assorted handtools and support equipment assorted wet weather gear 365 cots 16 GP tents 4 battery chargers 16 batteries 3 lightalls 2 ambulances with full life support equipment 22 security vehicles 1 bomb dog 4 staff cars 2 station wagons 4 8pax van 4 44pax van 2 5ton tractor/26ft. trailer 1 6pax pick up 2 1.5ton cargo truck 1 1ton truck/26ft. tilt trailer 1 10K forklift 1 4K forklift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>12:10:53</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Request status (need) for critical incident stress debriefing. FEMA ready to accept mission. II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Informed Human Services

DHS Liaison will meet with Margaret Bradford, Deputy Commissioner, ODMH, she is coordinating the effort to identify CISD.

State EAP council met and is setting up meetings for state employees effected by event. Contact Donna Miller, OPM 521-3358. RLH

Joe Williams, FBI Chaplain, have teams on way to assist. RLH

AG's office has teams available if related to substance abuse. RLH

OCPD, OHP, OCFD all have their own RLH
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>12:11:10</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Request the current official totals on injured and deaths. Info given to Ron Hill. Assigned to RC. Contacted RC EOC - requesting for Info. RC will call back w/ info. on total official on Injured &amp; Deaths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>12:20:07</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>FEMA Requests information on families displaced in residential area surrounding federal bldg. See Red Cross damage assessment info/message #171. ARC contacted OKC City Mgr: CNTY Human SVCS: OKC BLDG DEPT: Neighborhd SVCS. OKC will contact later with more info. (LDH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>12:24:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Society of American Military Engineers offering their assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>12:24:18</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>The society of American Military Engineers is offering their assistance in the following areas: Construction services, interior designers, landscape architects, architects, designers, regional planners, hydrologists, economists/analysts, engineers, civil, chemical, electrical, mechanical, sanitary, soils, structural, telecommunications, transportation, surveyors, and CADD operators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>12:29:51</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>A case of carmex and lip balm is needed at 5th &amp; Robinson. Given supply to an agent named Lynn. They are expected it. Informed Health Dept. referred to OSDH to deliver it/also NG will try to find some and deliver it [EM] NG will deliver 1 case of lip balm [1355 em]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>12:31:48</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>PORTA POTTY NEEDED TO BE LOCATED NORTH OF 5TH ON ROBINSON. THE ONES THAT ARE LOCATED RIGHT NOW ARE TOO FAR WEST FOR THE PEOPLE LOCATED NEAR 5TH &amp; ROBINSON. LL INFORMED HEALTH DEPT. INFORMED OSDH ENV HLTH AND THEY WILL PORTA POTTY ARE IN ROUTE TO 5TH AND ROB [1400 EM]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>12:42:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>CA TF2 Arrived at March AFB Guardian Funeral Home offering funerals for all children killed. CA TF2 equipment is palletized and loaded onto aircraft. GUARDIAN FUNERAL HOME WILL PROVIDE FREE FUNERALS TO ALL CHILDREN KILLED IN BOMBING. POC: MS VICKIE LEWIS, 405-942-5600 LOGGED/PASSED TO PIO KRIER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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National Fire Protection Association Fire Investigations Team Page 17
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>12:45:38</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>GUARDIAN FUNERAL HOME WILL PROVIDE FUNERALS FOR ALL CHILDREN KILLED IN BOMBING FOR FREE. 942-5600.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>12:45:39</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>DR. PATRICIA ANN GREENWAY, A PSYCHIC, CLAIMS SHE HAS SEEN 3 MEN AND A BOY IN A 4TH FLOOR BATHROOM, ALIVE. ALSO, 22 PEOPLE STILL ALIVE, 1 SMALL CHILD. ALSO SOMETHING ABOUT A HISPANIC/MEXICAN MOTHER CRYING FOR HER CHILD. SHE CLAIMS SHE HAD WORKED WITH FBI BEFORE AT WACO. CHRISTINE GAVE HER THE 235-1206 # TO CALL. INFO FAXED TO FBI CP. LL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>12:45:51</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>REQUEST 200 COTS/LINEN AND BEDDING DELIVER TO MIL COMMAND POST AT MYRIAD. POC DICK MANNING 232-8871 REQUEST BY TSgt MALCUM 291-7482, WANTS CONFIRMATION. LL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>13:05:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Team Echo (EMS Search and Rescue Team) Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>13:25:00</td>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>C141 from JFK expected at Tinker AFB with FEMA and DoD Reps. (Delayed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>13:32:44</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>PERIOD FROM 4/19/95 AT 1845L TO 4/20/95 AT 1145L. FAA HAS RESTRICTED AIRSPACE FOR A RADIUS OF 5 MILES. ESTIMATE OF CASUALTIES: DEAD - 38, INCLUDING 12 CHILDREN BUT THE TOTAL CONTINUES TO CLIMB W/APPROX 200 PERSONS UNACCOUNTED FOR. 423 INJURED AND TREATED AT LOCAL HOSPITALS. AN EXPERIENCED DMH-O IS ASSISTING THE LOCAL CHAPTER IN DEALING W/ THE MANY MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES THAT WILL ARISE FROM THIS EVENT. THERE ARE 60 - 70 LOCAL MENTAL HEALTH VOLUNTEERS AVAILABLE TO ASSIST. AT THE REQUEST OF MORRIE GOODMAN ALL NATIONAL MADIA REQUESTS ARE TO BE FORWARD ED TO 202-646-4600 AND ALL LOCAL MEDIA IS BEING HANDLED BY GARY JONES AND REGIONAL STAFF AT THE ROC. OKLAHOMA STATE INJURY INQUIRY: 405-820-6801; COMMAND POST INJURY INQUIRIES: 405-820-6801; COMMAND POST INJURY INQUIRIES: 405-820-6801. LT GOV MARY FALLIN OF OK IS COORDINATING MEDICAL HELP. TO VOLUNTEER, PHONE # FOR PROVIDERS IS 405-271-2331. PHONE LINES FROM THE ROC TO OKC HAVE BEEN OVERCOME W/ HIGH VOLUME TRAFFIC. WE COULD NOT CONTACT OK, EXCEPT VIA NAWAS. JAMES LEE WITT AND HEADQUARTERS STAFF WILL ARRIVE IN OKC BY 1930L. MR WITT WILL ASSIST AND COORDINATE FEDERAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE EMERGENCY. FBI SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE: MR. JIM WEBER. OKC FBI SWITCHBOARD: 405-842-9470/9321 (SOURCE: 5USA). NEW INCIDENT COMMAND POST: 5010 PENN PL. (50TH &amp; PENN, NEAR PENN SQUARE MALL) PHONE: 405-232-2308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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National Fire Protection Association Fire Investigations Team Page 18
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>13:37:19</td>
<td></td>
<td>For Immediate delivery - a condor Model 150S Device to provide access to all floors of the federal bldg. Able to furnish two drivers so that this unit may travel non stop from Sanford FL to OKC. Est 24hrs Contact Wendy Wagner or Lance Renzulli at 407-324-9009 for info.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>13:37:48</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY A CONDOR MODEL 150S SPECIFICATION: THIS AERIAL ACCESS DEVICE MAY QUITE POSSIBLY PROVIDE ACCESS TO ALL FLOORS OF THE FEDERAL BLDG. ABLE TO FURNISH TWO DRIVERS SO THAT THIS UNIT MAY TRAVEL NON STOP FROM SANFORD, FL TO OKC. EST 24 HRS. PLEASE CONTACT WENDY WAGNER OR LANCE RENZULLI AT (407) 324-9009 FOR INFO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>13:39:13</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>CAN PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING DISASTER SERVICES: GENERATORS FROM 15KW TO 2000KW. COMPLETE SYSTEMS OR AVAILABLE AND CAN INCLUDE GENERATORS, TRANSFORMERS, CABLE, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS, SWITCH GEAR, AUX. FUEL TANKS &amp; ON SITE PERSONNEL. TEMPORARY MORGUE COOLING. SYSTEMS CAN INCLUDE INDUSTRIAL AIR-CONDITIONING, DUCT WORK ELECTRICAL CABLE &amp; TEMP POWER. AVAL 24 HRS PER DAY. CALL: 918-446-8461 STEVE WOLFORD OR GLENN HAYNES, TULSA 214-293-0491 KURT WHITE, CEDAR HILL, TX 800-443-2447 OR 800-933-4771 X 11 KATHRYNE BICH, PEARLAND TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>13:39:34</td>
<td></td>
<td>Society of American Military Engineers is offering their assistance in the following areas. Construction services, interior designers, landscape architects, architects, designers, regional planners, hydrologists, economists/analysts, engineers, civil, chemical, electrical, mechanical, sanitary soils, structural, telecommunications, Contact Lance Benham 405-478-5353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>13:40:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>POC Dixie Stuart has a CISD Team available 24 hrs a day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>13:40:51</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>POC DIXIE STUART HAS A CRITICAL DEBRIEFING TEAM (5 INDIVIDUALS) AVAILABLE FOR 24 HR CONT. CALL 918-458-5403 OR 918-458-3275 OR PAGER: 1-800-569-7543 CHEROKEE NATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>13:41:21</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>GSA MOTORPOOL IN OKC HAS 35 VEHICLES OF VARIOUS TYPES AVAILABLE FOR FEDERAL RESPONDERS. DCO/DCE INBOUND TO OKC FROM FT. SILL, OK VIA GROUND. ETA AFTER 6 P.M. DCO: COL STUART BORNHOFT, USA. TOTAL 8 PEOPLE. 5USA LIAISON OFFICER, LTC RON CONE USA, ENROUTE VIA GROUND TO OKC EOC. ETA 9 P.M. TINNER AFB DESIGNATED DOD BASE SUPPORT INSTALLATION (BSI). POC LT HARRELL, USAF, (405)739-2171 (SOURCE: 5USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>13:44:30</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>SIT RPT #2(P) ON 04/20/95 NOON, EDT. THE FOLLOWING FEDERAL AGENCIES WERE LOCATED IN THE BOMBED BUILDING: DEPT OF DEFENSE, DEPT OF TRANSPORATION, GENERAL SERVICES ADMIN., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH &amp; HUMAN SERVICES, HOUSING &amp; URBAN DEVELOPMENT, DEPT OF JUSTICE, DEPT OF LABOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., DEPT STATIONS, US DEPT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS. PIPELINE: THE DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH &amp; SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMIN OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY REPORTS THAT OK NATURAL GAS CO HAS SHUT OFF SERVICE TO THE AREA AROUND THE EXPLOSION &amp; WILL CONDUCT LEAK TESTS ONCE THEY ARE ALLOWED ACCESS TO THE AREA. THE PIPELINE LEAKS HAVE BEEN REPORTED. NO SECONDARY INCIDENTS RELATED TO GAS LEAKS HAVE OCCURRED. MASS CARE: A 10 BLK AREA AROUND THE EXPLOSION AREA WAS EVACUATED. THE ARC IS SETTING UP A SHELTER FOR THOSE FROM A LARGE APT COMPLEX OF APPROX 600 APTS. ARC IS SENDING IN 2 ADDITIONAL CANTEENS TO SUPPORT LOCAL CHAPTER OPERATIONS. THE ARC HAS ACTIVATED THEIR DISASTER HEALTH &amp; MENTAL HEALTH PEOPLE TO POSSIBLE DEPLOY TO OKC. ARC HAS ESTABLISHED A 48 HR MORATORIUM ON DISASTER INQUIRIES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>13:47:58</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>MARLON BOWERS 405-226-4372 HEAVY EQUIPMENT OPERATOR AND HAS EQUIPMENT STEVE BEAN UTILITY CONSTRUCTION 226-0657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>13:58:01</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>LINDA MURPHY FROM GOV OFFICE REQ ASSISTANCE REMOVING 1 MILLION DOLLAR PIECE OF COMPUTER EQUIP LOCATED ON 2ND FLOOR OF BLDG. STATE GOVT OFFICE FOR STUDENT LOANS; WILL NEED HYDRAULIC EQUIP TO REMOVE; NEED ACCESS TO AREA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>14:00:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>FEMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>14:00:00</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Watts Drug Store of Independence, MO offers to supply all medical equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>14:00:25</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>C141 from Norfolk expected at Tinker AFB with FEMA Personnel and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>14:01:47</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>WATTS DRUG STORE, 11724 SE 23RD ST. INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050; WILL DONATE MEDICAL SUPPLIES; CONTACT: ROBERT BROWN OR VIKKI MITCHELL TREE @ 816-461-8844. LAURA D. HERNANDEZ INFO FOR HEALTH DEPT AND RC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>14:10:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>REQ OF GOVERNOR: REQ FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON THE ISSUING DHS OF A DISASTER DECLARATION. THIS WILL ALLOW THE DEPT. TO HD REQUEST FEDERAL FUNDING FOR CRISIS COUNSELING AND LONGER HILL TERM COUNSELING FOR INDIVIDUALS EFFECTED BY DISASTER. A DISASTER DECLARATION WAS NOT ISSUED FOR THE WORLD TRADE CENTER. THE CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH SRVCS RECOMMENDS THE REQ SPECIFICALLY BE DIRECTED TOWARD CRISIS AND LONGER TERM COUNSELING FOR VICTIMS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>14:10:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Full Circle Obedience School will provide assistance to all SAR dogs if needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>14:10:04</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>ADV PARTY CISD TM ON SCENE FROM SHREVEPORT, LA BALANCE OF TEAM ON WAY. RPTED TO CINDY ALEXANDER EMS, SHE TOLD THEM TO COORDINATE W/STATE EOC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>INFOR TO FEMA AND DHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RE: ACTION TAKEN: CONNELLA WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY OCFD FOR DEBRIEFING &quot;AFTER&quot; THE EVENT IS OVER. CLOSE AT 16:37 LIEBE DIRECTED THAT THEY COMMUNICATE W/WHOEVER REQUESTED THEM. RLM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OCFD HAD REQUESTED THEIR ASSISTANCE WITH DEBRIEFING OF FIREFIGHTERS AFTER THE EVENT WAS OVER. SHREVEPORT FIRE CHIEF CHOSE TO SEND TEAM ASAP RLH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16:37 LIEBE INSTRUCTED OIC TO COORDINATE W/WHO REQUESTED. RLH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MARK CONNELLA (RDWY IN 947-2400 RM 225) (CELL) 5 ADDL PEOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>14:10:19</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO RESCUE DOGS OR THEIR PERSONNEL - MONEY, HOUSING, FIRST AID, ETC. FOR DOGS OR HANDLERS. FULL CIRCLE OBEDIENCE SCHOOL, KAYLAN HEAD AT 721-7829.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GIVEN TO FEMA FOR INFO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>14:24:10</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>CHRIS LARSH OFFERING ASSISTANCE W/LAW ENF AND FIREFIGHTERS (405) 456-7633: ROFF EMG MGMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>14:45:40</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>CISD TEAMS AVAILABLE FROM VIRGINIA. CHIEF VA ENROUTE TO DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS. WILL ARRIVE 1800 HRS STATE EOC TO COORD W/FEMA. PINKSTON 297-5908.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>INFOR FOR DHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GRAHAM NANCE HAS COMMUNICATED WITH VA CHIEF. 16:47 RLH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>14:56:42</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>BOMB THREAT AT CENTRAL CHRISTIAN CHURCH IN ARDMORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:00:00</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>HOT MEALS WILL BE DELIVERED TO EOC AT 1800 L FOR EVENING MEAL DONATED BY HARRIGAN RESTAURANT. VICKI LEWIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:08:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oklahoma Petroleum Marketers will donate fuel to run equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:08:03</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>OKLAHOMA PETROLEUM MARKETERS WILL DONATE FUEL TO RUN EQUIPMENT; POC CHERYL 842-6625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:10:14</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>DR. JORDAN REQ ONE MORE PORTABLE X-RAY EQUIP AND TM TO CPR. 239-7141 IMMEDIATELY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>STATE HEALTH DOES NOT HAVE PORTABLE X-RAY EQUIP OR X-RAY TECHS - STATE HEALTH DEPT. 15:16 MESSAGE DELIVERED TO FEMA FOR REQUEST 15:41 ACTION COMPLETED, OTHER SOURCES PROVIDED REQ. CANCELED W/FEMA. LOOMIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:11:21</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>NO SEVERE THUNDERSTORMS ARE EXPECTED OVER THE AREA THROUGH TONIGHT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:12:23</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>GOVT LIAISON NOT A TEMP MORGUE; UNDERSTAND (UNCONFIRMED) GOV'S OFFICE EST OFFICE 36 AND WALKER. NO CASUALTY INFOR WILL BE RELEASED BY TEMP MORGUE OTHER THAN THRU OFFICIAL RPT CHANNEL (NOT GOV LIAISON) LL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:18:29</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>POC FOR ALEXANDRA 291-4917 OR MR. TASSEY. THEY ARE HANDLING CISD TMS. RM 210 SW BELL BLDG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>THANKS FOR INFO. RLH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJ DAVID BOWDEN OCFD, HAS A DOZEN VOLUNTEERS, TAKING CARE OF FIREFIGHTERS, (SHREVEPORT) WILL HELP W/FIREFIGHTERS AFTER THE SITUATION IS UNDER CONTROL. LL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:30:54</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>DR. THOMAS JOHNSTON, PHY INTERNAL MEDICINE, ADA OK 405-332-3211 (OFFICE) AVAILABLE FOR ASSISTANCE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:37:58</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>GREG COLLINS, W/ZENO SYSTEMS NOTIFIED BY SHARP ELECTRONICS CORP, WILLING TO OFFER FAX MACHINES FOR THIS INCIDENT AT NO CHARGE - ALSO GOVT AGENCIES CAN OBTAIN REPLACEMENT OF THEIR EQUIPMENT (IF DAMAGED IN INCIDENT) AT NO CHARGE UNTIL REPLACED. NEED LETTER REQUESTING NEED 405-946-9555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:38:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Joyce Crane Service offering assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:38:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Xerox Corp. offering demonstration room and all copying for free.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:38:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Greg Collins of Zeno Systems is offering free fax machines for use and replacement of lost equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:41:23</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>CONTACT W/ ARC MENTAL HEALTH. APPROX 200 INDIVIDUALS HAS RECEIVED CRISIS COUNSELING AS OF 2:30 PM TODAY. VICKIE LEWIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:42:49</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>GOV OFFICE RELAYED PROBLEM FROM FEDERAL RESERVE BANK. THEY NEED ACCESS TO BANK ONE BLOCK SOUTH OF EXPLOSION SITE IN ORDER TO MOVE MONEY BUT NG MILITARY POLICE WERE BLOCKING ACCESS. POC AT GOV OFFICE IS ANN KING TEL #523-4232. POC AT FEDERAL RESERVE BANK IS MR. MULINEX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>15:48:56</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>1556 hrs contacted Maj Paul Jones at OCPD FWD CP. He checked with OCPD Rep Ast Chief Spenser. Ast Chief Spenser said if Mr. Mullinex would see him he would give him pass for access. 1600 hrs relayed message to Ms. Ann King of Gov Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>16:00:00</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Dennis Siner at 918-682-6216 and Pager 684-0322 offering assistance w/ trackhoe that can sift. Is in demolition of bldgs in Muskogee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>16:00:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>C141 from Andrews AFB expected at Tinker AFB with secret Service Team and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>16:15:08</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>Lanier King (605-439-3141) was passed to me (LTC Garman) by Operator. She explained she was trying to locate an AIC Cartney Koch (Maiden name Mcraven) of 32 CBT Communication Squadron, TAFB. AIC Koch had been to Federal Bldg, she was 20 yrs. Old, blond hair, blue eyes, 5'7'' tall, slender build. She had not been located through red cross or hospitals. Thought she might have been pressed into to service at the scene.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>16:30:08</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>1620 contacted Maj Jones AIC Koch was not working at Forward CP 1703 called Lanier King suggested she contact AIC Koch Commanding Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 04/20/95| 16:30:08   | ODCEM  | Trans Tele Communications can arrange data communications. POC: Regina Smith, CEO 447-5025
LOGGED |
| 04/20/95| 16:35:00   | ODCEM  | SWA has offered to free trans - arrangements made thru Bil Maus, OK D Commerce ACTION PASSED TO ARC; INFO: OME, OFDA LL |
| 04/20/95| 16:35:38   | ODCEM  | Free long distance service to victims of disaster PASSED TO ARC & ODCEM PIO Officer Krier |
| 04/20/95| 16:38:17   | ODCEM  | Statewide prayer service to be held in OKC on Sunday, 04-23-95 at the State Fairgrounds area. LOGGED |
REQUESTED TO KNOW STATUS OF REQUEST FOR COTS AND LINEN PASSED TO NG FOR ACTION EARLIER IN THE DAY (MGB). 1639 CALLED MAJ PAUL JONES AT FWD CD. HE SAID REQUEST FOR LINEN HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND THAT COTS WERE BEING DELIVERED NOW. 1640 NOTIFIED SHERRY MCKENDRICK

04/20/95 16:50:26 ODCEM COL BILLS NG LIAISON TO DCO (FT SILL TEAM AT TAFB) ASKED IF THE COUNTY MEDICAL EXAMINER HAD REQUESTED PORTABLE X-RAY MACHINE FROM STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD REQUESTED IT FROM DCO AND THEY WANTED TO CONFIRM THAT STATE COULD NOT SUPPORT BEFORE WORKING THE ISSUE.

1657 CHECKED WITH LARRY LOOMIS AND WAS TOLD THAT THEY HAD REQUESTED X-RAY MACHINE BUT LATER CANCELLED THE REQUEST. 1704 HRS RELAYED INFORMATION TO COL BILLS. HE RESPONDED THAT REQUEST WAS NOW VALID AND WANTED TO KNOW IF WE WOULD RELAY THE REQUEST THROUGH FEMA FOR THEIR ACTION. I PUT COL BILLS ON THE PHONE WITH LARRY LOOMIS AND THE ISSUE WAS PASSED TO LARRY LOOMIS

04/20/95 16:54:49 ODCEM LTC SPEAKS OF WILL ROGERS ANGB OPNS CALLED AND ASKED FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON DISPOSITION OF 20 HIIFH PRESSURE OXYGEN BOTTLES THAT WERE DELIVERED ON THE KC135 FROM MEMPHIS WITH THE BODY BAGS.

1700 HRS CHECKED WITH LARRY LOOMIS IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY REQUEST OR REQUIREMENT FOR OXYGEN BOTTLES POSSIBLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE BODY BAGS. SEMA DID NOT HAVE ANY RECORD OF ANY REQUIREMENT. 1719 HRS CALLED MAJ JONES AT FWD CP. HE CHECKED AND THAT THERE WAS NOT ANY KNOWN REQUIREMENT 1724 HRS CALLED WILL ROGERS ANGB OPNS AND LEFT WORD WITH STAFF DUTY NCO THAT WE WERE NOT AWARE OF ANY REQUIREMENT TO

04/20/95 17:10:38 ODCEM REQUEST PORT X-RAY MOBILE DISASTER TEAM W/ALL EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL.

PASSED TO FEMA

04/20/95 17:14:20 ODCEM LARRY LOOMIS RELAYED THAT TEMP MORGUE HAD BEEN TRYING TO DIRECTLY TASK OUR MPS WORKING SECURITY AND THAT WE NEEDED TO MAKE THEM (MPs) AWARE NOT TO ACCEPT TASKING FROM ANYONE BUT CHAIN OF COMMAND OR OCPD.

1719 HRS CONTACTED MAJ JONES AND PASSED THE INFORMATION HE SAID IT HAD BEEN HANDLED
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>17:44:22</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>I HAVE COMPOSITES THAT WERE CAPTURED FROM CNN 2 BUMPS OF POSSIBLE SUSPECTS I WILL FORWARD SHORTLY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>18:05:58</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>FROM: SFC JIM COOK AT NATIONAL GUARD HQ, WASHINGTON, D.C. MR. ED REED CALLED, RE BOMB THREAT IN CHURCH. CORRECTION TO NAME OF CHURCH - SHOULD BE &quot;CENTRAL CHURCH OF CHRIST&quot; LOGGED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>18:10:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>CA TF2 recieved briefing at March AFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>18:30:26</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>RESOURCE:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>18:30:50</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>LOGGED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>18:40:22</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>RESOURCE: AD IN RECRUITING CMD IN AZ, COCHISE CO, HAS 2YRS IN ROPE RESCUE. (612)462-5620 NIGHT (612) 339-3915 DAY LOGGED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>18:40:32</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>REQUEST NAME OF PERSON WHO ASK FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE TEAM. ALLEN'S RESPONSE: KEVIN ROWLAND, ME OFFICE. URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE INFORMATION SHEET LOGGED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>18:45:29</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>BEAVER CO SENDING MR. ANDERSON WITH TRUCK LOAD OF FOOD REQUESTED FOOD NOT BE DELIVERED TO STATE EOC - BUT TO OKC CP LLOYD ANDERSON ARRIVED FROM BEAVER CO AND CALLED FOR DIRECTIONS TO THE CP. THESE WERE GIVEN TO HIM. HE CALLED AGAIN TO SAY HE COULD NOT FIND MR. ALLEN CLARK AT THE CP. BREWER CALLED ALLEN, HE SAID TO TELL ANDERSON TO GIVE THE RESOURCES TO THE RED CROSS. BREWER RELAYED THIS TO ANDERSON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>19:00:00</td>
<td>NWS</td>
<td>Weather Report: wind 5-10 mph temp. in upper 40's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 04/20/95 | 19:00:00 | OCFD   | Incident Objectives:  
1. Provide for the Safety of all personnel  
2. Search all 9 stories on East side of Building  
3. Focus search on front rubble pile-sectoring pile into central section, west section, east section, and associated work areas  
4. Complete work in basement, rear of structure, and rear of crater  
5. Complete search of floors 1-9 on west side  
6. Search Building across street from main structure, focusing on Roof panel collapse in parking lot  
7. Complete Base of Ops for NY, Montgomery County, Virginia Beach, and LA County Task Forces  
8. Continue to support OCFD |
<p>| 04/20/95 | 19:15:00 | USAF   | C141 from Andrews expected at Tinker AFB with rescue personnel |
| 04/20/95 | 19:25:00 | USAR   | CA TF2 Boarded aircraft at March AFB and departed for OKC |
| 04/20/95 | 19:25:59 | ODCEM  | NEED CELLULAR ONE REP TO GO TO TEMP MORGUE/ 5TH &amp; ROBINSON. 8 BIG GRAY PHONES NEED BATTERIES. PASSED TO CELLULAR ONE - WILL SEND REP/SERV |
| 04/20/95 | 19:40:21 | ODCEM  | SWIFT SHADY GROVE FD HAS EXPERT IN PTSD-DR GLENDIA WALKER, CONTACT: 409-560-3868/409-560-7777 LOGGED |
| 04/20/95 | 19:40:38 | ODCEM  | STATUS ON MOTEL ROOMS FOR ONE ATTACHED TEAM SEE HARD COPY LOG FOR ADDITIONAL INFO |
| 04/20/95 | 21:00:52 | ODCEM  | REQUESTED # INDIVIDUALS &amp; ADDRESSES FROM SHELTER TO ID HOMELESS. WILL CALL BACK W/INFO ASAP |
| 04/20/95 | 21:24:58 | ODCEM  | JOHN VINCENT OF BERNALLILLO FIRE DEPARTMENT IN OKC ASSISTING WITH THE DIASASTER CALLED REQUESTING 6 RAPITAL HARNESSSES, 6 FIGURE EIGHT DESCENDERS, 12 LOCKING D RING AND RAPITAL ROPE. TEL#833-8371 (MBG) 1838 HRS COL LOOM WITH MAJ DAVIS OF OKC FIRE DEPT AND HE SAID THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE A REQUIREMENT FOR RAPILING EQUIPMENT 1838 HRS RELAYED ANSWER TO JOHN VINCENT |
| 04/20/95 | 21:50:02 | ODCEM  | FRED LIEBE ASKED IF FEMA HAD A PAUL RING WITH THEIR TEAM FEMA SAID NO AND LIEBE WAS ADVISED. |
| 04/20/95 | 22:00:00 | USAF   | C141 from Riverside, CA expected at Tinker AFB with Rescue personnel and dog teams |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 04/20/95 | 22:02:10 | ODCEM  | JOHN LARSON - MARATHON CO, WI FORENSIC NURSE  
(H) 715-675-3536  
(O) 715-847-5399  
WASAUA, WI  
PASSED TO OME |
| 04/20/95 | 22:07:00 | USAR   | CA TF2 landed at Tinker AFB  
ARC EXPERIENCING SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS GETTING ACCESS TO DISASTER AREA TO RESUPPLY RELIEF WORKERS. REQUEST ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE ACCESS. ARC REPRESENTATIVE IS JIM BARFIELD, LOGISTIC COORDINATOR, 239-2312 |
| 04/20/95 | 22:14:54 | ODCEM  | CONTACTED MAJ JONES AT CP. HE IS GOING TO WALK AMERICAN RED CROSS REP TO THE PERIMETER REP AND CLEAR THE PROBLEM  
LATEST COUNT ON FATALITIES IS NOW 41 TOTAL, OF WHICH THREE (3) DIED AFTER BEING TAKEN TO A HOSPITAL. TOTAL INCLUDES 12 CHILDREN  
CA TF2 en-route to "convention center" (Myriad) |
| 04/20/95 | 22:39:30 | ODCEM  | 21/2200  
OKLA MILITARY DEPT  
8 MEDICS WORKING AT THE MORGUE  
30 MEDICS & MP'S WORKING SECURITY AT 36 & WALKER AT FAMILY NOTIFICATION CTR.  
OKLAHOMA HIGHWAY PATROL  
50 TROOPRS ON THE SCENE  
OKLA CITY FIRE DEPT  
SCENE IS CONSIDERED SAFE. FORWARD LOGISTIC CTR IS SETUP INSIDE THE BUILDING WITH PHONES AND LOGISTICS STORAGE.  
OKLAHOMA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT CURRENTLY TALKING TO FBI ABOUT COLLAPSING THE PERIMETER TO 6TH ST/DEAN A.  
MCBEE/HARVEY/BROADWAY. WILL TURN 7TH ST. INTO PARING. WILL ERECT A PLASTIC FENCE AROUND THE NEW PERIMETER. HAVE 100 POLICE OFFICERS WORKING SECURITY ON THE PERIMETER.  
CA TF2 at "convention center" (Myriad) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/20/95</td>
<td>23:48:12</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>STATE WATER RESOURCE HAS ONE EMPLOYEE STILL MISSING. SHE WAS LAST SEEN IN THE MAPPING ROOM ON THE SECOND FLOOR OF THE WATER RESOURCES BUILDING. SHE IS A WHITE FEMALE 30 YOA WITH LONG BROWN HAIR. THE WATER RESOURCES BUILDING IS LOCATED AT 5TH &amp; HARVEY. INFORMATION GIVEN TO OHP CP (CAPTAIN GRIMES). HE PASSES THE INFORMATION TO OCPD FIRE &amp; RESCUE. THEY ARE CURRENTLY FOLLOWING UP. BUILDING SEARCHED AND NO ONE FOUND INSIDE!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/21/95</td>
<td>01:20:28</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>CA TF2 given safet briefing at Myriad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/21/95</td>
<td>01:30:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>CA TF2 Lights Out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/21/95</td>
<td>02:00:00</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>Status: 3 Victims removed from front search area 7 Victims from basement rear area 4 victims from east basement area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/21/95</td>
<td>02:16:38</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>STEVE WILLOW AND TWO OTHER FIREMEN (MTs) CALLED TO MAKE THEMSELVES AVAILABLE IF NEEDED. CALL THEM AT 316-365-8009 GAVE INFORMATION TO OUR STATE CP MCGRAW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/21/95</td>
<td>03:09:31</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>RECEIVED A CALL FROM LTC RAGLAND REQUESTING FOUR STOKES BASKETS FOR SEARCH AND RESCUE. CALLED LT. HAYNIE, OHP. HE ADVISED FIRE DEPARTMENT HAD SEVERAL STOKES THE FIRST DAY. RELAYED THE MESSAGE TO LTC RAGLAND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/21/95</td>
<td>04:35:44</td>
<td>ODCEM</td>
<td>MEDICAL REQUESTING FOUR (4) SWEATERS/SWEATSHIRTS BE DELIVERED TO 5TH &amp; ROBINSON. POC-ERIC OSMOND 833-8784 ARC OPS CTR REPORTS 4 SWEATSHIRTS BEING DELIVERED TO SITE @ 4:45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/21/95</td>
<td>05:00:00</td>
<td>GOVK</td>
<td>Governor's Update: Victims: Casualties: 47 Dead at Scene 3 Died at Hospitals 50 Total (12 Children) Missing: Estimated by OSBI as 167 Transported by ambulance: 432 Seen at Hospitals: 711 Victim Assistance: ARC has set up Missing Person Lines St. Luke's housed 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
04/21/95  05:54:45  ODCEM  NWS reports conditions improving. Mostly sunny rest of logged today, winds S/SW at 5 to 10 MPH during early portion of the day. Mid-day 10-15 mph from W. End of day SSW (10 mph). Don’t expect gusts more than 15-20 mph. High Temp 60 - 70.

Forecast mostly clear with 5 - 10 mph SW winds. Temp down to upper 40's in morning hrs.

Friday - Mostly sunny. After sunrise wind will be mostly increasing to 10 - 20 mph by mid - day from the S.

High temp will be in the mid 70's.

04/21/95  09:00:00  NWS  Weather Report:
scattered clouds throughout the morning, with sunshine dominant. Temperatures will rise from 47 at 8AM to around 60-62 by midday. winds from the east-northeast at 12-18 mph. humidity at 50%. Slight chance for thunderstorm late in the day. High of low 70's.

04/21/95  14:13:00  
Donated Items:
- MCI & Federal Express free until Sunday
- Thermo video cameras
- Concrete cutting equipment
- Cranes
- Telescopic excavating crane
- Cutters and spreaders
- Fuel
- Generators, light towers
- Front end loaders
- trucks
- Giant hydraulic track mounted shears
- construction personnel and equipment
- Lighting
- Lubricants for equipment
- Skylifts
- Vacuum system to remove dust and small stones.

04/21/95  16:37:21  ODCEM  HOTLINE ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT BLAST VICTIMS, FAMILIES

THE TOLL-FREE LINE IS 1-800-522-9054. IT WILL SERVE AS AN OFFICIAL CRISIS HOTLINE AS LONG AS NEEDED

LOGGED
PERIOD COVERED: 4-20-95 AT 1145L TO 2100L

1. SITUATION: THERE WERE MANY BOMB INJURIES AND CASUALTIES. ALL WINDOWS FROM 600 UNIT APARTUNIT IN VINC OF FED BLDG BLOWN OUT.

2. EST OF CASUALTIES: 37 DEAD (INCL 12 CHILDREN) W/APPROX 200 PERS UNACCOUNTED FOR. SOURCE: OK SITREP 467 INJURED AND TREATED AT L HOSP. SOURCE: OK FIRE CH; PRESS CONFERENCE.

EM RESPONSE TM - A (ERT-A) CONSISTS OF: DELL GREER, FCO, BUDDY YOUNG, RD, BRUCE BAUGHMAN, FEMA NATL, OZZIE BALDWIN, DENTON MERS, GRAHAM NANCE, PR-IA, BILLY PENN, PIO, WOODY GOIN, DAE, BEN FRIZZELL, DAE

ON 4-19-95 AT 1315 CDT, A DEFENSE COORD OFF, COL STEWART BARNHOFT, WAS APPOINTED TO RPT/SPT THE FBI IN OKC. THE FOLLOWING ESFs HAVE BEEN ACTIVATED: 2,3,5,6,7,8, AND 9 AND WILL BE DEPLOYED TO DFO WHEN ESTAB.

A 10 BLK AREA ROUND ESPLOSION WAS EVAC'D ON 4-19-20. TULSA, OK DMAT TEAM STOOD-DOWN AT 0830 ON 4-20-95. 2 SHELTERS, 1 MASS CARE WITH POP. 38 FUNC AT ST. LUKE'S METHODIST CHURCH, OTHER SHELTER IS PRI INFORMATION, MENTAL HEALTH DEBRIEFING GATHERING POINT FOR AIRLIFT, CIVILIAN CHILDREN & YOUND PRI ON 300

04/21/95 21:00:00 USAR Sacramento operational in rear area of building
04/21/95 22:50:00 USAR NY & Virginia Beach (VB) Tas Forces begin work
04/21/95 22:50:00 USAR Sacaramento demobilized to rest area
04/21/95 24:00:00 OCFD OCFD changes shifts
04/21/95 24:00:00 USAR LA & Montgomery County arrive and review briefing for next operational period
04/22/95 02:00:00 USAR 3 victims removed from front area, 2 more located, 2 removed from rear area
04/22/95 03:00:00 USAR Operations on North Side of Building halted due to High winds blowing debris off upper floors.
04/22/95 03:00:00 USAR NY TF search of East interior complete, more victims (DOA) found in basement area
04/22/95 04:00:00 USAR 1/2 of VB TF exhausted- all sent to rehab area
04/29/95 10:15:28 ODCEM Phil Eddington, US Health Dept., Indicates USHD ARR Dallas airport DPT 0830 for OKC.
04/23/95 07:01:19 OGS The A.P. Murrah Building was demolished by Controlled Demolitions Incorporated.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05/23/95</td>
<td>07:01:28</td>
<td>OGS</td>
<td>Oklahoma Geological Survey Station at Norman, OK recorded a large Body wave. This is believed to be a result of the Murrah Building Demolition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix

Incident Action Plan

4/21 - 4/22
INCIDENT OBJECTIVES

1. INCIDENT NAME
6TH STREET

2. DATE PREPARED
4/21

3. TIME PREPARED
1700

4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD (DATE/TIME)
4/21/95 1900

5. GENERAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES FOR THE INCIDENT (INCLUDE ALTERNATIVES)

① PROVIDE FOR SAFETY OF ALL PERSONNEL
② CONTINUE CLOSE SUPPORT OF OKLAHOMA FIRE
③ CONTINUE OPERATIONS IN 3 SEARCH ZONES
   NORTH EXTERIOR DEBRIS PILE
   EAST INTERIOR BASEMENT
   SOUTH INTERIOR BASEMENT
④ SEARCH LARGE BUILDING ACROSS THE STREET +
   SMALL BUILDING BEHIND 6TH

6. WEATHER FORECAST FOR OPERATIONAL PERIOD

FORECAST IS FOR INCREASING CLOUDS AFTER MIDNIGHT. SLIGHT
CHANGE OF DEPART EARLY MORNING HOURS. WINDS 13-18 NE
LOW TEMPS 43°@ 0600 RH 49% TO 65%

7. GENERAL/SAFETY MESSAGE

ROTATE & REHAB PERSONNEL FREQUENTLY

8. ATTACHMENTS (✓ IF ATTACHED)

✓ ORGANIZATION LIST (ICS 203)
✓ DIVISION ASSIGNMENT LISTS (ICS 204)
✓ COMMUNICATIONS PLAN (ICS 205)
✓ MEDICAL PLAN (ICS 206)
✓ INCIDENT MAP
✓ TRAFFIC PLAN
✓ Medical Message
✓ Phone Plan
✓ Operational Plan/Meeting
✓ Safety Message

202 ICS 3/80

9. PREPARED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF)

10. APPROVED BY (INCIDENT COMMANDER)

Signed
The City of OKLAHOMA CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT

OPERATIONAL PERIOD
Date    April 21-22, 1995
Time    1900-0700

INCIDENT ACTION PLAN
6TH STREET INCIDENT

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE RESPONSE SYSTEM

INCIDENT SUPPORT TEAM
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th># MISSING</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st FLOOR EAST END</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st FLOOR WEST END</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.S.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd FLOOR</td>
<td>1 (CHILD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.S.A./CHILD CARE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd FLOOR</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CREDIT UNION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th FLOOR</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th FLOOR</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.D.A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VETERANS ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th FLOOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th AND 8th FLOOR</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.U.D.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th FLOOR</td>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SAFETY MESSAGE

1. BE ALERT - INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF COLLAPSE ZONES.

2. WATCH FOR FALLING OBJECTS

3. TURN ON PERSONAL ALERT DEVICES (PALS) WHEN OPERATING INSIDE BUILDING

4. WORK TOGETHER AS A TEAM AND STAY TOGETHER.

5. WATCH FOR SIGNS OF STRESS - REHAB -

6. DRINK ADDITIONAL FLUIDS (WATER AND JUICES)

7. ONE 55 GALLON DRUM OF ACID WAS IN THE BASEMENT BEFORE THE STRUCTURE COLLAPSED.

8. LISTEN FOR EMERGENCY HORN SIGNALS.

9. DECON PRIOR TO LEAVING AREA, IF CONTAMINATED

10. UTILIZE PPE
## INCIDENT RADIO COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYSTEM/CACHE</th>
<th>CHANNEL</th>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>ASSIGNMENT</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tr>
<td>FEMA US&amp;R FEEOs</td>
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<td>418.6750</td>
<td>AZ TF-1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>417.6625</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>COMMAND</td>
<td>416.8375</td>
<td>IST</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>COMMAND REPEATER</td>
<td>410.4875</td>
<td>416.3375</td>
<td>IST</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. PREPARED BY (COMMUNICATIONS UNIT)
SHORT TERM FORECAST FOR DISASTER SERVICES
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE OKLAHOMA CITY OK
515 PM CDT FRIDAY APRIL 21 1995

OK1025-212210-
FORECAST THROUGH MIDNIGHT (2400 LDT)... MOSTLY CLEAR SKIES WILL PERSIST
INTO THE EARLY EVENING. CLOUDS INCREASING GRADUALLY BY MIDNIGHT.
TEMPERATURES IN THE UPPER 60S WILL FALL INTO THE UPPER 50S BY 2200 LDT.
RELATIVE HUMIDITIES NEAR 49 PERCENT WILL RISE TO NEAR 65 PERCENT BY 2400
LDT. NORTH WINDS WILL BECOME NORTHEAST AT 10 TO 15 MPH THROUGH THE
EVENING.

FORECAST FOR MIDNIGHT THROUGH 0600 LDT SATURDAY...CLOUDS WILL CONTINUE
TO INCREASE... ALONG WITH A SLIGHT CHANCE OF A SHOWER OR THUNDERSTORM.
RAIN CHANCES WILL REMAIN LOW... AND ANY WHICH DOES OCCUR WOULD BE TOWARD
MORNING. TEMPERATURES BY 0600 LDT WILL BE NEAR 43 DEGREES. WINDS WILL
CONTINUE FROM THE NORTHEAST BUT INCREASE SOMEWHAT OVERNIGHT...REACHING
SPEEDS OF 13 TO 18 MPH.

A STATIONARY FRONT EXTENDING FROM SOUTHWEST TO EAST CENTRAL OKLAHOMA AT
LATE AFTERNOON IS EXPECTED TO DRIFT A LITTLE TO THE SOUTH OVERNIGHT.
SHOWERS AND THUNDERSTORMS COULD DEVELOP ALONG THE FRONT THIS EVENING AND
EARLY TONIGHT... BUT THE MAIN RESULT IN OKLAHOMA CITY FROM ITS SLOW
MOVEMENT TO THE SOUTH WILL BE THE INCREASING NORTHEAST WINDS.

$$
CS
0600 HOURS: CA TF #2 & MD TF #1
2400 HOURS: AZ TF #1
1800 HOURS: NY TF #1 & VA TF #2
2400 HOURS: CA TF #7
STATUS OF OBJECTIVES FOR LAST OPS PERIOD: (what have you accomplished?)

1. MAINTAIN SAFETY
2. BASE OPEN 4TH FLR & LA 40 FT-
3. BASEMENT DEBRIS RECOVERY - EAST & WEST BASEMENT
   INTERIOR CENTRAL 50% DONE ONGOING
4. EAST DEBRIS RECOVERY CONTINUES
5. MISSING PERSONS LIST (FLOOR BY FLOOR) UPDATED
6. EAST INTERIOR BASEMENT AREA - WILL BE DONE BY 0700

OBJECTIVES FOR THIS OPERATIONAL PERIOD: (What are you going to do?)

SEE ATTACHED INC OBJECTIVES

CRITICAL ISSUES:

LARGE BUILT-UP ACROSS THE STREET NEEDS TO BE THEROUGHLY
SEARCHED. LIVE VICTIMS NEED TO BE REMOVED.
6TH STREET INCIDENT OPERATIONAL PERIODS FOR NATIONAL US&R TEAMS

0700 - 1900 HOURS: CA TF #2 & MD TF #1

1300 - 0100 HOURS: AZ TF #1

1900 - 0700 HOURS: NY TF #1 & VA TF #2

0100 - 1300 HOURS: CA TF #7
DAILY BRIEFING

MANAGEMENT COORDINATION
- General Incident Objectives:
  - Continue search/debris removal - 10
  - Generate victims/wash with clp - handle logistics
  - ISSUES TO SUPPORT T.F.
- Strategic Planning:
  - Utilize two TFs 0700-1900, two TF 0700-1900
  - One TF 0700-1200 and one T.F 1300-0100

OPERATIONS/PLANNING
- Accomplishments/Current Assessment:
  - Remove 1 victim east initial - continue search - debris removal -_coords buildings/near 
    debris, 12th St, se corner - SMT 400 MB in south section w/ Phoenix
- Safety/Health/Medical:
  - Blood borne pathogens, OOS, rest
  - Watch for inherent or debris hygiene
- Weather: See Attach

Debriefing:
- Each TF needs to contact plans & update 
  MARS & status of the TF prior to departure for 
  debrief

LOGISTICS
- Comm Assignments/Freq:
  - Established/adequate phone system
- Ordering Supplies/Support Facilities:
  - Continue to order support equipment 
    & resupply - built up IST
- Transportation:
  - General dedicated transport - static bed,
    truck trucks & vans for recovery

MEDIA:
- Coverage/Field Involvement: 0

LIAISON:
- Assisting/Cooperating Agencies:
  - Continued liaison with CPD ops desk 
    and overview ICP, handled visitors/questions

ADMIN/ FINANCE
- Accountability/Cost Issues:
  - Worked w/gsa rep

DEMOBILIZATION:
- Passed to arrive to set up demobil plan

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:
- 0

DISTRIBUTION:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>04/21/95 SHIFT</th>
<th>ENGINEER/STRUCTURAL SPEC</th>
<th>STOLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900 - 0700</td>
<td>ENGINEER IN CHARGE TOM NIEDERNHOFER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENGINEER KELLY AASEN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHARGE PERSON MARK WITROCK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STOLS OPERATORS RAGAN GLANDON RICHARD BARNITZ PHIL BOAWN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TASKS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIFT</th>
<th>ENGINEER/STRUCTURAL SPEC</th>
<th>STOLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900 - 0700</td>
<td>Continue assess site for falling hazards - report to IST Leader Monitor N.E. air shaft Observe shoring at shift changes</td>
<td>Support any victim finds with STOLS Observe search in confined area Aid IST plans division - update building map</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DH:wb
The following reports on Urban Search & Rescue activities for the period shown:

**CURRENT SITUATION**
- 75% Complete on Search / Debris Removal in east section - 1 victim.
- Continue to work north building with S/I removal and search - Victim removed from building. 100% complete S/I removal.
- PIT Area - 1st Floor - South interior 1 - 90% complete 5/10到位.
- Fire truck to PIT Area - 4th Avenue - Child care center.

**CRITICAL ISSUES**
- Big building across street needs to be thoroughly searched - 90% victims need to be removed.
- Continue victim removal efforts - front section.

**CASUALTY REPORT**
- 1 victim - east interior
- 3 victims - north exterior
- 5 victims - west building
- 2 victims - south interior - 1st floor
- 1 victim - south int. - 2nd floor

**ACCOMPLISHMENTS**
- See current situation report.

**RESOURCES ASSIGNED**
- CAD to east int.
- Phoenix/CAD to north ext.
- PIT to west
- Phoenix/Monaco to south interior

**PLANNED ACTIVITIES** (next 24 - 72 hours)
- Work to keep to remove victims
- Continue search on north exterior - south interior.
- Search large white building across street.

**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**
- President Clinton is scheduled to arrive Sunday for visit.
- Develop photos for President visit.
- Received recovery equipment.
Base of operations - Convention Center

232-7047 UNASSIGNED
232-7102
232-7204
232-7340

232-7441 MD TFI
232-7521 MD TFI
232-7611 UNASSIGNED
232-7701
Medical Services (EMS) are provided on-site by EMSA, a private ALS service that contracts with the city.

The EMS supervisor today is Glenn Clark, EMT. Tony McCardi also has supervisory capacity.

They are aware that our medical teams will attend injuries to Task Force personnel and that a physician will be riding with the Task Force casualties to the hospital. They have no problem with this. Notify them immediately if a potential transport occurs. They may be contacted through any city fire personnel radio or through FEMA IST. The ambulances are situated on the east & west ends of the building. They are aware that we are willing to help with any other injuries or any located live victims.

There are 3 potential hospital receiving facilities, all "full service", (there are apparently no trauma designations in Oklahoma). The facilities and emer. dept. phone numbers are:

St Anthony's 272-6152  
Presbyterian 272-0359  
University  272-0357  

I've called and spoken with emergency physicians at each facility and told them about us. They are happy to receive patient's accompanied by FEMA medical team members.

Local veterinarians have responded to some CNN statement that they were needed on scene. One will be available at all times at the IST to care for any canine illnesses or injuries. They are also available for canine health checks. Please make your search team managers aware of this.

Scott Bjerke, M.D. from Clark County, Nevada's US&R Task Force will be providing IST medical coverage during the day shift today.

Joe Barbera, M.D.  
4/21/95 1000

APPROVED  
IST Commander

Local Vet for 4/21-22  1900-0700 - Patricia Simpson  
946-6074 (H)  
943-7733 (W)
FEMA US&R RESPONSE SYSTEM
URBAN SEARCH & RESCUE TASK FORCE

TASK FORCE OPERATIONS REPORT

TASK FORCE DESIGNATION: New York Task Force 1

DATE: 4/21/95

START TIME: 1900

TF TEAM: NY TF 1

COMPLETION TIME: _______________________

TEAM MANAGER: "Kelly Frenster"

TEAM/SQUAD MEMBERS:

1. Drude
2. Garcia
3. Lake
4. Winkler
5. Martin
6. Garcia
7. Lewis
8. Hernandez
9. Herold
10. Kellner

McDonough

ADDRESS: 6th Street Bridge

OPERATIONS SITE: Sector of Cruise ship

DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION:

1. Team operated in the front of Bride - looking for missing Federal Agent.

TEAM 2 operated in collision station and nearby Sector of Cruise ship.
TASK FORCE OPERATIONS REPORT

TASK FORCE DESIGNATION: New York Task Force 1

DATE: 4/21/95

START TIME: 9:00

TF TEAM: NYTF1

COMPLETION TIME:

TEAM MANAGER: McAndrew

TEAM/SQUAD MEMBERS:
1. Memman
2. English
3. Milner
4. Hanson
5. Tigue
6. Loges
7. Milisi
8. Dove
8. Brown
9. Brown

OPERATIONS SITE: 68th Street, Denaer

ADDRESS: 68th Street, Denaer

DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION: Teams operated in bed of known as Old Courthouse behind SP#1 - Making secondary examination for missing victims.

COMMENTS/EVALUATIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS:

TEAM LEADER/SQUAD OFFICER: John Webster

Signature
URBAN SEARCH & RESCUE TASK FORCE

TASK FORCE OPERATIONS REPORT

TASK FORCE DESIGNATION: A2-1/NORTH
DATE: 4/21/95
START TIME: 1945
COMPLETION TIME: 2100 HRS
TF TEAM: NORTH
TEAM MANAGER: Don Heidenbrand

TEAM/SQUAD MEMBERS:
1. L. Randell
2. T. Gallagher
3. P. Callaghe
4. J. Walter
5. G. Eells
6. A. Watertak
7. L. Reynolds
8. E. Person
9. D. Alvarado
10. M. Sandula
  C. Nelson

OPERATIONS SITE: ADDRESS: 205' x 225 W. 5TH ST (APPROX)
SECTOR: 1000

DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION: Assist D.C. F.D. by
1) Ensuring safety of all assigned personnel
2) Coordinating search efforts in both assigned
   buildings with D.C. F.D.
3) Co-ordinating evacuation of any patients/writers
   out of assigned buildings, W/D.C. F.D.
4) Maintain communications with D.C. F.D.
   and FEMA operations contacts

COMMENTS/EVALUATIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS:
1) No injuries or acute deaths
2) AC on D.C. WATER RESOURCE BLDG. (6) 2130
   (TWO MAJ LOCKER FOUNDED, NO LEAKS)
3) STILL OPERATING ON 225' W. 5TH ST
4) LIVER EXTRICATED AT 225' BELOW GRADE
5) EXCELLENT TEAMWORK BETWEEN 19-21-1, D.C. F.D.
   AND FRONT OPS (EST)
6) RELIEVED BY SAFETY TF AT APPROX 1300 HRS

TEAM LEADER/SQUAD OFFICER: [Signature]

Signature
TASK FORCE OPERATIONS SITE SKETCH

SIDE THREE

TYPE OF OPERATION: Primary and Secondary Search to Secure Building

DEPICT:
- [X] BUILDING/STRUCTURE(s)
- [ ] OPERATIONS POST
- [ ] EQUIPMENT STAGING AREA
- [X] ACCESS/ENTRY ROUTES
- [ ] CONTROL ZONES (Collapse/Hazard Zones, Work Zones, etc.)
- [X] PERSONNEL HAZARDS (Live Utilities, Haz Mat, Collapse Potentials, etc.) (LIVE UTILITIES, PORK HAZARDS)

EMERGENCY SIGNALLING

- EVACUATE THE AREA
- CEASE OPERATIONS/ALL QUIET
- RESUME OPERATIONS

3 short blasts (one second each)
1 long blast (three seconds)
1 long and 1 short blast
TASK FORCE OPERATIONS REPORT

TASK FORCE DESIGNATION: CA-TF2

DATE: 04/21/95

START TIME: ____________  COMPLETION TIME: ____________

TF TEAM: SQUAD 3  TEAM MANAGER: CAPT R. LEE

TEAM/SQUAD MEMBERS:

1. CAPT. R. LEE
2. CAPT. R. REHERK
3. CAPT. P. SYLCHAK
4. CAPT. G. CICELY
5. CAPT. J. CORBEIA
6. FPS D. MIDDLETON
7. FFPM D. SALTMARSH
8. FFPM G. LOPES
9. CANINE SPECIALIST
10. CANINE SPECIALIST

OPERATIONS SITE: ADDRESS: 6th St. + Robinson Ave (Journal Record Publishing)

SECOR:

DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION: CANINE PRIMARY SEARCH WITH RESCUE.
SQUAD SECONDARY SEARCH, LASTING APPROXIMATELY 1 1/2 HOURS. SEARCH
WILL COMMENCE IN THE BASEMENT AND PROCEED UP THRU THE 5TH FLOOR.


COMMENTS/EVALUATIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS: MINIMUM STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE, MAINLY GLASS AND FALLEN DEBRIS WITH MINIMUM VOID
SPACES. NO SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT ANTICIPATED.

TEAM LEADER/SQUAD OFFICER: [Signature]
SHORT TERM FORECAST FOR DISASTER SERVICES
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE OKLAHOMA CITY OK
900 PM CDT FRI APR 21 1995

OK1025-212210-
FORECAST THROUGH 0300 CDT SATURDAY... SCATTERED CLOUDS WILL BE
INCREASING BY MIDNIGHT. TEMPERATURES AROUND 57 DEGREES WILL FALL INTO
THE LOWER 50S BY 2400 CDT AND TO NEAR 47 DEGREES BY 0300 CDT. RELATIVE
HUMIDITIES NEAR 55 PERCENT WILL RISE TO NEAR 80 PERCENT BY 0300 CDT.
WINDS WILL BE NORTH TO NORTHEAST AT 16 MPH... OCCASIONALLY GUSTING TO 23
MPH. THE WIND CHILL INDEX WILL FALL INTO THE MID 30S BY 0100 CDT.

FORECAST FOR 0300 CDT THROUGH 1000 CDT SATURDAY... CLOUDS WILL
CONTINUE TO INCREASE. THERE WILL BE A SLIGHT CHANCE OF SHOWERS AFTER
0400 CDT. TEMPERATURES BY 0700 CDT WILL BE IN THE MID 40S. WINDS WILL BE
NORTH TO NORTHEAST 16 TO 22 MPH. THE WIND CHILL INDEX WILL FALL INTO THE
MID TO UPPER 20S BY 0700 CDT. TEMPERATURES WILL GRADUALLY WARM TO NEAR
50 DEGREES BY 1000 CDT.

A COLD FRONT EXTENDING ACROSS SOUTHEAST OKLAHOMA AT 2100 CDT WILL
CONTINUE MOVING SLOWLY SOUTHEAST OVERNIGHT. SCATTERED SHOWERS AND
THUNDERSTORMS ARE POSSIBLE ALONG THE FRONT THROUGH 2400 CDT. HOWEVER...
THIS ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN SOUTHEAST OF OKLAHOMA CITY.

$$
CS
SHORT TERM FORECAST FOR DISASTER SERVICES
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE OKLAHOMA CITY OK
700 PM CDT FRI APR 21 1995

OK8025-212210-
FORECAST THROUGH 0100 SATURDAY... MOSTLY CLEAR SKIES WILL PERSIST THROUGH MUCH OF THE EVENING. CLOUDS INCREASING GRADUALLY AROUND MIDNIGHT. TEMPERATURES IN THE MID 60S WILL FALL INTO THE UPPER 50S BY 2200 LDT... AND INTO THE LOWER 50S BY 0100 LDT SATURDAY. RELATIVE HUMIDITIES NEAR 45 PERCENT WILL RISE TO NEAR 75 PERCENT BY 0100 LDT. WINDS WILL BE NORTH TO NORTHEAST AT 15 TO 20 MPH.

FORECAST FOR 0100 THROUGH 0700 LDT SATURDAY... CLOUDS WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE. CHANCES FOR A SHOWER OR THUNDERSHOWER AFT 0400 LDT WILL REMAIN LOW. TEMPERATURES BY 0600 LDT WILL BE IN THE MID 40S. NORTH TO NORTHEAST WINDS 15 TO 20 MPH WILL PERSIST.

A COLD FRONT EXTENDING FROM EASTERN OKLAHOMA TO SOUTH CENTRAL OKLAHOMA AT 1900 LDT WILL CONTINUE MOVING SLOWLY SOUTHEAST OVERNIGHT. SCATTERED SHOWERS AND THUNDERSTORMS COULD DEVELOP ALONG THE FRONT THIS EVENING... BUT THIS ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN SOUTHEAST OF OKLAHOMA CITY.

$$
CS
SHORT TERM FORECAST FOR DISASTER SERVICES
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE OKLAHOMA CITY OK
1153 AM CDT FRI APR 21 1995

OK5025-211755-

SUNSHINE WILL PREVAIL THROUGH THE AFTERNOON HOURS...WITH NO MORE THAN
SCATTERED CLOUDS EXPECTED. TEMPERATURES WILL RISE THROUGH THE 60S...
REACHING AN AFTERNOON HIGH NEAR 71 OR 72 DEGREES AT AROUND 4 PM.
RELATIVE HUMIDITY WILL DECREASE FROM NOONTIME LEVELS NEAR 60 PERCENT TO
A MINIMUM NEAR 40 PERCENT AT THE TIME OF HIGH TEMPERATURE.

WINDS MAY BE A LITTLE LIGHTER THAN EARLIER ANTICIPATED...BUT THEY SHOULD
CONTINUE FROM THE EAST-NORTHEAST. SPEEDS SHOULD RANGE FROM 10 TO 15
MPH. NOTE THAT WELL ABOVE THE SURFACE...PROBABLY ABOVE 500 FEET OR
SO...WINDS WILL BE MORE FROM THE SOUTHEAST AT SPEEDS OF 15 TO 22 MPH.

FAIR WEATHER SHOULD CONTINUE INTO THE EVENING...WITH TEMPERATURES
FALLING OFF TO AROUND 60 AFTER SUNSET AND THEN DOWN THROUGH THE 50S.
THERE WILL BE SOME INCREASE IN CLOUD COVER OVERNIGHT...AND THERE
WILL BE A SLIGHT INCREASE IN THE CHANCE OF SHOWERS OR THUNDERSHOWERS...
BUT PROBABLY NOT UNTIL AFTER MIDNIGHT. WINDS WILL BE MAINLY FROM THE
NORTHEAST AT SPEEDS OF 12 TO 15 MPH.

A STATIONARY FRONT REMAINS ACROSS SOUTHWEST THROUGH EAST CENTRAL
OKLAHOMA AT MIDDAY. IT HAS DRIFTED A LITTLE CLOSER TO OKLAHOMA CITY
WHICH HAS ACTUALLY ACCOUNTED FOR THE SLIGHT DECREASE IN WIND SPEED. ANY
ADDITIONAL MOVEMENT ON THIS FRONT THROUGH TONIGHT IS EXPECTED TO BE
MINIMAL.

$$
DM

Post-n-fax transmittal memo 7671  3 of 3
## PERSONNEL ROSTER ASSIGNED

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>1ST POSITION</th>
<th>HOME BASE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M. TAMIKOW</td>
<td>LEADER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. MILS</td>
<td>HASON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. MINER</td>
<td>PLANS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. RISDON</td>
<td>OHS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>M. PARRISH</td>
<td>OHS</td>
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## ACTIVITY LOG (continue on reverse side)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>MAJOR EVENTS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Assumed Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2530</td>
<td>OSHA Agent Removed from North Exterior Deck Pile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100</td>
<td>Shoring in Pit Area Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0400</td>
<td>Partial collapse in South Interior Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0430</td>
<td>Raw Closure Down OHS</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Total 5 Victims Removed