Chapter 1  Administration

1.1  Scope.

1.1.1  This recommended practice covers Type F, Type G, and Type H fluid heaters and related equipment.

1.1.2  Within the scope of this recommended practice, a fluid heater is considered to be any thermal fluid heater or process fluid heater with the following features:

1. Fluid is flowing under pressure.
2. Fluid is indirectly heated.
3. Release of energy from combustion of a liquid or gaseous fuel or an electrical source occurs within the unit.

1.1.3  This recommended practice does not apply to the following:

1. Boilers (which are covered by NFPA 85, Boiler and Combustion Systems Hazards Code, or ANSI/ASME CSD-1, Controls and Safety Devices for Automatically Fired Boilers)
2. Class A, B, C, or D ovens and furnaces (which are covered by NFPA 86, Standard for Ovens and Furnaces)
3. Fired heaters in petroleum refineries and petrochemical facilities that are designed and installed in accordance with API 560, Fired Heaters for General Refinery Services; API RP 556, Instrumentation and Control Systems for Fired Heaters and Steam Generators; and API RP 2001, Fire Protection in Refineries
4. Fired heaters commonly called reformer furnaces or cracking furnaces in the petrochemical and chemical industries
5. Units that heat air for occupiable space or comfort
6. LP-Gas vaporizers designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code
7. Coal or other solid fuel–firing systems
8. Listed equipment with a heating system(s) that supplies a total input not exceeding 150,000 Btu/hr (44 kW)

1.1.4  The following types of heaters are covered by this recommended practice:

1. Class F heaters, which have fluid inside the tubes with a relatively constant flow rate
2. Class G heaters, which have fluid inside the tubes with a modulated flow rate and firing rate
3. Class H heaters, which have a heat source (combustion or electricity) inside the tubes

1.2  Purpose.

This recommended practice provides recommendations for fluid heaters to minimize the fire and explosion hazards that can endanger the fluid heater, the building, or personnel.

1.3  Application.

1.3.1  This recommended practice applies to new installations and to alterations or extensions of existing equipment.

1.3.2  Chapters 1 through 8 apply to equipment described in subsequent chapters except as modified by those chapters.

1.3.3  Chapter 7 applies to all operating fluid heaters.

1.4  Retroactivity.

The provisions of this recommended practice reflect a consensus of what is necessary to provide an acceptable degree of protection from the hazards addressed in this recommended practice at the time the recommended practice was issued.

1.4.1  Unless otherwise specified, the provisions of this recommended practice do not apply to facilities, equipment, structures, or installations that existed or were approved for construction or installation prior to the effective date of the recommended practice. Where specified, the provisions of this recommended practice are retroactive.

1.4.2  In those cases where the authority having jurisdiction determines that the existing situation presents an unacceptable degree of risk, the authority having jurisdiction should be permitted to apply retroactively any portions of this recommended practice deemed appropriate.
1.4.3
The retroactive recommendations of this recommended practice should be permitted to be modified if their application clearly would be impractical in the judgment of the authority having jurisdiction and only where it is clearly evident that a reasonable degree of safety is provided.

1.5* Equivalency.
Nothing in this recommended practice is intended to prevent the use of systems, methods, or devices of equivalent or superior quality, strength, fire resistance, effectiveness, durability, and safety over those recommended by this recommended practice.

1.5.1
Technical documentation should be submitted to the authority having jurisdiction to demonstrate equivalency.

1.5.2
The system, method, or device should be approved for the intended purpose by the authority having jurisdiction.

1.6 Units and Formulas.

1.6.1 SI Units.
Metric units of measurement in this recommended practice are in accordance with the modernized metric system known as the International System of Units (SI).

1.6.2 Primary and Equivalent Values.
If a value for a measurement as given in this recommended practice is followed by an equivalent value in other units, the first stated value is the recommendation. A given equivalent value might be approximate.

1.6.3 Conversion Procedure.
SI units have been converted by multiplying the quantity by the conversion factor and then rounding the result to the appropriate number of significant digits.
Chapter 2 Referenced Publications

2.1 General.
The documents or portions thereof listed in this chapter are referenced within this recommended practice and should be considered part of the recommendations of this document.

2.2 NFPA Publications.
National Fire Protection Association, 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471.

2.3 Other Publications.

2.3.1 API Publications.
American Petroleum Institute, 1220 L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-4070.

2.3.2 ASME Publications.
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Three Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5990.

2.3.3 ASTM Publications.
ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, P.O. Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959.

2.3.4 IEC Publications.
International Electrical Commission, 3 rue de Varembe, P.O. Box 131, CH - 1211, Geneva 20, Switzerland.

2.3.5 UL Publications.
Underwriters Laboratories Inc., 333 Pfingsten Road, Northbrook, IL 60062-2096.

2.3.6 Other Publications.
2.4 References for Extracts in Recommendation Sections.


Chapter 3 Definitions

3.1 General.

The definitions contained in this chapter apply to the terms used in this recommended practice. Where terms are not defined in this chapter or within another chapter, they should be defined using their ordinarily accepted meanings within the context in which they are used. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th edition, is the source for the ordinarily accepted meaning.

3.2 NFPA Official Definitions.

3.2.1 Approved.

Acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction.

3.2.2 Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ).

An organization, office, or individual responsible for enforcing the requirements of a code or standard, or for approving equipment, materials, an installation, or a procedure.

3.2.3 Labeled.

Equipment or materials to which has been attached a label, symbol, or other identifying mark of an organization that is acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction and concerned with product evaluation, that maintains periodic inspection of production of labeled equipment or materials, and by whose labeling the manufacturer indicates compliance with appropriate standards or performance in a specified manner.

3.2.4 Listed.

Equipment, materials, or services included in a list published by an organization that is acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction and concerned with evaluation of products or services, that maintains periodic inspection of production of listed equipment or materials or periodic evaluation of services, and whose listing states that either the equipment, material, or service meets appropriate designated standards or has been tested and found suitable for a specified purpose.

3.2.5 Recommended Practice.

A document that is similar in content and structure to a code or standard but that contains only nonmandatory provisions using the word “should” to indicate recommendations in the body of the text.

3.2.6 Shall.

Indicates a mandatory requirement.

3.2.7 Should.

Indicates a recommendation or that which is advised but not required.

3.2.8 Standard.

A document, the main text of which contains only mandatory provisions using the word “shall” to indicate requirements and which is in a form generally suitable for mandatory reference by another standard or code or for adoption into law. Nonmandatory provisions shall be located in an appendix or annex, footnote, or fine-print note and are not to be considered a part of the requirements of a standard. Nonmandatory provisions are not to be considered a part of the requirements of a standard and shall be located in an appendix, annex, footnote, informational note, or other means as permitted in the Manual of Style for NFPA Technical Committee Documents.

3.3 General Definitions.

3.3.1 Automatic Fire Check.

A flame arrester equipped with a check valve to shut off the fuel gas supply automatically if a backfire occurs. [86, 2011, 2015]

3.3.2 Backfire Arrester.

A flame arrester installed in fully premixed air–fuel gas distribution piping to terminate flame propagation therein, shut off fuel supply, and relieve pressure resulting from a backfire. [86, 2011, 2015]

3.3.3 Burner.

A device or group of devices used for the introduction of fuel and air into a fluid heater at the required velocities, turbulence, and concentration to maintain ignition and combustion of fuel.

3.3.3.1 Dual-Fuel Burner.

A burner designed to burn either fuel gas or liquid fuel but not to burn both simultaneously.

3.3.4* Burner Management System.

The field devices, logic system, and final control elements dedicated to combustion safety and operator assistance in the starting and stopping of fuel preparation and burning equipment and for preventing misoperation of and damage to fuel preparation and burning equipment.

3.3.5 Combustion Air.

The air necessary to provide for the complete combustion of fuel and usually consisting of primary air, secondary air, and excess air. [211, 2011, 2013]
3.3.6 **Combustion Safeguard.**
A safety control directly responsive to flame properties that senses the presence or absence of flame and de-energizes the fuel safety shutoff valve in the event of flame failure.

3.3.7 **Combustion Safety Circuitry.**
That portion of the fluid heater control circuitry that contains the contacts, arranged in series ahead of the safety shutoff valve(s) holding medium, for the recommended safety interlocks and the excess temperature limit controller(s).

3.3.8 **Controller.**
3.3.8.1 **Programmable Controller.**
A digital electronic system designed for use in an industrial environment that uses a programmable memory for the internal storage of user-oriented instructions for implementing specific functions to control, through digital or analog inputs and outputs, various types of machines or processes. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.8.2 **Temperature Controller.**
A device that measures the temperature and automatically controls the input of heat into the fluid heater.

3.3.9 **Emergency Shutoff Valve.**
A manual shutoff valve to allow the fuel to be turned off in an emergency.

3.3.10 **Equipment Isolation Valve.**
A manual shutoff valve for shutoff of the fuel to each piece of equipment.

3.3.11 **Flammable Limit.**
The range of concentration of a flammable gas in air within which a flame can be propagated, with the lowest flammable concentration known as the lower flammable limit (LFL), and the highest flammable concentration known as the upper flammable limit (UFL).

3.3.12 **Fluid Heater.**
3.3.12.1 **Class F Fluid Heater.**
A heater that has fluid inside the tubes with essentially constant fluid flow rate and where the outlet temperature of the fluid is controlled by modulating the heat input rate to the heater.

3.3.12.2 **Class G Fluid Heater.**
A heater that has fluid inside the tubes with modulated fluid flow rate (e.g., by process demand) and where the outlet temperature of the fluid is controlled by modulating the heat input rate to the heater.

3.3.12.3 **Class H Fluid Heater.**
A heater that has the heat source (combustion or electricity) inside the tube(s) with fluid surrounding the tube.

3.3.13 **Fuel Gas.**
A gas used as a fuel source, including natural gas, manufactured gas, sludge gas, liquefied petroleum gas–air mixtures, liquefied petroleum gas in the vapor phase, and mixtures of these gases. [820, 2008 2012]

3.3.14 **Fuel Oil.**
Grades 2, 4, 5, or 6 fuel oils as defined in ASTM D 396, *Standard Specifications for Fuel Oils*.

3.3.15 **Gas Analyzer.**
A device that measures concentrations, directly or indirectly, of some or all components in a gas or mixture. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.16 **Guarded.**
Covered, shielded, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected by means of suitable covers, casings, barriers, rails, screens, mats, or platforms to remove the likelihood of approach or contact by persons or objects to a point of danger. [70: Article 100]

3.3.17* **Hardwired.**
The method of interconnecting signals or interlocks to a logic system or between logic systems using a dedicated interconnection for each individual signal.

3.3.18 **Interlock.**
A device designed to cut off the source of heat if the operating temperature exceeds a predetermined temperature set point.

3.3.18.2 **Safety Interlock.**
A device required to ensure safe start-up and safe operation and to cause safe equipment shutdown.

3.3.19 **Lower Flammable Limit (LFL).**
See 3.3.11, *Flammable Limits*.

3.3.20 **Manufacturer.**
The entity that directs and controls any of the following: product design, product manufacturing, or product quality assurance; or the entity that assumes the liability for the product or provides the warranty for the product.

3.3.21 **Mixer.**
3.3.21.1 **Air–Fuel Gas Mixer.**
A mixer that combines air and fuel gas in the proper proportions for combustion. [86, 2011 2015]
3.3.21.2 Proportional Mixer.
A mixer comprising an inspirator that, when supplied with air, draws all the fuel gas necessary for combustion into the airstream, and a governor, zero regulator, or ratio valve that reduces incoming fuel gas pressure to approximately atmospheric. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.22 Mixing Blower.
A motor-driven blower to supply air–fuel gas mixtures for combustion through one or more fuel burners or nozzles on a single-zone industrial heating appliance or on each control zone of a multizone installation. Mixing machines operated at 10 in. w.c. (2.49 kPa) or less static pressure are considered mixing blowers. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.23 Mixing Machine.
An externally powered mechanical device that mixes fuel and air and compresses the resultant mixture to a pressure suitable for delivery to its point of use. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.24 Operator.
An individual trained and responsible for the start-up, operation, shutdown, and emergency handling of the fluid heater and associated equipment.

3.3.25 Pilot.
A flame that is used to light the main burner. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.25.1 Interrupted Pilot.
A pilot that is ignited and burns during light-off and is automatically shut off at the end of the trial-for-ignition period of the main burner(s). [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.26 Pressure Regulator.
Equipment placed in a gas line for reducing, controlling, and maintaining the pressure in that portion of the piping system downstream of the device. [54, 2009 2015]

3.3.27 Purge.
The replacement of a flammable, indeterminate, or high-oxygen-bearing atmosphere with another gas that, when complete, results in a nonflammable final state. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.28 Resistance Heating System.
A heating system in which heat is produced by current flow through a resistive conductor. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.29 Safe-Start Check.
A checking circuit incorporated in a safety-control circuit that prevents light-off if the flame-sensing relay of the combustion safeguard is in the unsafe (flame-present) position due to component failure within the combustion safeguard or due to the presence of actual or simulated flame. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.30 Safety Device.
An instrument, a control, or other equipment that acts, or initiates action, to cause the fluid heater to revert to a safe condition in the event of equipment failure or other hazardous event. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.31 Safety Relay.
A relay listed for safety service. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.32 Safety Shutoff Valve.
A normally closed valve installed in the piping that closes automatically to shut off the fuel in the event of abnormal conditions or during shutdown.

3.3.33 Scf.
One cubic foot of gas at 70°F (21°C) and 14.7 psia (an absolute pressure of 101 kPa). [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.34 Switch.

3.3.34.1 Closed Position Indicator Switch.
A switch that indicates when a valve is within 0.040 in. (1 mm) of its closed position but does not indicate proof of closure. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.34.2 Differential Pressure Switch.
A switch that is activated by a differential pressure that is detected by comparing the pressure at two different points.

3.3.34.3 Flow Switch.
A switch that is activated by the flow of a fluid in a duct or piping system. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.34.4 Pressure Switch.

3.3.34.4.1 Atomizing Medium Pressure Switch.
A pressure-activated switch arranged to effect a safety shutdown or to prevent the liquid fuel burner system from being actuated in the event of inadequate atomizing medium pressure.

3.3.34.4.2 High Fuel Pressure Switch.
A pressure-activated switch arranged to effect a safety shutdown of the burner system in the event of abnormally high fuel pressure. [86, 2011 2015]

3.3.34.4.3 Low Fuel Pressure Switch.
A pressure-activated switch arranged to effect a safety shutdown of the burner system in the event of abnormally low fuel pressure. [86, 2011 2015]
3.3.34* Proof-of-Closure Switch.
Non-field-adjustable switch installed in a safety shutoff valve by the manufacturer that activates only after the valve is fully closed.

3.3.35 Tank.

3.3.35.1 Expansion Tank.
A reservoir that allows expansion of a liquid to occur as the liquid is heated.

3.3.36 Trial-for-Ignition Period (Flame-Establishing Period).
The interval of time during light-off that a safety control circuit allows the fuel safety shutoff valve to remain open before the combustion safeguard is required to supervise the flame. [86, 2011 2015 ]

3.3.37* Valve Proving System.
A system used to check the closure of safety shutoff valves by detecting leakage. [86, 2014 2015 ]

3.3.38 Vent Limiter.
A fixed orifice that limits the escape of gas from a vented device into the atmosphere. [86, 2011 2015 ]
Chapter 4  General

4.1 Approvals, Plans, and Specifications.

4.1.1 Before new equipment is installed or existing equipment is remodeled, complete plans, sequence of operations, and specifications should be submitted for approval to the authority having jurisdiction.

4.1.1.1 Plans should be drawn that show all essential details with regard to location, construction, ventilation, piping, and electrical safety equipment. A list of all combustion, control, and safety equipment giving manufacturer, type, and number should be included.

4.1.1.2* Wiring diagrams and sequence of operations for all safety controls should be provided.

4.1.2 Any deviation from this recommended practice should require special permission from the authority having jurisdiction.

4.1.3 Electrical.

4.1.3.1* All wiring should be in accordance with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code; NFPA 79, Electrical Standard for Industrial Machinery; and as described hereafter.

4.1.3.2 Where seal leakage or diaphragm failure in a device can result in flammable gas or flammable liquid flow through a conduit or cable to an electrical ignition source, a conduit seal or a cable type that is sealed should be installed.

4.1.3.3 Wiring and equipment installed in hazardous (classified) locations should comply with the applicable requirements of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code.

4.1.3.4* The installation of a fluid heater in accordance with this recommended practice should not in and of itself require a change to the classification of the fluid heater location.

4.2 Safety Labeling.

4.2.1 A safety design data form or nameplate that states the operating conditions for which the fluid heater was designed, built, altered, or extended should be accessible to the operator.

4.2.2 A warning label stating that the equipment should be operated and maintained according to instructions should be provided.

4.2.3 The warning label should be affixed to the fluid heater or control panel.

4.3 Thermal Fluids and Process Fluids.

4.3.1 Mixtures of thermal or process fluids should not be used unless such mixtures are in accordance with recommendations of the manufacturer of the fluids.

4.3.2* When a fluid is being changed from one fluid type to another, a study should be performed to determine that all aspects of the system are compatible with the new fluid.
Chapter 5 Location and Construction

5.1 Location.

5.1.1 General.

5.1.1.1 Fluid heaters and related equipment should be located so as to protect personnel and buildings from fire or explosion hazards.

5.1.1.2 Fluid heaters should be located so as to be protected from damage by external heat, vibration, and mechanical hazards.

5.1.1.3 Fluid heaters should be located so as to make maximum use of natural ventilation, to minimize restrictions to adequate explosion relief, and to provide sufficient air supply for personnel.

5.1.1.4 Where fluid heaters are located in basements or enclosed areas, sufficient ventilation should be supplied so as to provide required combustion air and to prevent the hazardous accumulation of vapors.

5.1.1.5 Fluid heaters designed for use with fuel gas having a specific gravity greater than that of air should be located at or above grade and should be located so as to prevent the escape of the fuel gas from accumulating in basements, pits, or other areas below the fluid heater.

5.1.1.6 Location of the fluid heater, piping, and related equipment should consider the minimum pumpable viscosity of the fluid.

5.1.2 Structural Members of the Building.

5.1.2.1 Fluid heaters should be located and erected so that the building structural members are not affected adversely by the maximum anticipated temperatures (see 5.1.4.3) or by the additional loading caused by the fluid heater.

5.1.2.2 Structural building members should not pass through or be enclosed within a fluid heater.

5.1.3 Location in Regard to Stock, Processes, and Personnel.

5.1.3.1 Fluid heaters should be located so as to minimize exposure to power equipment, process equipment, and sprinkler risers.

5.1.3.2 Unrelated stock and combustible materials should be located at a distance from a fluid heater, its heating system, or ductwork so that the combustible materials will not be ignited, with a minimum separation distance of 2.5 ft (0.8 m).

5.1.3.3 Adequate clearance between heat transfer fluid piping and wood or other combustible construction materials should be provided.

5.1.3.3.1 A minimum 1 in. (25 mm) clearance should be provided for insulated piping with surface temperature below 200°F (93°C).

5.1.3.3.2 For insulated pipe whose surface temperature exceeds 200°F (93°C), suitable clearance to keep the surface temperature of nearby combustible construction materials below 160°F (71°C) should be provided.

5.1.3.3.3 A minimum 18 in. (450 mm) clearance for uninsulated piping should be provided.

5.1.3.4 Fluid heaters should be located so as to minimize exposure of people to possible injury from fire, explosion, asphyxiation, and hazardous materials and should not obstruct personnel travel to exitways.

5.1.3.5 Fluid heaters should be designed or located so as to prevent their becoming an ignition source to nearby flammable vapors, gases, dusts, and mists.

5.1.3.6 Equipment should be protected from corrosive external processes and environments, including fumes or materials from adjacent processes or equipment that produce corrosive conditions when introduced into the fluid heater environment.

5.1.4 Floors and Clearances.
5.1.4.1
Space should be provided above and on all sides for inspection, maintenance, and operational purposes.

5.1.4.2
In addition to the recommendation in 5.1.4.1, where applicable, adequate space should be provided for the installation of extinguishing systems and for the functioning of explosion venting.

5.1.4.3*
Fluid heaters should be constructed and located to keep temperatures at combustible floors, ceilings, and walls less than 160°F (71°C).

5.1.4.4
Floors in the area of mechanical pumps, liquid fuel burners, or other equipment using oil should be provided with a noncombustible, nonporous surface to prevent floors from becoming soaked with oil.

5.1.4.5
Means should be provided to prevent released fluid from flowing into adjacent areas or floors below.

5.1.5 Manifolds and External Piping.
Manifolds and external piping should be located to allow access for removal of tubes.

5.2* Fluid Heater Design.

5.2.1
Fluid heaters and related equipment should be designed to minimize the fire hazard inherent in equipment operating at elevated temperatures.

5.2.2
Fluid heater components exposed simultaneously to elevated temperatures and air should be constructed of noncombustible material.

5.2.3*
Fluid heater structural members should be designed to support the maximum loads of the fluid heater throughout the anticipated range of operating conditions.

5.2.4*
Fluid heaters should withstand the strains imposed by expansion and contraction, as well as static and dynamic mechanical loads and seismic, wind, and precipitation loads.

5.2.5
Provision should be made for draining the fluid heater for maintenance and emergency conditions.

5.2.6
Fluid heaters and related equipment should be designed and located to provide access for recommended inspection and maintenance.

5.2.6.1*
Ladders, walkways, or access facilities should be provided so that equipment can be operated or accessed for testing and maintenance.

5.2.6.2
Means should be provided for recommended internal inspection by maintenance and other personnel.

5.2.7
Radiation shields, refractory material, and insulation should be retained or supported so they do not fall out of place under designed use and maintenance.

5.2.8
External parts of fluid heaters that operate at temperatures in excess of 160°F (71°C) should be guarded by location, guard rails, shields, or insulation to prevent accidental contact by personnel.

5.2.8.1
Openings or other parts of the fluid heater from which flames, hot gases, or fluids could be discharged should be located or guarded to prevent injury to personnel.

5.2.8.2
Where it is impractical to provide adequate shields or guards recommended by 5.2.8, warning signs or permanent floor markings visible to personnel entering the area should be provided.

5.2.9
Observation ports or other visual means for observing the operation of individual burners should be provided and should be protected from damage by radiant heat.

5.2.10* Pressure Relief Devices.

5.2.10.1
Each section of the fluid flow path that can exceed the design pressure should be equipped with pressure relief.

5.2.10.2
Pressure relief should be provided for fluid piping and tanks that can be isolated.
Fluid vented from a pressure relief device should be directed to an approved location.

5.2.10.3.1
Vent piping should be sized for the anticipated flow of vented fluid, which can be a two-phase mixture.

5.2.10.3.2
Horizontal piping in the vent line should be sloped so that liquid does not accumulate.

5.2.10.3.3
Heat tracing of the vent line should be considered for fluids having a minimum pour point above expected ambient temperatures.

5.2.11
The metal frames of fluid heaters should be electrically grounded.

5.2.12
Fluid heaters should be designed for relatively uniform heat flux to all heat transfer surfaces.

5.2.13
Heater components should be designed to allow for thermal expansion.

5.2.14
Refractory and insulation should be adequately supported by materials that are fit for the conditions.

5.2.15
Fluid heater tube materials should be selected to accommodate the chosen fluid at the desired operating temperature, with sufficient protection against corrosion and erosion.

5.2.16
Heater pressure vessels operating at pressures greater than 15 psi (100 kPa) should be stamped as ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section I or ASME Section VIII Division 1 vessels.

5.2.17
For combustible fluids, seamless tubes and fittings should be utilized.

5.2.18
Tubing within the heat transfer area should have welded connections. Tubing or piping outside the heat transfer area should have either flanged or welded connections. Threaded connections can be used outside the heat transfer area for instrument connections and pressure relief valve corrections of 1/4 in. (32 mm) and smaller diameter only.

5.2.19
Low point drains and high point vents should be accessible outside the heater.

5.2.20
The maximum unsupported length of tubes should be such that tube stress does not exceed one-half of the stress to produce 1 percent creep in 10,000 hours.

5.2.21
Tube hangers that cannot be easily inspected and replaced should be designed such that their stress does not exceed one-half of the stress to produce 1 percent creep in 10,000 hours.

5.2.22
Burners should be designed to prevent flame impingement on tubes and tube supports when operating at maximum heat release.

5.2.23
Fluid heaters should be designed to accommodate a specific range of fluid volume and mass and should not be operated outside those ranges.

5.2.24
Fluid heaters should be designed for a specific range of fluid viscosities, densities, and velocities and should not be operated outside those ranges.

5.3* Explosion Mitigation.
Explosion hazards should be mitigated through one of the following methods:

(1) Containment
(2) Explosion relief
(3) Location
(4) Explosion suppression
(5) Damage limiting construction

5.4* Ventilation and Exhaust System.
5.4.1* Building Makeup Air.
A quantity of makeup air should be admitted to fluid heater rooms and buildings to provide the air volume required for fluid heater safety ventilation and combustion air.

5.4.2 Fans and Motors.
5.4.2.1
Electric motors that drive exhaust or recirculating fans should not be located inside the fluid heater or ductwork.
5.4.2.2
Fluid heater recirculating and exhaust fans should be designed for the maximum heating system temperature.

5.4.3 Ductwork.

5.4.3.1
Ventilating and exhaust systems, where applicable, should be installed in accordance with NFPA 31, Standard for the Installation of Oil-Burning Equipment, or NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code, unless otherwise noted in this recommended practice.

5.4.3.2
Wherever fluid heater exhaust ducts or stacks pass through combustible walls, floors, or roofs, noncombustible insulation, clearance, or both should be provided to prevent combustible surface temperatures from exceeding 160°F (71°C).

5.4.3.3*
Where ducts pass through fire resistance-rated or noncombustible walls, floors, or partitions, the space around the duct should be sealed with noncombustible material to maintain the fire-resistance rating of the barrier.

5.4.3.4
Ducts should be constructed entirely of sheet steel or other noncombustible material capable of meeting the intended installation and conditions of service, and the installation should be protected where subject to physical damage.

5.4.3.5*
No portions of the building should be used as an integral part of the duct.

5.4.3.6*
All ducts should be made tight throughout and should have no openings other than those required for the operation and maintenance of the system.

5.4.3.7
All ducts should be braced where required and should be supported by metal hangers or brackets.

5.4.3.8
Stacks should be properly braced and should not be supported with guy wires.

5.4.3.9
Hand holes for inspection or other purposes should be equipped with tight-fitting doors or covers.

5.4.3.10
Exposed hot fan casings, fluid piping, and hot ducts [temperatures exceeding 160°F (71°C)] should be guarded by location, guard rails, shields, or insulation to prevent injury to personnel.

5.4.3.11
Exhaust ducts should not discharge near openings or other air intakes where effluents can be entrained and directed to locations creating a hazard.

5.5 Mountings and Auxiliary Equipment.

5.5.1 Fluid Piping System.

5.5.1.1
Piping and fittings should be compatible with the fluid being used and with the system operating temperatures and pressures.

5.5.1.2
For fluid piping systems that operate above 15 psig (100 kPa), piping materials should be in accordance with ANSI/ASME B31.1, Power Piping, or ANSI/ASME B31.3, Process Piping.

5.5.1.3*
In applications where fluid leakage creates a hazard, all pipe connections should be welded.

5.5.1.3.1
Flange connections should be limited to pump, valve, boundary limit, spool, and equipment connections.

5.5.1.3.2
Threaded connections should be limited to instruments and other miscellaneous connections less than 1 in. (25 mm).

5.5.1.4
Thread sealant should be compatible with the fluid used and with the maximum operating temperature.

5.5.1.5
Seal and gasket materials should be compatible with the fluid and with the operating temperature and pressure.

5.5.1.6
The system design should accommodate the thermal expansion of the pipe.

5.5.1.7*
The system should be pneumatically tested with dry air prior to being filled with fluid.

5.5.1.8
Thermal insulation used on pipes and equipment should be selected for the intended purpose and for compatibility with the fluid.

5.5.1.8.1
Where there is a potential for fluid system leaks, the thermal insulation selected should be nonabsorbent.
5.5.1.8.2
Flanges, pumps, and equipment requiring routine maintenance should not be insulated.

5.5.1.8.3
Insulation applied to system piping and equipment should be applied only after a leakage or pressure test of the plant has been conducted.

5.5.1.8.4
Insulation should be applied only after a full heating cycle.

5.5.1.9
It is recommended that shielding be provided against hot fluid sprays in the event that a gasket or seal fails.

5.5.2
Pipes, valves, and manifolds should be mounted so as to provide protection against damage by heat, vibration, and mechanical hazard.

5.5.3
Fluid heater systems should have provisions such as motion stops, lockout devices, or other safety mechanisms to prevent injury to personnel during maintenance or inspection.

5.5.4
Instrumentation and control equipment should meet the following criteria:

1. Be located for ease of observation, adjustment, and maintenance
2. Be protected from physical and thermal damage and other hazards

5.6 Heating Elements and Insulation.

5.6.1
Material for electric heating elements should be suitable for the specified range of design conditions.

5.6.2
Internal electrical insulation material should be suitable for the specified range of design conditions.

5.7 Heat Baffles and Reflectors.

5.7.1
To prevent fluid heater damage, baffles, reflectors, and internal component supports should be designed to minimize warpage due to expansion and contraction.

5.7.2
To prevent fluid heater damage, baffles, reflectors, and internal component supports should be of heat-resistant material that minimizes sag, rupture, or cracking under normal operating limits specified by the manufacturer.

5.7.3
Baffles and reflectors should be accessible and removable for the purpose of cleaning and repairing.
Chapter 6  Heating Systems

6.1  General.

6.1.1  For the purposes of this chapter, the term heating system includes the heating source, the associated piping and wiring used to heat the enclosure, and the process fluid therein.

6.1.2  All components of the heating system and control cabinet should be grounded.

6.1.3  Pilot burners should be considered burners, and all provisions of Section 6.2 or Section 6.3 should apply.

6.2  Fuel Gas–Fired Units.

6.2.1*  Scope.

Section 6.2 applies to the following:

(1) Fluid heating systems fired with fuel gases such as the following:
   (a) Natural gas
   (b) Mixed gas
   (c) Manufactured gas
   (d) Liquefied petroleum gas (LP-Gas) in the vapor phase
   (e) LP-Gas–air systems
(2) Gas-burning portions of dual-fuel or combination burners

6.2.2  General.

Burners, along with associated mixing, valving, and safety controls and other auxiliary components, should be selected for the intended application, type, and pressure of the fuel gases to be used and temperatures to which they are subjected.

6.2.3*  Combustion Air.

6.2.3.1  The fuel-burning system design should provide a supply of clean combustion air delivered in amounts prescribed by the fluid heater designer or burner manufacturer across the full range of burner operation.

6.2.3.2  Products of combustion should not be mixed with the combustion air supply.

6.2.3.3  The recommendation of 6.2.3.2 should not exclude the use of flue gas recirculation systems specifically designed to accommodate such recirculation.

6.2.3.4*  Where combustion air is provided by a fan or blower, combustion airflow or fan discharge pressure and damper position should be proven and interlocked with the safety shutoff valves so that fuel gas cannot be admitted prior to establishment of combustion air and so that the gas is shut off in the event of combustion air failure.

6.2.3.5  Where a burner register air adjustment is provided, adjustment should include a locking device to prevent an unintentional change in setting.

6.2.4  Fuel Gas Supply Piping.

6.2.4.1*  An emergency shutoff valve should be provided that meets the following requirements:

(1) It should be remotely located away from the fluid heater so that fire or explosion at a fluid heater does not prevent access to the valve.

(2) It should be readily accessible.

(3) It should have permanently affixed visual indication of the valve position.

(4) A removable handle should be permitted provided all the following requirements are satisfied:

   (a) The valve position is clearly indicated whether the handle is attached or detached.
   (b) The valve handle is tethered to the gas main no more than 3 ft (1 m) from the valve in a manner that does not cause personnel safety issues and that allows trouble-free reattachment of the handle and operation of the valve without untethering the handle.

(5) It should be able to be operated from full open to full close and return without the use of tools.
6.2.4.2
Installation of LP-Gas storage and handling systems should comply with NFPA 58, *Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code*.

6.2.4.3
Piping from the point of delivery to the equipment isolation valve should comply with NFPA 54, *National Fuel Gas Code*. (See 6.2.5.2.)

6.2.4.4
An equipment isolation valve should be provided.

6.2.5 Equipment Fuel Gas Piping.

6.2.5.1 Equipment Isolation Valves.
Equipment isolation valves should meet the following requirements:

1. They should be provided for each piece of equipment.
2. They should have permanently affixed visual indication of the valve position.
3. They should be quarter-turn valves with stops.
4. Wrenches or handles should remain affixed to valves and should be oriented with respect to the valve port to indicate the following:
   (a) An open valve when the handle is parallel to the pipe
   (b) A closed valve when the handle is perpendicular to the pipe
5. They should be readily accessible.
6. Valves with removable wrenches should not allow the wrench handle to be installed perpendicular to the fuel gas line when the valve is open.
7. They should be able to be operated from full open to full close and return without the use of tools.

6.2.5.2*
Fuel gas piping materials should be in accordance with NFPA 54, *National Fuel Gas Code*.

6.2.5.3
Fuel gas piping should be sized to provide flow rates and pressures that maintain a stable flame over the burner operating range.

6.2.6 Control of Contaminants.

6.2.6.1
A sediment trap or other acceptable means of removing contaminants should be installed downstream of the equipment isolation valve and upstream of all other fuel-gas system components.

6.2.6.2
Sediment traps should have a vertical leg with a minimum length of three pipe diameters (minimum of 3 in. (80 mm)) of the same size as the supply pipe, as shown in Figure 6.2.6.2.

Figure 6.2.6.2 Method of Installing a Tee-Fitting Sediment Trap.

6.2.6.3*
A gas filter or strainer should be installed in the fuel gas piping and should be located downstream of the equipment isolation valve and sediment trap and upstream of all other fuel gas system components.

6.2.7 Pressure Regulators, Pressure Relief Valves, and Pressure Switches.

6.2.7.1
A pressure regulator should be furnished wherever the plant supply pressure exceeds the burner operating parameters or the design parameters or wherever the plant supply pressure is subject to fluctuations, unless otherwise permitted by 6.2.7.2.
6.2.7.2
An automatic flow control valve is permitted to meet the recommendation of 6.2.7.1, provided that it can compensate for the full range of expected source pressure variations.

6.2.7.3*
Regulators, relief valves, and switches should be vented to an approved location, and the following criteria also should be met:
1. Heavier-than-air flammable gases should be vented outside the building to a location where the gas is diluted below its lower flammable limit (LFL) before coming in contact with sources of ignition or re-entering the building.
2. Vents should be designed to prevent the entry of water and insects without restricting the flow capacity of the vent.

6.2.7.4*
Fuel gas regulators, ratio regulators, and zero governors are not required to be vented to an approved location in the following situations:
1. Where backloaded from combustion air lines, air–gas mixture lines, or combustion chambers, provided that gas leakage through the backload connection does not create a hazard
2. Where a listed regulator–vent limiter combination is used
3. Where a regulator system is listed for use without vent piping

6.2.7.5*
A pressure switch is not required to be vented if it employs a vent limiter rated for the service intended.

6.2.7.6
Vent lines from multiple fluid heaters should not be manifolded together.

6.2.7.7
Vent lines from multiple regulators and switches of a single fluid heater, where manifolded together, should be piped in such a manner that diaphragm rupture of one vent line does not backload the others.

6.2.7.7.1
Vents from systems operating at different pressure control levels should not be manifolded together.

6.2.7.7.2
Vents from systems served from different pressure reducing stations should not be manifolded together.

6.2.7.7.3
Vents from systems using different fuel sources should not be manifolded together.

6.2.7.8
The cross-sectional area of the manifold line should not be less than the greater of the following:
1. The cross-sectional area of the largest vent plus 50 percent of the sum of the cross-sectional areas of the additional vent lines
2. The sum of the cross-sectional areas of the two largest vent lines

6.2.7.9*
A vent between safety shutoff valves, where installed:
1. Should not be combined with other vents
2. Should terminate to an approved location

6.2.8 Overpressure Protection.

6.2.8.1
Overpressure protection should be provided in either of the following cases:
1. When the supply pressure exceeds the pressure rating of any downstream component
2. When the failure of single upstream line regulator or service pressure regulator results in a supply pressure exceeding the pressure rating of any downstream component

6.2.8.2
Overpressure protection should be provided by any one of the following:
1. A series regulator in combination with a line regulator or service pressure regulator
2. A monitoring regulator installed in combination with a line regulator or service pressure regulator
3. A full-capacity pressure relief valve
4. An overpressure cutoff device, such as a slam-shut valve or a high pressure switch in combination with an adequately rated shutoff valve

6.2.8.3*
When a relief valve is used to comply with 8.7.1.10, the relief valve should be a full-capacity relief type.
6.2.8.4 Token relief valves and internal token relief valves should not be permitted to be used as the only overpressure protection device.

6.2.9 Flow Control Valves.

Where the minimum or maximum flow of combustion air or fuel gas is critical to the operation of the burner, flow valves should be equipped with limiting means and with a locking device to prevent an unintentional change in the setting.

6.2.10* Air–Fuel Gas Mixers.

Subsection 6.2.10 applies only to mixtures of fuel gas with air.

6.2.10.1 Proportional Mixing.

(A) Piping should be designed to provide a uniform mixture flow of pressure and velocity needed for stable burner operation.

(B) Valves or other obstructions should not be installed between a proportional mixer and burners, unless otherwise permitted by 6.2.10.2(C).

(C) Fixed orifices are permitted for purposes of balancing.

(D) Any field-adjustable device built into a proportional mixer (e.g., gas orifice, air orifice, ratio valve) should incorporate a device to prevent unintentional changes in the setting.

(E) Where a mixing blower is used, safety shutoff valves should be installed in the fuel gas supply and should interrupt the fuel gas supply automatically when the mixing blower is not in operation or in the event of a fuel gas supply failure.

(F) Mixing blowers should not be used with fuel gases containing more than 10 percent free hydrogen (H₂).

(G) Mixing blowers having a static delivery pressure of more than 10 in. w.c. (2.49 kPa) should be considered mixing machines.

6.2.10.2 Mixing Machines.

(A)* Automatic fire checks should be provided in piping systems that distribute flammable air–fuel gas mixtures from a mixing machine.

(B) The automatic fire check should be installed at the burner inlet(s), and the manufacturer's installation guidelines should be followed.

(C) A separate, manually operated gas valve should be provided at each automatic fire check for shutting off the flow of an air–fuel mixture through the fire check after a flashback has occurred.

CAUTION: These valves should not be reopened after a flashback has occurred until the fire check has cooled sufficiently to prevent re-ignition of the flammable mixture and has been properly reset.

(D) The valves recommended by 6.2.10.2(C) should be located upstream of the inlets of the automatic fire checks.

(E)* A backfire arrester with a safety blowout device should be installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions near the outlet of each mixing machine that produces a flammable air–fuel gas mixture.

(F) Where a mixing machine is used, safety shutoff valves should be installed in the fuel gas supply and should interrupt the fuel gas supply automatically when the mixing machine is not in operation or in the event of an air or fuel gas supply failure.

6.2.11 Fuel Gas Burners.

6.2.11.1 All burners should maintain both the stability of the designed flame shape over the entire range of turndown encountered during operation where supplied with combustion air and the designed fuels in the designed proportions and in the designed pressure ranges.

6.2.11.2 Burners should be used only with the fuels for which they are designed.

6.2.11.3 All pressures required for the operation of the combustion system should be maintained within design ranges throughout the firing cycle.

6.2.11.4 Burners should have the ignition source sized and located in a position that provides ignition of the pilot or main flame within the design trial-for-ignition period.
Self-piloted burners should have a transition from pilot flame to main flame.

Burners that cannot be ignited at all firing rates should have provision to reduce the burner firing rates during light-off to a lower level, which ensures ignition of the main flame without flashback or blowoff.

6.2.12 Fuel Ignition.

6.2.12.1* The ignition source (e.g., electric spark, hot wire, pilot burner, handheld torch) should be applied at the design location with the designed intensity to ignite the air–fuel mixture.

6.2.12.2 Fixed ignition sources should be mounted to prevent unintentional changes in location and in direction with respect to the main flame.

6.2.12.3 Pilot burners should be considered burners, and all provisions of Section 6.2 should apply.

6.2.13 Dual-Fuel and Combination Burners.

Where fuel gas and liquid fuel are to be fired individually (dual-fuel) or simultaneously (combination), the provisions of Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 8.12 apply equally to the respective fuels.

6.3 Liquid Fuel–Fired Units.

6.3.1* Scope.

Section 6.3 applies to the following:

1. Fluid heating systems fired with liquid fuels such as the following:
   (a) No. 2 fuel oil (as specified by ASTM D 396, Standard Specifications for Fuel Oils)
   (b) No. 4 fuel oil (as specified by ASTM D 396)
   (c) No. 5 fuel oil (as specified by ASTM D 396)
   (d) No. 6 fuel oil (as specified by ASTM D 396)
   (e) Ethanol

2. Liquid fuel–burning portions of dual-fuel or combination burners

6.3.2 General.

Burners, along with associated valving, safety controls, and other auxiliary components, should be selected for the type and pressure of the liquid fuel to be used and for the temperatures to which they are subjected.

6.3.3* Combustion Air.

6.3.3.1 The fuel-burning system design should provide for a supply of clean combustion air delivered in the amounts prescribed by the fluid heater designer or burner manufacturer across the full range of burner operation.

6.3.3.2 Products of combustion should not be mixed with the combustion air supply.

6.3.3.3 The recommendation of 6.3.3.2 should not exclude the use of flue gas recirculation systems specifically designed to accommodate such recirculation.

6.3.3.4 Where combustion air is provided by a fan or blower, combustion airflow or fan discharge pressure and damper position should be proven and interlocked with the safety shutoff valves so that the fuel cannot be admitted prior to establishment of combustion air and so that the fuel is shut off in the event of combustion air failure.

6.3.3.5 Where a burner register air adjustment is provided, adjustment should include a locking device to prevent an unintentional change in setting.

6.3.4 Fuel Supply Piping.

6.3.4.1 The liquid fuel supply to a fluid heater should be capable of being shut off at a location remote from the fluid heater so that fire or explosion at the fluid heater does not prevent access to the liquid fuel shutoff.
6.3.4.2
The liquid fuel shutoff should be by either of the following:

(1) Emergency shutoff valve that meets the following requirements:
   (a) It should be remotely located away from the fluid heater so that fire or explosion at a fluid heater does not prevent access to this valve.
   (b) It should be readily accessible.
   (c) It should have permanently affixed visual indication of the valve position.
   (d) A removable handle should be permitted provided all the following requirements are satisfied:
      i. The valve position is clearly indicated whether the handle is attached or detached.
      ii. The valve handle is tethered to the gas main no more than 3 ft (1 m) from the valve in a manner that does not cause personnel safety issues and that allows trouble-free reattachment of the handle and operation of the valve without untethering the handle.

(2) Means for removing power to the positive displacement liquid fuel pump

6.3.4.3
Where a shutoff is installed in the discharge line of a fuel pump that is not an integral part of a burner, a pressure relief valve should be connected to the discharge line between the pump and the shutoff valve and arranged to return surplus fuel to the supply tank or to bypass it around the pump, unless the pump includes an internal bypass.

6.3.4.4*
All air from the supply and return piping should be purged initially, and air entrainment in the fuel should be minimized.

6.3.4.5
Suction, supply, and return piping should be sized with respect to fuel pump capacity.

6.3.4.6*
Where a section of fuel piping can be shut off at both ends, relief valves or expansion chambers should be installed to release the pressure caused by thermal expansion of the fuel.

6.3.4.7
An equipment isolation valve should be provided.

6.3.5 Equipment Fuel Piping.

6.3.5.1
Manual shutoff valves should comply with the following:
   (1) Individual manual shutoff valves for equipment isolation should be provided for shutoff of the fuel to each piece of equipment.
   (2) Manual shutoff valves should be installed to avoid fuel spillage during servicing of supply piping and associated components.
   (3) Manual shutoff valves should display a visual indication of the valve position.
   (4) Quarter-turn valves with removable wrenches should not allow the wrench handle to be installed perpendicular to the liquid fuel line when the valve is open.
   (5) The user should keep separate wrenches (handles) affixed to valves and keep the wrenches oriented with respect to the valve port to indicate the following:
      (a) An open valve when the handle is parallel to the pipe
      (b) A closed valve when the handle is perpendicular to the pipe
   (6)* Valves should be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.
   (7) Lubricated valves should be lubricated and subsequently leak tested for valve closure at least annually.

6.3.5.2
Liquid fuel piping materials should be in accordance with NFPA 31, Standard for the Installation of Oil-Burning Equipment.

6.3.5.3
Liquid fuel piping should be sized to provide flow rates and pressure to maintain a stable flame over the burner operating range.

6.3.5.4* Filters and Strainers.
A filter or strainer should meet the following criteria:
   (1) Be selected for the maximum operating pressure and temperature anticipated
   (2) Be selected to filter particles larger than the most critical clearance in the liquid fuel system
   (3) Be installed in the liquid fuel piping system downstream of the equipment isolation valve and upstream of all other liquid fuel piping system components

6.3.5.5 Pressure Regulation.
Where the fuel pressure exceeds that required for burner operation or where the fuel pressure is subject to fluctuations, either a pressure regulator or an automatic flow control valve that can compensate for the full range of expected source pressure variations should be installed.

6.3.5.6* Pressure Gauges.
Pressure gauges should be isolated or protected from pulsation damage during operation of the burner system.
6.3.6 Flow Control Valves.
Where the minimum or maximum flow of combustion air or the liquid fuel is critical to the operation of the burner, flow valves should be equipped with a limiting means and with a locking device to prevent an unintentional change in the setting.

6.3.7 Fuel Atomization.
6.3.7.1 Fuel should be atomized to droplet sizes required for combustion throughout the firing range.
6.3.7.2 The atomizing device should be accessible for inspection, cleaning, repair, replacement, and other maintenance, as required.

6.3.8 Liquid Fuel Burners.
6.3.8.1 All burners should maintain both the stability of the designed flame shape over the entire range of turndown encountered during operation where supplied with combustion air and the designed fuels in the designed proportions and in the designed pressure ranges.
6.3.8.2 All pressures required for the operation of the combustion system should be maintained within design ranges throughout the firing cycle.
6.3.8.3 All burners should be supplied with liquid fuel of the type and grade for which they have been designed and with liquid fuel that has been preconditioned, where necessary, to the viscosity required by the burner design. Burners should be used only with the fuels for which they are designed.
6.3.8.4 Burners should have the ignition source sized and located in a position that provides ignition of the pilot or main flame within the design trial-for-ignition period.
(A) Self-piloted burners should have a transition from pilot flame to main flame.
(B) Burners that cannot be ignited at all firing rates should have provision to reduce the burner firing rates during light-off to a lower level, which ensures ignition of the main flame without flashback or blowoff.
6.3.8.5 If purging of fuel passages upon termination of a firing cycle is required, it should be done prior to shutdown, with the initial ignition source present and with all associated fans and blowers in operation.

6.3.9 Fuel Ignition.
6.3.9.1 The ignition source should be applied at the design location with the design intensity to ignite the air–fuel mixture.
6.3.9.2 Fixed ignition sources should be mounted so as to prevent unintentional changes in location and in direction with respect to the main flame.

6.3.10 Dual-Fuel and Combination Burners.
Where fuel gas and liquid fuel are fired individually (dual-fuel) or simultaneously (combination), the provisions of Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 8.12 should apply equally to the respective fuels.

6.4 Oxygen Enhanced Fuel–Fired Units.
For guidance regarding oxygen enhanced fuel–fired units, refer to NFPA 86, Standard for Ovens and Furnaces.

6.5 Flue Product Venting.
Means should be provided to ensure ventilation of the products of combustion from fuel-fired equipment.

6.6 Electrically Heated Units.
6.6.1 Scope.
Section 6.6 applies to all types of heating systems where electrical energy is used as the source of heat.

6.6.2 Safety Equipment.
Safety equipment, including airflow interlocks, time relays, and temperature switches, should be in accordance with Chapter 8.

6.6.3 Electrical Installation.
All parts of the electrical installation should be in accordance with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code.

6.6.4 Resistance Heating Systems.
6.6.4.1 The provisions of 6.6.4 should apply to resistance heating systems, including infrared lamps, such as quartz, ceramic, and tubular glass types.
6.6.4.2
Resistance heating systems shall be constructed in accordance with the following:

(1) The heater housing should be constructed so as to provide access to heating elements and wiring.
(2) Heating elements and insulators should be supported securely or fastened so that they do not become easily dislodged from their intended location.
(3) Heating elements that are electrically insulated and that are supported by a metallic frame should have the frame electrically grounded.
(4) Open-type resistor heating elements should be supported by electrically insulated hangers and should be secured to prevent the effects of motion induced by thermal stress, which could result in adjacent segments of the elements touching one another, or the effects of touching a grounded surface.
(5) External parts of heaters that are energized at voltages that could be hazardous as specified in NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, should be guarded.
Chapter 7 Commissioning, Operations, Maintenance, Inspection, and Testing

7.1 Scope.
Chapter 7 applies to safety systems and their application to fluid heaters.

7.2 Commissioning.
7.2.1* Commissioning is recommended for all new installations or for any changes that affect the safety system.

7.2.2 The party responsible should ensure that all pertinent apparatus is installed and connected in accordance with the system design.

7.2.3 The party responsible should not release the fluid heater for operation before the installation and checkout of the recommended safety systems have been successfully completed.

7.2.4 The party responsible should ensure that any changes to the original design made during commissioning are reflected in the documentation.

7.2.5* The party responsible should ensure that set points of all safety interlocks are documented.

7.2.6* The party responsible should perform a test of the fire protection system to verify proper functioning of all interlocks and actuators.

7.2.7 The party responsible should verify that distribution piping for the extinguishing agent is unobstructed.

7.2.8* If hazardous conditions could result from the presence of air, water, and other contaminants, they should be removed from the fluid system prior to charging.

7.2.9* The fluid should be added to the heater system according to the heater manufacturer's instructions.

7.2.10* Initial preheating and operation of the heater should be conducted according to the heater manufacturer's instructions.

7.2.11 Minimum fluid flow should be established before the burner is operated.

7.2.12* A confirmed source of combustible gas should be provided to the inlet to the equipment isolation valve(s) (see 6.2.5.1) each time a combustible gas supply is placed into service or restored to service.

7.3 Training.
7.3.1* The personnel responsible for operating, maintaining, and supervising the fluid heater should be thoroughly instructed and trained in their respective job functions under the direction of a qualified person(s).

7.3.2 The personnel responsible for operating, maintaining, and supervising the fluid heater should be required to demonstrate an understanding of the equipment, its operation, and the practice of safe operating procedures in their respective job functions.

7.3.3 Operating, maintenance, and supervisory personnel should receive regularly scheduled retraining and testing.

7.3.4* The training program should cover start-up, operation, shutdown, maintenance, and emergency procedures in detail.

7.3.5 The training program should be kept current with changes in equipment and operating procedures, and training materials should be available for reference.

7.4 Operations.
7.4.1 The fluid heater should be operated in accordance with the design parameters.
7.4.2
Operating instructions that include all of the following should be provided by the parties responsible for the system design:

1. Design limits (maximum and minimum) on process parameters such as firing rate, turndown, fluid flow rates, and fluid characteristics
2. Schematic piping and wiring diagrams and instrument configurations
3. Startup procedures
4. Shutdown procedures
5. Emergency procedures occasioned by loss of essential utilities, such as electric power, instrument air, and inert gas
6. Emergency procedures occasioned by process upsets, such as low fluid flow, excess firebox temperature, and indicators of fluid-fed fires
7. Maintenance procedures, including interlock and valve tightness testing

7.4.3*
If the original equipment manufacturer no longer exists, the user should develop inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures.

7.4.4
The user should establish plant operating procedures that cover normal and emergency conditions and the use of fire protection equipment.

7.4.4.1
Plant operating procedures should be directly applicable to the equipment involved and should be consistent with safety requirements and the manufacturer's recommendations.

7.4.4.2
Plant operating procedures should be kept current with changes in equipment and processes.

7.4.4.3
Where different modes of operation are possible, plant operating procedures should be prepared for each operating mode and for switching from one mode to another.

7.4.5
Personnel should have access to operating instructions at all times.

7.4.6
Plant operating procedures should prohibit the removal or disabling of safety devices.

7.4.7*
The system should be operated within the limits specified by the manufacturer of the heat transfer fluid and by the manufacturer of the heater.

7.5 Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance.

7.5.1
Safety devices should be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

7.5.2
It should be the responsibility of the fluid heater manufacturer to provide instructions for inspection, testing, and maintenance.

7.5.3*
For recirculating fluid systems, the instructions in 7.5.2 should include instructions for inspection, testing, and maintenance of the heat transfer fluid.

7.5.3.1
If indications of fluid overheating or contamination are observed, an investigation should be performed to evaluate and eliminate the cause of the overheating and contamination. The fluid should be drained from the heater and evaluated.

7.5.3.2
If there are indications that the material being heated is infiltrating into the fluid loop, an investigation should be performed to identify the internal leakage point.

7.5.3.3
If the fluid testing results indicate an unacceptable level of degradation or contamination, the fluid should be replaced.

7.5.4
It should be the responsibility of the user to establish, schedule, and enforce the frequency and extent of the inspection, testing, and maintenance program, as well as the corrective action to be taken.

7.5.5*
A test of the fire protection system to verify proper functioning of all interlocks and actuators should be performed annually.

7.5.6
Fluid and fuel leaks should be repaired promptly.

7.5.7
Fluid spills and releases should be cleaned promptly, and fluid-soaked insulation should be replaced.

7.5.8*
Pressure relief valves should be tested in accordance with applicable codes and regulations.
7.5.9
Cleaning of the inside or outside of heater tubes should not adversely affect tube integrity.

7.5.10
All safety interlocks should be tested for function at least annually.

7.5.11*
The set point of temperature, pressure, or flow devices used as safety interlocks should be verified at least annually.

7.5.12
Safety device testing should be documented at least annually.

7.5.13
Explosion relief devices, if installed, should be visually inspected at least annually to ensure that they are unobstructed and properly labeled.

7.5.14
Pressure relief devices should be tested at least annually to ensure that they are functioning properly.

7.5.15*
Testing of fuel gas safety shutoff valve seat leakage and valve proving systems should be performed at least annually.

7.5.16
Manual shutoff valves should be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

7.5.17*
Lubricated manual shutoff valves should be lubricated and subsequently leak tested for valve closure at least annually.

7.5.18
The temperature indication of the excess temperature controller should be verified at least annually as being accurate.

7.5.19
Wherever any safety interlock is replaced, it should be tested for function.

7.5.20
Wherever any temperature, pressure, or flow device used as a safety interlock is replaced, the setpoint should be verified.

7.5.21
An inspection should be completed at least annually to verify that all designed safety interlocks are present and have not been bypassed or rendered ineffective.

7.5.22*
Whenever combustible gas piping is placed into service or removed from service, any release of combustible gas should be vented to an approved location.

7.6 Record Retention.
Records of inspection, testing, and maintenance activities should be retained for a period of 1 year or until the next inspection, testing, or maintenance activity, whichever is longer.

7.7* Procedures.
The user's operational and maintenance program should include procedures that apply to worker safety in accordance with all applicable regulations.
Chapter 8 Heating System Safety Equipment and Application

8.1 Scope.

8.1.1 Chapter 8 applies to safety equipment and its application to the fluid heater heating system.

8.1.2 Section 8.3 should be applied to all safety controls included in this recommended practice.

8.1.3 For the purpose of this chapter, the term heating system includes the heating source, associated piping, wiring, and controls used to heat the fluid heater and the fluid therein.

8.2 General.

8.2.1 The recommendations of Chapter 8 should not apply to thermal liquid heaters with fuel input ratings less than 12,500,000 Btu/hr (3.7 MW) that conform with ASME CSD-1, Controls and Safety Devices for Automatically Fired Boilers, or with UL 795, Standard for Commercial-Industrial Gas Heating Equipment.

8.2.2 All safety devices should meet one of the following criteria:

1. Be listed for the service intended
2. Be approved, where listed devices are not available
3. Be programmable controllers applied in accordance with Section 8.4

8.2.3 Safety devices should be applied and installed in accordance with this recommended practice and the manufacturer's instructions.

8.2.4 Electric relays should not be used as substitutes for electrical disconnects, and safety shutoff valves should not be used as substitutes for manual shutoff valves.

8.2.5 Regularly scheduled inspection, testing, and maintenance of all safety devices should be performed. (See Section 7.5.)

8.2.6 Safety devices should be installed, used, and maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

8.2.7 Safety devices should be located or guarded to protect them from physical damage.

8.2.8 Safety devices should not be bypassed electrically or mechanically.

8.2.8.1 The recommendation in 8.2.8 should not prohibit safety device testing and maintenance in accordance with 8.2.5. Where a system includes a “built-in” test mechanism that bypasses any safety device, it should be interlocked to prevent operation of the system while the device is in the test mode, unless listed for that purpose.

8.2.8.2 The recommendation in 8.2.8 should not prohibit a time delay applied to the action of a pressure-proving, flow-proving, or proof-of-closure safety switch, where the following conditions exist:

1. There is an operational need demonstrated for the time delay.
2. The use of a time delay is approved.
3. The time delay feature is not adjustable beyond 5 seconds.
4. A single time delay does not serve more than one pressure-proving or flow-proving safety device.
5. The time from an abnormal pressure or flow condition until the holding medium is removed from the safety shutoff valves does not exceed 5 seconds.

8.2.9 At least one hardwired manual emergency switch should be provided to initiate a safety shutdown.

8.2.10 Shutdown of the heating system by any safety feature or safety device should require manual intervention of an operator for re-establishment of normal operation of the system.
8.2.11
Where transmitters are used in place of switches for safety functions, the following should apply:
(1) The transmitter should possess a safety integrity level (SIL) rating of 2.
(2) Transmitter failure should be detected and initiate a safety shutdown.
(3) The transmitter should be dedicated to safety service unless listed for simultaneous process and safety service.

8.3* Burner Management System Logic.
8.3.1 General.
8.3.1.1
Purge, ignition trials, and other burner safety sequencing should be performed using either devices listed for such service or programmable controllers used in accordance with 8.4.
8.3.1.2
The activation of any safety interlock recommended in Chapter 8 should result in a safety shutdown.
8.3.1.3
Safety interlocks should meet one or more of the following:
(1) Be connected to a combustion safeguard
(2) Be hardwired without relays in series ahead of the controlled device
(3) Be connected to an input of a programmable controller logic system complying with Section 8.4
(4) Be connected to a relay that represents a single safety interlock configured to initiate safety shutdown in the event of power loss
(5) Be connected to a listed safety relay that represents one or more safety interlocks and initiates safety shutdown upon power loss

8.3.1.4*
Electrical power for safety control circuits should be dc or single-phase ac, 250 volt maximum, one-side grounded, with all breaking contacts in the ungrounded, fuse-protected, or circuit breaker–protected line.

8.4* Programmable Logic Controller Systems.
8.4.1
Programmable logic controller (PLC)–based systems listed for combustion safety service should be used in accordance with the listing requirements and the manufacturer's instructions.
8.4.2
For PLCs that are not listed for combustion safeguards, the PLC and its associated I/O used to perform safety functions should be certified to IEC 61508 for use in safety applications with a safety integrity level of 3 or greater.

8.4.3 General.
(A) Before the PLC is placed in operation, documentation should be provided that confirms that all related safety devices and safety logic are functional.
(B) All changes to hardware or software should be documented and maintained in a file that is separate from the fluid heater PLC.
(C) System operation should be tested and verified for compliance with the design criteria when the PLC is replaced, repaired, or updated.
(D) The control system should have at least one manual emergency switch that initiates a safety shutdown.

8.4.4 Software.
8.4.4.1
Safety-related software should be logically independent from non-safety-related software.
8.4.4.2
Safety-related software should be password-protected or otherwise locked so that access is limited to the fluid heater manufacturer or the burner management system manufacturer.
8.4.4.3
Software should be documented as follows:
(1) Labeled to identify elements or groups of elements containing safety software
(2) Labeled to describe the function of each element containing safety software

8.4.4.4
A listing of the programs with documentation should be available.

8.5.1 Pre-Ignition Purging.
Prior to each heating system startup, provision should be made for the removal of all flammable vapors and gases that have entered the heating chambers during the shutdown period.

**8.5.1.1 Mechanical Purging.**

When a combustion air blower or exhaust blower is provided, a timed pre-ignition purge should be provided that incorporates all of the following:

1. At least 4 standard cubic feet (scf) of fresh air or inert gas per cubic foot (4 m³/m³) of system volume is introduced during the purging cycle.
2. The system volume includes the combustion chambers and all other passages that handle the recirculation and exhaust of products of combustion to the stack inlet.
3. All passages from the air inlet to the heater to the stack inlet should be purged.
4. To begin the timed pre-ignition purge interval, all of the following conditions are satisfied:
   a. The minimum required pre-ignition purge airflow is proved.
   b. Fluid heaters with total pilot capacity over 400,000 Btu/hr should have at least one safety shutoff valve required by 8.7.2.2 proved closed between all pilot burners and the fuel supply.
   c. Fluid heaters with total capacity over 400,000 Btu/hr should have at least one safety shutoff valve proved closed between all main burners and the fuel supply.
5. The minimum required pre-ignition purge airflow is proved and maintained throughout the timed pre-ignition purge interval.
6. Failure to maintain the minimum required pre-ignition purge airflow stops the pre-ignition purge and resets the purge timer.

**8.5.1.1.1**

Prior to the re-ignition of a burner after a burner shutdown or flame failure, a pre-ignition purge should be accomplished.

**CAUTION:** Repeated ignition attempts can result in a combustible concentration greater than 25 percent of the LFL. Liquid fuels can accumulate, causing additional fire hazards.

**8.5.1.1.2**

Repeating the pre-ignition purge on any fuel-fired system can be omitted where all of the following conditions are satisfied:

1. Each burner and pilot is supervised by a combustion safeguard in accordance with Section 8.9.
2. Each burner system is equipped with safety shutoff valves in accordance with Section 8.7.
3. At least one burner remains operating in the common combustion chamber of the burner to be re-ignited.

**8.5.1.2 Natural Draft Purging.**

When no combustion air blower or exhaust blower is provided, a natural draft purge is permissible provided all of the following conditions are satisfied:

1. Means are provided for proving that inlet air registers and outlet dampers are in the fully open position to admit air.

**8.5.1.2.1**

The purge should be considered complete when all of the following conditions are satisfied:

1. The flammable vapor or gas concentration in the combustion chamber is measured to be 25 percent or less of the LFL of the fuel in air.
2. The inlet air registers and outlet dampers are proved in the fully open position.

**8.5.2 Trial-for-Ignition Period.**

**8.5.2.1**

The trial-for-ignition period of the pilot burner should not exceed 15 seconds.

**8.5.2.2**

The trial-for-ignition period of the main gas burner should not exceed 15 seconds, unless both of the following conditions are satisfied:

1. A written request for an extension of trial for ignition is approved by the authority having jurisdiction.
2. It is determined that 25 percent of the LFL cannot be exceeded in the extended time.

**8.5.2.3**

The trial-for-ignition period of the main liquid fuel burner should not exceed 15 seconds.

**8.5.2.4**

Electrical ignition energy for direct spark ignition systems should be terminated after the main burner trial-for-ignition period.

**8.6 Combustion Air Safety Devices.**

**8.6.1**

Where air from the exhaust or recirculating fans is required for combustion of the fuel, airflow should be proved prior to an ignition attempt.

**8.6.2**

Reduction of airflow to a level below the minimum required level should result in closure of the safety shutoff valves.
8.6.3
Where a combustion air blower is used, the minimum combustion airflow or source pressure needed for burner operation should be proved prior to each attempt at ignition.

8.6.4
Motor starters on equipment required for combustion of the fuel should be interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry.

8.6.5*
Combustion air minimum pressure or flow should be interlocked into combustion safety circuitry.

8.6.6*
Where it is possible for combustion air pressure to exceed the maximum safe operating pressure, a high pressure switch interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry should be used.

8.7  Safety Shutoff Valves (Fuel Gas or Liquid Fuel).

8.7.1  General.

8.7.1.1  Safety shutoff valves are a key safety control to protect against explosions and fires.

8.7.1.2*
Each safety shutoff valve recommended in 8.7.2.1 and 8.7.3.1 should automatically shut off the fuel to the burner system after interruption of the holding medium (such as electric current or fluid pressure) by any one of the interlocking safety devices, combustion safeguards, or operating controls.

8.7.1.3*
Safety shutoff valves should not be used as modulating control valves unless they are designed as both safety shutoff and modulation valves and tested for concurrent use.

8.7.1.4
The use of listed safety shutoff valves designed as both a safety shutoff valve and a modulating valve and tested for concurrent use is permitted.

8.7.1.5
Safety shutoff valves should not be open-close cycled at a rate that exceeds that specified by its manufacturer.

8.7.1.6
Valve components should be of a material selected for compatibility with the fuel handled and for ambient conditions.

8.7.1.7
Safety shutoff valves in systems containing particulate matter or highly corrosive fuel gas should be operated at time intervals in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions in order to maintain the safety shutoff valves in operating condition.

8.7.1.8
Valves should not be subjected to supply pressures in excess of the manufacturer's ratings.

8.7.1.9*
Valves should be selected to withstand the maximum anticipated backpressure of the system.

8.7.1.10*
If the inlet pressure to a fuel pressure regulator exceeds the pressure rating of any downstream component, overpressure protection should be provided.

8.7.1.11
Local visual position indication should be provided at each safety shutoff valve to burners or pilots in excess of 150,000 Btu/hr (44 kW).

(A)
The local visual position indication should directly indicate the physical position, closed and open, of the valve.

(B)
Where lights are used for position indication, the absence of light should not be used to indicate open or closed position.

(C)
Indirect indication of valve position, such as by monitoring operator current voltage or pressure, should not be permitted.

8.7.2*  Fuel Gas Safety Shutoff Valves.

8.7.2.1
Each main and pilot fuel gas burner system should be separately equipped with two safety shutoff valves piped in series.

8.7.2.2*
Where the main or pilot fuel gas burner system capacity exceeds 400,000 Btu/hr (117 kW), at least one of the safety shutoff valves between each burner and the fuel supply should be proved closed and interlocked with the pre-ignition purge interval.

(A)
A proved closed condition should be accomplished by either of the following means:

(1) A proof-of-closure switch incorporated in a listed safety shutoff valve assembly in accordance with the terms of the listing
(2) A valve-proving system
Auxiliary and closed-position indicator switches do not satisfy the proved-closed recommendation of 8.7.2.2(A).

8.7.2.3
Means for testing all fuel gas safety shutoff valves for valve seat leakage should be installed.

8.7.3 Liquid Fuel Safety Shutoff Valves.
8.7.3.1
At least one liquid fuel safety shutoff valve should be provided.
8.7.3.2
Two safety shutoff valves should be used where any one of the following conditions exists:
   (1) The pressure is greater than 125 psi (862 kPa).
   (2) The liquid fuel pump operates without the main liquid fuel burner firing, regardless of the pressure.
   (3) The liquid fuel pump operates during the fuel gas burner operation of combination gas and liquid fuel burners.

8.7.3.3*
Where the burner system capacity exceeds 400,000 Btu/hr (117 kW), at least one of the safety shutoff valves between each burner and the fuel supply should be proved closed and interlocked with the pre-ignition purge interval.

8.8 Fuel Pressure Switches (Gas or Liquid Fuel).
8.8.1
A low fuel pressure switch should be provided and should be interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry.
8.8.2
A high fuel pressure switch should be provided and should meet the following criteria:
   (1) Be interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry
   (2) Be located downstream of the final pressure-reducing regulator

8.8.3
Pressure switch settings should be made in accordance with the operating limits of the burner system.

8.9 Combustion Safeguards (Flame Supervision).
8.9.1
Each burner flame should have a combustion safeguard that has a maximum flame failure response time of 4 seconds or less and that performs a safe-start check.
8.9.2* Flame Supervision.
Each pilot and main burner flame should be equipped with flame supervision in one of the following ways:
   (1) Main and pilot flames supervised with independent flame sensors
   (2) Main and interrupted pilot flames supervised with a single flame sensor
   (3)* Self-piloted burner supervised with a single flame sensor

8.10 Liquid Fuel Atomization (Other than Mechanical Atomization).
8.10.1
The pressure of the atomizing medium should be proved and interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry.
8.10.2
The low pressure switch used to supervise the atomizing medium should be located downstream from all valves and other obstructions that can shut off flow or cause pressure drop of atomization medium.
8.10.2.1
The low pressure switch used to supervise the atomizing medium should be permitted to be located upstream of atomizing media balancing orifices and balancing valves provided balancing devices are equipped with a locking device to prevent an unintentional change in the setting.
8.10.3
Where the atomizing medium requires modulation, an additional low atomizing medium pressure switch, located upstream of the modulating valve, should be provided to meet the recommendations in 8.10.1.

8.11* Liquid Fuel Temperature Limit Devices.
Where equipment is used to regulate liquid fuel temperature, liquid fuel temperature limit devices should be provided and interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry if it is possible for the liquid fuel temperature to rise above or fall below the temperature range required by the burners.

8.12 Multiple Fuel Systems.
8.12.1*
Safety equipment in accordance with the provisions of this recommended practice should be provided for each fuel used.
8.12.2
Where dual-fuel burners, excluding combination burners, are used, positive provision should be made to prevent the simultaneous introduction of both fuels.

8.13 Air–Fuel Gas Mixing Machines.
8.13.1
Safety shutoff valves should be installed in the fuel gas supply connection of any mixing machine.

8.13.2
The safety shutoff valves should be arranged to shut off the fuel gas supply automatically when the mixing machine is not in operation or in the event of an air or fuel gas supply failure.

8.14 Ignition of Main Burners — Fuel Gas or Liquid Fuel.
Where a reduced firing rate is required for ignition of the burner, an interlock should be provided to prove the control valve has moved to the design position prior to each attempt at ignition.

8.15* Stack Excess Temperature Limit Interlock.

8.15.1
A stack excess temperature limit interlock should be provided and interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry.

8.15.2
The stack excess temperature limit interlock should operate before the maximum stack temperature, as specified by the fluid heater manufacturer, is exceeded.

8.15.2.1
Operation of the stack excess temperature limit interlock should cut off the heating system.

8.15.2.2
If the process fluid is combustible, operation of the stack excess temperature limit interlock should also cut off the process fluid supply.

8.15.3
Operation of the stack excess temperature limit interlock should require manual reset before restart of the fluid heater or affected zone.

8.15.4*
The temperature-sensing element of the stack excess temperature limit interlock should be selected for the temperature and atmosphere to which they are exposed.

8.15.5
The temperature-sensing element of the stack excess temperature limit interlock should be located where recommended by the fluid heater manufacturer.

8.15.6
The operating temperature controller and its temperature-sensing element should not be used as the excess temperature limit interlock.

8.16 Fluid Excess Temperature Limit Interlock.

8.16.1
All heaters should have the fluid excess temperature measurements on the heater outlet.

8.16.1.1
The temperature-sensing device should be compatible with the fluid being measured and the expected operating temperature and pressure.

8.16.1.2
Temperature-sensing devices should be located so that they are exposed to the stream and are not in a stagnant location or where they might be insulated by deposits.

8.16.2
The fluid excess temperature set point should be set no higher than the maximum temperature specified by the fluid manufacturer, the heater design, or downstream process limits, whichever is lowest.

8.16.3
The fluid excess temperature limit interlock should be provided and interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry.

8.16.4
Operation of the fluid excess temperature limit interlock should require manual reset before restart of the fluid heater or affected zone.

8.16.5
Open-circuit failure of the temperature-sensing components of the fluid excess temperature limit interlock should cause the same response as does an excess temperature condition.

8.16.6
Fluid excess temperature interlocks should be equipped with temperature indication.

8.16.7
The fluid excess temperature limit interlock should indicate its set point in temperature units that are consistent with the primary temperature-indicating controller.

8.16.8
The temperature-sensing element of the fluid excess temperature limit interlock can be monitored by other instrumentation, provided that the accuracy of the fluid excess temperature limit interlock temperature reading is not diminished.
8.16.9
The operating temperature controller and its temperature-sensing element should not be used as the fluid excess temperature limit interlock.

8.17 Electrical Heating Systems.

8.17.1 Heating Equipment Controls.

8.17.1.1 Electric heating equipment should be equipped with a main disconnect device or with multiple devices to provide backup circuit protection to equipment and to persons servicing the equipment.

8.17.1.2 The disconnecting device(s) recommended by 8.17.1.1 should be capable of interrupting maximum available fault current as well as rated load current.

8.17.1.3 Shutdown of the heating power source should not affect the operation of equipment such as pumps, ventilation or recirculation fans, cooling components, and other auxiliary equipment, unless specifically designed to do so.

8.17.1.4 Resistance heaters larger than 48 amperes should not be required to be subdivided into circuits of 48 amperes or less.

8.17.1.5 The capacity of all electrical devices used to control energy for the heating load should be selected on the basis of continuous duty load ratings where fully equipped for the location and type of service proposed.

8.17.1.6 All controls using thermal protection or trip mechanisms should be located or protected to preclude faulty operation due to ambient temperatures.

8.17.2 Heating Element Excess Temperature Limit Interlock.

8.17.2.1 An excess temperature limit interlock should be provided and interlocked into the heating element circuitry, unless it can be demonstrated that the maximum temperature limit specified by the element manufacturer cannot be exceeded.

8.17.2.2 Operation of the excess limit interlock should shut off the heating system before the heating element’s maximum temperature, as specified by the element manufacturer, is exceeded.

8.17.2.3 Operation of the excess temperature limit interlock should require manual reset before restart of the fluid heater or affected zone.

8.17.2.4 Open-circuit failure of the temperature-sensing components of the excess temperature limit interlock should cause the same response as an excess temperature condition.

8.17.2.5 The temperature-sensing components of the excess temperature limit interlock should be rated for the temperature and environment to which they are exposed.

8.17.2.6 The temperature-sensing element of the heating element excess temperature limit interlock should be located where recommended by the heating element manufacturer.
Chapter 9 Class F Heaters

9.1* General.

9.1.1 Class F heaters should be designed to ensure that the required minimum fluid flow is achieved through all tube passes.

9.1.1.1* When multiple parallel tube passes are used, balanced flow distribution between passes should be ensured, such that each parallel pass maintains the minimum design flow rate, so that maximum fluid film temperatures and maximum allowable material temperatures are not exceeded.

9.1.2 The maximum allowable bulk fluid temperature should be determined based on the maximum allowable fluid film temperature and the maximum allowable material temperature.

9.1.3* The heater manufacturer should determine the minimum flow rate, taking into consideration the maximum allowable bulk and film fluid temperature at the design flow rate and all heat input rates.

9.1.4 Where backflow into the heater presents a hazard, a means to prevent backflow should be provided.

9.1.5 The installation of a pressure relief valve, of appropriate pressure and flow rating, should be installed if the fluid can be trapped in the heated zone.

9.1.5.1 Discharge from relief valves should be handled in accordance with 9.2.2.

9.1.5.2 Vent lines should be sized to handle 150 percent of the maximum anticipated flow.

9.1.6* The fluid system should be designed to maintain at least the minimum required fluid flow, as determined in 9.1.3, through the heater under all operating conditions.

9.1.7 An expansion tank should be provided for all closed-loop liquid circuits.

9.1.8 A hard-wired manual emergency switch at a remote location should be provided to initiate a safety shutdown of the entire fluid heater system.

9.1.9 A means of sampling for fluid contamination or degradation should be provided from the active loop.

9.2 Auxiliary Equipment.

9.2.1 Pumps.

9.2.1.1* Pumps that are specifically designed for fluid heater service should be used.

9.2.1.2* The pumps should be compatible with the fluid used as well as the operating pressures and temperatures.

9.2.1.3 The system should be designed such that there is sufficient net positive suction head available for the pump.

9.2.1.4 Positive displacement pumping systems should incorporate means of pressure relief.

9.2.1.5* If water-cooled pumps are used, a means of verifying cooling water flow should be provided.

9.2.1.6* Cold alignment of air- and water-cooled pumps should be done in accordance with the pump manufacturer’s recommendations prior to the pump being started.

9.2.1.7* Hot alignment of air- and water-cooled pumps should be done within the first 24 hours after operating temperature has been reached.
9.2.1.8
Cold and hot alignment should be performed during commissioning and following pump maintenance.

9.2.1.9*
Means should be provided to protect pumps from debris if required for the safe operation of the fluid heater.

9.2.2* Effluent Handling.
All effluent from all pressure relief devices, vents, and drains should be directed to an approved location.

9.2.2.1 Gaseous Effluent.

9.2.2.1.1
Gaseous effluents that are asphyxiants, toxic, or corrosive are outside the scope of this recommended practice, and other standards should be consulted for appropriate venting.

9.2.2.1.2
Flammable gases and oxidizers should be vented to an approved location to prevent fire or explosion hazards.

9.2.2.1.3
When gaseous effluents are vented, the vent pipe should be located in accordance with the following:

1. Gaseous effluents should not impinge on equipment, support, building, windows, or materials because the gas could ignite and create a fire hazard.
2. Gaseous effluents should not impinge on personnel at work in the area or in the vicinity of the exit of the vent pipe because the gas could ignite and create a fire hazard.
3. Gaseous effluents should not be vented in the vicinity of air intakes, compressor inlets, or other devices that utilize ambient air.

9.2.2.1.4
The vent exit should be designed in accordance with the following:

1. The pipe exit should not be subject to physical damage or foreign matter that could block the exit.
2. The vent pipe should be sized to minimize the pressure drop associated with length, fitting, and elbows at the maximum vent flow rate.
3. The vent piping should not have any shutoff valves in the line.

9.2.2.1.5
If the gas is to be vented inside the building, the following additional guidance is offered:

1. If the gaseous effluents are flammable and lighter than air, the flammable gases should be vented to a location where the gas is diluted below its LFL before coming in contact with sources of ignition.
2. The gaseous effluents should not re-enter the work area without extreme dilution.

9.2.2.2 Liquid Phase Effluent.

9.2.2.2.1 *
Liquid phase effluent should be directed to a containment vessel where the fluid may be reused or discarded.

9.2.2.2.2
The effluent containment vessel should have a vent to atmosphere, with the vent outlet directed at an approved location.

9.2.2.2.2.1
If the containment vessel vent has the potential to vent gaseous effluents, the requirements of 9.2.2.1 should apply.

9.2.2.2.2.2
The vent from the effluent containment vessel should be adequately sized to handle 150 percent of the maximum anticipated flow.

9.2.2.2.3
The effluent containment vessel's inlets should be located to prevent siphoning of the contents back into the system.

9.2.2.2.4
Means for indicating liquid level should be provided on the effluent containment vessel.

9.2.2.2.5 *
The effluent containment vessel should be designed for the intended service.

9.2.3 Valves.

9.2.3.1
Valves should be compatible with the fluid being used and the system operating temperatures and pressures.

9.2.3.2*
Valves should be selected for the intended application.

9.2.4 Expansion Tanks.

9.2.4.1
The expansion tank should be connected to the fluid system piping upstream of the fluid pump.

9.2.4.2*
The expansion tank should be compatible with the fluid being used and the system operating temperatures and pressures.
9.2.4.3*
The expansion tank should be sized to accommodate the fluid expansion in the entire system.

9.2.4.4*
The expansion tank should be equipped with a low-level interlock.

9.2.4.4.1
The low-level switch should be satisfied before the pumps and the heater can be started.

9.2.4.4.2
The low-level switch should be interlocked to shut down the pump and heater if a low level occurs.

9.2.4.4.2.1
In situations where maintaining flow is required to protect the heater due to residual heat, an emergency pump should be used to circulate fluid through an emergency cooling system.

9.2.4.4.3
Indication of low-level interlock activation should be provided.

9.2.4.5
Means of draining the expansion tank to an approved location should be provided.

9.2.4.6
An expansion tank vent or an expansion tank pressure relief device should be provided, and the effluent should be directed to an approved location, in accordance with 9.2.2.

9.2.4.7
Local or remote indication of expansion tank level should be provided.

9.2.4.8*
An expansion tank pressurized with an inert gas should be used if any of the following conditions exist:

(1) The tank is not the highest point in the system.
(2) The tank contents can be at a temperature such that exposure of the fluid to air would cause degradation of the fluid.
(3) The fluid manufacturer recommends use of an inert blanket.
(4) The fluid is operated at or above its atmospheric boiling point.

9.2.4.9*
All expansion tanks that are pressurized over a gauge pressure of 15 psi (100 kPa) should meet the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII Division 1.

9.2.4.10*
If pressurization of the expansion tank is required due to the vapor pressure of the fluid, the expansion tank should have a blanket gas low pressure alarm set at a value above the vapor pressure of the fluid at the operating temperature.

9.2.4.11*
If pressurization of the expansion tank is required due to the net positive suction head (NPSH) of the pump, the expansion tank should have a blanket gas low-pressure alarm set to satisfy the NPSH required by the pump.

9.3 Safety Devices for Class F Heaters.

9.3.1 Low Fluid Flow.

9.3.1.1*
One or more interlocks should be provided to prove minimum fluid flow through the heater at all operating conditions.

9.3.1.2
The minimum flow–proving device should be interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry.

9.3.1.3
The minimum flow–proving device should be interlocked to shut down the heater if a low flow occurs.

9.3.2 Interlocks.
The combustion safety circuitry should incorporate the following interlocks:

(1) High flue gas temperature
(2) High fluid outlet temperature, measured as close as possible to exit of heating chamber
(3) Minimum flow limit
(4) Low expansion tank fluid level
(5) Activation of the heater's fire suppression system, where provided
(6) Activation of an emergency stop
Chapter 10  Class G Heaters

10.1  General.

10.1.1  Class G heaters should be designed to ensure that the required minimum fluid flow is achieved through all tube passes.

10.1.1.1  When multiple parallel tube passes are used, balanced flow distribution between passes should be ensured, such that each parallel pass maintains the minimum design flow rate, so that maximum fluid film temperatures and maximum allowable material temperatures are not exceeded.

10.1.2  The maximum allowable bulk fluid temperature should be determined based on the maximum allowable fluid film temperature and the maximum allowable material temperature.

10.1.3  The heater manufacturer should determine the minimum designed flow rate, taking into consideration the maximum allowable bulk and film fluid temperature at all flow rates and heat input rates.

10.1.4  Means of limiting the firing rate in accordance with the actual flow should be provided so that maximum fluid film temperature and maximum material temperature is not exceeded.

10.1.5  Where backflow into the heater presents a hazard, a means to prevent backflow should be provided.

10.1.6  The installation of a pressure relief valve, of appropriate pressure and flow rating, should be installed if the fluid can be trapped in the heated zone.

10.1.6.1  Discharge from relief valves should be handled in accordance with 10.2.2.

10.1.6.2  Vent lines should be sized to handle 150 percent of the maximum anticipated flow.

10.1.7  The fluid system should be designed to maintain at least the minimum required fluid flow (as determined in 10.1.3) through the heater under all operating conditions.

10.1.8  An expansion tank should be provided for all closed-loop liquid circuits.

10.1.9  A hard-wired manual emergency switch at a remote location should be provided to initiate a safety shutdown of the entire fluid heater system.

10.1.10  A means of sampling for fluid contamination or degradation should be provided from the active loop.

10.2  Auxiliary Equipment.

10.2.1  Pumps.

10.2.1.1  Pumps that are specifically designed for fluid heater service should be used.

10.2.1.2  The pumps should be compatible with the fluid used as well as the operating pressures and temperatures.

10.2.1.3  The system should be designed such that there is sufficient net positive suction head available for the pump.

10.2.1.4  Positive displacement pumping systems should incorporate means of pressure relief.

10.2.1.5  If water-cooled pumps are used, a means of verifying cooling water flow should be provided.

10.2.1.6  Cold alignment of air- and water-cooled pumps should be done in accordance with the pump manufacturer’s recommendations prior to the pump being started.
10.2.1.7*  
Hot alignment of air- and water-cooled pumps should be done within the first 24 hours after operating temperature has been reached.

10.2.1.8  
Cold and hot alignment should be performed during commissioning and following pump maintenance.

10.2.1.9*  
Means should be provided to protect pumps from debris if required for the safe operation of the fluid heater.

10.2.2*  
Effluent Handling.

All effluent from relief valves, vents, and drains should be directed to an approved location.

10.2.2.1  
Gaseous Effluent.

10.2.2.1.1  
Gaseous effluents that are asphyxiants, toxic, or corrosive are outside the scope of this recommended practice, and other standards should be consulted for appropriate venting.

10.2.2.1.2  
Flammable gases and oxidizers should be vented to an approved location to prevent fire or explosion hazards.

10.2.2.1.3  
When gaseous effluents are vented, the vent pipe should be located in accordance with the following:

(1) Gaseous effluents should not impinge on equipment, support, building, windows, or materials because the gas could ignite and create a fire hazard.  
(2) Gaseous effluents should not impinge on personnel at work in the area or in the vicinity of the exit of the vent pipe because the gas could ignite and create a fire hazard.  
(3) Gaseous effluents should not be vented in the vicinity of air intakes, compressor inlets, or other devices that utilize ambient air.

10.2.2.1.4  
The vent exit should be designed in accordance with the following:

(1) The pipe exit should not be subject to physical damage or foreign matter that could block the exit.  
(2) The vent pipe should be sized to minimize the pressure drop associated with length, fitting, and elbows at the maximum vent flow rate.  
(3) The vent piping should not have any shutoff valves in the line.

10.2.2.1.5  
If the gas is to be vented inside the building, the following additional guidance is offered:

(1) If the gaseous effluents are flammable and lighter than air, the flammable gases should be vented to a location where the gas is diluted below its LFL before coming in contact with sources of ignition.  
(2) The gaseous effluents should not re-enter the work area without extreme dilution.

10.2.2.2  
Liquid Phase Effluent.

10.2.2.2.1*  
Liquid phase effluent should be directed to a containment vessel where the fluid can be reused or discarded.

10.2.2.2.2  
The effluent containment vessel should have a vent to atmosphere, with the vent outlet directed at an approved location.

10.2.2.2.1  
If the containment vessel vent has the potential to vent gaseous effluents, the requirements of 10.2.2.1 should apply.

10.2.2.2.2  
The vent from the effluent containment vessel should be adequately sized to handle 150 percent of the maximum anticipated flow.

10.2.2.3  
The effluent containment vessels inlets should be located to prevent siphoning of the contents back into the system.

10.2.2.4  
Means for indicating liquid level should be provided on the effluent containment vessel.

10.2.2.5*  
The effluent containment vessel should be designed for the intended service.

10.2.3  
Valves.

10.2.3.1  
Valves should be compatible with the fluid being used and the system operating temperatures and pressures.

10.2.3.2*  
Valves should be selected for the intended application.

10.2.4  
Expansion Tanks.

10.2.4.1  
The expansion tank should be connected to the fluid system piping upstream of the fluid pump.
10.2.4.2*  
The expansion tank should be compatible with the fluid being used and the system operating temperatures and pressures.

10.2.4.3*  
The expansion tank should be sized to accommodate the fluid expansion in the entire system.

10.2.4.4*  
The expansion tank should be equipped with a low-level interlock.

10.2.4.4.1  
The low-level interlock should be satisfied before the pumps and the heater can be started.

10.2.4.4.2  
The low-level interlock should shut down the pump and heater if a low level occurs.

10.2.4.4.2.1  
In situations where maintaining flow is required to protect the heater due to residual heat, an emergency pump should be used to circulate fluid through an emergency cooling system.

10.2.4.4.3  
Indication of low-level interlock activation should be provided.

10.2.4.5  
Means of draining the expansion tank to an approved location should be provided.

10.2.4.6  
An expansion tank vent or an expansion tank pressure relief device should be provided and the effluent should be directed to an approved location, in accordance with 10.2.2.

10.2.4.7  
Local or remote indication of expansion tank level should be provided.

10.2.4.8*  
An expansion tank pressurized with an inert gas should be used if any of the following conditions exist:

(1) The tank is not the highest point in the system.
(2) The tank contents can be at a temperature such that exposure of the fluid to air would cause degradation of the fluid.
(3) The fluid manufacturer requires use of an inert blanket.
(4) The fluid is operated at or above its atmospheric boiling point.

10.2.4.9*  
All expansion tanks that are pressurized over a gauge pressure of 15 psi (100 kPa) should meet the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII Division 1.

10.2.4.10*  
If pressurization of the expansion tank is required due to the vapor pressure of the fluid, the expansion tank should have a blanket gas low-pressure alarm set at a value above the vapor pressure of the fluid at the operating temperature.

10.2.4.11*  
If pressurization of the expansion tank is required due to the net positive suction head (NPSH) of the pump, the expansion tank should have a blanket gas low-pressure alarm set to satisfy the NPSH required by the pump.

10.3  Safety Devices for Class G Heaters.

10.3.1  Low Fluid Flow.

10.3.1.1*  
One or more interlocks should be provided to prove minimum fluid flow through the heater at all operating conditions.

10.3.1.2  
The minimum flow–proving device should be interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry.

10.3.1.3  
The minimum flow–proving device should be interlocked to shut down the heater if a low flow occurs.

10.3.2  Interlocks.

The combustion safety circuitry should incorporate the following interlocks:

(1) High flue gas temperature
(2) High fluid outlet temperature, measured as close as possible to exit of heating chamber
(3) Minimum flow limit
(4) Low expansion tank fluid level
(5) Activation of the heater’s fire suppression system, where provided
(6) Activation of an emergency stop
Chapter 11 Class H Heaters

11.1* General.
11.1.1 Class H heaters should be designed to ensure that the required minimum fluid flow is achieved through all flow paths.

11.1.1.1* When multiple parallel flow paths are used, balanced flow distribution between flow paths should be ensured, such that each parallel path maintains the minimum design flow rate, so that maximum fluid film temperatures and maximum allowable material temperatures are not exceeded.

11.1.2 The maximum allowable bulk fluid temperature should be determined based on the maximum allowable fluid film temperature and the maximum allowable material temperature.

11.1.3* The heater manufacturer should determine the minimum designed flow rate, taking into consideration the maximum allowable bulk and film fluid temperature at the design flow rate and all heat input rates.

11.1.4 The temperature of all heat transfer surfaces in contact with the fluid should be below the temperature at which fluid degradation can occur under all operating conditions.

11.1.5 Where backflow into the heater presents a hazard, a means to prevent backflow should be provided.

11.1.6 The installation of a pressure relief valve, of appropriate pressure and flow rating, should be installed if the fluid can be trapped in the heated zone.

11.1.6.1 Discharge from relief valves should be handled in accordance with 11.2.2.

11.1.6.2 Vent lines should be sized to handle 150 percent of the maximum anticipated flow.

11.1.7* The fluid system should be designed to maintain at least the minimum required fluid flow (as determined in 11.1.3) through the heater under all operating conditions.

11.1.8 An expansion tank should be provided for all closed-loop liquid circuits.

11.1.9 A hard-wired manual emergency switch at a remote location should be provided to initiate a safety shutdown of the entire fluid heater system.

11.1.10 A means of sampling for fluid contamination or degradation should be provided from the active loop.

11.2 Auxiliary Equipment.

11.2.1 Pumps.

11.2.1.1* Pumps that are specifically designed for fluid heater service should be used.

11.2.1.2* The pumps should be compatible with the fluid used as well as the operating pressures and temperatures.

11.2.1.3 The system should be designed such that there is sufficient net positive suction head available for the pump.

11.2.1.4 Positive displacement pumping systems should incorporate means of pressure relief.

11.2.1.5* If water-cooled pumps are used, a means of verifying cooling water flow should be provided.

11.2.1.6* Cold alignment of air- and water-cooled pumps should be done in accordance with the pump manufacturer’s recommendations prior to the pump being started.
11.2.1.7
Hot alignment of air- and water-cooled pumps should be done within the first 24 hours after operating temperature has been reached.

11.2.1.8
Cold and hot alignment should be performed during commissioning and following pump maintenance.

11.2.1.9*
Means should be provided to protect pumps from debris if required for the safe operation of the fluid heater.

11.2.2* Effluent Handling.
All effluent from relief valves, vents, and drains should be directed to an approved location.

11.2.2.1 Gaseous Effluent.

11.2.2.1.1 Gaseous effluents that are asphyxiants, toxic, or corrosive are outside the scope of this recommended practice, and other standards should be consulted for appropriate venting.

11.2.2.1.2 Flammable gases and oxidizers should be vented to an approved location to prevent fire or explosion hazards.

11.2.2.1.3 When gaseous effluents are vented, the vent pipe should be located in accordance with the following:

(1) Gaseous effluents should not impinge on equipment, support, building, windows, or materials because the gas could ignite and create a fire hazard.

(2) Gaseous effluents should not impinge on personnel at work in the area or in the vicinity of the exit of the vent pipe because the gas could ignite and create a fire hazard.

(3) Gaseous effluents should not be vented in the vicinity of air intakes, compressor inlets, or other devices that utilize ambient air.

11.2.2.1.4 The vent exit should be designed in accordance with the following:

(1) The pipe exit should not be subject to physical damage or foreign matter that could block the exit.

(2) The vent pipe should be sized to minimize the pressure drop associated with length, fitting, and elbows at the maximum vent flow rate.

(3) The vent piping should not have any shutoff valves in the line.

11.2.2.1.5 If the gas is to be vented inside the building, the following additional guidance is offered:

(1) If the gaseous effluents are flammable and lighter than air, the flammable gases should be vented to a location where the gas is diluted below its LFL before coming in contact with sources of ignition.

(2) The gaseous effluents should not re-enter the work area without extreme dilution.

11.2.2.2 Liquid Phase Effluent.

11.2.2.2.1* Liquid phase effluent should be directed to a containment vessel where the fluid can be reused or discarded.

11.2.2.2.2 The effluent containment vessel should have a vent to atmosphere, with the vent outlet directed at an approved location.

11.2.2.2.2.1 If the containment vessel vent has the potential to vent gaseous effluents, the requirements of 11.2.2.1 should apply.

11.2.2.2.2.2 The vent from the effluent containment vessel should be adequately sized to handle 150 percent of the maximum anticipated flow.

11.2.2.3 The effluent containment vessel's inlets should be located to prevent siphoning of the contents back into the system.

11.2.2.4 Means for indicating liquid level should be provided on the effluent containment vessel.

11.2.2.5* The effluent containment vessel should be designed for the intended service.

11.2.3 Valves.

11.2.3.1 Valves should be compatible with the fluid being used and the system operating temperatures and pressures.

11.2.3.2* Valves should be selected for the intended application.

11.2.4 Expansion Tanks.

11.2.4.1 The expansion tank should be connected to the fluid system piping upstream of the fluid pump.
11.2.4.2*
The expansion tank should be compatible with the fluid being used and the system operating temperatures and pressures.

11.2.4.3*
The expansion tank should be sized to accommodate the fluid expansion in the entire system.

11.2.4.4*
The expansion tank should be equipped with a low-level interlock.

11.2.4.4.1
The low-level interlock should be satisfied before the pumps and the heater can be started.

11.2.4.4.2
The low-level interlock should shut down the pump and heater if a low level occurs.

11.2.4.4.2.1
In situations where maintaining flow is required to protect the heater due to residual heat, an emergency pump should be used to circulate fluid through an emergency cooling system.

11.2.4.4.3
Indication of low-level interlock activation should be provided.

11.2.4.5
Means of draining the expansion tank to an approved location should be provided.

11.2.4.6
An expansion tank vent or an expansion tank pressure relief device should be provided and the effluent should be directed to an approved location, in accordance with 11.2.2.

11.2.4.7
Local or remote indication of expansion tank level should be provided.

11.2.4.8*
An expansion tank pressurized with an inert gas should be used if any of the following conditions exist:

(1) The tank is not the highest point in the system.
(2) The tank contents can be at a temperature such that exposure of the fluid to air would cause degradation of the fluid.
(3) The fluid manufacturer requires use of an inert blanket.
(4) The fluid is operated at or above its atmospheric boiling point.

11.2.4.9*
All expansion tanks that are pressurized over a gauge pressure of 15 psi (100 kPa) should meet the requirements of ASME *Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code*, Section VIII Division 1.

11.2.4.10*
If pressurization of the expansion tank is required due to the vapor pressure of the fluid, the expansion tank should have a blanket gas low-pressure alarm set at a value above the vapor pressure of the fluid at the operating temperature.

11.2.4.11*
If pressurization of the expansion tank is required due to the net positive suction head (NPSH) of the pump, the expansion tank should have a blanket gas low-pressure alarm set to satisfy the NPSH required by the pump.

11.3 Safety Devices for Class H Heaters.

11.3.1 Low Fluid Flow.

11.3.1.1*
One or more interlocks should be provided to prove minimum fluid flow through the heater at all operating conditions.

11.3.1.2
The minimum flow-proving device should be interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry.

11.3.1.3
The minimum flow-proving device should be interlocked to shut down the heater if a low flow occurs.

11.3.2 Interlocks.
The combustion safety circuitry should incorporate the following interlocks:

(1) High flue gas temperature
(2) High fluid outlet temperature, measured as close as possible to exit of heating chamber
(3) Minimum flow limit
(4) Low expansion tank fluid level
(5) Activation of the heater’s fire suppression system, where provided
(6) Activation of an emergency stop
Chapter 12 Fire Protection

12.1* General.
The user should determine the need for fire protection systems for fluid heaters or related equipment based on the hazards associated with the equipment.

12.1.1* Where determined to be necessary, portable, manual fixed, or automatic fixed fire protection systems should be provided.

12.1.2 The fire protection system should be provided with a remotely located manual actuator.

12.1.3 The fire protection system design should be submitted for approval to the authority having jurisdiction.

12.1.4* Where a sustained fluid fire is possible, fireproofing of exposed heater-supporting members is recommended.

12.1.5 If a fluid fire occurs in the combustion chamber of a heater, it is recommended that the following actions be taken:

1. Shut off the heating system fuel supply.
2. Stop combustion air fans.
3. Shut combustion air inlet dampers.
4. Open outlet dampers to prevent overpressure of the firebox. Implement fail-safe damper position.
5. Activate the discharge of extinguishing agent or use portable extinguishers at openings to the fire box.
6. Depressurize the fluid system to reduce the flow of fluid into the firebox.
7. To extinguish the fluid-fed fire, drain the fluid to a location where it will not create a hazard.
8. Isolate or repair the fluid leak before restarting the heating system.

CAUTION: Where a pressurized fluid is at a temperature above its atmospheric boiling point, rapid draining can lead to flashing of the fluid and the generation of combustible vapors. An emergency cooler can be provided to cool the fluid to below its atmospheric boiling point.

12.1.6 The emergency response team (ERT) and the fire service should be aware of the fluid identity and associated hazards, the location of the fluid and the fuel piping and shutoff valves, and proper fire-fighting methods.

12.2 Types of Fire Protection Systems.

12.2.1* Where automatic sprinklers are provided, they should be installed in accordance with NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, unless otherwise permitted by 12.2.2.

CAUTION: The introduction of water into a hot chamber can create a steam explosion hazard.

12.2.2 Where sprinklers that protect only fluid heaters are installed and connection to a reliable fire protection water supply is not feasible, a domestic water supply connection can be permitted to supply the sprinklers, subject to the approval of the authority having jurisdiction.

12.2.3 Where water spray systems are provided, they should be installed in accordance with NFPA 15, Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection.

12.2.4 Where carbon dioxide protection systems are provided, they should be installed in accordance with NFPA 12, Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems.

12.2.5 Where foam extinguishing systems are provided, they should be installed in accordance with NFPA 11, Standard for Low-, Medium-, and High-Expansion Foam.

12.2.6 Where chemical protection systems are provided, they should be installed in accordance with NFPA 17, Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems or NFPA 17A, Standard for Wet Chemical Extinguishing Systems.

12.2.7 Where water mist systems are provided, they should be installed in accordance with NFPA 750, Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems.
12.2.8
Where steam extinguishing systems are provided, they should be installed in accordance with accepted industry practice. (See Annex C.)

12.2.9
Where portable fire-extinguishing systems are provided, they should be used in accordance with NFPA 10, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers

12.2.9.1
When portable fire protection is relied upon for extinguishing internal fluid-fed fires, an effective means of access for the extinguishing agent should be provided.

12.3 Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Fire Protection Equipment.
All fire protection equipment should be inspected, tested, and maintained as specified in the following standards:

(1) NFPA 10, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers
(2) NFPA 11, Standard for Low-, Medium-, and High-Expansion Foam
(3) NFPA 12, Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems
(4) NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems
(6) NFPA 17, Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems
(7) NFPA 17A, Standard for Wet Chemical Extinguishing Systems
(8) NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems
(9) NFPA 750, Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems
Annex A Explanatory Material

Annex A is not a part of the recommendations of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. This annex contains explanatory material, numbered to correspond with the applicable text paragraphs.

A.1.1

Explosions and fires in fuel-fired and electric fluid heaters constitute a loss potential in life, property, and production. This recommended practice is a compilation of guidelines, rules, and methods applicable to the safe operation of this type of equipment.

Conditions and regulations that are not covered in this standard — such as toxic vapors, hazardous materials, noise levels, heat stress, and local, state, and federal regulations (EPA and OSHA) — should be considered in the design and operation of fluid heaters.

Most causes of failures can be traced to human error. The most significant failures include inadequate training of operators, lack of proper maintenance, and improper application of equipment. Users and designers must utilize engineering skill to bring together that proper combination of controls and training necessary for the safe operation of equipment. This recommended practice classifies fluid heaters as Class F fluid heaters.

Class F fluid heaters operate at approximately atmospheric pressure and present a potential explosion or fire hazard that could be occasioned by the overheating and/or release of flammable or combustible fluids from the tubing that carries them through the heating chamber. Class F fluid heaters operate with a relatively constant flow of fluid through the tubes, and the flowing fluid is intended to remove sufficient heat to maintain tubing walls cool enough to avoid irreversible damage that could lead to rupture. Safeguards that reduce the risk of fire or explosion associated with the use of fuel gases or fuel oils are also a major consideration for the design and operation of Class F fluid heaters.

A.1.1.3(7)

For guidance on solid fuel systems, see NFPA 85, Boiler and Combustion Systems Hazards Code

A.1.3.1

Because this recommended practice is based on the current state of the art, application to existing installations is not recommended. Nevertheless, users are encouraged to adopt those features that are considered applicable and reasonable for existing installations.

A.1.5

No recommended practice can guarantee the elimination of fires and explosions in fluid heaters. Technology in this area is under constant development, which is reflected in fuels, fluids, geometries, and materials. Therefore, the designer is cautioned that this recommended practice is not a design handbook and thus does not eliminate the need for an engineer or competent engineering judgment. It is the intention of this recommended practice that a designer capable of applying more complete and rigorous analysis to special or unusual problems have latitude in the development of fluid heater designs. In such cases, the designer should be responsible for demonstrating and documenting the safety and validity of the design.

A.3.2.1 Approved.

The National Fire Protection Association does not approve, inspect, or certify any installations, procedures, equipment, or materials; nor does it approve or evaluate testing laboratories. In determining the acceptability of installations, procedures, equipment, or materials, the authority having jurisdiction may base acceptance on compliance with NFPA or other appropriate standards. In the absence of such standards, said authority may require evidence of proper installation, procedure, or use. The authority having jurisdiction may also refer to the listings or labeling practices of an organization that is concerned with product evaluations and is thus in a position to determine compliance with appropriate standards for the current production of listed items.
A.3.2.2 Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ).

The phrase “authority having jurisdiction,” or its acronym AHJ, is used in NFPA documents in a broad manner, since jurisdictions and approval agencies vary, as do their responsibilities. Where public safety is primary, the authority having jurisdiction may be a federal, state, local, or other regional department or individual such as a fire chief; fire marshal; chief of a fire prevention bureau, labor department, or health department; building official; electrical inspector; or others having statutory authority. For insurance purposes, an insurance inspection department, rating bureau, or other insurance company representative may be the authority having jurisdiction. In many circumstances, the property owner or his or her designated agent assumes the role of the authority having jurisdiction; at government installations, the commanding officer or departmental official may be the authority having jurisdiction.

A.3.2.4 Listed.

The means for identifying listed equipment may vary for each organization concerned with product evaluation; some organizations do not recognize equipment as listed unless it is also labeled. The authority having jurisdiction should utilize the system employed by the listing organization to identify a listed product.

A.3.3.4 Burner Management System.

The burner management system includes the combustion safety circuitry, safety interlocks, combustion safeguards, and safety devices.

A.3.3.17 Hardwired.

When the term hardwired is applied to the logic system itself, it refers to the method of using individual devices and interconnecting wiring to program and perform the logic functions without the use of software-based logic solvers.

A.3.3.34.5 Proof-of-Closure Switch.

A common method of effecting proof of closure is by valve seal over-travel. [86, 2011]

A.3.3.37 Valve Proving System.

EN 1643, Valve Proving Systems for Automatic Shut-Off Valves for Gas Burners and Gas Appliances, requires leakage to be less than 1.76 ft³/hr (50 L/hr). The definition of proof of closure in ANSI Z21.21/CSA 6.5, Automatic Valves for Gas Appliances, and FM 7400, Approval Standard for Liquid and Gas Safety Shutoff Valves, requires leakage less than 1 ft³/hr (28.32 L/hr). [86, 2011]

A.4.1.1.2 Ladder-type schematic diagrams are recommended.

A.4.1.3.1 The proximity of electrical equipment and flammable gas or liquid in an electrical enclosure or panel is a known risk and would be considered a classified area. Article 500 of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, should be consulted.

If the device fails, conduit-connecting devices handling flammable material might carry this material to an electrical enclosure, creating a classified area in that enclosure. Sealing of such conduits should be considered.

A.4.1.3.4 Unless otherwise required by the local environment, fluid heaters and the surrounding area are not classified as a hazardous (classified) location. The primary source of ignition associated with a fluid heater installation is the heating system or the materials heated. The presence of these ignition sources precludes the need for imposing requirements for wiring methods appropriate for a hazardous (classified) location. Refer to Section 3.3 of NFPA 497, Recommended Practice for the Classification of Flammable Liquids, Gases, or Vapors and of Hazardous (Classified) Locations for Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Areas, regarding equipment with open flames or other ignition sources. In addition, fluid heaters are considered unclassified internally, since proved ventilation is provided to ensure safety.

A.4.3.2 The following items are examples of compatibility issues to be studied: system materials, flow rates, temperatures, pressures, venting, inerting, and fire protection.

A.5.1.1.1 Hazards to be considered include spillage of molten metal, salt, or other molten material, hydraulic oil ignition, overheating and/or release of material being heated in the fluid heater, and escape of fuel or flue gases.
A.5.1.1.4
For additional information, refer to NFPA 31, Standard for the Installation of Oil-Burning Equipment; NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; and NFPA 91, Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, and Noncombustible Particulate Solids.

A.5.1.1.6
Solidification of the fluid in the fluid heater and associated piping should be avoided. Consider providing insulation and heat tracing on piping and equipment where it is impractical to reliably guarantee that temperatures will not go below the minimum pumpable viscosity for an extended period of time.

A.5.1.3.5
The hazard is particularly severe where vapors from nearby processes could flow by means of gravity to ignition sources at or near floor level. See NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code; NFPA 33, Standard for Spray Application Using Flammable or Combustible Materials; and NFPA 34, Standard for Dipping, Coating, and Printing Processes Using Flammable or Combustible Liquids.

A.5.1.4.3
If the fluid heater is located in contact with a wood floor or other combustible floor and the operating temperature is above 160°F (71°C), one or both of the following steps should be adequate to prevent surface temperatures of combustible floor members from exceeding 160°F (71°C):

1. Combustible floor members should be removed and replaced with a monolithic concrete slab that extends a minimum of 3 ft (1 m) beyond the outer extremities of the fluid heater.
2. Air channels, either naturally or mechanically ventilated, should be provided between the floor and the equipment (perpendicular to the axis of the equipment), or noncombustible insulation should be provided.

A.5.2
Steam or hot water boilers should not be converted to fluid heating operation except under the guidance of the equipment manufacturer.

A.5.2.3
Fluid heater design should include factors of safety so as to avoid failures when the heater is operating at maximum design loading.

A.5.2.4
For fluid heaters that utilize induced draft fans, the design should account for operation at subambient pressure and should be designed to prevent implosion.

A.5.2.6.1
Ladders, walkways, and access facilities, where provided, should be designed in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.24 through 29 CFR 1910.29 and with ANSI A14.3, Safety Requirements for Fixed Ladders.

A.5.2.10
Adequate coolant flow is vital to the safe operation of fluid heaters. Where flow switches are provided to verify flow, they should be tested regularly. Other means, such as flow indicators, should also be considered for supplementing the function of flow switches (see A.5.2.10).

A.5.3
For additional information regarding explosion protection of equipment and buildings, see NFPA 68, Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting; and NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems.

Where explosion relief is provided, its location is a critical concern and should be close to the ignition source. Personnel considerations and proximity to other obstructions can affect the location selected for these vents. The intent of providing explosion relief in furnaces is to limit damage to the furnace and to reduce the risk of personnel injury due to explosions. To achieve those goals, relief panels and doors should be sized so that their inertia does not preclude their ability to relieve internal explosion pressures.

Damage-limiting construction could include exterior panels that are designed to become detached under the influence of internal pressure from a deflagration. In such cases, tethering the panels is vitally important to ensure dislodged panels don’t cause injury or damage. NFPA 68 provides guidance for tethering doors and walls that can become dislodged in a deflagration event.

A.5.4
For additional information, refer to NFPA 31, Standard for the Installation of Oil-Burning Equipment; NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; and NFPA 91, Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, and Noncombustible Particulate Solids.
A.5.4.1
Some fluid heaters rely on the air in a building or room for safety ventilation and combustion. If the fluid heater fans must compete with other building fans (such as building exhausts), safety and performance of the fluid heater could be compromised.

When the air requirements of a building or room are being determined or reviewed for safety ventilation and combustion, provisions should be made for air being removed from the room for other purposes, such as for removal of heat, flue products, emergency generators, and other combustion equipment. Safety ventilation and combustion air must be in excess of air that is to be removed from the room for other purposes. Seasonal factors could also be relevant in cold climates, where building openings are closed during cold weather.

In the case of fluid heaters, especially those using natural draft, combustion air consistent with the requirements identified in Section 8.3 of NFPA 54, *National Fuel Gas Code*, should be provided.

A.5.4.3.3
Ducts that pass through fire walls should be avoided.

A.5.4.3.5
High temperature or corrosive gases conveyed in the duct could compromise structural members if contact occurs.

A.5.4.3.6
All interior laps in the duct joints should be made in the direction of the flow.

A.5.5.1.3
Flanged and threaded connections are not recommended for flammable or combustible liquids due to possible leakage. Additional guidance can be found in ASME B31.3, *Process Piping*.

A.5.5.1.7
Care should be taken that none of the fluid heater system components is overpressurized. Hydrostatically testing with water can contaminate the system due to residual water in the system.
A.6.2.1

The term ignition temperature means the lowest temperature at which a gas–air mixture will ignite and continue to burn. This condition is also referred to as the autoignition temperature. Where burners supplied with a gas–air mixture in the flammable range are heated above the autoignition temperature, flashbacks could occur. In general, such temperatures range from 870°F to 1300°F (465°C to 704°C). A much higher temperature is needed to ignite gas dependably. The temperature necessary is slightly higher for natural gas than for manufactured gases, but for safety with manufactured gases, a temperature of about 1200°F (649°C) is needed, and for natural gas, a temperature of about 1400°F (760°C) is needed. Additional safety considerations should be given to dirt-laden gases, sulfur-laden gases, high-hydrogen gases, and low-Btu waste gases.

The term rate of flame propagation means the speed at which a flame progresses through a combustible gas–air mixture under the pressure, temperature, and mixture conditions existing in the combustion space, burner, or piping under consideration. (See Table A.6.2.1 and Figure A.6.2.1.)

Table A.6.2.1 Properties of Typical Flammable Gases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flammable Gas</th>
<th>Molecular Weight</th>
<th>Heating Value (Btu/ft³)</th>
<th>Auto-Ignition (°F)</th>
<th>LFL (% by volume)</th>
<th>UFL (% by volume)</th>
<th>Vapor Density (Air = 1)</th>
<th>Air Required to Burn 1 ft³ of Gas (ft³)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Butane</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>1128</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrogen</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas (high-Btu type)</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>1115</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas (high-methane type)</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas (high-inert type)</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propane</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For SI units, 1 Btu = 1.055 kJ, 1 ft³ = 0.028 m³, °C = 5/9 (°F – 32).

Figure A.6.2.1 Ignition Velocity Curves for Typical Flammable Gases.

A.6.2.3

For additional information, refer to NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code.

A.6.2.3.4

See A.5.4.1 for information on combustion air supply considerations.

A.6.2.4.1

The valve used for remote shutoff service should be identified. If the main incoming service valve is used for this purpose, it must be understood that the valve might be owned by the local utility, which could affect access to and service of the valve. Remotely located valves used for shutting down fuel distribution systems that serve a number of users or pieces of equipment should be regularly exercised (by opening and closing several times) to verify their ability to operate when needed. Lubricated plug valves should be maintained annually, including the installation of sealant and leak testing.
A.6.2.5.2

A.6.2.6.3
When the fuel train is opened for service, the risk of dirt entry exists. It is not required that existing piping be opened for the sole purpose of the addition of a filter or strainer. It is good practice to have the sediment trap located upstream of the filter. The intent of the sediment trap is to remove larger particulates, while the intent of the filter is to remove smaller particulates. The reverse arrangement will result in additional maintenance and might result in removal of the filter element from service.

A.6.2.7.3
Paragraph 6.2.7.3 covers venting of flammable and oxidizing gases only. Gases that are asphyxiants, toxic, or corrosive are outside the scope of this recommended practice, and other standards should be consulted for appropriate venting. Flammable gases and oxidizers should be vented to an approved location to prevent fire or explosion hazards. When gases are vented, the vent pipe should be located in accordance with the following:

1. Gas should not impinge on equipment, support, building, windows, or materials because the gas could ignite and create a fire hazard.
2. Gas should not impinge on personnel at work in the area or in the vicinity of the exit of the vent pipe because the gas could ignite and create a fire hazard.
3. Gas should not be vented in the vicinity of air in takes, compressor inlets, or other devices that utilize ambient air.

The vent exit should be designed in accordance with the following:

1. The pipe exit should not be subject to physical damage or foreign matter that could block the exit.
2. The vent pipe should be sized to minimize the pressure drop associated with length, fitting, and elbows at the maximum vent flow rate.
3. The vent piping should not have any shutoff valves in the line.

If the gas is to be vented inside the building, the following additional guidance is offered:

1. If the gas is flammable and lighter than air, the flammable gases should be vented to a location where the gas is diluted below its LFL before coming in contact with sources of ignition.
2. The gas should not re-enter the work area without extreme dilution.

A.6.2.7.4

Vent limiters are used to limit the escape of gas into the ambient atmosphere if a vented device (e.g., regulator, zero governor, pressure switch) requiring access to the atmosphere for operation has an internal component failure. Where a vent limiter is used, there might not be a need to vent the device to an approved location. Following are some general guidelines and principles on the use of vented devices incorporating vent limiters:

1. The listing requirements for vent limiters are covered in ANSI Z21.18/CSA 6.3, *Standard for Gas Appliance Pressure Regulators*, for regulators and in UL 353, *Standard for Limit Controls*, for pressure switches and limit controls. ANSI Z21.18/CSA 6.3 requires a maximum allowable leakage rate of 2.5 ft³/hr (0.071 m³/hr) for natural gas and 1.0 ft³/hr (0.028 m³/hr) for LP-Gas at the device's maximum rated pressure. UL 353 allows 1.0 ft³/hr (0.028 m³/hr) for natural gas and 1.53 ft³/hr (0.043 m³/hr) for LP-Gas at the device's maximum rated pressure. Since a vent limiter can be rated less than the device itself and can be a field-installable device, a combination listed device and vent limiter should be used.
2. Where a vent limiter is used, there should be adequate airflow through the room or enclosure in which the equipment is installed. In reality, conditions can be less ideal, and care should be exercised for the following reasons:
   a. The relative density of the gas influences its ability to disperse in air. The higher the relative density, the more difficult it is for the gas to disperse (e.g., propane will disperse more slowly than natural gas).
   b. Airflow patterns through a room or enclosure, especially in the vicinity of the gas leak, affect the ability of the air to dilute that gas. The greater the local air movement, the greater the ease with which the gas is able to disperse.
   c. The vent limiter might not prevent the formation of a localized flammable air–gas concentration for the preceding reasons.
A.6.2.7.5
See A.6.2.7.4.

A.6.2.7.9
NFPA 87 does not address vents between safety shutoff valves, but they are sometimes installed.

A.6.2.8.3
Token relief valves only provide minimum pressure relief in cases where ambient temperatures increase the pressure inside the gas piping, which can occur during shutdown periods, or relieves a small increase of pressure due to high lockup pressures that occur during a shutdown.

A.6.2.10
In the design, fabrication, and utilization of mixture piping, it should be recognized that the air–fuel gas mixture might be in the flammable range.

A.6.2.10.2(A)
Two basic methods generally are used. One method uses a separate fire check at each burner, the other a fire check at each group of burners. The second method generally is more practical if a system consists of many closely spaced burners.

A.6.2.10.2(E)
Acceptable safety blowouts are available from some manufacturers of air–fuel mixing machines. They incorporate the following components and design features:

(1) Flame arrester
(2) Blowout disk
(3) Provision for automatically shutting off the supply of air–gas mixture to the burners in the event of a flashback passing through an automatic fire check

A.6.2.12.1
A burner is suitably ignited when combustion of the air–fuel mixture is established and stable at the discharge port(s) of the nozzle(s) or in the contiguous combustion tunnel.

A.6.3.1
In the design and use of oil-fired units, the following should be considered:

(1) Unlike fuel gases, data on many important physical and chemical characteristics are not available for fuel oil, which, being a complex mixture of hydrocarbons, is relatively unpredictable.

(2) Fuel oil has to be vaporized prior to combustion. Heat generated by the combustion commonly is utilized for this purpose, and oil remains in the vapor phase as long as sufficient temperature is present. Under these conditions, oil vapor can be treated as fuel gas.

(3) Unlike fuel gas, oil vapor condenses into liquid when the temperature falls too low and revaporizes whenever the temperature rises to an indeterminate point. Therefore, oil in a cold furnace can lead to a hazardous condition, because, unlike fuel gas, it cannot be purged. Oil can vaporize (to become a gas) when, or because, the furnace-operating temperature is reached.

(4) Unlike water, for example, there is no known established relationship between temperature and vapor pressure for fuel oil. For purposes of comparison, a gallon of fuel oil is equivalent to 140 ft³ (4.0 m³) of natural gas; therefore, 1 oz (0.03 kg) equals approximately 1 ft³ (0.03 m³).

Additional considerations that are beyond the scope of this recommended practice should be given to other combustible liquids not specified in 6.3.1.

A.6.3.3
For additional information, refer to NFPA 31, Standard for the Installation of Oil-Burning Equipment.

A.6.3.4.4
A long circulating loop, consisting of a supply leg, a back-pressure regulating valve, and a return line back to the storage tank, is a means of reducing air entrainment. Manual vent valves might be needed to bleed air from the high points of the oil supply piping.
A.6.3.4.6
The weight of fuel oil is always a consideration in vertical runs. When fuel oil is going up, pressure is lost. A
gauge pressure of 100 psi (689 kPa) with a 100 ft (30.5 m) lift nets only a gauge pressure of 63 psi (434
kPa). When fuel oil is going down, pressure increases. A gauge pressure of 100 psi (689 kPa) with a 100 ft
(30.5 m) drop nets a gauge pressure of 137 psi (945 kPa). This also occurs with fuel gas, but it usually is of
no importance. However, it should never be overlooked with oils.

A.6.3.5.1(6)
Lubricated plug valves require lubrication with the proper lubricant to shut off tightly. The application and type
of gas used can require frequent lubrication to maintain the ability of the valve to shut off tightly when
needed.

A.6.3.5.4
Customarily, a filter or strainer is installed in the supply piping to protect the pump. However, this filter or
strainer mesh usually is not sufficiently fine for burner and valve protection.

A.6.3.5.6
Under some conditions, pressure sensing on fuel oil lines downstream from feed pumps can lead to gauge
failure when rapid pulsation exists. A failure of the gauge can result in fuel oil leakage. The gauge should be
removed from service after initial burner start-up or after periodic burner checks. An alternative approach
would be to protect the gauge during service with a pressure snubber.

A.6.3.7.1
The atomizing medium might be steam, compressed air, low pressure air, air–gas mixture, fuel gas, or other
gases. Atomization also might be mechanical (mechanical atomizing tip or rotary cup).

A.6.3.9.1
A burner is suitably ignited when combustion of the air–fuel mixture is established and stable at the
discharge port(s) of the nozzle(s) or in the contiguous combustion tunnel.

A.7.2.1
Commissioning could be required again following modification, reactivation, or relocation of the furnace.

A.7.2.5
It is recommended that all system settings and parameters be documented for future maintenance and
operational needs.

A.7.2.6
A test involving discharge of an extinguishing agent in a sufficient amount to verify that the system is properly
installed and functional is recommended. The discharge test can be simulated by an appropriate means. The
discharge test can be omitted if damage to the equipment or surroundings would result.

A.7.2.8
Using inert gas that is heated can help vaporize water trapped within the system.

A.7.2.9
Addition of fluid should be at a low point of the piping. A small positive displacement pump is typically used to
fill the fluid heater system.

A.7.2.10
Raising the temperature slowly helps prevent spalling during refractory dryout and curing, minimizes thermal
stresses on the equipment, and prevents rapid vaporization of residual water in the piping.

A.7.2.12
The evacuation/purging, charging, and confirmation of the fuel or combustible gas supply in the piping
upstream of the equipment isolation valve is governed by other codes, standards, and recommended
practices. Examples are NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code, which requires charging to be stopped upon
detection of combustible gas at the point of discharge, and NFPA 56PS, Standard for Fire and Explosion
Prevention During Cleaning and Purging of Flammable Gas Piping Systems. Careful consideration should be
given to the potential hazards that can be created in the surrounding area for any fuel or combustible gas
discharge.

In NFPA 54, the term appliance shutoff valve is analogous to the term equipment isolation valve in NFPA 86
and 87.
A.7.3.1
The training program can include one or more of the following components:

1. Review of operating and maintenance information
2. Periodic formal instruction
3. Use of simulators
4. Field training
5. Other procedures
6. Comprehension testing

The following training topics should be considered for inclusion in the training program:

1. Process and equipment inspection testing
2. Combustion of fuel-air mixtures
3. Explosion hazards, including improper purge timing and purge flow, and safety ventilation
4. Sources of ignition, including autoignition (e.g., by incandescent surfaces)
5. Functions of controls, safety devices, and maintenance of proper set points
6. Handling and processing of hazardous materials
7. Management of process fluid level, flow, and temperature
8. Confined space entry procedures
9. Operating instructions (see 7.4.2)
10. Lockout/tagout procedures
11. Hazardous conditions resulting from interaction with surrounding processes
12. Fire protection systems
13. Molten material

A.7.3.4
Training should include recognition of upset conditions that could lead to dangerous conditions. Operator training should cover the relationships between firing rate, fluid flow rate, and fluid temperature increase, so that if a high fluid temperature is detected, the cause can be determined quickly.

A.7.4.3
See Annex B.

A.7.4.7
If a new operating envelope is desired, the equipment manufacturer and the fluid supplier should be contacted to establish new operating limits.

A.7.5.3
The fluid manufacturer should be consulted for help in determining where in the system to take samples. The samples should be sent to the supplier. Facilities with laboratories might be able to perform independent tests, provided a baseline sample is available for comparison purposes.

A.7.5.5
Tests involving the discharge of the extinguishing agent should be performed at a frequency recommended by the fire protection system manufacturer.

A.7.5.8
See, for example, the NBBPVI National Board Inspection Code.

A.7.5.11
In cases where minimal operating states (e.g., minimum fluid flow) must be established to prevent a hazardous condition, it is recommended that the precision of the set point be confirmed. Where precision is inadequate, the component should be either recalibrated or replaced. Frequency of this testing and calibration should be established based on the component's mean time between failure (MTBF) data and the component manufacturer's recommendations.
A.7.5.15
An example of a leak test procedure for safety shutoff valves on direct gas-fired ovens with a self-piloted burner and intermittent pilot follows.

**Leak Test Procedure.** With the oven burner(s) shut off, the main shutoff valve open, and the manual shutoff valve closed, proceed as follows:

1. Place the tube in test connection 1 and immerse it just below the surface of a container of water.
2. Open the test connection valve. If bubbles appear, the valve is leaking; reference the manufacturer’s instructions for corrective action. The auxiliary power supply to safety shutoff valve No. 1 should be energized, and the valve should be opened.
3. Place the tube in test connection 2 and immerse it just below the surface of a container of water.
4. Open the test connection valve. If bubbles appear, the valve is leaking. Reference the manufacturer’s instructions for corrective action.

The preceding procedure is predicated on the piping diagram shown in Figure A.7.5.15(a) and the wiring diagram shown in Figure A.7.5.15(b).

It is recognized that safety shutoff valves are not entirely leakfree. Valve seats can deteriorate over time and require periodic leak testing. Many variables are associated with the valve seat leak testing process, including gas piping and valve size, gas pressure and specific gravity, size of the burner chamber, length of downtime, and the many leakage rates published by recognized laboratories and other organizations.

Leakage rates are published for new valves and vary by manufacturer and the individual listings to which the manufacturer subscribes. It is not expected that valves in service can be held to published leakage rates, but rather that the leakage rates are comparable over a series of tests over time. Any significant deviation from the comparable leakage rates over time will indicate to the user that successive leakage tests can indicate unsafe conditions. These conditions should then be addressed by the user in a timely manner.

The location of the manual shutoff valve downstream of the safety shutoff valve affects the volume downstream of the safety shutoff valve and is an important factor in determining when to start counting bubbles during a safety shutoff valve seat leakage test. The greater the volume downstream of the safety shutoff valve, the longer it will take to fully charge the trapped volume in the pipe between the safety shutoff valve and the manual shutoff valve. This trapped volume needs to be fully charged before starting the leak test.

Care should be exercised during the safety shutoff valve seat leakage test, because flammable gases will be released into the local environment at some indeterminate pressure. Particular attention should be paid to lubricated plug valves if used as manual shutoff valves, in order to ensure that they have been properly serviced prior to the valve seat leakage test.

Examples, although not all-inclusive, of acceptable leakage rate methodologies that the user can employ can be found in the publications in Annex D.

Figure A.7.5.15(a) through Figure A.7.5.15(c) show examples of gas piping and wiring diagrams for leak testing.

The following example also is predicated on the piping diagram shown in Figure A.7.5.15(a) and the wiring diagram shown in Figure A.7.5.15(b).

With the burner(s) shut off, the equipment isolation valve open, and the manual shutoff valve located downstream of the second safety shutoff valve closed, proceed as follows:

1. Connect the tube to leak test valve No. 1.
2. Bleed trapped gas by opening leak test valve No. 1.
3. Immerse the tube in water as shown in Figure A.7.5.15(c). If bubbles appear, the valve is leaking — reference the manufacturer’s instructions for corrective action. Examples of acceptable leakage rates are given in Table A.7.5.15.
4. Apply auxiliary power to safety shutoff valve No. 1. Close leak test valve No. 1. Connect the tube to leak test valve No. 2 and immerse it in water as shown in Figure A.7.5.15(c).
5. Open leak test valve No. 2. If bubbles appear, the valve is leaking — reference the manufacturer’s instructions for corrective action. Examples of acceptable leakage rates are given in Table A.7.5.15.

**Figure A.7.5.15(a) Example of a Gas Piping Diagram for Leak Test.**
Figure A.7.5.15(b) Example of a Wiring Diagram for Leak Test. [86:Figure A.7.4.9(b)]

Figure A.7.5.15(c) Leak Test for a Safety Shutoff Valve. [86:Figure A.7.4.9(c)]

Table A.7.5.15 Acceptable Leakage Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NPT Nominal Size (in.)</th>
<th>DN Nominal Size (mm)</th>
<th>UL 429, ANSI Z21.21/CSA 6.5</th>
<th>FM 7400</th>
<th>EN 161</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ft³/hr</td>
<td>mL/hr</td>
<td>cc/hr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.0083</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>3.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.0083</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>3.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75</td>
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<td>8.00</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0.0664</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>31.33</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

[86: Table A.7.4.9]

A.7.5.17

Lubricated plug valves require lubrication with the proper lubricant in order to shut off tightly. The application and type of gas used can require frequent lubrication to maintain the ability of the valve to shut off tightly when needed.

A.7.5.22

See A.6.2.7.3.

A.7.7

Examples of worker safety procedures and regulations can be found in ANSI Z117.1, Safety Requirements for Confined Spaces; NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards; 29 CFR, Chapter XVII: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor; Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations; and other references.
A.8.1.3
For the protection of personnel and property, consideration should also be given to the supervision and monitoring of conditions in systems other than the heating system that could cause or that could lead to a potential hazard on any installation.

A.8.2.9
For some applications, additional manual action might be required to bring the process to a safe condition. The actions resulting from a manual emergency switch action take into account the individual system design and the hazards (e.g., mechanical, combustion system, process fluid, thermal fluid, etc.) associated with changing the existing state to another state and initiates actions to cause the system to revert to a safe condition.

A.8.3
Fluid heater controls that meet the performance-based requirements of ANSI/ISA 84.00.01, Application of Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industries, or IEC 61511, Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector, can be considered equivalent. The determination of equivalency involves complete conformance to the safety life cycle, including risk analysis, safety integrity level selection, and safety integrity level verification, which should be submitted to the authority having jurisdiction.

A.8.3.1.4
This control circuit and its non-furnace-mounted or furnace-mounted control and safety components should be housed in a dusttight panel or cabinet, protected by partitions or secondary barriers, or separated by sufficient spacing from electrical controls employed in the higher voltage furnace power system. Related instruments might or might not be installed in the same control cabinet. The door providing access to this control enclosure might include means for mechanical interlock with the main disconnect device required in the furnace power supply circuit.

Temperatures within this control enclosure should be limited to 125°F (52°C) for suitable operation of plastic components, thermal elements, fuses, and various mechanisms that are employed in the control circuit.

A.8.4
One PLC approach to combustion interlocks on multiburner heating systems is as follows:

(1) Interlocks relating to purge are done via the PLC.
(2) Purge timer is implemented in the PLC.
(3) Interlocks relating to combustion air and gas pressure are done via the PLC.
(4) Gas valves for pilot and burner directly connected to combustion safeguard should conform to the recommendations of 8.7.2.
(5) Operation of pilot and burner gas valves should be confirmed by the PLC.
(6) A PLC can be set up as intermittent, interrupted, or constant pilot operation. With appropriate flame safeguard, it would be possible to provide an interrupted pilot with one flame sensor and one flame safeguard.

This recommended practice suggests that the signal from the safety device be directly transmitted to the safety PLC input. Once the safety PLC processes the signal, the resulting data can be used for any purpose.

A.8.4.4.1
This recommended practice suggests that the signal from the safety device be directly transmitted to the safety PLC input. Once the safety PLC processes the signal, the resulting data can be used for any purpose.

A.8.5.1.2(1)
Sampling in more than one location could be necessary to adequately confirm the absence of combustible vapors or gas in the heating chambers and all the passages that contain the products of combustion.

A.8.5.1.2.1(2)
Consideration should be given to the proximity of operating burners when the common combustion chamber exception to repeating purges is utilized. Accumulation of localized vapors or atmospheres is possible even with an operating burner in a chamber, depending on the size of the chamber, the number of burners, and the proximity of operating burners to the accumulation. In addition to proximity, burner design and exposure of the flame can also impact the ability of the operating burner to mitigate vapor or gaseous accumulations.
A.8.5.2

When the purge is complete, there should be a limit to the time between the completed purge and the trial for ignition. Delay can result in the need for a repurge.

A.8.6.5

Interlocks for combustion air minimum pressure or flow can be provided by any of the following methods:

1. A low-pressure switch that senses and monitors the combustion air source pressure. In industrial combustion applications with modulating flow control valves downstream of the combustion air blower, it is most common to interlock the constant combustion air source pressure on single-burner and multiburner systems to meet the recommendations of 8.6.3 and 8.6.5. Because the combustion airflow is proved during each purge cycle along with the combustion air source pressure, the most common convention is to prove the combustion air source pressure during burner operation following purge. In a multiburner system, the proof of combustion airflow during purge proves that any manual valves in the combustion air system are in an adequately open position. These manual air valves are provided for maintenance and combustion airflow balancing among burners in a temperature control zone. In combustion air supply systems that use either an inlet damper or a speed control, the combustion air pressure can fall below reliably repeatable levels with listed pressure switch interlocks at low fire. For these systems, the proof of minimum airflow can be a more reliable interlock.

2. A differential pressure switch that senses the differential pressure across a fixed orifice in the combustion air system. In combustion air supply systems that use either an inlet damper or a speed control, the combustion air pressure can fall below reliably repeatable levels with listed pressure switch interlocks at low fire. For these systems, the proof of minimum airflow by use of a differential pressure switch across an orifice can be a more reliable interlock.

3. An airflow switch. In combustion air supply systems that use either an inlet damper or a speed control, the combustion air pressure can fall below reliably repeatable levels with listed pressure switch interlocks at low fire. For these systems, the proof of minimum airflow by use of an airflow switch can be a more reliable interlock.

4. A pressure switch on the inlet (suction) side of an induced draft (I.D.) fan. For heaters where airflow is induced by an I.D. fan, a pressure switch on the inlet of the I.D. fan can be used to prove that the minimum required suction pressure is available, which along with proof that air and stack dampers are not closed can be used as a minimum air flow interlock.

5. For combustion systems that use high pressure gas/air to induce (inspirate) air locally at each burner or that use natural draft to induce air into the burners or combustion champer, proof that air and stack dampers are not closed/open to at least a minimum position can be used to satisfy the intent of a low air flow interlock. It is not possible to monitor and prove the availability of combustion air for fluid heaters that use natural draft or air inspiriting burners.

A.8.6.6

Where compressed air is utilized, the maximum safe operating pressure can be exceeded.

A.8.7.1.2

See Figure A.8.7.1.2.

Figure A.8.7.1.2 Multiple Burner System Using Proof-of-Closure Switches.
Paragraph 8.7.1.3 addresses conditions under which only one safety shutoff valve is too close to isolate a burner from its fuel gas supply. Figure A.8.7.1.3 provides a summary of 8.7.1.3 in the form of a decision tree. See 8.5.1.1.2 for guidance regarding conditions that are needed to allow that burner to be placed back in service. The requirements of 8.5.1.1.2 might not allow a burner shut off by closing a single safety shutoff valve to be placed back in service without repeating a pre-ignition purge.

The requirements of 8.7.1.3 do not preclude opening of the safety shutoff valve located upstream of the individual burners using single safety shutoff valves during the trial for ignition for the first burner being lighted.

Figure A.8.7.1.3 Safety Shutoff Decision Tree

A.8.7.1.9

Backpressure can lift a valve from its seat, permitting combustion gases to enter the fuel system. Examples of situations that create backpressure conditions are leak testing, combustion chamber back pressure, and combustion air pressure during prepurge.

A.8.7.1.10

See A.6.2.7.3.
A.8.7.2
See Figure A.8.7.2.

Figure A.8.7.2 Typical Piping Arrangement Showing Fuel Gas Safety Shutoff Valves.

A.8.7.2.2
An additional safety shutoff valve located to be common to the heating system and that is proved closed and interlocked with the pre-ignition purge circuit can be used to meet the recommendations of 8.7.2.2.

A.8.7.3.3
An additional safety shutoff valve that is located so as to be common to the heating system and that is proved closed and interlocked with the pre-ignition purge circuit can be used to meet the recommendations of 8.7.3.2.

A.8.9.2
Ultraviolet detectors can fail in such a manner that the loss of flame is not detected. When these detectors are placed in continuous service, failures can be detected by use of a self-checking ultraviolet detector or by periodic testing of the detector for proper operation.

Flame detectors (scanners) with combustion safeguards that continuously operate beyond the maximum interval recommended by the combustion safeguard and flame detector manufacturer's instructions would not be compliant.

A.8.9.2(3)
The term *self-piloted burner* is defined in NFPA 86, *Standard for Ovens and Furnaces*, 3.3.5.14.

A.8.11
Some liquid fuel can become too viscous for proper atomization at low temperatures. Some liquid fuels can congeal if their temperature falls below their pour point. Some liquid fuels can vaporize at higher temperatures and negatively affect burner stability.

A.8.12.1
The fact that oil or gas is considered a standby fuel should not reduce the safety requirements for that fuel.

A.8.15
The fluid should be protected with an additional temperature limit interlock to prevent excess fluid temperatures.

A.8.15.4
Temperature-sensing components, such as thermocouple and extension wires, that are not rated for the environment are at greater risk of short-circuiting.

A.8.17.1.1
Abnormal conditions that could occur and require automatic or manual de-energization of affected circuits are as follows:

1. A system fault (short circuit) not cleared by normally provided branch-circuit protection (*see NFPA 70, National Electrical Code*)
2. The occurrence of excess temperature in a portion of the furnace that has not been abated by normal temperature-controlling devices
3. A failure of any normal operating controls where such failure can contribute to unsafe conditions
4. A loss of electric power that can contribute to unsafe conditions
A.8.17.1.5

The permitted use in 8.17.1.5 could necessitate the derating of some components listed by manufacturers for other types of industrial service and motor control and as shown in Table A.8.17.1.5.

Table A.8.17.1.5 Heater Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Device</th>
<th>Resistance-Type Heating Devices</th>
<th>Infrared Lamp and Quartz Tube Heaters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rating (% actual load)</td>
<td>Permissible Current (% rating)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fusible safety switch (% rating of fuse employed)</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individually enclosed circuit breaker</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circuit breakers in enclosed panelboards</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnetic contactors</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–30 amperes</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–100 amperes</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150–600 amperes</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table applies to maximum load or open ratings for safety switches, circuit breakers, and industrial controls approved under current National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) standards.

A.8.17.2

The excess temperature set point should be set no higher than the maximum element temperature specified by the element manufacturer. The fluid should be protected with an additional temperature limit controller to prevent excess fluid temperatures.

A.8.17.2.5

Temperature-sensing components, such as thermocouple and extension wires, that are not rated for the environment are at greater risk of short-circuiting.

A.8.17.2.6

The sensing element should be positioned where the difference between the temperature control sensor and the excess temperature limit sensor is minimized. The temperature-sensing element of the excess temperature limit interlock should be located where it will sense the excess temperature condition that will cause the first damage to the heating element.

A.9.1

Class F heaters have fluid inside the tubes with essentially constant fluid flow rate and where the outlet temperature of the fluid is controlled by modulation of the heat input rate to the outside of the tubes. A fluid bypass loop should be considered to achieve variable flow to the user.

Class F fluid heaters present the following two major hazards:

1. Uncontrolled release of the fluid, which can be caused by tube cracking or rupture, or pump seal failure, which can result in fire or explosion
2. Release and accumulation of combustible fuel gas or liquid, followed by ignition and explosion

A.9.1.1.1

Balanced flow is typically achieved by the piping geometry or fixed flow restrictions. If fluid flow rates fall below the designed minimum flow rate, fluid overheating and subsequent degradation can occur. Some heater designs have one flow rate for tubes in the radiant section and another flow rate for tubes in the convective section.

If balancing trim valves are used, the flow through each pass should be monitored and interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry. Manual balancing trim valves should also have provisions to lock the valve to prevent inadvertent adjustment of the valve.

A.9.1.3

The maximum bulk fluid temperature is typically measured at the outlet of the heater.
A.9.1.6

Three-way valves or an automatic process equipment bypass can be used to maintain the minimum flow through the heater.

A.9.2.1.1

Air-cooled or water-cooled pumps with mechanical seals, canned motor pumps, seal-less pumps, and pumps that are magnetically coupled are examples of pumps that are used. If magnetically coupled pumps are used, over-temperature protection of the pump coupling location should be provided. Packing-based seals are prone to leakage and are not recommended. The pump material selection should take into account the possible thermal shock experienced under fire suppression scenarios.

A.9.2.1.2

The fluid manufacturer and the heater manufacturer or person or company responsible for the design or supply of the fluid heater should be consulted to provide recommendations on the appropriate pump for the application.

A.9.2.1.5

Loss of cooling can cause seal failure and a subsequent fire hazard.

A.9.2.1.6

Misalignment can cause seal failure and a subsequent fire hazard.

A.9.2.1.7

The alignment of the pump can change during the transition from cold to operating temperatures.

A.9.2.1.9

Examples of devices to protect pumps can be drip legs, strainers, filters, and screens.

A.9.2.2

If the fluid being relieved is combustible, measures should be taken to prevent ignition of the vapors or aerosols from the vent. Additional guidance can be found in NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.

A.9.2.2.2.1

Containment vessels for liquids include drain tanks, fill tanks, supplemental storage tanks, and catch tanks.

A.9.2.2.5

Secondary containment of effluent containment vessel should be considered if the fluid is flammable or hazardous.

A.9.2.3.2

Gate and ball valves can be used for isolation purposes, and globe or wafer-style butterfly valves can be used for throttling purposes.

A.9.2.4.2

Expansion tanks are typically fabricated from carbon and stainless steel.

A.9.2.4.3

The operating temperature, the expansion coefficient of the fluid, and the system volume are used to calculate the volume of the expansion tank. Some vapor space should remain in the tank when the system is at operating temperature. If the tank operates at atmospheric pressure and is located outdoors, an inert gas blanket should be considered to minimize moisture ingress into the system. For very large systems, where expansion tanks are elevated and working volume exceeds 1000 gallons (3785 L), a secondary, ground-level catch/storage tank and refill pumps can be used to take up excess expansion volume.

A.9.2.4.4

In addition to the low-level interlock, on large volume systems, it is good practice to use dynamic leak detection (rate of change monitoring) on expansion tanks. Dynamic leak detection is encouraged because it will detect abnormal fluid loss over time whereas a low-level switch is a single set point and often located just above tank empty. In some situations, expansion tanks can be several thousand gallons in capacity. Therefore, if only low-level monitoring is provided, several thousand gallons could escape the system before the alarm is sounded. With dynamic leak detection, alarm notification of the falling oil level will be made much sooner.
A.9.2.4.8
Nitrogen is typically used as the inert blanket. Other gases, such as carbon dioxide, can be used. In the oil and gas industry, it is common to use flammable gases. If using flammable gases are used, other precautions should be considered, such as area classification and explosion-proof electrical devices can be required.

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A.9.2.4.9
Consideration should be given to pressure surges that can occur during process upsets that can expose the expansion tank to pressures greater than 15 psi (100 kPa). An example of a common process upset is the rapid pressure rise due to water flashing to steam. For this reason, many users specify expansion tanks to meet the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII Division 1.

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A.9.2.4.10
A blanket gas low-pressure interlock should be considered where low blanket gas pressure could create a fluid heater system hazard.

A.9.2.4.11
See A.9.2.4.10.

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A.9.3.1.1
The required minimum fluid flow rate is based on design requirements. Detecting only flow/no flow conditions is not adequate. A pressure switch at the pump discharge and a pump rotation switch, are examples of proving devices that are not recommended to prove minimum flow as because unexpected blockages in the heater tubes will not be detected by these devices.

Orifice plate(s) located at the outlet of a fluid heater and used with differential pressure interlock(s) are a reliable way of proving the minimum flow. If pressure drop across the heater is used, additional interlocks and precautions should be considered.

A.10.1
Class G heaters have fluid inside the tubes with modulated fluid flow rate (e.g., by process demand) and where the outlet temperature of the fluid is controlled by modulation of the heat input rate to the outside of the tubes.

Class G fluid heaters present the following two major hazards:

1. Uncontrolled release of the fluid, which can cause tube cracking or rupture, pump seal failure, which can result in fire or explosion
2. Release and accumulation of combustible fuel gas or liquid, followed by ignition and explosion

A.10.1.1.1
Balanced flow is typically achieved by the piping geometry or fixed flow restrictions. If fluid flow rates fall below the designed minimum flow rate, fluid overheating and subsequent degradation can occur. Some heater designs have one flow rate for tubes in the radiant section and another flow rate for tubes in the convective section.

If balancing trim valves are used, the flow through each pass should be monitored and interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry. Manual balancing trim valves should also have provisions to lock the valve to prevent inadvertent adjustment of the valve.

A.10.1.3
The maximum bulk fluid temperature is typically measured at the outlet of the heater.

A.10.1.7
The fluid flow control device should have mechanical stops or equivalent provisions to prevent the flow from dropping below the minimum design flow. Variable speed pumping systems should provide a minimum motor speed limit to prevent flow less than the minimum required level in both automatic and manual operation.

A.10.2.1.1
Air-cooled or water-cooled pumps with mechanical seals, canned motor pumps, seal-less pumps, and pumps that are magnetically coupled are examples of pumps that are used. If magnetically coupled pumps are used, over-temperature protection of the pump coupling location should be provided. Packing-based seals are prone to leakage and are not recommended. The pump material selection should take into account the possible thermal shock experienced under fire suppression scenarios.
A.10.2.1.2
The fluid manufacturer and the heater manufacturer should be consulted to provide recommendations on the appropriate pump for the application.

A.10.2.1.5
Loss of cooling can cause seal failure and a subsequent fire hazard.

A.10.2.1.6
Misalignment can cause seal failure and a subsequent fire hazard.

A.10.2.1.7
The alignment of the pump can change during the transition from cold to operating temperatures.

A.10.2.1.9
Examples of devices to protect pumps can be drip legs, strainers, filters, and screens.

A.10.2.2
If the fluid being relieved is combustible, measures should be taken to prevent ignition of the vapors or aerosols from the vent. Additional guidance can be found in NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.

A.10.2.2.2.1
Containment vessels for liquids include drain tanks, fill tanks, supplemental storage tanks, and catch tanks.

A.10.2.2.2.5
Secondary containment of effluent containment vessel should be considered if the fluid is flammable or hazardous.

A.10.2.3.2
Gate and ball valves can be used for isolation purposes, and globe or wafer-style butterfly valves can be used for throttling purposes.

A.10.2.4.2
Expansion tanks are typically fabricated from carbon and stainless steel.

A.10.2.4.3
The operating temperature, the expansion coefficient of the fluid, and the system volume are used to calculate the volume of the expansion tank. Some vapor space should remain in the tank when the system is at operating temperature. If the tank operates at atmospheric pressure and is located outdoors, an inert gas blanket should be considered to minimize moisture ingress into the system. For very large systems, where expansion tanks are elevated and working volume exceeds 1000 gallons, a secondary, ground-level catch/storage tank and refill pumps can be used to take up excess expansion volume.

A.10.2.4.4
In addition to the low-level interlock, on large-volume systems, it is good practice to use dynamic leak detection (rate of change monitoring) on expansion tanks. Dynamic leak detection is encouraged because it will detect abnormal fluid loss over time whereas a low-level switch is a single set point and often located just above tank empty. In some situations, expansion tanks can be several thousand gallons in capacity. Therefore, if only low-level monitoring is provided, several thousand gallons could escape the system before the alarm is sounded. With dynamic leak detection, alarm notification of the falling oil level will be made much sooner.

A.10.2.4.8
Nitrogen is typically used as the inert blanket. Other gases, such as carbon dioxide, can be used. In the oil and gas industry, it is common to use flammable gases. If flammable gases are used, other precautions can be required, such as area classification and explosion-proof electrical devices.

A.10.2.4.9
Consideration should be given to pressure surges that can occur during process upsets that can expose the expansion tank to pressures greater than 15 psi. An example of a common process upset is the rapid pressure rise due to water flashing to steam. For this reason, many users specify expansion tanks that meet the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII Division 1.

A.10.2.4.10
A blanket gas low-pressure interlock should be considered where low blanket gas pressure can create a fluid heater system hazard.
A.10.2.4.11
See A.10.2.4.10.

A.10.3.1.1
Detecting only flow/no flow conditions is not adequate. A pressure switch at the pump discharge and a pump rotation switch are examples of proving devices that are not recommended to prove minimum flow as unexpected blockages in the heater tubes will not be detected by these devices.

Orifice plate(s) located at the outlet of a fluid heater and used with differential pressure interlock(s) are a reliable way of proving the minimum flow. If pressure drop across the heater is used, additional interlocks and precautions should be considered.

A.11.1
Class H heaters have heat source (combustion or electricity) inside the tube(s) with fluid surrounding the tube.

Class H fluid heaters present the following two major hazards:

1. Uncontrolled release of the fluid, which can cause tube cracking or rupture, or pump seal failure, which can result in fire or explosion
2. Release and accumulation of combustible fuel gas or liquid, followed by ignition and explosion

A.11.1.1.1
Balanced flow is typically achieved by the piping geometry or fixed flow restrictions. If fluid flow rates fall below the designed minimum flow rate, fluid overheating and subsequent degradation can occur.

If balancing trim valves are used, the flow through each pass should be monitored and interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry. Manual balancing trim valves should also have provisions to lock the valve to prevent inadvertent adjustment of the valve.

A.11.1.3
The maximum bulk fluid temperature is typically measured at the outlet of the heater.

A.11.1.7
Three-way valves or an automatic process equipment bypass can be used to maintain the minimum flow through the heater.

A.11.2.1.1
Air-cooled or water-cooled pumps with mechanical seals, canned motor pumps, seal-less pumps, and pumps that are magnetically coupled are examples of pumps that are used. If magnetically coupled pumps are used, over-temperature protection of the pump coupling location should be provided. Packing-based seals are prone to leakage and are not recommended. The pump material selection should take into account the possible thermal shock experienced under fire suppression scenarios.

A.11.2.1.2
The fluid manufacturer and the heater manufacturer should be consulted to provide recommendations on the appropriate pump for the application.

A.11.2.1.5
Loss of cooling can cause seal failure and a subsequent fire hazard.

A.11.2.1.6
Misalignment can cause seal failure and a subsequent fire hazard.

A.11.2.1.7
The alignment of the pump can change during the transition from cold to operating temperatures.

A.11.2.1.9
Examples of devices to protect pumps can be drip legs, strainers, filters, and screens.

A.11.2.2
If the fluid being relieved is combustible, measures should be taken to prevent ignition of the vapors or aerosols from the vent. Additional guidance can be found in NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.

A.11.2.2.2.1
Containment vessels for liquids include drain tanks, fill tanks, supplemental storage tanks, and catch tanks.
A.11.2.2.5
Secondary containment of effluent containment vessel should be considered if the fluid is flammable or hazardous.

A.11.2.3.2
Gate and ball valves can be used for isolation purposes, and globe or wafer-style butterfly valves can be used for throttling purposes.

A.11.2.4.2
Expansion tanks are typically fabricated from carbon and stainless steel.

A.11.2.4.3
The operating temperature, the expansion coefficient of the fluid, and the system volume are used to calculate the volume of the expansion tank. Some vapor space should remain in the tank when the system is at operating temperature. If the tank operates at atmospheric pressure and is located outdoors, an inert gas blanket should be considered to minimize moisture ingress into the system. For very large systems, where expansion tanks are elevated and working volume exceeds 1000 gallons, a secondary, ground-level catch/storage tank and refill pumps can be used to take up excess expansion volume.

A.11.2.4.4
In addition to the low-level interlock, on large-volume systems, it is good practice to use dynamic leak detection (rate of change monitoring) on expansion tanks. Dynamic leak detection is encouraged because it will detect abnormal fluid loss over time whereas a low-level switch is a single set point and often located just above tank empty. In some situations, expansion tanks can be several thousand gallons in capacity. Therefore, if only low-level monitoring is provided, several thousand gallons could escape the system before the alarm is sounded. With dynamic leak detection, alarm notification of the falling oil level will be made much sooner.

A.11.2.4.8
Nitrogen is typically used as the inert blanket. Other gases, such as carbon dioxide, may can be used. In the oil and gas industry, it is common to use flammable gases. If using flammable gases are used, other precautions can be required, such as area classification and explosion-proof electrical devices.

A.11.2.4.9
Consideration should be given to pressure surges that can occur during process upsets that can expose the expansion tank to pressures greater than 15 psi. An example of a common process upset is the rapid pressure rise due to water flashing to steam. For this reason, many users specify expansion tanks that meet the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII Division 1.

A.11.2.4.10
A blanket gas low-pressure interlock should be considered where low blanket gas pressure can create a fluid heater system hazard.

A.11.2.4.11
See A.11.2.4.10.

A.11.3.1.1
Detecting only flow/no flow conditions is not adequate. A pressure switch at the pump discharge and a pump rotation switch are examples of proving devices that are not recommended to prove minimum flow as unexpected blockages in the heater tubes will not be detected by these devices.

Orifice plate(s) located at the outlet of a fluid heater and used with differential pressure interlock(s) are a reliable way of proving the minimum flow. If pressure drop across the heater is used, additional interlocks and precautions should be considered.
A.12.1

This recommended practice addresses the fire protection needs of fluid heaters and related equipment. Fire protection needs external to this equipment are beyond the scope of this recommended practice.

Fire extinguishing systems and methods should be designed in accordance with fire protection engineering principles and applicable standards.

Hazards associated with combustible or high temperature fluid migration to other areas through open or incompletely sealed floors should be considered.

Fixed fire protection for the equipment can consist of sprinklers, water spray, carbon dioxide, foam, dry chemical, water mist, or steam extinguishing systems. The extent of the protection depends on the construction, arrangement, and location of the fluid heater or related equipment as well as the materials being processed.

Hydrogen and other flammable gas fires normally are not extinguished until the supply of gas has been shut off because of the danger of re-ignition or explosion. Re-ignition can occur if a hot surface adjacent to the flame is not cooled with water or by other means. Personnel should be cautioned that hydrogen flames are invisible and do not radiate heat.

A.12.1.1

Where automatic fire protection systems are installed, alarming and actuation can be based on one or more of the following criteria:

1. High values from differential flow detectors comparing fluid flowing into and out of the heater
2. Low fluid level in the expansion tank (Note: This function can be used only if the expansion tank level is not automatically corrected with a pumped resupply of fluid from the storage tank.)
3. High values from flue gas combustibles analyzer
4. Increase in opacity of smoke exiting the heater
5. High flue gas temperature
6. Increase in carbon monoxide in flue gas
7. Decrease in oxygen in flue gas

A.12.1.4

Fire resistance duration, corrosion resistance, and weathering resistance should be considered when fireproofing is applied to heater structural members.

A.12.2.1

Sprinkler protection alone cannot ensure that a fire involving a fluid release will not cause catastrophic heater or building damage.
Annex B Example Maintenance Checklist

This annex is not a part of the recommendations of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only.

B.1 General.

The recommendations in this annex are for the maintenance of equipment. Different types of equipment need special attention. A preventive maintenance program, including adherence to the manufacturer’s recommendations, should be established and followed. The program should establish a minimum maintenance schedule that includes inspection and action on the recommendations provided in this annex. An adequate supply of spare parts should be maintained, and inoperable equipment should be cleaned, repaired, or replaced, as required.

B.2 Visual Operational Checklist.

The following operational checks should be performed:

1. Check burners for ignition and combustion characteristics. Verify flame shape and confirm that flames are not impinging on heat transfer surfaces.
2. Check pilots or igniters, or both, for main burner ignition.
3. Check air-to-fuel ratios.
4. Check operating temperature.
5. Check sight drains and gauges for cooling waterflow and water temperature.
6. Check that burners and pilots have adequate combustion air.
7. Check the operation of ventilating equipment.
8. Inspect heater interior for signs of fluid leaks or tube overheating (e.g., ballooning or discoloration). Consider using infrared scanner to observe furnace interior and identify hot spots or other abnormalities.
9. After each fuel shutoff, check the heater interior for glowing tubes (which could indicate fouling or plugging), flames due to combustible fluid leaks, or flames from burners due to fuel leaking past safety shutoff valves.

B.3 Regular Shift Checklist.

The following operational checks should be performed at the start of every shift:

1. Check the set point of control instrumentation.
2. Check positions of hand valves, manual dampers, secondary air openings, and adjustable bypasses.
3. Check blowers, fans, compressors, and pumps for unusual bearing noise and shaft vibration; if V-belt driven, belt tension and belt fatigue should be checked.
4. Perform lubrication in accordance with manufacturer’s requirements.
B.4 Periodic Checklist.
The following maintenance checklist should be completed at intervals based on manufacturers’ recommendations and the
requirements of the process:

1. Inspect flame-sensing devices for condition, location, and cleanliness.
2. Inspect thermocouples and lead wire for shorts and loose connections. A regular replacement program should be established
   for all control and safety thermocouples. The effective life of thermocouples varies, depending on the environment and
temperature, so those factors should be considered in setting up a replacement schedule.
3. Check setting and operation of low and high temperature limit devices.
4. Test visual and audible alarm systems for proper signals.
5. Check igniters and verify proper gap.
6. Check all pressure switches for proper pressure settings.
7. Check control valves, dampers, and actuators for free, smooth action and adjustment.
8. Test the interlock sequence of all safety equipment. If possible, the interlocks should manually be made to fail, thus verifying
   that the related equipment operates as specified by the manufacturer.
9. Test the safety shutoff valves for operation and tightness of closure as specified by the manufacturer.
10. Test the main fuel manual valves for operation and tightness of closure as specified by the manufacturer.
11. Test the pressure switches for proper operation at set point.
12. Visually inspect electrical switches, contacts, and controls for signs of arcing or contamination.
14. Clean or replace the air blower filters.
15. Clean the water, fuel, gas compressor, and pump strainers.
16. Clean the fire-check screens and valve seats and test for freedom of valve movement.
17. Inspect burners and pilots for proper operation, air-to-fuel ratio, plugging, and deterioration. Burner refractory parts should be
   examined to ensure good condition.
18. Check all orifice plates, air–gas mixers, flow indicators, meters, gauges, and pressure indicators; if necessary, clean, repair, or
   replace them. Check calibrations as appropriate
19. Check the ignition cables and transformers.
20. Check the operation of modulating controls.
21. Check the integrity of and the interior of the equipment, ductwork, and ventilation systems for cleanliness and flow restrictions.
22. Test pressure relief valves; repair or replace them as necessary.
23. Inspect air, water, fuel, and impulse piping for leaks.
24. Inspect radiant tubes and heat exchanger tubes for leakage; repair them as necessary.
25. Lubricate the instrumentation, valve motors, valves, blowers, compressors, pumps, and other components.
26. Test and recalibrate instrumentation in accordance with manufacturers’ recommendations.
27. Test flame safeguard units. A complete shutdown and restart should be made to check the components for proper operation.
28. Check electric heating elements for contamination, distortion, cracked or broken refractory element supports, and proper
   position. Repair or replace elements if grounding or shorting could occur.
29. Check electric heating element terminals for tightness.
30. Perform required pressure vessel or pressure piping inspection and testing (e.g., in accordance with the requirements of the
   National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors).
31. If indications of overheating are observed, drain the fluid from the heater, perform an internal inspection to evaluate and
   eliminate the cause of the overheating, and assess the need for repair.
32. Consider nondestructive testing of wall thicknesses by eddy-current, ultrasonic, or other means.
33. Perform a fluid system leakage test by pressurizing the entire system to 1½ times working pressures or maximum pump
   pressure, whichever is lower, but do not exceed the pressure setting of the pressure relief valves.
Annex C  Steam Extinguishing Systems

This annex is not a part of the recommendations of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. This annex is extracted from NFPA 86, Standard for Ovens and Furnaces, Annex F.

C.1 General.

Steam extinguishes fire by excluding air or reducing the oxygen content of the atmosphere in a manner similar to that of carbon dioxide or other inert gases. The use of steam preceded other modern smothering systems. Steam is not a practical extinguishing agent except where a large steam supply is continuously available. The possible burn hazard should be considered in any steam extinguishing installation. A visible cloud of condensed vapor, popularly described as steam, is incapable of extinguishment. Although many fires have been extinguished by steam, its use often has been unsuccessful due to a lack of understanding of its limitations. Except for specialized applications, other types of smothering systems are preferred in modern practice. No complete standard covering steam smothering systems has yet been developed.

One pound of saturated steam at 212°F (100°C) and normal atmospheric pressure has a volume of 26.75 ft³ (0.76 m³). A larger percentage of steam is required to prevent combustion than in the case of other inert gases used for fire extinguishment. Fires in substances that form glowing coals are difficult to extinguish with steam, because of the lack of cooling effect. For some types of fire, such as fires involving ammonium nitrate and similar oxidizing materials, steam is completely ineffective.

Steam smothering systems should be permitted only where oven temperatures exceed 225°F (107°C) and where large supplies of steam are available at all times while the oven is in operation. A complete standard paralleling those for other extinguishing agents has not been developed for the use of steam as an extinguishing agent, and, until this is done, this form of protection is not as dependable as water, carbon dioxide, dry chemical, or foam extinguishing systems, nor are the results as certain. Release devices for steam smothering systems should be manual, and controls should be arranged to close down oven outlets to the extent practicable.

C.2 Life Hazard.

C.2.1 Equipment should be arranged to prevent the operating of steam valves when doors of box-type ovens or access doors or panels of conveyor ovens are open.

C.2.2 A separate outside steam manual shutoff valve should be provided for closing off the steam supply during oven cleaning. The valve should be locked closed whenever employees are in the oven.

C.2.3 The main valve should be designed to open slowly, because the release should first open a small bypass to allow time for employees in the vicinity to escape in an emergency and also to protect the piping from severe water hammer. A steam trap should be connected to the steam supply near the main valve to keep the line free of condensate.

C.3 Steam Outlets.

If steam is used, steam outlets should be sufficiently large to supply 8 lb/min (3.6 kg/min) of steam for each 100 ft³ (2.8 m³) of oven volume. They preferably should be located near the bottom of the oven, but if the oven is not over 20 ft (6.1 m) high, they might be located near the top, pointing downward. Steam jets should be directed at dip tanks (in a manner to avoid disturbing the liquid surface) or other areas of special hazard.
Annex D  Informational References

D.1  Referenced Publications.

The documents or portions thereof listed in this annex are referenced within the informational sections of this recommended practice and are not part of the recommendations of this document unless also listed in Chapter 2 for other reasons.

D.1.1  NFPA Publications.

National Fire Protection Association, 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471.


D.1.2  Other Publications.

D.1.2.1  ANSI Publications.

American National Standards Institute, Inc., 25 West 43rd Street, 4th Floor, New York, NY 10036.


D.1.2.2  ASME Publications.

American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Three Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5990.


ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,  ,

D.1.2.3  EN Publications.

European Committee for Standardization, 36, rue de Stassart, B-1050, Brussels, Belgium.


D.1.2.4  FM Publications.

FM Global, 1301 Atwood Avenue, P.O. Box 7500, Johnston, RI 02919.


D.1.2.5  IEC Publications.

International Electrical Commission, 3 rue de Varembé, P.O. Box 131, CH - 1211, Geneva 20, Switzerland.


D.1.2.6  NBBPVI Publications.

National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors, 1055 Crupper Avenue, Columbus, OH 43229.

D.1.2.7 NIOSH Publications.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Road, Atlanta, GA 3033.


D.1.2.8 UL Publications.
Underwriters Laboratories Inc., 333 Pfingsten Road, Northbrook, IL 60062-2096.

D.1.2.9 U.S. Government Publications.

D.2 Informational References.
The following documents or portions thereof are listed here as informational resources only. They are not a part of the recommendations of this document.

D.2.1 ABMA Publications.
American Boiler Manufacturers Association, 8221 Old Courthouse Road, Suite 207, Vienna, VA 22182.

D.2.2 ANSI Publications.
American National Standards Institute, Inc., 25 West 43rd Street, 4th Floor, New York, NY 10036.
ISA S77.41.01, Fossil Fuel Power Plant Boiler Combustion Controls, 2005.
ANSI/ISA S77.42.01, Fossil Fuel Plant Feedwater Control System — Drum Type, 2006.
ISA S77.44.01, Fossil Fuel Plant — Steam Temperature Controls, 2007.

D.2.3 API Publications.
American Petroleum Institute, 1220 L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005.
API STD 650, Welded Tanks for Oil Storage, 2009.
API STD 653, Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration and Reconstruction, 2009.
API RP 500, Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installation at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Division 1 and Division 2, 1998 (reaffirmed 2002).

D.2.4 ASME Publications.
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Three Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5990.

D.2.5 ASTM Publications.
ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, P.O. Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959.

D.2.6 Other Publications.
The following documents provide additional information about heat recovery steam generators (HSRGs).

D.3 References for Extracts in Informational Sections.
Revise new definition created at the ROP to match an existing definition from the NFPA Glossary of Terms and add extract citation:

**3.3.20 Manufacturer.**
The entity that directs and controls any of the following: compliant product design, compliant product manufacturing, or compliant product quality assurance; or the entity that assumes the liability for the compliant product or provides the warranty for the compliant product.

**Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Comment**

As a representative of the GOT Committee, I can report that the GOT committee would like to see modification of this definition. The GOT Committee's work has been to create general and consistent definitions of the same term throughout the NFPA system of documents. At present there are 20 definitions for the word, "Manufacturer" in the glossary of terms. I have proposed a change that will make this definition match the one most commonly used in NFPA documents, currently used in 9 documents: 1851, 1852, 1971, 1975, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984. Keeping the definition as is adds another completely unique one and that would be going in the wrong direction for the Glossary of Terms, as recommended by the NFPA Standards Council. GOT recommends that NFPA 87 "extract" its definition from an existing document.

**Submitter Information Verification**

Submitter Full Name: Susan Desrocher
Organization: [ Not Specified ]
Affiliation: Glossary of Terms Committee
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Sun Apr 21 11:55:47 EDT 2013

**Committee Statement**

Committee Action: Rejected
Resolution: The proposed revision to the definition contains a requirement in the form of the word "compliant" that has been added; use of requirements within definitions is not permitted by the NFPA Manual of Style.

**Copyright Assignment**

I, Susan Desrocher, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I affirm that I am Susan Desrocher, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature.
Public Comment No. 2-NFPA 87-2013 [Section No. 6.2.7.7.1]

6.2.7.7.1

Vents from systems operating at different pressure levels regulators should not be manifolded together.

Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Comment

The language 'at different pressure levels' can not be consistently enforced without knowing if 0.1"wc, 1"wc or 10"wc is considered different. By changing the wording to 'different pressure regulators', then there is a clear distinction and the format mirrors the following 6.2.7.7.2, which states 'different pressure-reducing stations'.

NOTE: if the committee decides that pressure-reducing stations implies pressure regulators, then 6.2.7.7.1 should be deleted.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: Dan Curry
Organization: Eclipse, Inc.
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Tue Apr 30 00:16:10 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action: Rejected but see related SR
Resolution: SR-1-NFPA 87-2013 accomplishes the intent of the submitter for PC No. 2.
Statement: The Committee agrees with the substantiation provided by the submitter of Public Comment No. 2; the language 'at different pressure levels' can not be consistently enforced without knowing if 0.1"wc, 1"wc or 10"wc is considered different. The Committee modified the First Draft wording by inserting the word "control" so it is now "...operating at different pressure control levels..." and this wording addresses the intent of the submitter for PC No. 2.

Copyright Assignment

I, Dan Curry, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I affirm that I am Dan Curry, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature.
### Public Comment No. 3-NFPA 87-2013 [ Section No. 6.2.8.4 ]

<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Token relief valves and internal token relief valves should not be permitted to be used as the only overpressure prevention device.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Comment

Add the word 'only' so that a device with token relief can be combined when used with other approved OPDs, such as a monitoring regulator system.

### Submitter Information Verification

- **Submitter Full Name:** Dan Curry
- **Organization:** Eclipse, Inc.
- **Street Address:**
- **City:**
- **State:**
- **Zip:**
- **Submittal Date:** Tue Apr 30 00:21:25 EDT 2013

### Committee Statement

- **Committee Action:** Rejected but see related SR
- **Resolution:** SR-5-NFPA 87-2013. The Committee accepted the addition of "the only" as proposed in PC No. 3, but made a correction for the term OPD.
- **Statement:** Add the word 'only' so that a device with token relief can be combined when used with other approved OPDs, such as a monitoring regulator system. Also change the word "prevention" to "protection" for the correct meaning of OPD.

### Copyright Assignment

I, Dan Curry, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

I, by checking this box, affirm that I am Dan Curry, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature.
Title of New Content

Add Annex:

Safety-related software should meet all of the following:

1. The BMS logic, memory, and I/O should be independent from non-safety logic and memory
2. The BMS logic, memory, and I/O should be protected from alteration by non-BMS logic or memory access
3. The BMS logic, memory, and I/O should be protected from alteration by unauthorized users

Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Comment

Add Annex material to identify objectives of software separation.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: Ted Jablikowski
Organization: Fives North American Combustion
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Wed May 01 11:08:31 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action: Rejected
Resolution: The proposed change is covered elsewhere in the standard, in paragraphs 8.4.4.1 and 8.4.4.2.

Copyright Assignment

I, Ted Jablikowski, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

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Public Comment No. 4-NFPA 87-2013 [ Section No. 8.4.2 ]

8.4.2
For PLCs that are not listed for combustion safeguards, the PLC and its associated I/O used to perform safety functions should be certified to IEC 61508 for use in safety applications with a safety integrity level of 3 or greater and should be applied per the manufacturer’s safety manual to meet a SIL-2 capable controller.

Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Comment

Adds clarity to requirements and proposed a change to SIL 2 which is consistent with "hardwired" requirements which include comparable SIL 0, 1 and 2 requirements. A SIL 2 capable processor is capable of the secure separation of the BMS safety logic from the process logic. SIL 3 requires redundancy which has not been addressed elsewhere in the Recommended Practice.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: Ted Jablkowski
Organization: Fives North American Combustion
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Wed May 01 11:04:43 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action: Rejected
Resolution: SIL 3 was chosen because SIL 3 equipment inherently provides the separation and locking of the safety functions from other functions. The list of struck items from 8.4.2.5 in the 2011 edition of NFPA 87 are standard functions of SIL 3 PLCs. In addition, the items deleted by action on FR No. 49 might need to be revisited if the modification from SIL 3 to SIL 2 as proposed was accepted.

Copyright Assignment

I, Ted Jablkowski, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

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When a combustion air blower or exhaust blower is provided, a timed pre-ignition purge should be provided that incorporates all of the following:

1. At least 4 standard cubic feet (scf) volumes of fresh air or inert gas per cubic foot (4 m³/m³) of system volume is gas, introduced during the purging cycle.
2. The system volume includes the combustion chambers and all other passages that handle the recirculation and exhaust of products of combustion to the stack inlet.
3. All passages from the air inlet to the heater to the stack inlet should be purged.
4. To begin the timed pre-ignition purge interval, all of the following conditions are satisfied:
   a. The minimum required pre-ignition purge airflow is proved.
   b. Fluid heaters with total pilot capacity over 400,000 Btu/hr should have at least one safety shutoff valve required by 8.7.2.2 proved closed between all pilot burners and the fuel supply.
   c. Fluid heaters with total capacity over 400,000 Btu/hr should have at least one safety shutoff valve proved closed between all main burners and the fuel supply.
5. The minimum required pre-ignition purge airflow is proved and maintained throughout the timed pre-ignition purge interval.
6. Failure to maintain the minimum required pre-ignition purge airflow stops the pre-ignition purge and resets the purge timer.

Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Comment

The present requirement includes a contradiction in that the requirement for 4 scf (standard cubic foot) is not on the same basis as (4 m³/m³). The purge requirement should be based on actual volume, not corrected for Standard or Normal conditions.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: Ted Jablowski
Organization: Fives North American Combustion
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Wed May 01 11:14:22 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action: Rejected but see related SR
Resolution: SR-3-NFPA 87-2013. This accomplishes the intent of the submitter with a slight modification to the wording for clarification purposes.
Statement: The present requirement includes a contradiction in that the requirement for 4 scf (standard cubic foot) is not on the same basis as (4 m³/m³). The purge requirement should be based on actual volume, not corrected for Standard or Normal conditions. The Committee accepted the intent of this proposed revision in PC No. 7 with the addition of "system volumes" in SR No. 3.
Copyright Assignment

I, Ted Jablowski, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

☐ By checking this box I affirm that I am Ted Jablowski, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature.
Combustion air minimum pressure or flow should be interlocked into Burner Management System.

Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Comment

Change "combustion safety circuitry" to "Burner Management System". Burner Management System was defined in the FR.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: Ted Jablkowski
Organization: Fives North American Combustion
Street Address: 
City: 
State: 
Zip: 
Submittal Date: Wed May 01 11:12:47 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action: Rejected
Resolution: Accepting this revision would not be consistent with the definition for Burner Management System (BMS) because the pressure or flow interlock is included in the BMS. See also SR No. 22 which adds an annex to the definition for BMS (A.3.3.4) to clarify the relationship between Combustion Safety Circuitry, Combustion Safeguard, and Safety Shut-off Valve, and BMS.

Copyright Assignment

I, Ted Jablkowski, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I affirm that I am Ted Jablkowski, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature.
2.4 References for Extracts in Recommendation Sections.


Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: Guy Colonna
Organization: National Fire Protection Assoc
Street Address: 
City: 
State: 
Zip: 
Submittal Date: Wed Oct 30 12:08:17 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: Editorial corrections of extract source document edition dates to update to most current.
Response Message:

Ballot Results

✔ This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
20 Affirmative All
  0 Affirmative with Comments
  0 Negative with Comments
  0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraft, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
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<tr>
<td>Dauer, John</td>
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<td>Gaither, Joel D.</td>
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<td>Hudson, James G. (Jay)</td>
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<td>Jablowski, Ted</td>
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<td>Kane, John F.</td>
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<td>Macaulay, Charles S.</td>
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<td>Mickelson, Bruce L.</td>
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<td>Oetinger, James</td>
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<td>Polagye, Michael C.</td>
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<td>Santos, Adriano</td>
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<td>Stanley, John J.</td>
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<td>Switzer, Jr., Franklin R.</td>
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<td>Underys, Algirdas</td>
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<td>Wadkinson, Melissa M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wechsler, Tom</td>
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<tr>
<td>Willse, Peter J.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3.3.4* Burner Management System.
The field devices, logic system, and final control elements dedicated to combustion safety and operator assistance in the starting and stopping of fuel preparation and burning equipment and for preventing misoperation of and damage to fuel preparation and burning equipment.

Supplemental Information

<table>
<thead>
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<th>File Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: [Not Specified]
Organization: [Not Specified]
Street Address: [Not Specified]
City: [Not Specified]
State: [Not Specified]
Zip: [Not Specified]
Submittal Date: Mon Oct 14 16:32:20 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: Add annex to 3.3.4 Burner Management System definition to explain the elements of the BMS.

Ballot Results

☑ This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
20 Affirmative All
0 Affirmative with Comments
0 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraaff, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Second Revision No. 1-NFPA 87-2013 [Section No. 6.2.7.7.1]

6.2.7.7.1
Vents from systems operating at different pressure control levels should not be manifolded together.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: [Not Specified]
Organization: [Not Specified]
Street Address: [Not Specified]
City: [Not Specified]
State: [Not Specified]
Zip: [Not Specified]
Submittal Date: Tue Oct 01 11:53:11 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: The Committee agrees with the substantiation provided by the submitter of Public Comment No. 2; the language 'at different pressure levels' can not be consistently enforced without knowing if 0.1"wc, 1"wc or 10"wc is considered different. The Committee modified the First Draft wording by inserting the word "control" so it is now "...operating at different pressure control levels..." and this wording addresses the intent of the submitter for PC No. 2.

Response Message:
Public Comment No. 2-NFPA 87-2013 [Section No. 6.2.7.7.1]

Ballot Results

✓ This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
19 Affirmative All
0 Affirmative with Comments
1 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraff, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
Hudson, James G. (Jay)
Jablkowski, Ted
Kane, John F.
Macaulay, Charles S.
Martin, Richard J.
Mickelson, Bruce L.
Oetinger, James
Polagye, Michael C.
Santos, Adriano
Stanley, John J.
Switzer, Jr., Franklin R.
Underys, Algirdas
Wadkinson, Melissa M.
Willse, Peter J.

Negative with Comment
Wechsler, Tom
No technical reason for this
6.2.7.7.2

Vents from systems served from different pressure reducing stations should not be manifolded together.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: [ Not Specified ]
Organization: [ Not Specified ]
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Mon Oct 14 16:26:26 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement:
With the edits to 6.2.7.7.1 in SR No. 1, paragraph 6.2.7.7.2 is no longer necessary. Delete this paragraph and renumber existing 6.2.7.7.3.

Response Message:

Ballot Results

☑ This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
20 Affirmative All
0 Affirmative with Comments
0 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraft, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
Hudson, James G. (Jay)
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<td>Stanley, John J.</td>
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6.2.8.4
Token relief valves and internal token relief valves should not be permitted to be used as the only overpressure protection device.

Submitter Information Verification
Submitter Full Name: [Not Specified]
Organization: [Not Specified]
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Tue Oct 08 12:36:02 EDT 2013

Committee Statement
Committee Statement: Add the word 'only' so that a device with token relief can be combined when used with other approved OPDs, such as a monitoring regulator system. Also change the word "prevention" to "protection" for the correct meaning of OPD.

Response Message:
Public Comment No. 3-NFPA 87-2013 [Section No. 6.2.8.4]

Ballot Results
This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
20 Affirmative All
0 Affirmative with Comments
0 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraff, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
Hudson, James G. (Jay)
Jabikowski, Ted
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<td>Willse, Peter J.</td>
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</table>
When a combustion air blower or exhaust blower is provided, a timed pre-ignition purge should be provided that incorporates all of the following:

1. At least 4 standard cubic feet (scf) or four system volumes of fresh air or inert gas per cubic foot (4 m³/m³) of system volume is introduced during the purging cycle.

2. The system volume includes the combustion chambers and all other passages that handle the recirculation and exhaust of products of combustion to the stack inlet.

3. All passages from the air inlet to the heater to the stack inlet should be purged.

4. To begin the timed pre-ignition purge interval, all of the following conditions are satisfied:
   a. The minimum required pre-ignition purge airflow is proved.
   b. Fluid heaters with total pilot capacity over 400,000 Btu/hr should have at least one safety shutoff valve required by 8.7.2.2 proved closed between all pilot burners and the fuel supply.
   c. Fluid heaters with total capacity over 400,000 Btu/hr should have at least one safety shutoff valve proved closed between all main burners and the fuel supply.

5. The minimum required pre-ignition purge airflow is proved and maintained throughout the timed pre-ignition purge interval.

6. Failure to maintain the minimum required pre-ignition purge airflow stops the pre-ignition purge and resets the purge timer.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: [Not Specified]
Organization: [Not Specified]
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Tue Oct 01 14:01:47 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: The present requirement includes a contradiction in that the requirement for 4 scf (standard cubic foot) is not on the same basis as (4 m³/m³). The purge requirement should be based on actual volume, not corrected for Standard or Normal conditions. The Committee accepted the intent of this proposed revision in PC No. 7 with the addition of "system volumes" in SR No. 3.

Response Message:

Public Comment No. 7-NFPA 87-2013 [Section No. 8.5.1.1 [Excluding any Sub-Sections]]

Ballot Results

✔ This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
20 Affirmative All
  0 Affirmative with Comments
  0 Negative with Comments
  0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraff, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
Hudson, James G. (Jay)
Jablkowski, Ted
Kane, John F.
Macaulay, Charles S.
Martin, Richard J.
Mickelson, Bruce L.
Oetinger, James
Polagye, Michael C.
Santos, Adriano
Stanley, John J.
Switzer, Jr., Franklin R.
Underys, Algirdas
Wadkinson, Melissa M.
Wechsler, Tom
Willse, Peter J.
9.2.2* Effluent Handling.
   All effluent from all pressure relief devices, vents, and drains should be directed to an approved location.

9.2.2.1 Gaseous Effluent.

9.2.2.1.1 Gaseous effluents that are asphyxiants, toxic, or corrosive are outside the scope of this recommended practice, and other standards should be consulted for appropriate venting.

9.2.2.1.2 Flammable gases and oxidizers should be vented to an approved location to prevent fire or explosion hazards.

9.2.2.1.3 When gaseous effluents are vented, the vent pipe should be located in accordance with the following:
   (1) Gaseous effluents should not impinge on equipment, support, building, windows, or materials because the gas could ignite and create a fire hazard.
   (2) Gaseous effluents should not impinge on personnel at work in the area or in the vicinity of the exit of the vent pipe because the gas could ignite and create a fire hazard.
   (3) Gaseous effluents should not be vented in the vicinity of air intakes, compressor inlets, or other devices that utilize ambient air.

9.2.2.1.4 The vent exit should be designed in accordance with the following:
   (1) The pipe exit should not be subject to physical damage or foreign matter that could block the exit.
   (2) The vent pipe should be sized to minimize the pressure drop associated with length, fitting, and elbows at the maximum vent flow rate.
   (3) The vent piping should not have any shutoff valves in the line.

9.2.2.1.5 If the gas is to be vented inside the building, the following additional guidance is offered:
   (1) If the gaseous effluents are flammable and lighter than air, the flammable gases should be vented to a location where the gas is diluted below its LFL before coming in contact with sources of ignition.
   (2) The gaseous effluents should not re-enter the work area without extreme dilution.

9.2.2.2 Liquid Phase Effluent.

9.2.2.2.1 Liquid phase effluent should be directed to a containment vessel where the fluid may be reused or discarded.

9.2.2.2 The effluent containment vessel should have a vent to atmosphere, with the vent outlet directed at an approved location.

9.2.2.2.1 If the containment vessel vent has the potential to vent gaseous effluents, the requirements of 9.2.2.1 should apply.

9.2.2.2.2 The vent from the effluent containment vessel should be adequately sized to handle 150 percent of the maximum anticipated flow.

9.2.2.2.3 The effluent containment vessel’s inlets should be located to prevent siphoning of the contents back into the system.
9.2.2.4 Means for indicating liquid level should be provided on the effluent containment vessel.

9.2.2.5* The effluent containment vessel should be designed for the intended service.

**Submitter Information Verification**

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<td>Submittal Date</td>
<td>Tue Oct 08 14:25:26 EDT 2013</td>
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</table>

**Committee Statement**

Committee Statement: This is an editorial change; the modified text clarifies this annex item. This revision also makes the annex material consistent between Chapters 9, 10, and 11.

**Ballot Results**

- **This item has passed ballot**
  - 24 Eligible Voters
  - 4 Not Returned
  - 20 Affirmative All
    - 0 Affirmative with Comments
    - 0 Negative with Comments
    - 0 Abstention

- **Not Returned**
  - Pendergraff, John
  - Ray, Kevin W.
  - Tanguay, Francois
  - Venizelos, Demetris T.

- **Affirmative All**
  - Andress, Gary S.
  - Christiansen, Erik W.
  - Curry, Dan
  - Dauer, John
  - Gaither, Joel D.
  - Hudson, James G. (Jay)
  - Jablowski, Ted
  - Kane, John F.
  - Macaulay, Charles S.
  - Martin, Richard J.
  - Mickelson, Bruce L.
  - Oetinger, James
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<td>Willse, Peter J.</td>
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</table>
9.2.4.4*
The expansion tank should be equipped with a low-level interlock.

9.2.4.4.1
The low-level switch should be satisfied before the pumps and the heater can be started.

9.2.4.4.2
The low-level interlock should be interlocked to shut down the pump and heater if a low level occurs.

9.2.4.4.2.1
In situations where maintaining flow is required to protect the heater due to residual heat, an emergency pump should be used to circulate fluid through an emergency cooling system.

9.2.4.4.3
Indication of low-level interlock activation should be provided.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: [ Not Specified ]
Organization: [ Not Specified ]
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Tue Oct 08 14:30:24 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: This is an editorial change; the modified text clarifies this annex item. This revision also makes the annex material consistent between Chapters 9, 10, and 11.

Response Message:

Ballot Results

This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
20 Affirmative All
0 Affirmative with Comments
0 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraff, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.
Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
Hudson, James G. (Jay)
Jablkowski, Ted
Kane, John F.
Macaulay, Charles S.
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Mickelson, Bruce L.
Oetinger, James
Polagye, Michael C.
Santos, Adriano
Stanley, John J.
Switzer, Jr., Franklin R.
Underys, Algirdas
Wadkinson, Melissa M.
Wechsler, Tom
Willse, Peter J.
Second Revision No. 14-NFPA 87-2013 [ Section No. 9.2.4.6 ]

9.2.4.6
An expansion tank vent or an expansion tank pressure relief device should be provided, and the effluent should be directed to an approved location, in accordance with 9.2.2.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: [ Not Specified ]
Organization: [ Not Specified ]
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Tue Oct 08 14:33:50 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: This is an editorial change; the modified text clarifies this annex item. This revision also makes the annex material consistent between Chapters 9, 10, and 11.
Response Message:

Ballot Results

✓ This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
20 Affirmative All
0 Affirmative with Comments
0 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergrass, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
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9.2.4.7
Local or remote indication of expansion tank level should be provided.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: [ Not Specified ]
Organization: [ Not Specified ]
Street Address: [ Not Specified ]
City: [ Not Specified ]
State: [ Not Specified ]
Zip: [ Not Specified ]
Submittal Date: Tue Oct 08 14:35:45 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: This is an editorial change; the modified text clarifies this annex item. This revision also makes the annex material consistent between Chapters 9, 10, and 11.

Response Message:

Ballot Results

✔ This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
20 Affirmative All
0 Affirmative with Comments
0 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraff, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
Hudson, James G. (Jay)
Jablkowski, Ted
Kane, John F.
Macaulay, Charles S.
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9.2.4.8*
An expansion tank pressurized with an inert gas should be used if any of the following conditions exist:

1. The tank is not the highest point in the system.
2. The tank contents can be at a temperature such that exposure of the fluid to air would cause degradation of the fluid.
3. The fluid manufacturer recommends use of an inert blanket.
4. The fluid is operated at or above its atmospheric boiling point.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: [ Not Specified ]
Organization: [ Not Specified ]
Street Address: [ Not Specified ]
City: [ Not Specified ]
State: [ Not Specified ]
Zip: [ Not Specified ]
Submittal Date: Tue Oct 08 14:37:41 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: This is an editorial change; the modified text clarifies this annex item. This revision also makes the annex material consistent between Chapters 9, 10, and 11.

Response Message:

Ballot Results

This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
20 Affirmative All
0 Affirmative with Comments
0 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraaff, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
Hudson, James G. (Jay)
Jablkowski, Ted
Kane, John F.
Macaulay, Charles S.
Martin, Richard J.
Mickelson, Bruce L.
Oettinger, James
Polagye, Michael C.
Santos, Adriano
Stanley, John J.
Switzer, Jr., Franklin R.
Underys, Algirdas
Wadkinson, Melissa M.
Wechsler, Tom
Willse, Peter J.
Second Revision No. 20-NFPA 87-2013 [ Section No. A.8.4 ]

A.8.4
One PLC approach to combustion interlocks on multiburner heating systems is as follows:

1. Interlocks relating to purge are done via the PLC.
2. Purge timer is implemented in the PLC.
3. Interlocks relating to combustion air and gas pressure are done via the PLC.
4. Gas valves for pilot and burner directly connected to combustion safeguard should conform to the recommendations of 8.7.2.
5. Operation of pilot and burner gas valves should be confirmed by the PLC.
6. A PLC can be set up as intermittent, interrupted, or constant pilot operation. With appropriate flame safeguard, it would be possible to provide an interrupted pilot with one flame sensor and one flame safeguard.

This recommended practice suggests that the signal from the safety device be directly transmitted to the safety PLC input. Once the safety PLC processes the signal, the resulting data can be used for any purpose.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: [ Not Specified ]
Organization: [ Not Specified ]
Street Address: [ Not Specified ]
City: [ Not Specified ]
State: [ Not Specified ]
Zip: [ Not Specified ]
Submittal Date: Tue Oct 08 14:55:26 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: The additional text has been moved from A.8.4.1 as it is more related to this existing annex text.
Response Message:

Ballot Results

This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
19 Affirmative All
0 Affirmative with Comments
1 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraff, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

**Affirmative All**
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
Hudson, James G. (Jay)
Jablkowski, Ted
Kane, John F.
Macaulay, Charles S.
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Mickelson, Bruce L.
Polagye, Michael C.
Santos, Adriano
Stanley, John J.
Switzer, Jr., Franklin R.
Underys, Algirdas
Wadkinson, Melissa M.
Wechsler, Tom
Willse, Peter J.

**Negative with Comment**
Oetinger, James

Unless its a fire tube heater which is not an optimum design there are no multi-burner fluid heaters.
This recommended practice suggests that the signal from the safety device be directly transmitted to the safety PLC input. Once the safety PLC processes the signal, the resulting data can be used for any purpose.

Committee Statement:

The annex is being moved to the end of A.8.4 as it is more appropriately linked with this section.

Ballot Results:

✅ This item has passed ballot

- 24 Eligible Voters
- 4 Not Returned
- 20 Affirmative All
- 0 Affirmative with Comments
- 0 Negative with Comments
- 0 Abstention

Not Returned:
Pendergraff, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All:
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
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Second Revision No. 6-NFPA 87-2013 [ Section No. A.9.2.1.2 ]

A.9.2.1.2
The fluid manufacturer and the heater manufacturer the person or company responsible for the design or supply of the fluid heater should be consulted to provide recommendations on the appropriate pump for the application.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: [ Not Specified ]
Organization: [ Not Specified ]
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Tue Oct 08 13:17:50 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: This is an editorial change; the deleted text does not belong in this annex item. This revision also makes the annex material consistent between Chapters 9, 10, and 11.
Response Message:

Ballot Results

✔ This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
19 Affirmative All
1 Affirmative with Comments
0 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraff, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
Hudson, James G. (Jay)
Jablkowski, Ted
Kane, John F.
Macaulay, Charles S.
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Mickelson, Bruce L.
Polagye, Michael C.
Santos, Adriano
Stanley, John J.
Switzer, Jr., Franklin R.
Underys, Algirdas
Wadkinson, Melissa M.
Wechsler, Tom
Willse, Peter J.

**Affirmative with Comment**
Oetinger, James
Agreed
A.9.2.4.3
The operating temperature, the expansion coefficient of the fluid, and the system volume are used to calculate the volume of the expansion tank. Some vapor space should remain in the tank when the system is at operating temperature. If the tank operates at atmospheric pressure and is located outdoors, an inert gas blanket should be considered to minimize moisture ingress into the system. For very large systems, where expansion tanks are elevated and working volume exceeds 1000 gallons gal (3785 L), a secondary, ground-level catch/storage tank and refill pumps can be used to take up excess expansion volume.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: [ Not Specified ]
Organization: [ Not Specified ]
Street Address: [ Not Specified ]
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Tue Oct 08 13:22:38 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: This is an editorial change; the added text clarifies this annex item. This revision also makes the annex material consistent between Chapters 9, 10, and 11.

Response Message:

Ballot Results

This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
19 Affirmative All
1 Affirmative with Comments
0 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraft, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
Hudson, James G. (Jay)
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Mickelson, Bruce L.
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Santos, Adriano
Stanley, John J.
Switzer, Jr., Franklin R.
Underys, Algirdas
Wadkinson, Melissa M.
Wechsler, Tom
Willse, Peter J.

Affirmative with Comment
Oetinger, James

Only glycol based thermal fluids will absorb water. Non-glycol fluid will condense water vapor if the fluid temperature is below the atmospheric dew point. Which is not likely if the system is operating.
A.9.2.4.8
Nitrogen is typically used as the inert blanket. Other gases, such as carbon dioxide, can be used. In the oil and gas industry, it is common to use flammable gases. If flammable gases are used, other precautions should be considered, such as area classification and explosion-proof electrical devices can be required.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: [ Not Specified ]
Organization: [ Not Specified ]
Street Address: 
City: 
State: 
Zip: 
Submittal Date: Tue Oct 08 13:25:46 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: This is an editorial change; the reworded text clarifies this annex item. This revision also makes the annex material consistent between Chapters 9, 10, and 11. The deletion of the reference to area classification is included in this revision as area classification is already covered within the document.

Response Message:

Ballot Results

This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
19 Affirmative All
1 Affirmative with Comments
0 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraff, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
Hudson, James G. (Jay)
Jablkowski, Ted
Kane, John F.
Macaulay, Charles S.
Martin, Richard J.
Mickelson, Bruce L.
Polagye, Michael C.
Santos, Adriano
Stanley, John J.
Switzer, Jr., Franklin R.
Underys, Algirdas
Wadkinson, Melissa M.
Wechsler, Tom
Willse, Peter J.

**Affirmative with Comment**
Oetinger, James

Flammable gases are soluble in mineral oil based fluids.
A.9.2.4.9
Consideration should be given to pressure surges that can occur during process upsets that can expose the expansion tank to pressures greater than 15 psi (100 kPa). An example of a common process upset is the rapid pressure rise due to water flashing to steam. For this reason, many users specify expansion tanks that meet the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII Division 1.

Submitter Information Verification
Submitter Full Name: [Not Specified]
Organization: [Not Specified]
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Tue Oct 08 13:27:53 EDT 2013

Committee Statement
Committee Statement: This is an editorial change; the revised text clarifies this annex item. This revision also makes the annex material consistent between Chapters 9, 10, and 11.

Ballot Results
This item has passed ballot
24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
20 Affirmative All
0 Affirmative with Comments
0 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraff, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
Hudson, James G. (Jay)
Jablonski, Ted
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kane, John F.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macaulay, Charles S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Martin, Richard J.</td>
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<td>Mickelson, Bruce L.</td>
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<td>Oetinger, James</td>
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<td>Polagye, Michael C.</td>
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<td>Wadkinson, Melissa M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wechsler, Tom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willse, Peter J.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A.9.2.4.10
A blanket gas low-pressure interlock should be considered where low blanket gas pressure *could* create a fluid heater system hazard.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: [ Not Specified ]
Organization: [ Not Specified ]
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Tue Oct 08 13:29:24 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: This is an editorial change; the reworded text clarifies this annex item. This revision also makes the annex material consistent between Chapters 9, 10, and 11.

Response Message:

Ballot Results

☑️ This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
19 Affirmative All
1 Affirmative with Comments
0 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

Not Returned
Pendergraff, John
Ray, Kevin W.
Tanguay, Francois
Venizelos, Demetris T.

Affirmative All
Andress, Gary S.
Christiansen, Erik W.
Curry, Dan
Dauer, John
Gaither, Joel D.
Hudson, James G. (Jay)
Jabikowski, Ted
Kane, John F.
Macaulay, Charles S.
Martin, Richard J.
Mickelson, Bruce L.
Polagye, Michael C.
Santos, Adriano
Stanley, John J.
Switzer, Jr., Franklin R.
Underys, Algirdas
Wadkinson, Melissa M.
Wechsler, Tom
Willse, Peter J.

**Affirmative with Comment**

Oetinger, James
agreed
The required minimum fluid flow rate is based on design requirements. Detecting only flow/no flow conditions is not adequate. A pressure switch at the pump discharge and a pump rotation switch are examples of proving devices that are not recommended to prove minimum flow as because unexpected blockages in the heater tubes will not be detected by these devices.

Orifice plate(s) located at the outlet of a fluid heater and used with differential pressure interlock(s) are a reliable way of proving the minimum flow. If pressure drop across the heater is used, additional interlocks and precautions should be considered.
Affirmative with Comment

Oetinger, James

Pressure drop across the heater is proven method for low flow protection. It has been used in many installations.
Nitrogen is typically used as the inert blanket. Other gases, such as carbon dioxide, can be used. In the oil and gas industry, it is common to use flammable gases. If flammable gases are used, other precautions can be required, such as area classification and explosion-proof electrical devices.
Macaulay, Charles S.
Martin, Richard J.
Mickelson, Bruce L.
Polagye, Michael C.
Santos, Adriano
Stanley, John J.
Switzer, Jr., Franklin R.
Underys, Algirdas
Wadkinson, Melissa M.
Wechsler, Tom
Willse, Peter J.

Affirmative with Comment
Oetinger, James
see comment under SR-8
Nitrogen is typically used as the inert blanket. Other gases, such as carbon dioxide, may be used. In the oil and gas industry, it is common to use flammable gases. If using flammable gases, other precautions can be required, such as area classification and explosion-proof electrical devices.
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Switzer, Jr., Franklin R.
Underys, Algirdas
Wadkinson, Melissa M.
Wechsler, Tom
Willse, Peter J.

**Affirmative with Comment**
Oetinger, James
see comment under SR-8
D.3 References for Extracts in Informational Sections.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: Guy Colonna
Organization: National Fire Protection Assoc
Street Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Submittal Date: Wed Oct 30 12:10:57 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: Editorial corrections of extract source document edition dates to update to most current.
Response Message:

Ballot Results

This item has passed ballot

24 Eligible Voters
4 Not Returned
20 Affirmative All
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0 Negative with Comments
0 Abstention

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| Santos, Adriano         |
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| Switzer, Jr., Franklin R. |
| Underys, Algirdas      |
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| Willse, Peter J.        |